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Abstract 
In the region of drought-dominated inland eastern Australia now known as the Murray-
Darling Basin, floods occupy a special status. Although relatively infrequent, they are 
crucial sources of water for people, animals, and plants. They drive hydrology in the 
region, supplying most of the surface and ground water. Floods are often transformative 
events for people as well as the non-human environment. This thesis explores Australian 
settlers' changing relationships with, and understandings of, the rivers and floodplains of 
the Murray and Darling river systems from 1850 to the present. It analyses floods in terms 
of the two dominant roles that they have played in settler history in the Murray and 
Darling river systems: as 'natural disasters' and as part of the wider hydrology of rivers. 
Four key flood events are closely examined. The selected flood episodes - 1852, 1890, 
1956, and 1990 - . illuminate changing ways of knowing and managing rivers, floods, and 
floodplains over a century and a half, and some of the long-term consequences for people, 
rivers, and ecologies. Analysis is also anchored in an examination of a number of themes: 
regional tension with centralised governments over decision-making processes; the 
particular forms of river management that centralised government enables (such as large-
scale riverine engineering); different kinds of knowledge of the rivers, especially regional 
(or local) knowledge, scientific knowledge, and government (and managerial) knowledge; 
tensions and cooperation between the custodians of these different kinds of 
understanding; and the emergence of the Murray-Darling Basin as a managerial unit. The 
thesis aims to present a 'floods-eye-view' of the history of the area (and, partly, of 
Australia) and explore the ways that settlers, the rivers, and the floods have re-made each 
other. 
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Conversions 
This thesis uses the measurements quoted in primary sources, except where conversions 
to contemporary (metric) units have been necessary for comparison or clarity. 
Conversions are provided below. 
Imperial to metric: 
1 acre = 0.405 hectares 
1 inch= 25.4 millimetres 
1 foot = 30.5 centimetres 
1 yard= 0.914 metres 
1 mile = 1.61 kilometres 
1 pound = 0.45 kilograms 
1 acre foot = 0.123 hectare metres 
(Acre feet and hectare metres are units of volume, i.e. acre= area, feet= depth). 
Other measurements: 
1 cusec = 28.35 litres per second 
1 megalitre = 1,000,000 litres 
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Introduction 
In 2008 the Macquarie River made headlines around Australia. Newspapers reported that 
floodwater was being 'stolen'. Scientists had released a study claiming that irrigators had 
built unapproved earth embankments along the river. The embankments, the scientists 
maintained, would illegally divert flood flows to drought-stricken farms. The scientists 
argued that 'harvesting' floodwater in this unmonitored way could damage the 
internationally recognised Macquarie Marshes wetlands down river. The ecology of the 
wetlands is dependent on sizable flood flows; thousands of birds flock to the marshes to 
breed during flood events. Graziers also relied on floods to rejuvenate pastures and 
replenish water supplies in the lower Macquarie. Journalists reported that irrigators were 
stealing environmental flows intended for the marshes, and had done so for years without 
prosecution. A spokesman for irrigators in the area claimed that they were being 
victimised by government, graziers, and environmentalists. 1 These newspaper reports 
about this region, located on the eastern edge of the Darling river system in New South 
Wales, came in the wake of national discussions about environmental degradation along 
the iconic Murray River as Australians reassessed, and sought to reform, their 
relationships with rivers. 
1 See, Daniel Lewis and Marian Wilkinson, 'River rescue under threat', Sydney Morning Herald, 25 February 
2008, http://www.smh.eom.au/ news/environment/river-rescue-under-
threat/2008/02/24/1203788147679.html, accessed 15 March 2008; Sarah Clarke, 'Water theft along the 
Murray: report', AM: Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) [Radio] Broadcasting, 25 February 2008, 
http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2008/s2 l 71213.htm, accessed 15 March 2008; 'Flood plain 
development 'stealing water", The West Australian, 25 February 2008, 
http://www.thewest.eom.au/aapstory.aspx?StoryName=462391, accessed 15 March 2008; and, Daniel 
lewis and Marian Wilkinson, "Water-theft' threatens Murray-Darling', The land, 25 February 2008, 
http://theland.farmonline.corn.au/news/nationalrural/all'ribusiness-and-general/general/water-theft-
threatens-murraydarlinll'/57356.aspx, accessed 15 March 2008. 
A year later, in another part of the Darling river system, floods again made 
headlines; but for a different reason. The town of Bourke, located on the upper reaches 
of the Darling River in New South Wales, flooded. The flood caused $6 million worth of 
damage to property and infrastructure in the town. The state government declared 
Bourke a 'natural disaster zone' and the Federal government initiated financial assistance 
to those who suffered losses from the flood. 2 
These two instances , of conflict on the Macquarie and disaster in Bourke, draw 
attention to the complex ways in which floods in the Murray and Darling river systems 
are entangled in the lives and livelihoods of residents of flood country and ultimately 
impact upon the nation. Floods in these river systems are central to the boom and bust 
nature of the watercourses and the environments and ecologies they are connected with. 
'Boom and bust' environments, as Libby Robin and Leo Joseph have recently noted, are 
also cultural concepts.3 It is the role of floods in booms, within a region frequently in 
drought (busts), that have shaped settler understandings of them as simultaneously 
important sources of water and 'natural disasters'. This often fraught duplicity has created 
frequent conflict in a region that has become Australia's agricultural heartland. 
The Murray and Darling river systems together form what is now known as the 
Murray-Darling Basin. The web of rivers and their catchments that comprise the Basin 
cover parts of four states (Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia) 
and the entire Australian Capital Territory. The Great Dividing Range forms the eastern 
edge of the Basin and is where most of the rivers have their headwaters. Rain-bearing 
weather systems that break over these mountains, along with snow falls in the southern 
ranges and southward moving monsoonal systems in the north, bring rain which feeds 
floods. Floods drive hydrology in the Murray and Darling river systems, feeding networks 
of rivers, creeks, gullies, soaks, and underground aquifers; indeed the Darling River has 
the most variable flow of any river in the world - large floods that spill out onto vast 
floodplains can quickly pass to leave intensely dry, sometimes completely dry, riverbeds. 
2 
'Rudd offers Federal help to Bourke flood victims', ABC Rural, 19 February 2009, 
http://www.abc.net.au/ rural/news/content/200902/s2495656.htm, accessed 12 March 2009. 
3 Libby Robin and Leo Joseph, 'The Boom and Bust Desert World: A Bird's Eye View', in Libby Robin, 
Robert Heinsohn, and Leo Joseph (eds.), Boom and Bust: Bird Stories for a Dry Country (Canberra: CSTRO 
Publishing, 2009), pp. 7-17. 
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The Basin is a significant part of the total area of Australia; one seventh or 14 
percent of the continent.4 Within this vast area are diverse local environments; from the 
mountainous regions of the Great Dividing Range to the flat black soil floodplains of the 
Darling River, red gum forests of the Murray, and chains of ponds in the far west of the 
Basin. There is a wide diversity of environments even within these regions. They are 
connected through the rivers and floods, which drain into the ocean through a common 
mouth (if the water reaches it) near Goolwa in South Australia. 
There are no large cities within the Basin, except for Canberra; it is an area that is 
dominated by agricultural industries. In the census years 2005-06, 84 percent of the land 
in the Basin was owned by agricultural businesses and 67 percent of the land was used for 
growing crops and as pasture. Agricultural production also used the greatest amount of 
water in the Murray and Darling river systems in the 2005-06 coensus period; during this 
time 83 percent of the water consumed in the Basin went to agricultural industries.5 The 
region produces a significant portion of Australia's agricultural goods (comprising 39 
percent of Australia's total agricultural value in 2005-06), especially food. All rice in 
Australia is grown in the Basin and a number of other foods grown there contribute large 
percentages of the national totals, such as oranges, apples, wheat, and pork. Many crops 
that are cultivated in the Basin are grown through irrigation, predominantly cotton, fruit 
and nuts, and grapes. Many dairy farmers also irrigate pastures.6 
The Murray-Darling Basin and the role of these industries has been the focus of 
national debates over the last few decades but increasingly so in recent years. These 
debates provoke confronting and always difficult questions; how do we live in a land 
dominated by drought and flood? How should water and changing environments be 
managed? Floods are important in these debates; and so is history. These questions are 
not new. Their histories need to be considered in order to shape water futures. Settlers' 
changing relationships with rivers and floods in the Murray and Darling river systems 
4 
'Water and the Murray-Darling Basin -A Statistical Profile, 2000-01 to 2005-06' (4610.0.55.007), 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
http://www.abs.~ov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/DCODC8AAE4ECD727CA2574A5001F803A? 
opendocument, accessed 3 July 2009. 
5 
'Water and the Murray-Darling Basin -A Statistical Profile, 2000-01 to 2005-06' (4610.0.55.007), 
Australian Bureau of Statistics , 
http://www.abs.~ov.au/aussrars/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/DCODC8AAE4ECD727CA2574A5001F803A? 
opendocument, accessed 3 July 2009. 
6 
'Water and the Murray-Darling Basin - A Statistical Profile, 2000-01 to 2005-06' (4610.0.55.007), 
Australian Bureau of Statistics , 
http://www.abs. ~ov.au/ausstats/abs@. nsf/ Latestproducrs/DCODC8AAE4 ECD727CA2574A5001 F803A? 
opendocument, accessed 3 July 2009. 
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have shaped the environment, the way the rivers flow, and the landscape in which these 
questions need to be asked. Floods have also shaped settler understandings of the 
environment, their lives and livelihoods. 
As major sources of water in dry regions, floods have been highly valued, sources 
of heated debate, and the rationale behind engineering schemes; they have also been seen 
as 'natural disasters', causing death and damage. This thesis explores Australian settlers' 
changing relationships with, and understandings of, floods and the rivers and floodplains 
of the Murray and Darling river systems from 1850 to the present. It takes its starting date 
as roughly the time when permanent colonial settlement began in the inland.7 Earlier 
ventures of settlers into the region are included where relevant. 
This thesis closely analyses four key flood events. The selected flood episodes 
focus on events at different places within the Murray and Darling river systems that 
occurred at different times. Each focuses on a town but also includes analysis of the 
surrounding regions and adjoining rivers. These events occurred in: Gundagai (located on 
the Murrumbidgee River, New South Wales) in 1852; Bourke (on the Darling River, New 
South Wales) in 1890; Mildura (on the Murray River, Victoria) in 1956; and Cunnamulla 
(on the Warrego River, Queensland) in 1990. These flood episodes or case studies, 
together with the chapters that link them, explore changing ways of knowing and 
managing rivers and floods over a century and a half, and some of the long-term 
consequences for people, rivers, and ecologies. In particular this thesis takes up a number 
of key themes: regional tension with centralised governments over decision-making 
processes; the particular forms of river management that centralised government enables 
(such as large-scale riverine engineering); different kinds of knowledge of the rivers, 
especially regional (or local) knowledge, scientific knowledge, and government (and 
managerial) knowledge; tensions and cooperation between the custodians of these 
different kinds of understandings; and the emergence of the Murray-Darling Basin as a 
managerial unit. It aims to present a 'floods'-eye-view' of the history of the area (and, 
partly, of Australia) and explore the ways that settlers, the rivers, and the floods have re-
made each other. 
Another aim of this thesis is to show how each flood is unique, influenced by 
vastly different, as well as nuanced, weather, river, and floodplain conditions. Two floods 
in the same river will be different, so the precise history of each is important now. The 
7 In this thesis the word 'inland' refers to the area of Australia that lies west of the Great Dividing Range 
and east of the central desert region - in short the area that is now the Murray-Darling Basin. 
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case studies also attempt to draw attention to the diversity of local environments within 
the Murray and Darling river systems and how they have changed and continue to 
change. 
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Introduction 
* * * 
Floods and Commentaries 
This thesis explores floods in terms of the two dominant roles that they have played in 
settler history in the Murray and Darling river systems: as 'natural disasters' and as part of 
the wider hydrology of rivers. In this context floods have been understood as both events 
and part of longer environmental rhythms. They have been managed as emergencies, but 
also within broader water and environmental policies and understood as part of the way 
rivers flow. This thesis aims to bring together these somewhat contradictory ways floods 
have been understood. Its structure is designed to achieve this purpose. 
The case study chapters are the backbone of the thesis. Each concentrates on 
either a single large flood or sequence of large floods that occurred at a particular place 
and time. Each explores floods primarily as events and examines the ways in which they 
have been managed, understood, and experienced as natural disasters and emergencies, as 
well as the conflicts that have followed them. Together they offer a situated examination 
of how big ideas about the nation, environment, technology, and industries that were 
held in state bureaucracies, professional fields, and metropolitan media, affected 
particular areas as they experienced flood events, and how the ideas themselves were in 
turn shaped by floods and the responses of residents of flood country. 
The chapters between the case studies do two things. First, they explore how 
floods (small and large) have shaped, and been entangled with, wider water and 
environmental management and transitions in understandings and uses of rivers and 
floodplains. Secondly, they act as chronological links between the case studies, providing 
broader perspectives in terms of places and periods of time as well as bridging 
information and arguments between the close studies of flood events. 
* * * 
Sources and Method 
This thesis draws on a humanities perspective to reframe ideas about floods and the 
settler history of the Murray and Darling river systems and Australia. Floods in the 
7 
Murray and Darling river systems and Australia are commonly written about within the 
sciences and, to a lesser extent, the social sciences. This thesis re-examines these studies, 
but primarily aims to contribute to the growing body of work in the humanities about 
floods, rivers, and floodplains. My approach is influenced by recent work and by what are 
now classic studies in the humanities on rivers, floods, dams, and local knowledge.8 These 
include work by academics such as Timothy Mitchell (Rule of Experts, 2002), James C. 
Scott (Seeing Like a State, 1998), and Donald Worster (Rivers of Empire, 1985). 
Particular aspects of these scholars' work have influenced my approach. Mitchell's 
exploration of the local, national, and international effects of river management in 
British-occupied Egypt has been an important influence. His analysis of the profound 
consequences of new technology, such as large-scale dams, has influenced my focus on the 
role of technology and the politics that surround its implementation. In addition, 
Mitchell's examination of the relationship between local residents and centralised 
government in Egypt, especially as these relationships incorporate environments and 
broader ecological relationships, has contributed to my analysis of the ways in which both 
local residents and centralised government have shaped rivers and flood flows, points of 
tension between these two groups, and the immediate and long-term consequences of 
their actions. Scott's analysis of the exclusion of local knowledge (what he terms 'metis') 
from increasingly centralised bureaucratic policies and decision-making processes, with 
the advent of 'modern statecraft', has also influenced my examination of the tensions 
between local residents and centralised government.9 Worster's analysis of the ideologies 
that underpinned dam construction and the expansion of irrigation in the American 
W est in the 1930s has also been influential, especially his examination of the ongoing 
environmental, social, and political consequences of these schemes, at local, state, and 
national levels. 
This thesis is an environmental history. Broadly defined, environmental history is 
a branch of the discipline of history that studies people's changing relationships with 
8 This thesis explores what local knowledge is, does, and means. It therefore does not offer a preemptive 
definition of 'local knowledge'. 
9 James C . Scott, Seeing Like a Stace: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp.3-8. 
8 
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their environments. 10 This thesis is situated within, and engages with , a number of key 
areas of environmental history and the works of academics in these fields. It explores 
changing ideas of the nation through discussions of cultural imaginings of 'the bush' as a 
source of national identity, projects of national development such as dams, Federation, 
and broad changes in understandings of Australian environments (Libby Robin, George 
Seddon, Tim Bonyhady, Tom Griffiths). Another key influence is the history of science, 
particularly the way environments have both shaped, and been shaped by, scientific 
practices, institutions, and bureaucracies (Robin, Kirsty Douglas, Tim Sherratt, Ian 
Tyrrell). It also draws on work by environmental historians in analysing settler 
relationships with rivers and floodplains as well as with wider environments on a regional 
or local scale, particularly in discussions of mining, pastoralism, and irrigation (Heather 
Goodall, Paul Sinclair, John Merritt, Griffiths, Tyrrell, Robin). 
In addition, this thesis draws on and engages with the work of two historians who 
have written substantial histories of water management in Australia: Clem Lloyd and J.M. 
Powell. It particularly draws on two of their books, Lloyd's Either Drought or Plenty (1988, 
on water management in New South Wales) and Powell's Watering the Garden State (1989, 
on water management in Victoria). These works, first published in the 1980s, remain 
important foundational studies in a variety of disciplines in Australia, including 
environmental history, human geography, and historical geography. Both histories, while 
commissioned by state water authorities, critically analyse water management since 
settlement and explore the way ideas, environments, and individuals have shaped 
government bureaucracies and management as well as politics. In an historical context, 
these works can be seen as part of the reflexivity of water management departments in the 
1980s as they restructured and assessed their histories in order to address environmental 
degradation and local conflicts around the effects of dams and irrigation on river flows. 
These works and their contexts are discussed further in chapter six ('Challenging 
10 Tom Griffiths, 'The Nature of Culture and the Culture of Nature', in Hsu-Ming Teo and Richard White 
(eds.), Cultural History in Australia (Sydney: Univers ity of New South Wales Press, 2003), pp.67-80; Eric 
Pawson and Stephen Dovers, 'Environmental History and the Challenges oflnterdisciplinarity', 
Environmenr and History, 9, 2003, pp.53-75; Richard White, 'Environmental History: Watching a Historical 
Field Mature', Pacific History Review, 70, 1, February 2001, pp. 103-11 1; Sarah Brown, Steve Dovers, Jodi 
Frawley, Andrea Gaynor, Heather Goodall, Grace Karskens, and Steve Mullins, 'Can Environmental 
History Save the World?' History Australia, 5, 1, 2008, pp. 3.1to 3.24. DOI: 10.2104/ ha080003; Grace 
Karskens, 'Water Dreams, Earthen Histories: Exploring Urban Environmental History at the Penrith Lakes 
Scheme and Castlereagh, Sydney', Environment and History, 13, 2, 2007, pp.1 15-154; John MacNeill, 
'Observations on the Nature and Culture of Environmental History', History and Theory (Theme Issue), 42, 
2003, pp.5-43; and, David Lowenthal, 'Environmental History: From Genesis to Apocalypse', History Today, 
51, 4, April 2001 , pp.36-42. 
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National Development: Dams and Irrigation, 1956 to 1990'). This thesis also draws on 
other histories of water management in Australia, such as Daniel Connell's Water Politics 
in the Murray-Darling Basin (2007). 
The research for this thesis was conducted in a variety of libraries, archives, and 
other places. Many of the documentary primary sources were researched at state libraries 
and archives located in Brisbane, Sydney, and Melbourne. Research was also conducted at 
the National Library of Australia, National Archives of Australia, the Murray-Darling 
Basin Commission (now Murray-Darling Basin Authority) library, and the Australian 
Dictionary of Biography research room (which provides access to biographical research 
files), all of which are located in Canberra. In addition, research was conducted at the 
Bureau of Meteorology library in Melbourne. Other documentary sources, especially for 
the case study chapters, were researched at local libraries, including at Gundagai, Bourke, 
Dubbo, Mildura, and Cunnamulla. I draw on government documents, scientific works 
(including published articles, unpublished manuscripts, government scientific reports, 
and non-government scientific work), personal papers, survey plans, maps, pictures, 
manuscripts, past and current legislation (especially in chapters seven and eight) and 
newspaper articles researched at these locations. 
Some documentary sources were found outside of these institutions and services. 
In travelling to the places I was researching I informally met a number of relevant people. 
In two cases people passed on documentary sources that were valuable to this thesis. 
Ted Lawton in Mildura gave me copies of photographs he took during the 1956 
floods. The photographs had been recently digitised by staff at the Mildura library and 
Lawton granted permission for these to be copied for use in this thesis. He also talked me 
through the photographs, describing locations and the time they were taken in relation to 
the progress of the flood. Some of these photographs appear in chapter five ('Mildura and 
the Murray River 1956: The Failure of Engineering'). 
Allan Tannock in Cunnamulla gave me a copy of his book, The Warrego 
Watershed. Chapter seven ('Cunnamulla 1990: The Town That Did Not Flood') discusses 
this book in detail. This book is available through a number of libraries, but it was 
important that I met Tannock. We were able to discuss the book and he elaborated on 
some of the ideas in it. Through our discussions I also gained additional insights into 
local networks and floods which I might have missed if I only had the book; if I had read 
the book, in a sense, outside of its local, authored, context. Indeed, it was through local 
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networks that I was able to meet custodians of local knowledge, such as Tannock. As I 
visited places, I was gradually directed by residents to certain people who were custodians 
of both local documentary sources and flood knowledge. I conducted two informal 
interviews with Tannock which I draw on in that chapter. For chapter seven I also 
informally interviewed former policeman Harry Edwards. As these interviews were 
informal I have used them minimally. They have been mainly used to supplement and 
cross-check documentary sources. 
Travelling to places in the inland for research has also informed this thesis in 
other ways. Spending time in these locations, seeing levee banks and rivers, walking, and 
in some cases flying, over the floodplains, and talking to people who live there has added 
to the way this thesis is written and its arguments. Mostly these have been subtle 
additions, such as in the descriptions of rivers and floodplains presented in the chapters, 
but some have also been more significant. For example, talking to an employee at the 
tourist information centre in Gundagai was helpful in the discussion in chapter one 
('Gundagai 1852: The Town That Moved') of the location of graves and burial grounds of 
those that died during the June 1852 flood. Such conversations with residents prompted 
me to follow certain research threads and also to talk to particular people with local flood 
knowledge, such as T annock. 
Other sources used in this thesis include local histories, theses, government and 
non-government websites (for example, the Macquarie Marshes Management Committee 
website), and scholarly books and articles. 
* * * 
Overview 
Together the chapters of this thesis map the way understandings of floods have changed 
as well as aspects that have endured. However, each chapter emphasises different themes, 
places, and floods within the broader scope of the thesis. The first chapter ('Gundagai 
1852: The Town That Moved') focuses on a flood that occurred in June 1852 in the town 
of Gundagai, located on the Murrumbidgee River in New South Wales. The flood was 
large and destructive, with over 70 people killed, and led to the town being moved to 
higher ground. Yet there had already been other large floods in the town. Why was the 
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town surveyed and built on a floodplain? Why did settlers continue to live there despite 
the threat of large floods? These questions are addressed in this study and are also 
relevant to many towns that were established in the inland in this period. This chapter 
examines the way settlers accumulated and evaluated flood knowledge in a location where 
they had begun to reside only recently, including exchanges with Aborigines about flood 
knowledge and the way this information was evaluated by settlers. It further analyses the 
accumulation of flood knowledge by government officials, and tensions between residents 
of flood country and centralised government over flood knowledge and decision-making 
processes to address floods, especially as large floods began to occur in the town. 
The second chapter ('Experimentation and Regulation: Pastoralism and Mining, 
1850 to 1890') explores the way floods shaped water management between 1850 and 
1890, as government regulations over settler use of river water became more restrictive. It 
particularly focuses on water regulations in goldmining and pastoralism, two dominant 
industries in the inland in this period. Colonial governments formulated extensive 
regulations around miners' use of river water, diversion of flood flows, and flood 
mitigation, while pastoralists' use of river water was largely unregulated. This chapter 
explores how water regulations in mining and the lack of regulations around pastoralists' 
water use connected with broader government ideologies of land settlement and shaped 
settlers' relationships with rivers and floods. 
The third chapter ('Bourke 1890: The Birth of Engineering') focuses on a large 
flood that threatened the town of Bourke, located on the Darling River in New South 
Wales, in 1890. It explores the relationship between the colonial government, district 
representatives to the colonial government, and the residents of Bourke, both during and 
after the flood. More specifically, it focuses on the formation of these relationships 
around the claims of the townspeople on government funds for the building of a 
permanent flood embankment around the town. This flood marked a transition in 
government approaches to floods, from predicting flood flows through meteorology to 
mitigating floods through engineering. It further signalled a shift in government 
accountability and involvement in local affairs through built works. Government 
involvement in ensuring settler security from the fluctuations of river flow through 
engineering was part of a broader government move towards watershed-wide river 
manipulation. This flood is also examined within the context of Bourke as the centre of 
an important wool growing district and symbol of cultural identity for urban-dwellers in 
New South Wales and Australia. 
12 
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The fourth chapter ('Federation, Engineering, and a 'Watershed' Perspective, 
1890 to 1956') explores how rivers and floods in the inland were entangled in colonial, 
and then state, plans for large-scale engineering works, from before Federation through to 
the beginning of the post-war period. In this period the Murray River became, and 
remained, the focus of colonial and state governments' 'river development'. This chapter 
analyses why the Murray became the focus of government river engineering, why 
irrigation superseded navigation in governments' priorities for the river, how the creation 
of federal bureaucratic frameworks facilitated large-scale river engineering and watershed 
administration, particularly the River Murray Commission, and the role of floods in these 
developments. It also examines the expansion of irrigation and international influences 
on Australia's water management for irrigation and its watershed administrations, 
necessary for large-scale engineering. 
The fifth chapter ('Mildura and the Murray River 1956: The Failure of 
Engineering') focuses on a series of floods that occurred along the Murray River in 1956, 
particularly as they were experienced in the irrigation district of Mildura located in 
Victoria. Floods occurred throughout the Murray and Darling river systems in 1956, 
causing either a single peak or a series of peaks in different areas. This chapter explores 
the ways in which the floods were perceived by settlers as a failure of state and Federal 
government engineering to control and manage floods. The floods occurred when 
projects of technocratic national development were being built to harness and regularise 
river flow along the Murray and its tributaries for irrigation and hydro-electricity. This 
chapter further examines the way engineering structures such as the Hume Dam and 
Snowy Mountains Scheme were perceived by some settlers to have increased both the 
height and frequency of floods that occurred in 1958 and to have undermined local flood 
knowledge. 
The sixth chapter ('Challenging National Development: Dams and Irrigation, 
1956 to 1990') explores three ways in which highly centralised state government water 
management, programs of dam building for national development, and policies that 
privileged irrigation, were challenged between 1956 and 1990. It examines the way floods 
were entangled in these challenges and in changing national perceptions of dams, from 
projects of national development to being problematic on a number of levels, including 
environmentally and politically. First, it analyses B.R. Davidson's economic critique of 
irrigation; secondly, the challenges by residents of flood country along the Namoi and 
Macquarie rivers to then recent irrigation works, to government water management, and 
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to the operation of government dams; and thirdly, the way the environmental movement 
fostered a national change in the perception of dams and irrigation. Yet the centralised 
management of rivers and 'flood response', a development that was strengthened and 
then challenged in this period, endured into the 1990s. 
The seventh chapter ('Cunnamulla 1990: The Town That Did Not Flood') 
focuses on a flood that threatened the town of Cunnamulla, located on the Warrego 
River in Queensland, in 1990. It explores this flood in the context of rural decline in 
south-western Queensland and highly bureaucratised and centralised state involvement in 
flood response. It concentrates on the local knowledge of resident Allan T annock and his 
role in preventing the evacuation of the town. This chapter further explores the regional 
context of the flood through a discussion of the evacuation of Charleville, a town located 
on the Warrego, upstream from Cunnamulla. lt examines some of the tensions between 
residents of flood country, including custodians of local flood knowledge, and state 
government officials within a bureaucracy of emergency management that devalued local 
knowledge and favoured humanitarian approaches to floods above that of communities-
in-place. 
The eighth chapter ('Local Knowledge in the Context of Climate Change') brings 
examination of floods up to the present, tying issues into a contemporary set of problems. 
It explores the importance of local knowledge in addressing changed flood flows due to 
climate change. It also asks, in such a global happening as climate change, what are the 
limits of local knowledge? It explores the value of local knowledge in the face of 
environmental uncertainty induced by climate change and other alterations to the 
environment from past and current settler land use practices. 
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Gundagai 1852 
The Town That Moved 
1 
Scanning across the floodplain that stretches between the Murrumbidgee River and its 
anabranch Morelys Creek it was quite possible for me to pick out unmistakable elements 
of a water landscape even during these drought years. To the east, on this floodplain, lie 
ravines carved by past, fast-flowing water and in the distance eucalypts trace out the path 
of long, eroded watercourses and willows hang over the banks of the Murrumbidgee. 
This is a landscape that has been shaped by countless wet periods with 
intermittent and sudden floods. It is not a place to build a town. Yet the flat within this 
floodplain was selected by the New South Wales colonial government, surveyed in 1838, 
as the site for the town of Gundagai, officially established in 1841. Despite damaging 
floods in Gundagai in the years 1844, 1847, and 1851 it was not until the large and 
destructive flood in June 1852 that major sections of the town were eventually moved to 
the hill, north of the flat, named Mount Parnassus. It is this place and event, of flood 
landscape and the town that moved to a hill, that frame cultural and environmental 
interconnections particular to the case of Gundagai. 
In 2007 I visited Gundagai again, this time not for the purpose of research, but 
for a break in a drive to Melbourne. In stopping there, I was following a travellers' 
tradition that had been the impetus behind selecting the site for the town. Gundagai was 
established as a service town at the only crossing place on the Murrumbidgee River on the 
main overland route from Sydney to Port Phillip and South Australia. In an era of 
pastoral expansion and when gold was beginning to draw settlers south, the town had a 
steady trade and a period of economic growth in the 1850s. 
The flood of June 1852 devastated Gundagai. The floodwaters rose high and fast, 
fed by large quantities of rain and snowmelt. According to Emergency Management 
Australia in 2009, this flood remains Australia's worst flood disaster in terms of lives 
lost. 1 Between 7 5 and 100 people, or one third to one half of those visiting or living on 
the flat, were reported to have perished. 
This chapter builds and draws on other histories of Gundagai. These include 
Wardiningsih Soerjohardjo's thesis 'Aspects of Life in Gundagai, 1840-60'; David 
Lindley's work on the biography of Thomas Lindley (an early settler and landowner in 
Gundagai); Cliff Butcher's book on Gundagai history Gundagai: A Track Winding Back; 
and the heritage assessment of 'Old Gundagai' by Brendan O'Keefe et al. The purposes 
and interests of these histories have been those of biography, commissioned assessments, 
and broader histories of the town. They have contributed to an understanding of wider 
social, economic, and political aspects of the town's history. Soerjohardjo noted that the 
flood 'generated a body of social and economic data which is of considerable assistance in 
reconstructing a social history of the period'. 2 Each of their histories describes the June 
1852 flood within the broader purpose of the work. I too see the 1852 flood as crucial to 
the story of the town, the period, and also to this history of floods; especially the way 
environmental and flood knowledge was accumulated, contested, and evaluated in 
relation to other settler interests and within local and colonial power structures. 
In order to address these questions of flood knowledge a longer perspective is 
necessary. I examine surveyors' and other government agents' flood knowledge alongside 
that of settlers, from the time of the town's survey in 1838 to the flood in June 1852. I 
also examine settler exchanges with Aborigines (predominately Wiradjuri, 'people of the 
three rivers') about flood knowledge. 
In November 1852 a gold prospector, A. Waight, wrote a letter to his sister in 
England about the flood. He had travelled from Sydney to the Ovens River goldfields and 
then to the Spring Creek diggings. Recovering from dysentery and abandoned by his 
three fellow travellers, he described the 'misery' of his travels. He had taken the overland 
track to the goldfields and crossed the Murrumbidgee at Gundagai, arriving two months 
1 
'Disasters Database', Emergency Management Australia, 
http://www.ema.gov.au/www/emaweb/emaweb.nsf/Page/Resources DisastersDatabase DisastersDatabase 
, accessed 3 April 2009. See also, Lucinda Coates, 'Flood Fatalities in Australia, 1788-1996', Australian 
Geographer, 30, 3, 1999, pp.391-408, Table 3 p.393. 
2 Wardiningsih Soerjohardjo, 'Aspects of Life in Gundagai, 1840-1860', Masters thesis, The Australian 
National University, 1986, p.58. 
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after the June 1852 flood. There he stopped and witnessed the damage: 'The whole 
town ... washed away'. He wrote about the flood, that 'came one night & rose to the tops 
of the Trees 30 feet & upwards'. He had heard stories from flood survivors, and may have 
spoken to other travellers or read one of the many regional or metropolitan newspaper 
reports, but he judged the height of the flood by where he saw things lodged in trees: 'you 
could see Houses, Cattle, Sheep, Gigs, Furniture, Roofs of Houses, & Clothes, & Human 
bodies at least as high as that, there was one body found the morning we got there & 
strange it had nor putrefied although it had been there 2 months'.3 He could also see 
where people had tried to escape the flood by climbing onto the roofs of buildings: 
One place where there had been a school they had placed chairs on the Table & a long 
form to reach the trap door at the top but it appears from what the Survivors say that they 
had not the courage or strength to get up as the whole Family was found drowned in the 
School room.4 
At the end of his letter, Waight drew a small map of the town's location. He told his 
tJ',...._~M4w. .,4:~.(/ sister that 'the town was built in a very sn1pid place as I ;r;;,;c.,._,,,/{( the Murrumbidgee is on one side & a wide lagoon on 
, .:...1r-3 "- the other no one could imagine a worse place to build 1.-~v 
Figure 1.1 
Map of Gundagai drawn by A. 
Waight at the end of his letter 
to his sister, 1852. 
[From: A. Waight. Letter to 
Elizabeth [sister]. 20 November, 
1852. ms2279. [manuscript]. 
National Library of Australia.] 
the town on as in case of a Flood there is little chance of 
escape... however it is entirely the fault of the 
Government'.5 He wrote that 'the inhabitants have 
petitioned several times to have it removed to the other 
side of the river where they would be perfectly secure ... 
It is almost the same with government in this Country 
[,] there are such a lot (quite useless) employed who 
never attend to their business through Pride and 
ignorance'.6 T he June 1852 flood in Gundagai was a source of outrage against the 
government both in Gundagai and throughout the colony. 
3 Original capital letters and punctuation. A. Waight. Letter to Elizabeth [sister). 20 November, 1852. 
ms2279. [manuscript]. National Library of Australia. 
4 Original capital letters and pu nctuation. A. Waight. Letter to Elizabeth [sister) . 
5 Original capital letters and punctuation. A. Waight. Letter to Elizabeth [sister). 
6 Original capital letters and pu nctuation. A. Waight. Letter to Elizabeth [sister] .. 
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Gundagai had been surveyed by government surveyors. Why was it located on an 
island between two rivers, with a lagoon collecting floodwater and funnelling it into one 
of the rivers that ran near the town? In a location surrounded by hills, Gundagai's 
original positioning on the flat seems puzzling. Surveyors were trained to assess the 
environmental suitability of potential sites for settlements. The continued location of the 
settlement on the flat is also puzzling. Settlers had suffered large and damaging floods 
before 1852, without significant government intervention to protect them. 
Following the June 1852 flood, the residents' and landowners' decision to 
continue to live on the flat was also questioned by former residents, visitors to the town, 
and distant commentators. Why would townsfolk rebuild in a place known to flood? This 
is a question that has also puzzled historians but been little investigated. For example, 
Soerjohardjo concluded that although the government surveyed and auctioned land on 
higher ground after the 1844 flood, 'the people still preferred the lower ground, the bed 
of a river, even though their lives were in peril' .7 Why they 'preferred' to live on the flat 
remains tantalising. 
Settler descriptions of floods in Gundagai were infused with discussions of how 
environmental knowledge was gained and evaluated. Environmental knowledge varied 
between individuals and over time. Through disparate accounts and representative 
manuscripts, such as petitions, we can begin to gain a sense of both shared 
understandings and areas of disagreement. Accounts, for example, indicate the roles given 
to Aborigines as prophets and saviours, but also the dismissals of their advice. There are 
also accounts that highlight the signs of previous flood debris, at first unnoticed and then 
understood, and the way settlers assimilated the experience of recent floods, sometimes as 
warnings, and sometimes as reassurance that 'the big one' was behind them. 
Environmental knowledge was only one factor at work and was weighed against political, 
legal, and economic interests of government and those who lived, traded, and bought 
land on the flat.8 
The petitions from Gundagai landowners and residents to the government in the 
aftermath of both the 1844 and June 1852 floods reveal changes in the relationship (and 
tensions) between residents and landowners and the centralised government over flood 
7 Soerjohardjo, 'Aspects of Life in Gundagai, 1840-1860', p.56. 
8 Steven L. Driever and Danny M. Vaughn have noted similar tensions, between accumulating 
environmental knowledge and various benefits of living on floodplains, in relation to Kansas City, United 
States of America. See, Steven L. Driever and Danny M. Vaughn, 'Flood Hazard in Kansas City Since 
1880', The Geographical Review, 78, 1, January 1988, pp. l-19. 
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knowledge, responsibility for the siting of the town, and continued occupation of the flat 
despite the occurrence of severe large floods. These relations between the state and local 
knowledge significantly shaped diverse settler experiences, not just in Gundagai, but also 
in each of the other case studies discussed in this thesis. 
The June 1852 flood occurred within the context of colonial government 
expansion into the inland regions of New South Wales. Gundagai was initially 
established as a government town, part of the colonial government's extension of land 
survey and greater administrative control beyond the Twenty Counties (or Settled Lands) 
after the abolition of free land grants in 1831.9 The town thus represented an early 
venture by the colonial government in administering inland settlement, especially towns, 
far from the colonial administrative centre in Sydney. 
Gundagai was part of a government drive for increased settlement in the inland 
and developmental progress of the colony generally. Established on a trade route, it was 
also part of an attempt to support and secure communication and travel routes between 
disparate, emergent colonial settlements. Gundagai's early growth and prosperity were 
due to its position within networks of pastoral trade and later of the gold rush (1850s). 
Gundagai was also to become the grim exemplar of the environmental challenges to 
inland settlement and centralised government administration, especially with respect to 
the establishment of towns in the colony's unfamiliar environments. With the failure of 
siting and inaction subsequent to disastrous floods, Gundagai's cause became linked to 
broader questions of government administration, responsibility, and environmental 
knowledge. The location and flooding of Gundagai provides perspectives on ways in 
which the imperatives of settlement interconnected with attempts to make sense of the 
unpredictability of weather and river flow within the particular landforms of floodplains. 
* * * 
Gundagai Floods in 1844, 1851, and 1852: A Brief Comparison 
The heights of the key floods in Gundagai during this period (1844, 1851 and 1852) offer 
scarce data for comparison. Only one numerical height has been found for the 1844 
9 David Denholm, The Colonial Australians (Penguin Books, Middlesex, England: 1979), p.57. The Twenty 
Counties was 'an area of about 40,000 square miles inside a rough arc of about 150 map miles around 
Sydney'. Denholm, The Colonial Australians, p.57. 
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flood. James Gormly, then a teenager whose family moved to Gundagai that year, later 
stated that the 1844 flood 'would probably have reached a height of 32 feet' (9.75 
metres). 10 In 1844, the height of the flood was judged according to landmarks, buildings, 
and debris. For example, George Robinson, Protector of Aborigines for Port Phillip, 
travelling through Gundagai soon after the flood, wrote that the flood reached half way 
up the walls of houses. 11 Another account, by a resident, described the flood as reaching 
the tops of the ridgepoles of some buildings. 12 Still another described debris lodged at a 
'great elevation in the trees'. 13 Similarly, no numerical heights can be found for two floods 
that occurred in 1851, in May and August. The May 1851 flood was described as reaching 
levels 'within three feet of the great flood' of 1844. 14 The August 1851 flood was larger, 
described as reaching the height of the 1844 flood.15 The height of the August 1851 flood 
was also judged in terms of landmarks and buildings. One settler wrote, '[t]o those who 
know the locality it is sufficient to state that the water was at the ridge pole of the 
blacksmith's shop'. 16 
The June 1852 flood reached 40 feet and six inches (12.34 metres). 17 A flood in 
July 1853 rose higher, reaching 41 feet and four inches (12.59 metres). 18 These flood 
heights were probably recorded by settlers after the floodwaters receded and measured at 
the bank of the Murrumbidgee. These flood levels were probably close to those reached in 
the centre of the town, which was level with the top of the riverbank. These two floods 
are thought to be the highest recorded since the town was first surveyed. The June 1852 
flood, though not as high as the one in July 1853, was the more destructive of the two. 
This may be because in 1853 the rivers were probably still high from the previous year's 
flood and rains, and therefore the force of the water would likely not have been as great. 
Furthermore, the 1852 flood occurred at the height of a boom in Gundagai when there 
were likely to have been more people in the town. 
10 James Gormly, 'When it Broke: Drought of 1850-51', Gundagai Independent, 4 May, 1915, p.4. 
11 G.A. Robinson, Chief Protector of Aborigines, 'Chief Protector's Journal (abridged) of an Expedition to 
the Aborigines of the Eastern Interior commencing April and terminating October', 1844, in Governor 
Gipps Despatches, January-May, 1845, p.746. A1236. Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales. 
12 Sydney Morning Herald (SMH), 29 October, 1844, p.4. 
13 SMH, 11 November, 1844, p.2. 
14 Argus, 19 June, 185 1, p.4. This flood occurred on 17 May 1852. 
15 Goulburn Herald, 30 August, 1851, p.3. 
16 Goulburn Herald, 30 August, 1851, p.3. 
17 Cliff Butcher, Gundagai; A Track Winding Back (A.C. Butcher: Gundagai, 2002), p.84; and, Petition from 
Gundagai residents to Governor FitzRoy, 15 July, 1852, in Goulburn Herald, 4 September, 1852, p.8 
18 Butcher, Gundagai, p.84. 
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Soerjohardjo stated that the word 'Murrumbidgee' derived from an Aboriginal 
warning, 'Mor-unbeed-ja', meaning 'a big flood' .19 The Murrumbidgee and its anabranch 
wrapped around the flat, forming a pocket of land about 2.1 kilometres long and 800 
metres wide (sometimes described as an 'island'), from their downstream junction to a 
point where the watercourses diverged more widely and the anabranch formed a lagoon 
('the lagoon').20 
Map 1.1 
Simplified map of 'Old Gundagai', the allotments of which are indicated by the dotted lines. 
This map also includes contemporary settlement and features, such as the road and railway 
bridges. The lagoon is evident on the right of the map, near allotment 21. 
[From: Brendan O'Keefe, et al., The Watermen of Gundagai (Gundagai: Old Gundagai Project 
Committee, 2002), p.35.) 
The wide lagoon, to the east of the Gundagai flat, played a significant role in flooding the 
town (and areas further downstream) during this period. The lagoon was fed by the 
anabranch (later named Morelys Creek) and the Murrumbidgee upstream from 
G undagai. During periods when the Murrumbidgee received quantities of snowmelt from 
the Snowy Mountains and/ or large amounts of upstream and local rainfall and run-off, 
the lagoon formed as a large basin. Water collected in the wide lagoon and was forced 
under pressure into the narrow stream (a continuation of the anabranch) that ran 
through the town. Thus, large floods could be fast rising (12 to 24 hours) on the flat. 
19 Soerjohardjo, 'Aspects of Life in Gundagai, 1840-1860', p. l. 
20 The Murrumbidgee and anabranch initially part about 5km upstream from the original Gundagai site. 
21 
Surrounding hills exacerbated the impact of large floods by directing and confining the 
water in the valley.21 
Figure 1.2 
The flat (the original site of Gundagai) in flood, sometime between 1887 and 1927 and 
after the town was relocated to higher ground. 
[Charles Louis Gabriel, 1857-1927. Gundagai photograph collection, taken by Dr C.L. 
Gabriel, from the Butcher and Bell collections [631] [picture] between 1887 and 1927. 
nla.pic-an85264 79-631. National Library of Australia.] 
Flooding along the Murrumbidgee and anabranch completely cut off settlers on the flat 
from higher land. It was a combination of the force of the water, the speed at which it 
rose, its quantity, the amount of water already in the Murrumbidgee and anabranch (or 
lack of it), and the way people were isolated, that caused floods to be so destructive to the 
town and so deadly to its inhabitants. The June 1852 flood followed a period of drought 
and low river flow. The flood was fed by heavy rainfall and snowmelt and the rivers 
swelled with turbulent water as the flood was not 'cushioned' by already full rivers. The 
intersection of such environmental conditions, which favoured a large and turbulent 
21 Petition quoted in, Goulbum Herald, 4 September, 1852, p.8 
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flood, coincided with a period of growth in Gundagai, and the flood brought together a 
cumulation of wider environmental and cultural factors in the history of Gundagai. 
* * * 
Gundagai Before Survey: Crossing Place and Conflict 
Gundagai in 1852 was in many ways a by-product of the 1830s and 40s boom in 
settlement and land investment, centred on pastoralism following rapidly from 
exploration of the inland in the 1820s. Peter Stuckey established Willie Poolma (or 
Polma) pastoral station in 1828 at the site that was later to become South Gundagai. He 
was the first European to cross the Murrumbidgee at the point which was later to give 
place to the town of Gundagai, and it became known as Stuckeys Crossing or Stuckeys 
Ford. Explorers, such as William Hovell and Hamilton Hume (who journeyed near the 
area in 1824 on their way to Port Phillip, but veered west of the site), and later Charles 
Sturt (who passed through the area and crossed the Murrumbidgee at Stuckey's Crossing 
in 1828), used Aboriginal paths (or trackways) on their travels.22 A heritage assessment of 
the site has speculated that 'Stuckey may have made use of Aboriginal knowledge or 
followed Aboriginal example in making his crossing of the river at Gundagai' .23 At the 
time, the flat was likely an established Aboriginal crossing place over the Murrumbidgee, 
as it was a ceremonial site and camping place. 24 Other squatters joined Stuckey soon after 
his arrival. The area, then outside the colonial government's 'official limits of settlement', 
had been reported favourably by explorers and, using this information, pastoral 
prospectors continued to establish runs, moving south-west along the Murrumbidgee. 
Conflicts between squatters and local Aborigines - predominantly Wiradjuri -
erupted in about 1838 along the frontier region near the Murrumbidgee. The conflict was 
later termed the 'Wiradjuri War' by Bill Gammage.25 Although Gammage does not 
discuss conflict at the Gundagai site directly, his examination of frontier violence in the 
broader area indicates the context in which the town was established. While there had 
22 Brendan O'Keefe, et al., The Watermen of Gundagai (Gundagai: Old Gundagai Project Committee, 2002), 
p.5 
23 O'Keefe, et al., The Watermen of Gundagai, p.5. 
24 O'Keefe, et al., The Watermen of Gundagai, p.3 and p.5. Today the remnants of one bora ring are still 
evident on the flat. O'Keefe et al noted that some people have suggested that this bora ring is actually a 
remnant of a Dutch windmill, which is possible. O'Keefe et al., The Watermen of Gundagai, p.5. 
25 Bill Gammage, 'The Wiradjuri War, 1838-40', The Push, 16, October 1983, pp.3-17 . 
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been violent confrontations and attacks between settlers and Wiradjuri and other 
Aboriginal groups before this time, Gammage argued that between 1838 and 1840 
conflict escalated as Wiradjuri became more pro-active and organised in their warfare. 
Indeed, along the eastern frontier Aboriginal groups went on the offensive and for a short 
time reclaimed 60 miles of territory from the invaders.26 Violence between the two groups 
intensified after a severe drought when the Murrumbidgee stopped flowing. Gammage 
has argued that increased competition for resources and settler occupation of hunting 
grounds fostered the war, instigated by Wiradjuri and other clans.27 
Drawing on Gammage's arguments to explain frontier relationships at the 
particular site of Gundagai, Brendan O'Keefe et al have noted that, '[w]hile the same 
potential existed for conflict to occur among Aborigines and Europeans around 
Gundagai, there is no evidence that it actually eventuated'.28 O'Keefe et al speculate that 
such violence may have occurred but cannot be proven due to a lack of written records. 
O'Keefe et al have also hypothesised an alternative account that little frontier violence 
occurred at the Gundagai site, because diseases, such as small pox and chicken pox, killed 
substantial numbers of Wiradjuri in the area, lessening conflict over resources and 
territory. Disease may have also lessened the Wiradjuri's potential for attack and 
resistance in the immediate vicinity of the future town. These diseases may also have 
contributed to the end of the Wiradjuri War in the early 1840s.29 Massacres in 
surrounding areas, such as that of 60 to 70 Wiradjuri men on Murdering Island in the 
Murrumbidgee in 1839, further reduced Wiradjuri numbers.30 It is clear that Wiradjuri 
numbers declined dramatically over this period. 31 
Partly as a direct result of this type of violence, in 1839 Crown Land 
Commissioners were appointed to districts 'beyond the limits of settlement'. The role of 
Commissioners was to ensure the administration of the law within their districts and 'to 
put a stop to the atrocities which have of late been so extensively committed beyond the 
26 Gammage, 'The Wiradjuri War, 1838-40', p.15. 
27 Gammage, 'The Wiradjuri War, 1838-40'. 
28 O'Keefe, et al., The Watermen of Gundagai, p.5. 
29 O'Keefe, et al., The Watermen of Gundagai, pp.5-6. 
30 Gammage, 'The Wiradjuri War, 1838-40', p.14. 
31 There is some evidence, albeit from settler estimations, of the decrease in Wiradjuri numbers between 
1844 and 1854. James Gormly, an early settler at Gundagai, recalled that in 1844 he had seen gatherings of 
up to 300 Aborigines in the area. In 185 1 Gundagai's Land Commissioner, Henry Bingham, estimated 
there were 40 Aborigines living near the town and 1, 140 within the Murrumbidgee area. By 1854, a new 
Land Commissioner, Charles Lockhart, estimated there were 450 Aborigines in the entire Murrumbidgee 
district. O'Keefe, et al., The Watermen of Gundagai, p.6. 
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boundaries, both by the Aborigines and on them' .32 Further, the Commissioners were 
instructed to conduct an official inquest into Aboriginal deaths that were suspected to 
have been caused by settler violence. 33 It was hoped that the Commissioners would 
facilitate friendlier frontier relations as plans for towns in the inland were being put into 
effect by the government. 
* * * 
Surveying Gundagai: Environmental Knowledge and Existing Settlement 
Gundagai was surveyed in 1838, as the Wiradjuri War was being fought. By this time the 
crossing place was frequently used by settlers. The site was already called 'Gundagai' by 
them - the Wiradjuri word for that stretch of the river, meaning 'cut with a tomahawk 
[axe] at the back of the knee' (possibly referring to the bend in the river) and adopted as 
the name of a nearby pastoral station.34 By 1838 there were also a number of buildings at 
the crossing place. In August 1837 William Brodribb petitioned the government to 
establish a punt service over the river. Brodribb managed a station which encompassed 
the flat between the Murrumbidgee and the anabranch (the eventual site of the town). He 
had erected buildings on the flat, near the river crossing, but also farmed sheep on the 
site. Settlers were already regularly camping at the site when the river was high, waiting for 
a safer opportunity to cross, often with stock.35 It had in some ways already become a 
small settlement with a transient population of travellers. 
With government approval, Brodribb began a punt service in January 1838, which 
enabled travellers to cross the river at times when river flow was too high. It also reduced 
32 
'Agency Detail', information on 'Commissioner of Crown Lands for the Lachlan District' record (Agency 
number 3496), State Records Authority of New South Wales, 
htm:!/investi~ator.records.nsw.i:-ov.au/Entity.aspx?Path=%5CAgency%5C3496, accessed 13 November, 
2008. 
33 
'Agency Detail', information on 'Commissioner of Crown Lands for the Lachlan District' record (Agency 
number 3496), State Records Authority of New South Wales, 
http://investigator.records.nsw.gov.au/ Entity.aspx?Path=%5CAi:-ency%5C3496, accessed 13 November, 
2008. 
34 Butcher, Gundagai, p.8; and, Soerjohardjo, 'Aspects of Life in Gundagai, 1840-1860', p.l. ln 1836 
Governor Richard Bourke introduced new land licensing fees for squatters and in 1837 established seven 
districts to encompass land which lay outside the official limits of settlement (Gundagai was within District 
3). 
35 Butcher, Gundagai, p.12; and, Janette Finch and Ruth Teale, 'Brodribb, William Adams (1809 - 1886)', 
Australian Dictionary of Biography (ADB) Online, ADB, 
http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/bioi:-s/A030222b.htm?hilite=Brodribb, accessed 12 December 2008. 
The station managed by Brodribb was owned by William Lithgow. It was established in 1837. 
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the risk of drowning, for both stock and people 36 That year, before the survey was 
complete, the flat also became home to an Inn (the 'Murrumbidgee Inn'). The Inn was 
built by Edward Bernard Green, who rented it to Joseph Andrews, a retired Major of the 
British Army.37 
Deputy Surveyor-General Captain Samuel Augustus Perry had selected the 
Gundagai site for further investigation as a possible location for a township, largely 
because it was an established crossing place over the Murrumbidgee. The surveying of 
Gundagai was part of a broader project by the Surveyor-General's office to establish towns 
along the Port Phillip Road at crossing places - including over the Murray, Ovens, and 
Goulburn Rivers, and Violet Creek - to improve transport routes within the colony.38 
Although Perry selected the site at Gundagai, the town survey was entrusted to two teams 
led by Assistant Surveyors Granville William C hetwynd Stapylton and Henry Cavendish 
Danvers Butler. 39 
Stapylton had accompanied Surveyor-General Thomas Mitchell on his 1836 
Australia Felix expedition as second-in-command. The expedition passed near Gundagai 
on their return journey in November. Unfortunately neither man recorded a detailed 
description of the place at the time. Exhausted after 10 months of work and travel, 
Stapylton discontinued his journal (which ended 12 November, when he reached the 
Murrumbidgee) and made only a brief survey. He wrote: 'Hurrah Hurrah Hurrah here 
ends my journal the country between this point on the Murray & the Stations on the 
next River [Murrumbidgee] being pretty well known to many'. 40 Mitchell, also exhausted, 
did not make detailed notes of the area either. 41 Squatters had already taken up land on 
the upper Murrumbidgee and upper Murray, and there was no impetus for an exploratory 
36 
'Extracts from Letter of Instructions [from Deputy Surveyor-General S.A. Perry] to Assistant Surveyor 
Stapylton', 22 January, 1838. 'Gundagai'. New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 
1852. pp.251-278, pp.260-261 
37 O'Keefe et al., The Watermen of Gundagai, p.1 2. 
38 
'Port Phillip Road Stations Recommended by Mr. Stewart', Letter from Deputy Surveyor-General S.A. 
Perry to Surveyor-General, 21 July, 1838. 'Gundagai'. New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and 
Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.25 1-278, p.263. 
39 
'Extracts from Letter of Instructions [from Deputy Surveyor-General S.A. Perry] to Assistant Surveyor 
Stapylton', 22 January, 1838, 'Gundagai'. New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 
1852. pp.25 1-278, p.260-261; and, 'Copy of Letter from the Surveyor-General to Assistant Surveyor Butler', 
22 January, 1838. 'Gundagai'. New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-
278, pp.262-3. 
40 Granville William Chetwynd Stapylton, Australia Felix Expedition journal entry, 5 November, 1836, 
p. 181, in Alan E.J. Andrews (ed.), Stapylwn with Major Mitchell's Australia Felix Expedition, 1836: largely from 
the journal of Granville William Chetwynd Stapylton (Hobart: Blubber Head Press, 1986), p.235. 
41 Alan E.J. Andrews, 'Editor's Commentary', in Alan E.J. Andrews (ed.), Stapylton with Major Mitchell's 
Australia Felix Expedition, 1836: largely from the journal of Granville William Chetwynd Stapylwn (Hobart: 
Blubber Head Press, 1986), pp.227-23 1, p.229. 
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survey. The 1838 surveying trip was thus Stapylton's second visit to Gundagai in an 
official capacity, but the first that required detailed observation. 
In accordance with the wider assignment of improving the Port Philip Road, Perry 
instructed the Assistant Surveyors' parties to pay particular attention to the road from 
Yass to the punt at Gundagai ('in the description of the road it is impossible to be too 
minute'), in addition appointing a member of Butler's party to be particularly responsible 
for observations of the road.42 Perry further requested that the surveying groups gather 
information on the crops that were being grown by settlers there and the possibilities for 
agriculture and 'small settlers'.43 
Perry additionally instructed the Assistant Surveyors to investigate the crossing 
place itself, the river, and the operations of Brodribb's punt, 'in order that the 
Government may be enabled to form a judgement as to the expediency of making reserves 
for such establishments as may be requisite in a station of such importance to the public 
as I conceive Sruckey's crossing to be' .44 From this statement the area was clearly held to 
be an important gathering and crossing place. Perry's interest in the site was not purely 
motivated by environmental suitability, but prompted by a number of other factors, 
including the need to include government land reserves for public amenities associated 
with an important crossing place. Gundagai also appeared to be a natural gathering place 
with potential for economic and population growth, as indicated by the pre-existence of 
buildings on the flat and travel route.45 Surveyor-General Thomas Mitchell later drew 
attention to the importance of these factors in the selection of the site. He stated that, 
'the design [of Gundagai] was made to follow the road, and to embrace a paddock and 
42 
'Extracts from Letter of Instructions [from Deputy Surveyor-General S.A. Perry] to Assistant Surveyor 
Stapylton', 22 January, 1838. 'Gundagai'. New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 
1852. pp.251-2 78, p.260-261; and, 'Copy of Letter from the Surveyor-General to Assistant Surveyor Butler', 
22 January, 1838. 'Gundagai'. New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-
278, pp.262-263. 
43 
'Extracts from Letter of Instructions [from Deputy Surveyor-General S.A. Perry] to Assistant Surveyor 
Stapylton', 22 January, 1838. 'Gundagai'. New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2. 
1852. pp.251-2 78, p.260-261; and, 'Copy of Letter from the Surveyor-General to Assistant Surveyor Butler', 
22 January, 1838. 'Gundagai'. New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-
278. pp.262-263. 
44 
'Dennis Kean, By J.R. Hardy, P.M., Yass: Surveyor-General to report on Kean's offer to erect a Punt and 
house of Accommodation at Stuckey's station, Murrumbidgee, on the road to Port Phillip, on condition of 
receiving a free grant of 100 acres', 14 February, 1838. 'Gundagai'. New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes 
and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-278, pp.262. 
45 
'Extracts from Letter of Instructions [from Deputy Surveyor-General S.A. Perry] to Assistant Surveyor 
Stapylton', 22 January, 1838, p.260-261. 'Gundagai'. New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and 
Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-278, p.260. What was to become South Gundagai, on the opposite bank of 
the Murrumbidgee River, was also marginally surveyed at this time, but no town plans were compiled until 
1845 and no lots gazetted for sale until 1846. 
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buildings then in use' .46 Indeed, the pre-existence of buildings at Gundagai seems to have 
taken precedence over environmental observations in determining the site of the town - a 
situation that Perry would later reference in his defence after the town flooded in 1844. 
In 1844 Perry also claimed that no official survey report of the town site had been 
produced.47 In assessing the evidence from the survey of Gundagai it is unclear exactly 
what was produced by the survey teams. It appears that Buder and Stapylton did not 
answer Perry's detailed instructions about the site. Buder did return a survey of 
Brodribb's station, and of the road between the Murrumbidgee and Port Phillip (as 
requested by Perry), but there seems to have been no more documentation made or 
returned by the Assistant Surveyors (not even the field notes relevant to Gundagai).48 It 
was Perry who drew the official 1838 survey map of Gundagai (approved by the Executive 
Council in August 1838), with a note that 'the original of this is by Mr. Buder' .49 So, 
Butler must have communicated something more to Perry but this has not been found 
(or survived).50 On Perry's map there is a note that land east of the flat (but not the flat 
itself) was 'subject to inundation' (Map 2.1).51 
Why was no official survey report made? The answer can only be speculative. It is 
possible that the report was not submitted because, only a few days after submitting the 
survey report of the road between the Murrumbidgee and Port Phillip (18 June 1838), 
Butler tendered his resignation from the Surveyor-General's office.52 His letter of 
resignation, dated 21 June 1838, followed a leave of absence, indicating that he may have 
suffered from ill health after the January survey trip to Gundagai, which may in turn 
explain the lack of a report. The other su rveyor, Stapylton, travelled on to Port Phillip, 
where he was sent to work under Robert Hoddle. There, in October 1838, he was 
46 
'Village of Gundagai. Mr. Bingham's Report', Thomas Mitchell's notes on Henry Bingham's report of the 
1844 flood, 2 December, 1844. 'Gundagai'. New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 
1852. pp.251-278, pp.263-264. 
47 SMH, 18 February, 1845, in 'Gundagai, New South Wales'. Newspaper Clippings fi le. Mitchell Library, 
State Library of New South Wales. 
48 
'Mr. Assistant Surveyor Butler to the Surveyor-General', 21 March 1838. 'Gundagai'. New South Wales 
Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-278, p.262; and, Butler to the Surveyor-General, 
21 June, 1838. Surveyor-General - Letters Received 1822-1855; H.C.D. Butler, 7 Jan 1836- 21 June 1838. 
NRS 13736, [2/1520]. Reel 3057. State Records Authority of New South Wales. 
49 Samuel Perry, 'Gundagai', 'Approved by Executive Council'. Survey Map. 1838. NRS 13859, [Map 281 1]. 
State Records Authoriry of New South Wales. 
50 There is no record of a survey map or any further communication from Butler to the Surveyor-General's 
Office in the State Records Authoriry of New South Wales archive. 
51 Samuel Perry, 'Gundagai', 'Approved by Executive Council'. 1838. NRS 13859, [Map 281 1]. State 
Records Authoriry of New South Wales. 
52 Butler to the Surveyor-General, 18 June, 1838 and 21 June, 1838. Surveyor-General - Letters Received 
1822-1855; H.C.D. Butler, 7 Jan 1836-21June1838. NRS 13736, [2/1520]. Reel 3057. State Records 
Authoriry of New South Wales. 
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reprimanded for several incidents of drunkenness.53 This behaviour may have begun 
earlier as there is little surviving correspondence from Stapylton about his Gundagai 
survey. With little advice available from surveyors about the environment, it appears that 
the site of Gundagai was surveyed primarily to contribute to travellers' convenience and 
settlers' economic advantage. 
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Map 1.2 
Survey map of Gundagai by Samuel Perry, 1838. 
To the right of the allotments is written 'subject to inundation'. 
Below the scale rule is written 'the original of this is by Mr. Butler'. 
Note the location of the lagoon in relation to the allotments. 
[Samuel Perry, 'Gundagai', 'Approved by Executive Council'. Survey map. 1838. NRS 13859, 
[Map 2811]. State Records Authority of New South Wales.] 
It was not uncommon in this period for surveyors to survey areas after settler 
occupation, particularly in areas 'outside the limits of location'. As historian David 
Denholm has explained, pastoralists often preceded government surveyors, establishing 
buildings and runs that a surveyor then 'legitimised' 'with his straight lines' .54 The grant 
system (that amounted to free selection) worked well for a government whose experts 
53 Louis Cranfield, 'Stapylton, Granville William Chetwynd (1800-1840)', ADB Online, 
http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/ A020437b.htrn?hilite=stapylton, accessed 22 October 2008. 
54 Denholm, The Colonial Australians, p.55. 
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were still learning about new environments. Denholm argued that pastoralists' free choice 
of land 'left the Colonial Office in the clear': if the settler 'chose badly, he alone was 
responsible' .55 Free grants ceased in 1831. The survey of Gundagai as a government town 
at the location of pre-existing settlement brought together the eras of pre- and post- land 
grants. Surveyors endorsed the site in the same way that areas had been under the grant 
system. However, the laying out of a town by government surveyors, with allotments to be 
purchased by settlers, did not hold the freedom from government responsibility the grant 
system had allowed. 
The business that could be gained from the traffic on the road, and the status of 
the site as an established stopping place, was also of interest to colonial entrepreneurs. At 
the time of the survey, settler Dennis Kean requested permission from the government to 
establish an additional punt and 'a place of accommodation' at the crossing, in exchange 
for a free grant of 100 acres of land. 56 The site of Gundagai, was, from the beginning, one 
of convenience and economic advantage.57 By adhering to the river and road, surveyors 
were reinforcing the economic potential of the site. 
* * * 
Establishment of the Town: Commerce and Trade in Gundagai's Planning 
In August 1838 Perry secured the Governor's approval for the establishment of a town at 
Gundagai.58 Perry had already marked the town out into half-acre lots, approximately half 
of which were on the flat between the two watercourses and the rest stemmed north, onto 
the slopes of Mount Parnassus. Gundagai was laid out on a strict grid plan, with main 
streets named after major literary figures, for example, Shakespeare, Milton, and 
Sheridan. The grid layout of the town was an efficient administrative tool for town 
55 Denholm, The Colonial Aiistralians, p.55. 
56 
'Dennis Kean, By J.R. Hardy, P.M., Yass: Surveyor-General to report on Kean's offer to erect a Pun t and 
house of Accommodation at Stuckey's station, Murrumbidgee, on the road to Port Phillip, on condition of 
receiving a free grant of 100 acres', 14 February 1838. 'Gundagai' . New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes 
and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-278, pp.262. An inn, the 'Murrumbidgee Inn', was established in 1838, 
but was licensed to Joseph Andrews, not Dennis Kean. The 'Murrumbidgee Inn' was built on the banks of 
the Murrumbidgee, on the eastern side of the Port Phillip Road, near the crossing place. It was located 
outside the later town plans. O ' Keefe, et al., The Watermen of Gundagai, p.12 and p.35 . 
57 Michael Norton (Gundagai's first police constable), quoted in, Gundagai Independent, 9 September, 1948, 
p.13. 
58 
'Copy of a letter from the Colonial Secretary to The Surveyor-General', 2 August 1838. 'Gundagai'. New 
South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-278, p.263. 
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planning. In modern settler-colonial societies, such as Australia and the Americas, it was 
widely used.59 It was practical and quickly done, a way of efficiently parcelling land for 
sale.60 The grid could also be adjusted to suit particular topographical as well as functional 
purposes, whether political and symbolist, military, or to serve mercantile economies.61 
Gundagai fell into this last category. The main travelling route - Port Phillip Road -
became the main street of the town (Homer Street), located on a north-south axis running 
directly though the middle. This street became 'the main thoroughfare' and carried 'heavy 
traffic'.62 Town allotments reached almost to the crossing place by the river. Indeed 
settlers later built outside of the surveyed blocks, to be closer to the trade afforded by the 
crossing place. Perry aligned Gundagai's north-south grid lines with magnetic north (a 
standard feature of colonial Australian towns).63 Denholm has argued that the ever-
dominant straight line, used in surveying much of Australia, was a way of 'tiding the 
landscape' not in and for itself, but 'to suit someone's purposes'.64 In Gundagai it 
promoted the growth of an economy based on an already established trade, suiting 
current residents, potential future investors, and ultimately the government in terms of 
land revenue. 
Gundagai was gazetted as a town site on 10 October 1838, and allotments were 
gazetted for sale on 12 August 1841.65 Significantly, not all the surveyed sections (or 
blocks) were put up for sale, only those on the flat which were closest to the crossing place 
and road. The river flat was clearly envisioned as the town centre. At the initial sales 29 
allotments were sold, 23 of which were on blocks bordering the crossing place on the 
Murrumbidgee River or along Port Phillip Road.66 Buyers clearly perceived the benefits of 
59 Spiro Kostof, The City Shaped: Urban Patterns and Meanings Through History (London: Thames and Hudson, 
1991), pp.95-103. 
60 Kostof, The City Shaped, pp.95-103. 
61 Kostof, The City Shaped, pp.95-103. 
62 Michael Norton, Gundagai Independent, 9 September, 1948, p.13. 
63 Denholm, The Colonial Australians, p.59. 
64 Denholm, The Colonial Australians, p.50. 
65 David Lindley, Early Gundagai: Thomas Lindley (1807-1862) Emancipist in Southern New South Wales 
(Canberra: T. Greensmith & Co., 2002), p.60. 
66 
'Return of the several Allotments of Land situated in the Township of Gundagai, (under the designations 
of 'Gundagai', 'South Gundagai', and 'North Gundagai') sold by the Crown, since the establishment of the 
Township, to the present date', 24 August, 1852. 'Gundagai'. New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and 
Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-278, p.275-278. 
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these locations for trade, and inns, hotels, stores, and private dwellings of timber and 
brick were soon erected.67 
In the years following initial sales, there were many other allotment purchases, as 
those who owned property extended their purchases, new buyers moved in, and others 
left the district, selling their allotments and buildings. Despite large property purchases, 
by 1844 there were only 17 men engaged in trade in Gundagai (excluding servants and 
women): two wheelwrights, three blacksmiths, two tanners and curriers, three 
shoemakers, one harness maker, one storekeeper, two surgeons, and three innkeepers.68 
The residents were a mixture of emancipist convicts and free settlers. In 1851 
between one third and one half of the population was comprised of ex-convicts.69 In 
addition to the buildings listed in surveys and reports, it is also likely that there were less 
solid structures, such as huts and tents, in the vacant lots and near the river, erected by 
residents and travellers as semi-permanent and temporary shelters and storehouses.70 
Allotments were also used as market gardens and stockyards. Gundagai was becoming a 
major gathering place, an early principal colonial town of inland Australia. 
There is evidence that from the start Wiradjuri warned settlers of the danger of 
flooding on the flat land that lay between the Murrumbidgee River and the anabranch.71 
Although squatters, such as Stuckey, had settled in the area since the late 1820s, there is 
no evidence that squatters told surveyors or those who built on the flat about large floods 
in Gundagai. However, according to settlers who arrived around the time of the first 
allotments sale in 1841, Wiradjuri spoke of two large floods that had occurred in the past 
67 O'Keefe, et al., The Watermen of Gundagai, pp.29-39. At the initial sale, allotments were bought by eleven 
buyers, one of which was the land Commissioner for the Murrumbidgee District, Henry Bingham; another 
was retired Army Major Joseph Andrews. Andrews, who already leased the 'Murrumbidgee Inn', later 
purchased nearby Ki mo Station, and in 1852 owned 18 allotments on the flat. In 1843 Joseph Andrews 
also opened a pose office, which he ran out of the Inn. O 'Keefe, et al., The Watermen of Gundagai, p.13, 
pp.29-30 and p.81. 
Spiro Kostof notes that a feature of settler-colonial grid planning was chat it allowed this kind of land 
monopoly by first buyers ('the luck of first ownership'), and perpetuated a wealthy property owning class of 
first buyers (as land prices were later driven up), rather than the grid being a tool of settler-colonial 
egalitarianism as sometimes argued by American scholars. Kostof, The City Shaped, pp.99-101. 
68 SMH, 22 August, 1844, p.3; and, O'Keefe et al., The Watermen of Gundagai, p.13. 
69 The Blue Book, 1851; Soerjohardjo, 'Aspects of life in Gundagai, 1840-1860', p.28; and, Butcher, 
Gundagai, p. l 7. 
70 O'Keefe ec al., The Watermen of Gundagai, p.29-35. 
71 SMH, 11 November, 1844, p.2; and, Harry Turnbull, 'The Stuff Old-Timers Were made Of' (first 
published in Southern Cross, 6 January, 1920), in James Gormly, Exploration and Settlement in Australia 
(Sydney: D.S. Ford, printer, 1921), pp.196-198, p. 197. 
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decade; the first in 1830 and the second in 1838 - the year of the town survey.72 
Colonists continued to build on the flat despite these warnings. Perhaps they thought 
large floods were unusual occurrences, perhaps they did not believe (or listen to) 
Wiradjuri, or perhaps the growing business trade on the flat was worth the risk. 
During the first three years of town settlement, the inhabitants experienced 
floods; however there were no reports of damage from these small floods, probably caused 
by snowmelt and local freshes. 73 Settlers marked the floods' heights with a 'flood-stake' 
(one was possibly located near the lagoon and another near the crossing place).74 By 1844 
some town residents had come to know the behaviour of these floods, such as the 
particular sound the water made and type of wash that signalled its peak. 75 In 1844 the 
town experienced its first large flood and such knowledge became a liability because this 
flood behaved very differently. 
* * * 
October 1844 Flood 
The drought that began in the late 1830s started to break in 1843.76 Rain began steadily 
falling during the first week of October 1844.77 The snow that covered the Snowy 
Mountains also thawed.78 Fed by rain and snowmelt, the Murrumbidgee swelled, isolating 
shepherds' huts in paddocks near Gundagai. Although heavy rain on Thursday 9 October 
swelled the rivers further, the following day they began to fall. Over the next two days rain 
continued. One resident observed, by examining the flood-stake, that the flood remained 
stationary from Friday until lOpm on Sunday (12 October). By dusk on Monday, 
72 In 1844 the SMH reported that some settlers had already been warned by Wiradjuri of floods, one of 
which they said occurred in 1830. Gundagai's first Police Constable, Michael Norton, who arrived in 1851, 
later wrote that Aborigines told him of a large flood that occurred in 1838. See, SMH, 11 November, 1844, 
p.2; and, O'Keefe et al., Watermen of Gundagai, p.12, 
73 SMH, 29 October, 1844, p.4. 
Freshes are local rises in river levels. They usually occur after heavy local rain and mostly result from the 
washing away of logs and other debris that had been blocking river flow, releasing the water downstream. 
74 SMH, 29 October, 1844, p.4. 
75 SMH, 29 October, 1844, p.4. 
76 Charles MacAlister, Old Pioneering Days in the Sunny South (Goulburn: Chas. MacAlister Book Publication 
Committee, 1907), pp.120-122. 
77 SMH, 11 November, 1844, p.2. 
78 SMH, 11 November, 1844, p.2. 
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however, the flood had risen two feet and nine inches above any previous flood mark on 
the stake. Many still believed 'Tuesday would show us the receding floodwaters'.79 
Two men had already been flooded out of their home on Monday, and stayed 
with another resident and his family, who was later to write to the Sydney Morning Herald 
(SMH) about the flood. The unnamed correspondent lived on a ridge, outside the centre 
of Gundagai, possibly on the southern slopes of Mount Parnassus. They were confident 
that the waters would fall overnight; the flood was moving, 'with that sluggish movement 
which always indicated to us its arrival to its maximum height'. But the flood continued 
to rise. Late on Monday night they took a lantern to investigate the progress of the flood 
and saw that the water had risen over two feet in a matter of hours. 80 
In realising the speed at which the water was rising, the shouts that the group had 
heard earlier that night suddenly took on new meaning, with 'fearful certainty'. They had 
thought shepherds were trying to scare off 'wild dogs'; but now recognised the calls as a 
sign that people on the flat were being 'driven out of their huts'. The correspondent later 
wrote that those on the flat had no way to escape. They had already been isolated by the 
high rivers for days.8 1 
Throughout the night the SMH correspondent could hear the shouts and cries of 
people 'in all directions' and by dawn he was completely cut off from the town. Water 
had started to enter their own house. The writer's family and the two men who had 
sought safety with them placed their belongings on benches and tables, and packed some 
goods, moving to a higher ridge by dray. There they set stakes in a small plot of dry land 
to monitor the speed at which the water was rising - it was rising quickly. The plot of dry 
land decreased from three square feet after dawn to two square feet by lOam. They 
described the turbulence of the waters, 'roaring' and 'boiling', the sound of which was 
'awful'. Furniture, goods, dead sheep and pigs floated past. They remained on the ridge 
for four days and three nights as the flood reached a final peak on Tuesday afternoon, 
and slowly subsided.82 
Going into the town, people gathered to tell stories of the flood. Water had 
reached at least three to four feet in all buildings on the flat, and in some places it 
reached to the top of the 'roof-tree' (ridge pole). The water had arrived quickly in the 
town and at night. To escape the turbulent water, people had climbed onto rooftops and 
79 SMH, 29 October, 1844, p.4. 
80 SMH, 29 October, 1844, p.4. 
81 SMH, 29 October, 1844, p.4. 
82 SMH, 29 October, 1844, p.4. 
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into the upper branches of trees. One woman with her four children, along with a 
traveller staying in the same hut, had climbed into the branches of a tree. They stayed 
there for three nights, 'in the midst of boiling water'. One of the children fell into the 
water twice from exhaustion, and 'another became delirious from his sufferings'. The only 
food they ate was a fowl they caught and ate raw. The woman's husband was nearby but 
unable to help.83 
Aborigines rescued some settlers using bark canoes. 'Mrs. Guise' (whose husband 
was in Port Phillip) and her two children climbed onto the roof of their hut, where they 
stayed 'for several days' as the water rose nearly to the roof. From there, they were 
'rescued by the blacks in a bark canoe'.84 An Aborigine (also using a bark canoe) saved 
farmers Henry and Susannah Hargreaves, and their children, who lived two miles down 
river.85 There is a suggestion in the Gundagai resident's account that others were also 
saved by Aborigines: 'many escaped to the mountains by aid of a canoe' .86 Settlers on the 
Lachlan River (which also flooded at this time) were also 'rescued by blacks in their 
canoes'.87 
Commissioner for Crown Lands in the Murrumbidgee District, Henry Bingham, 
wrote to 'the government' soon after the flood. His letter was a statement of 'the great 
services rendered by the aborigines on that river [the Tumut] and the Murrumbidgee 
lately when those rivers were in flood, by which many individuals were saved' . Bingham 
further urged that some reward be presented to the individuals 'as an acknowledgement 
of their services and exertions'.88 There is no evidence any reward was given. 
As a Land Commissioner, one of Bingham's roles was to promote friendly 
frontier relationships between settlers and Aborigines. Perhaps his wish to recognise the 
Aboriginal rescuers as heroes through government reward was a way of demonstrating an 
example of friendly relationships, to the government and local communities in Gundagai 
(both settler and Aboriginal). In the context of the recent Wiradjuri War, Aboriginal 
rescues of settlers during this flood take on even more significance. Perhaps the urgent 
moments of danger overcame recent hostilities - they were moments in which the skill 
and knowledge as well as bravery of Wiradjuri, who had survived a smallpox epidemic 
83 SMH, 29 October, 1844, p.4. 
84 SMH, 29 October, 1844, p.4. 
85 Henry Hargreaves, Letter to his nephew and nephew's wife, 11, 14, 19 June, 1870. ML DOC 949. 
Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales. 
86 SMH, 29 October, 1844, p.4. 
87 MacAlister, Old Pioneering Days in the Sunny South, pp.126-127. 
88 Maitland Mercury, 30 November, 1844, p.4. 
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and war, were extended to endangered settlers, invaders, who were perhaps also 
strangers.89 
The 1844 flood revealed to those in Gundagai the vulnerability of the site to large 
floods as well as the truth behind Aboriginal warnings. Signs of the flood lingered. The 
height to which the flood had risen was marked by debris lodged high in the trees. 
Settlers' attention was also drawn to older debris, lodged even higher. A resident wrote 
that, 'our attention being frequently attracted to the weeds and rubbish left by the late 
floods at so great an elevation on the trees, we have noticed what would have perhaps 
otherwise escaped our observation. The vestiges of a former inundation, which must have 
been eighteen inches above that from which we had lately suffered'. The branches of trees 
had enfolded this debris, 'proving a lapse of many years between the intervals of the 
floods'.90 The resident further wrote that '[t]he aboriginals do not appear to consider the 
flood at all extraordinary'. On the writer's 'first visit to the Murrumbidgee', while 
building their father's head station, Aborigines had told them that during past floods the 
hill on which they were building was surrounded by water, and that this had proved the 
case in this flood.91 They estimated that one of these past floods occurred in 1830, 'if 
their [the Aborigines'] calculation of time be correct' .92 
After the flood, residents hypothesised on the cause of the flood. The 'generally 
received opinion' was that 'the inundation was caused by the sudden thawing of snow on 
the Maneroo [Monaro] Alps' .93 One settler noted that a few days before the flood the 
Snowy Mountains had been covered in snow and they were now bare.94 The 1844 flood 
marked a turning point in settler knowledge, with new understanding developed through 
their own observations and a direct demonstration of what they had heard from 
Aborigines in the area. 
As the water level slowly dropped the damage revealed itself. Fences were broken, 
gardens destroyed, food was rotting, and animals were dead.95 Although many had moved 
89 For more on smvivors of small pox and war, see: Gammage, 'The Wiradjuri War, 1838-40', p.15. 
90 SMH, 11 November, 1844, p.2. 
91 SMH, 11 November, 1844, p.2. 
92 SMH, l 1 November, 1844, p.2. 
93 SMH, 11 November, 1844, p.2. 
94 SMH, 11 November, 1844, p.2. George Augustus Robinson, Chief Protector o f Aborigines for Port 
Phillip, journeyed through Gundagai about a week after the flood. In his journal he commented that the 
floods were due to a combination of snowmelt and rain. See: Robinson, 'Chief Protectors Journal 
(abridged) of an Expedition to the Aborigines of the Eastern Interior commencing April and terminat ing 
October', 1844, in Governor G ipps Despatches, January-May, 1845, p.746. A1236. Mitchell Library, State 
Library of New South Wales. 
95 SMH, 29 October, 1844, p.4. 
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belongings and stores onto tables, possessions and tradesmen's tools had been lost, 
washed away by the force of the floodwaters. On the southern bank of the river, a 
blacksmith's shop was destroyed, the post that anchored his anvil was uprooted, and the 
anvil was carried 'a considerable distance'.96 One of the biggest losers was retired Army 
Major Joseph Andrews, one of the first residents of Gundagai town. He had not moved 
belongings and stores from the floor, and most of these were ruined or washed away.97 
There was no government or other aid (for example, from charitable relief funds) external 
to the town itself in the aftermath of the flood. Residents of the town, however, organised 
their own aid for victims.98 
Only one man died in Gundagai; Thomas Arms, a servant of Charles Thomason, 
drowned while trying to rescue a woman and her children. There were, however, 
drownings at other points on the Murrumbidgee near Gundagai, including one man at 
'Jewging', one at 'Bagelong', and one at Yass.99 In his reminiscences, drover and 
pastoralist Charles MacAlister recalled that a convict shepherd was drowned at Yalbraith 
in this flood. The shepherd, Tom Gurney, had taken 'refuge beneath the overhanging 
bank of a creek, and the waters rose so quickly that Gurney was suffocated in his lair'. 100 
Another body was washed down river, past Gundagai. The body of an Aboriginal man 
was later found and thought to be the same. Bingham conducted an inquiry into the 
man's death. 101 Later, reports from downstream indicated that while human deaths had 
been 'less than anticipated', '[a]lmost everyone has suffered in some way', through stock 
losses and damage to fencing and buildings. 102 
The Lachlan River had also flooded in October. 103 This river, which runs parallel 
to the Murrumbidgee to the north, was (like the Murrumbidgee) already in flood in early 
October from heavy rainfall and peaked around the same time. 104 Along the Lachlan the 
flood rose quickly. Patrick Boswell, then living on the Lachlan, later recalled having to 
96 SMH, 11 November, 1844, p.2. 
97 O'Keefe, et al., T he Watermen of Gundagai, p. 13 and p.81. 
98 SMH, 29 October, 1844, p.4; and, SMH, 11 November, 1844, p.2. 
99 SMH, 29 October, 1844, p.4. 'Jewging' probably refers to the settlement of 'Jugiong' located on the 
Murrumbidgee River, approximately 40 kilometres north of Gundagai on the Murrumbidgee. 'Bagelong' 
probably refers to the settlement of 'Binalong', located 30 kilometres northeast of Jugiong, on Balgalal 
Creek, a tributary of the Murrumbidgee. Yass is a town located approximately 80 kilometres northeast of 
Gundagai on the Yass River, a tributary of the Murrumbidgee. 
100 MacAlister, Old Pioneering Days in the Sunny South, p.126. 
101 SMH, 29 October, 1844, p.4; SMH, 11 November, 1844, p.2; and O'Keefe, et al., Watermen of Gundagai, 
p.7. 
102 SMH, 11 November, 1844, p.2. 
103 There were also floods in the Hawkesbury in October 1844. SMH, 29 October, 1844, p.4. 
104 The river is not fed by snowmelt, its headwaters being too far north. 
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quickly evacuate his household. On his way to give aid to a neighbour he had noticed a 
rapidly swelling creek, which could soon cut off and flood his house. The household -
which included thirteen children, five women, and four men - moved to higher ground, 
temporarily erecting tents before travelling to a near-by station to wait out the flood. They 
had left the house in two groups. The first group loaded a cart and moved to the hill and 
the cart returned for the second load of supplies and group of people. The first group had 
a dry passage, but the water rose so quickly that those who walked in the second group, 
'had to wade almost up to their knees'. 105 
When the flood began to subside Boswell rode to his house, wading through 
water to get there. While the land around the house was now dry, Boswell saw that the 
floor was covered with about a foot of mud and the kitchen wall, made of brick, had 
collapsed. The flood had left a four foot water mark in the house. Boswell considered 
himself 'more fortunate' than others in the district, whose houses had been more 
substantially damaged and whose stock losses were greater. Boswell managed to save most 
of his cattle by swimming them onto higher land, however another pastoralist in the 
district lost 1, 100 sheep. Three men drowned in the area. 106 
In this period it was not uncommon for settlers to drown during floods, especially 
whilst trying to cross swollen rivers. Prior to the establishment of punts and bridges, 
settlers had little option but to swim horses across rapidly flowing rivers, or themselves 
wade through floodwater, even though it is evident that many could not swim. For 
example, James Gormly, a strong swimmer who was later to survive the 1852 flood by 
swimming to a tree amid turbulent waters, wrote the following account of crossing the 
flooded Macquarie River in 1851: 
At the time there was no bridge over the river, and the boat used for taking over foot 
passengers had been swamped. I attempted to swim over on horseback when the river was 
in flood, and was swept down by the force of the current for half a mile before I could 
land on the other side. At the time three men were drowned in one week in attempting 
to swim the Macquarie at Bathurst. 107 
105 Patrick Charles Douglas Boswell, 'The Great Flood of the Lachlan River in October, 1844', in A.A.CD. 
Boswell, 'Some Recollections of My Early Days Written At Different Periods', circa 1908. N 994.42 B747. 
National Library of Australia. 
106 Patrick Charles Douglas Boswell, 'The Great Flood of the Lachlan River in October, 1844'. 
107 James Gormly, 'Immigration in the Early Days' (first published in Wagga Express, 12 August, 1916), in 
James Gormly, Exploration and Settlement in Australia (Sydney: D.S. Ford, printer, 192 1), pp.72-76, p.75. 
38 
Chapter One - Gundagai 1852 
Flooded rivers were sites of death and danger not only for those crossing them but also 
for those living along their banks. For residents of Gundagai, as well as concerned settlers 
in other parts of the colony, the establishment of a town, by the government, at a location 
revealed in 1844 to be so clearly in the path of large floods, was cause for action. 
* * * 
Blame and Responsibility: Bingham, Petitioners, and the Government 
Residents and landowners in Gundagai blamed the government for the effects of the 
1844 flood. They asserted that it was government agents who had sited a large part of the 
town on the flat. Settlers were concerned not only that they were living with the danger of 
large floods, but that town properties were now worthless. The flood endangered the 
perceived economic future of the town. In this period between the formation of the 
Legislative Council in 1843 and responsible government in 1856, newspapers and 
petitions were two important avenues for political expression by settlers. They were also 
two media that acted as gauges of public opinion for politicians and which politicians 
(largely) took seriously and which fed back into policy and laws. 108 Indeed, legal historian 
Kerry Fraser Mills has argued that they were important in shaping the political and legal 
landscape in this period. 109 Residents and landowners in Gundagai argued for 
government redress in both newspapers and petitions after the 1844 flood. 
In a letter to the SMH soon after the flood, a resident of Gundagai wrote that the 
government had no option but to move the town: 'The position of Gundagai as a 
government township is no longer tenable; no one would receive the allotments now as a 
gift, and the government has no alternative but to remove the site, and allow the present 
holders of allotments the choice of others on the newly defined village'. 110 Gundagai' s 
allotments were thought to now be valueless. The resident hinted that the initial survey 
teams were to blame for siting the town there: 'The surveyor who marked out the present 
township committed an egregious error in the selection of the site, and evidently had no 
data to form his judgement upon: for the only spot which was not covered by the flood is 
108 Kerry Fraser Mills, 'Of the people, by the people, for the people: Law-making in New South Wales, 1843-
1855', PhD thesis, University of New England, 2006, pp.92-98. 
109 Mills, 'Of the people, by the people, for the people: Law-making in New South Wales, 1843-1855', 
pp.92-98. 
110 SMH, 29 October, 1844, p.4 
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marked on the chart as valueless, being 'subject to inundations". 111 According to this 
resident, the surveyors ' expertise was inadequate, which led them to misinterpret the 
environmental suitability of the site for a town. 
Concerned for the future of the town, the Land Commissioner for the 
Murrumbidgee District, Henry Bingham (who also owned allotments in Gundagai), wrote 
to the Colonial Secretary in early November urging that land on higher ground, on the 
'south bank of the Murrumbidgee' (and to the south of the township), be surveyed and 
that landowners be allowed to exchange their floodable land for these new, drier, lots. 112 
He further added that 'the water was 4 to 5 feet deep in the huts at Gundagai, and parties 
suffered severe loss of property; and with the prospect of similar inundations, all chance 
of the advancement of Gundagai, as an Inland Township on its present site, I would say are 
at an end, as no persons would now think of purchasing allotments, or of building in 
such a precarious situation' . 11 3 Indeed, soon after the flood the population of Gundagai 
dropped to eight people (again, excluding women and servants). 114 The aftermath of the 
flood brought more concern about economics than future safety. The economic 
ramifications of the flood could badly affect landowners (land value could fall), residents 
(town growth could fall), and the government (land revenue could fall). The Colonial 
Secretary replied to Bingham in December that the Governor, George Gipps, would 
order the survey of lots on the south bank of the Murrumbidgee, but that landowners 
would not be able to exchange their land as Gipps, 'considers that what a man buys, he 
buys for better or for worse'. 115 
Another man, named John Spencer, also wrote to the Colonial Secretary in early 
February 1845. Spencer wrote in support of Bingham's choice of land for survey on the 
111 SMH, 29 October, 1844, p.4 
112 
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south bank of the Murrumbidgee.116 Spencer had recently moved (within the previous 
year) to Gundagai from Bredalbane Plains, and was later to become Gundagai 
correspondent to the Goulbum Herald. 117 He was a proprietor of a hotel, 'Thatched 
Cottage Inn' (later 'Family Hotel'), on the southern bank of the Murrumbidgee, near 
Gundagai. The land on which he had built had not been surveyed and Spencer's support 
of surveying land near his hotel was perhaps an attempt to increase his business through 
development at the site. 
In his letter Spencer pre-empted a general petition by residents in the current 
Gundagai township. He had seen an advertisement in the SMH indicating that a petition 
and letter were being compiled by the 'Gundagaites', which would express the views of 
the 'District generally'. Spencer acknowledged to the Governor that the notice in the 
newspaper had requested that no one write personally to the Governor until the petition 
and general letter were compiled. Spencer, however, was concerned about the petition. 
He told the Governor that the petitioners planned to request that new allotments be 
surveyed on higher land on the northern side of the river and they would not see the 
benefit of new allotments on the southern side of the river. Indeed he told the Governor 
to disregard 'the Petition of adverse persons who fancy their interests may in some slight 
manner be interfered with'. 118 He suggested that the actual purchased allotments in 
Gundagai township were 'inconsiderable' and therefore the Governor should look to the 
future development of the site on the southern side of the river, 'the beautiful and 
admirable site suggested by Mr. Bingham' rather than the 'present low land' .119 
However, Bingham's proposal had already been disregarded by the Governor. The 
Colonial Secretary replied to Spencer that Gipps had 'already decided that he cannot 
incur the expense oflaying out a new Township at that place'. 120 Inquiries into the cost of 
a survey for allotments on the southern bank, through the Surveyor-General's 
116 
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department, had returned a survey tender that would cost half the earnings from 
allotment sales. Gipps determined that he could not 'sanction the expense'. 121 
* * * 
Economic Futures and Environmental Knowledge: 1844 Petition 
The general petition arrived at the Governor's offices soon after. It was signed by nine 
landowners in the township. The petitioners pointed out that they had relinquished their 
financial interests in other towns when they moved to Gundagai. They had put 
'considerable' amounts of money into developing their properties, erecting businesses 
such as inns and stores, as well as dwellings. These, as well as goods and belongings, had 
been 'considerably injured' by the flood. They requested that three town sections (15, 16, 
and 1 7), which were 'without the reach of floods', and already surveyed, be subdivided. 
They also requested an opportunity to purchase these allotments without competition 
from other bidders. 122 
The petitioners further explained that their move to Gundagai had been 
motivated by the financial opportunities the town afforded. They had planned to 
capitalise on the situation of the town as 'the only Township in the neighbourhood'. The 
petitioners saw Bingham's proposal for allotments on the opposite side of the river as the 
seeds of 'a rival Township'. A new town could do them 'great injury' through increasing 
competition for trade. 123 Indeed, the petitioners made a pledge to the Governor that they 
would purchase the allotments in the three sections they requested at the full government 
price of £8 an acre, 'if no allotments are laid out on the South bank of the 
121 
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Murrumbidgee' .124 Their collective action was a commercial manoeuvre. By acting 
collectively, and potentially moving their businesses together, they could ensure the trade 
centre of the town remained intact and would continue to be a business hub - ideally 
without competition. Further, negotiating collectively with the government potentially 
increased the force of their arguments and gained political clout. 125 Their proposal had a 
number of advantages over Bingham's and Spencer's (Spencer, however, was not 
mentioned in the petition). First, it was an expression of 'public opinion', given the 
number of signatures, and as such carried weight with the Legislative Council. 126 
Secondly, it would cost the government less and possibly ensure it an easy profit as the 
sections were already surveyed and a surveyor would only need to sub-divide them. 
In addition to negotiating the future economy of the town, the petitioners were 
also trading in environmental knowledge. The flood, they argued, had revealed which 
parts of the town were subject to inundation, something that had not been recognised in 
the initial survey. With this knowledge they were able to support their argument against 
the survey and sale of land on the opposite side of the Murrumbidgee, because 'ample 
room in the most favourable situation [above the height of the 1844 flood] can be found 
adjoining the present Township' .127 Further, through the direct experience of a flood, 
they had acquired substantial knowledge of the Gundagai site, compared with the 
government, especially which land was liable to large inundations. Their experiences gave 
them a kind of 'knowledge capital' with which to trade and a platform from which to 
argue. 
Gipps in some ways seemed to recognise this. He agreed to the subdivisions of the 
three sections the petitioners requested. Perhaps also, by fulfilling the petitioners' request, 
he was placing responsibility for the choice of flood-free sections and allotments on the 
124 
'Copy of a letter from R.W. Goodall, Esq. To the Colonial Secretary', 27 February, 1845. 'Gundagai'. 
New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-278, pp.255-256. Government 
pricing at £8 an acre: see, 'Copy of a Letter from the Surveyor-General to the Colonial Secretary', 31 
December, 1844. 'Gundagai' . New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-
278, p.254. 
125 Ravi De Costa, quoted in, Mills, 'Of the people, by the people, for the people: Law-making in New 
South Wales, 1843-1855', p.92. See Mills generally on the political role of petitions: Mills, 'Of the people, 
by the people, for the people: Law-making in New South Wales, 1843-1855', p.92-95. 
126 Mills, 'Of the people, by the people, for the people: Law-making in New South Wales, 1843-1855', p.92-
98. 
127 
'Copy of a Letter from R.W. Goodall, Esq. To the Colonial Secretary', 27 February, 1845. 'Gundagai'. 
New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-278, pp.255-256, p.256. 
43 
landowners. The new allotments, however, were to be sold at competitive auction rather 
than at a set price to the current landowners; it was, Gipps notified, 'the law' . 128 
Further, G ipps was not convinced that the Murrumbidgee would flood to such a 
height again. He thought the 1844 flood 'a very unusual rising of the Murrumbidgee'. 
Such a flood, the Colonial Secretary wrote (on behalf of Gipps) was 'not known to have 
occurred before, and may never occur again' .129 The Governor, far from the site of the 
town, had not heard Wiradjuri warnings and had not seen the old debris in the trees. 
Perhaps such evidence did not count - it was certainly not mentioned in any official 
documents. Surveyor-General Thomas Mitchell also hypothesised that such a flood 'may 
perhaps never reach them again' . 130 The views of Gipps and Mitchell were very different 
to the observations of George Augustus Robinson. Robinson, Protector of Aborigines in 
Port Phillip, had travelled through Gundagai about a week after the flood. He wrote in 
his report on the expedition that 'Gundagai. .. is a township ... on flooded land'. 131 The 
Governor's wording in his letter to the petitioners may have been guided by the potential 
legal and financial implications of admitting that the initial town surveyors had made a 
mistake. Such an admission would make the Government liable and expose it to claims of 
compensation not only in Gundagai but potentially throughout the colony. Negotiations 
over environmental knowledge were interwoven with legal, economic, and political trade-
offs after the 1844 flood. 
Bingham had fallen out of favour with Gipps. Bingham's suggestion that the 
townspeople be allowed to exchange allotments was illegal, and this Gipps thought 
Bingham 'ought ... to have known'. Indeed, in his letter to the petitioners, Gipps called 
Bingham's proposal ' inconsiderate' - to both himself (Gipps) and the town 's residents 
and landowners. Bingham's suggestion had been made, it seemed, 'without the 
knowledge and even against the wishes of the townspeople'. Gipps forwarded a copy of 
his letter addressed to the petitioners, containing these statements, to Bingham. As a 
consequence, Bingham, already caught between the interests of the government and 
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settlers in his position as Land Commissioner, became overtly mistrusted and alienated 
by both. 132 
Bingham defended himself against these allegations. He wrote to the Governor, 
denying any knowledge of breaking the law, arguing that he had been called on by two 
residents of Gundagai to suggest a new survey and that at least one of these men's names 
(Andrews) had been forged on the petition. 133 The reply to Bingham's letter was short. It 
did not acknowledge his claims to innocence. Bingham's letter to Gipps and Gipps' reply 
were published in the SMH in full. 134 The Colonial Secretary wrote, at the Governor's 
direction, that 'he [Gipps] feels it necessary to intimate to you, that it is quite contrary to 
official practice ... to publish his correspondence without permission from the head of 
Government'. 135 
The letters became the subject of editorials and letters to the newspapers that 
severely criticised Gipps. One editorial argued that Gipps' maxim in other situations, 
'that he was sent here 'to protect the interests of the Crown" had been carried over to 
'the Gundagai case'. Gipps' was a partisan stance that did not deal in justice but defended 
the interests of the Crown. 136 Deputy Surveyor-General Perry attempted to defend the 
Governor and himself (as he held responsibility for the town's survey). He wrote to the 
SMH. He argued that 'Gipps had nothing whatever to do with the laying out of that 
town' and that surveyors (including himself) had sited the town there only because 
individuals had already erected buildings on the flat - private individuals had effectively 
selected the town site, surveyors had merely formalised their selection. 137 Perry inferred 
that surveyors were therefore not to blame, but rather the settlers who had chosen the 
site. He wrote: 
The site having been adopted according to the selection of private individuals, as 
indicated by their occupancy of the ground, and all other circumstances taken into 
132 
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consideration, it was necessary that the details, not of the ground but of the subdivisions 
and appropriations, should be approved merely for the purpose of proclamation and 
record [of Gundagai as a township] ... '. 138 
In another letter Perry elaborated on this point. He explained that as the region lay 
outside 'the limits off proclaimed counties ... exceptions to the existing regulations for the 
sale of land were made in favour of those persons who had previously established 
themselves upon the land'. 139 The surveyors (and government) had wished to give those 
who had built at the crossing the opportunity to purchase the land. 
As the survey plans were being drawn up in January 1838, Gipps was travelling to 
Australia to take up the post of Governor General. Perry argued that he could therefore 
have had nothing to do with choice of the site: 'he merely marked the plans as approved 
- after it had been laid before the Council, and without considering whether Gundagai 
was in New South Wales or on the moon'. 14° Further, Perry argued that settlers who 
chose to buy allotments after the survey did so based on their own assessments of the site: 
'the purchasers of allotments selected for themselves and upon their own knowledge of 
the country' .141 It was settlers who had close knowledge of the country (rather than 
surveyors or the governor) and who were therefore accountable. 
The editors of the SMH did not agree. They argued that surveyors had selected the 
site upon their own expertise and that a site suitability survey was not the job of settlers. 
They wrote: 
Aware that private adventurers have little leisure and less qualification for the task of 
surveying scientifically the country in which they are toiling for bread, the Government, 
very properly, declined to act upon the selections of such persons. The Government thus 
became responsible for the eligibility of the selection . The selection was thus made from 
official data, and from those alone ... it is rather too bad to come forward now, when the 
selection is proved to have been a calamitous blunder, with an attempt to absolve the 
138 Original emphasis. SMH, 15 February, 1845, in 'Gundagai, New South Wales'. Newspaper Clippings 
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official survey from all responsibility, and cast the whole of the burden upon the private 
selection! 142 
It was in response to this editorial that Perry revealed that no survey report was made. In 
his words: 'I do not perceive any trace of the [official survey] report in question - I merely 
said I called for one. In fact no report was furnished'. 143 All of Perry's arguments (in three 
letters) were dismissed by the SMH editors - they argued that Perry's points did not 
relinquish Gipps' current responsibility. In fact, the issues raised by Perry only confirmed 
the 'sweeping indiscriminate doctrine, 'that what a man buys he buys for better or worse" .144 
Such a doctrine was 'contrary to the transactions of every-day life, and monstrously 
untenable in its application to the present case'. 145 The editors argued that the purchase 
of allotments was equitable with the purchase of products, not marriage: 
If you buy a coat from a tailor, and it falls to pieces the first time you put it on; a loaf 
from your baker, and it proves to be half sand; a pipe of mine from your merchant, and it 
turns out to be a pipe of wine - would any of these sellers have the impudence to tell 
you, in answer to your demand for a genuine article, that 'he cannot sanction the 
proposed exchange' .146 
The editors wrote that, 'Captain Perry ... shines much better as an officer than logician'. 147 
The fact remained that Gundagai allotments were clearly 'not fit for either of the two 
purposes for which they were marked out': as building allotments and town allotments. 148 
Extracts of Gipps' letter continued to be quoted in the following months, 
especially the phrase 'for better or worse', which appealed to poets and journalists. In 
early 1845, a poem (initialled J.LT.) was published in the Sydney Atlas. The poem was 
142 Original emphasis. SMH, 15 February, 1845, in 'Gundagai, New South Wales'. Newspaper Clippings 
file. Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales. 
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highly critical of Gipps, and expressed a sense of injustice. The final stanza was 
particularly personal: 
Then Gundagai, then Gundagai 
Be liberal with your purse; 
Again your town allotments buy 
'For better or for worse'; 
And if, as further still you wend, 
To land still worse you go, 
Gipps will stand your friend 
In the settlements below! 149 
The Land Commissioner's (Bingham's) written exchange with Gipps, made public, 
fostered animosity towards the Governor, while Bingham became a hero within the 
colony (although largely ostracised locally and out of favour with Gipps). 
Bingham's suggestion of an allotment exchange was wetl known by the 1850s and 
gained increasing support beyond Gundagai, particularly after the 1852 flood. Residents' 
accounts of the 1844 flood had been published in the SMH, so that the effects of the 
flood were known in the colony's capital. Made aware of settler concerns in Gundagai, 
the Governor's attitude was heavily criticised in the metropolitan press, as was his refusal 
to grant land exchanges. Public debates revolved around Bingham's communications with 
G ipps, which largely took place before the general petition from Gundagai. The general 
petition requested different action from that proposed by Bingham, and overtly argued 
against his suggestion. 
The actual course of action the Governor took was to issue no compensation but 
to release land for sale in locations suggested by the petitioners and to release additional 
land in South Gundagai as requested by Bingham. While bound by legal restrictions, 
such as those around allotment exchange as compensation, these actions indicate 
opportunism on the part of the Governor. He indeed seems to have proceeded with the 
interests of the Crown as primary, seeking to maximise land revenue. This course of 
action appears immediately shrewd as it was likely to contribute to the short-term growth 
of the town because buyers could purchase land thought to be above flood mark whilst 
continuing to trade on the flat. This is in fact what happened, as settlers readily invested 
149 J.L.T., Sydney Atlas, 22 February, 1845, p. 150. 
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in land and development on the floodplain after the 1844 flood. The next section 
explores why settlement on the floodplain flourished despite the warning of the 1844 
flood. 
* * * 
Town Growth: North and South Gundagai 
In 1845 the Governor instructed Surveyor James Larmer to proceed to Gundagai to mark 
out the three sections requested by the petitioners and to gather information on the land 
suggested by Bingham.150 Larmer marked out the height of the 1844 flood to the south of 
the river on his survey map. By June 1845, Larmer had measured out the three plots on 
the northern side of the river. He suggested that there were two further sections (blocks) 
on the south bank suitable for division and sale. 151 In 1845 the new allotments in North 
Gundagai, and in 1846 those in what now became South Gundagai, were gazetted for 
sale. Only three property owners who had experienced the 1844 flood bought allotments 
in the new sections of North Gundagai in the initial sales in August and November 
1845. 152 
Despite the effects of the 1844 flood and fears of residents that the township was 
'no longer tenable', the population and industry of North Gundagai grew extensively and 
the economy recovered quickly. The year following the flood, both established residents 
and newcomers bought new allotments (not previously purchased by another) on the flat. 
The 1844 flood had not deterred all those who had experienced the inundation from 
investing and building there, suggesting that the economic benefits of the location 
outweighed the risk of future damaging floods. For example Henry and Susannah 
Hargreaves, whose farm about two miles from Gundagai had been flooded in 1844, 
150 
'Copy of a Letter from the Colonial Secretary to the Surveyor-General', 18 March, 1845, p. 258-259; 
and, 'Copy of a Letter from the Surveyor-General to the Colonial Secretary', 27 March 1845. 'Gundagai'. 
New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-278, p.264. 
151 
'Copy of a Letter from the Deputy Surveyor-General to the Colonial Secretary', 18 June, 1845. 
'Gundagai'. New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-278, pp.265-266. 
152 
'Return of the several Allotments of Land situated in the Township of Gundagai, (under the 
designations of 'Gundagai', 'South Gundagai', and 'North Gundagai ') sold by the Crown, since the 
establishment of the Township, to the present date', 24 August, 1852. 'Gundagai'. New South Wales 
Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.25 1-278, p.275-278; and, O 'Keefe, et al., The Watermen 
of Gundagai, pp.29-36. 
49 
bought an allotment on the flat in 1848. 153 To recover their economic losses they left the 
farm and worked for a squatter and in various business partnerships with other settlers. 
In Gundagai, Hargreaves built a wooden house and bought a dray cart with bullocks 
(presumably hiring as a goods carrier) and by their own account the family 'got on very 
well' . 154 
Another settler, who experienced the 1844 flood and re-built on the flat, later 
wrote that his reason for rebuilding there was the economic advantage afforded by trading 
on the Port Phillip Road. He wrote, 
... as one of the sufferers of the flood of 1843 [sic], and one of the subscribers to the 
memorial [petition] presented to the late Sir George Gipps, I can assure you that I found 
as a man of business I should be a serious loser by competitors, who would occupy even a 
tent on low ground on the concentrated line of traffic, and though I had determined to 
build on high ground, relinquished the idea on finding that I would be prejudiced by 
it.155 
Building on the flat was a business decision. Although liable to inundation, it was the 
best place to trade. Higher land was simply too far from the road. The importance of 
catching the passing trade influenced the way settlers evaluated environmental knowledge 
and where they chose to live and invest. Commercial advantage was weighed against 
environmental risk. Further, it was competition from traders on the floodplain close to 
traffic that threatened the trade of settlers on higher land. Shops and inns near the road 
and on the flat offered convenience to travellers and so flourished economically. If the 
town had been moved after the 1844 flood, or those on the flat had been ensured a set 
price for allotments and re-located as a group, perhaps the economic advantages of 
building on the flat would have been reduced, as competitors would have also moved. On 
the other hand, the economic lure of the flat may have remained too strong. 
Visitors and residents in Gundagai, in the period following the 1844 flood, 
commented on its economic growth. Michael Norton, who had lived in Wagga from 
153 Henry Hargreaves, Letter to his nephew and nephew's wife, 11, 14, 19 June, 1870. ML DOC 949. 
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Map 1.3 
Survey map of South Gundagai by James Larmer, 1845. 
Note the line of the 1844 flood height drawn by Larmer. 
In the right-hand corner of this map is Larmer's description of the survey, which reads: 
'Survey of the site proposed by Mr. Commissioner Bingham as an addition to the town of 
Gundagai on the south bank of the Morumbidgee [sic] River'. 
Uames Larmer, ['Gundagai', 'South side Murrumbidgee River, shows Spencers Hotel and 
other buildings']. Survey map. 1845. NRS 13859, [Map 2824). State Records Authority of 
New South Wales.] 
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Map 1.4 
The survey of allotments in South Gundagai by James Larmer, 1845. 
Uames Larmer, 'Gundagai', '40 allotments in South Gundagai'. Survey map. 1845. NRS 
13859, [Map 2827]. State Records Authority of New South Wales.) 
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Map 1.5 
North and South Gundagai by James Larmer, 1850. 
Uames Larmer, 'Gundagai', 'Plan showing proposed extension of North and South 
Gundagai'. Survey map. 1850. NRS 13859, [Map 2831]. State Records Authority of New 
South Wales.] 
1847 and was appointed Gundagai's first police constable in 1851, later wrote that in the 
1840s and 1850s '[m]oney was plentiful' and 'could be made in quick order' .156 Another 
settler commented that, ' [m]oney in both pockets is the popular air here just now' . 157 
Further, there is evidence some settlers on the flat assimilated the experience of the 1844 
flood not as a warning, but as a reassurance that 'the' large flood was now behind them. 158 
T hey thought that another large flood was unlikely to occur for many years, much as 
Gipps and Mitchell had asserted. 
Between 184 7 and 1850 land sales increased rapidly in North Gundagai, with the 
total number of purchased allotments reaching approximately 280 by 1851. 159 In 1851, 
along with gaining a police constable, Gundagai's first National (government) School 
156 Michael Norton (Gundagai's first police constable), quoted in, Gundagai Independent, 9 September, 1948, 
p.13. 
157 Q uoted in, Soerjohardjo, 'Aspects of Life in Gundagai, 1840-1860', pp.8 1-84. 
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opened. The introduction of new legislation in May 184 7, giving squatters longer leases 
(of 14 years) and greater security, may have also contributed to an increase in trade from 
those droving livestock. Further, there were more pastoral stations being established in 
the inland, with settlers increasingly pushing west. Immigration to Australia also 
increased rapidly in this period. 160 
South Gundagai expanded and by 1850 had developed into a small settlement of 
25 purchased allotments and a number of buildings. 161 South Gundagai remained second 
to North Gundagai, however, in terms of industry, population, and buildings. In 1850 
Surveyor Larmer wrote to the Governor that, 
In South Gundagai there are two public houses of poor accommodation, one small 
brewery, and a blacksmith's shop. Whereas in North Gundagai there are four public 
houses, a steam flour mill, four substantial stores, butchers', bakers', blacksmiths', and 
carpenters' shops, as well as private dwellings and numerous huts occupied by labourers 
employed in the town. 162 
Indeed it is difficult to find historical evidence of South Gundagai itself. While travellers, 
Land Commissioners, and others often described the population and buildings of North 
Gundagai, South Gundagai was not as closely observed. Further, it was sometimes 
subsumed into broader regional assessments. For example, the 1851 census for Gundagai 
- giving a population of 397 - did not differentiate between North and South, and 
probably included horticulturalists and pastoralists in the surrounding region. 163 
Development at Gundagai boomed despite another high flood in 1847. The flood 
entered parts of the northern and southern sections of the town but did not cause much 
damage and no loss of life was recorded. In 1850 Larmer wrote to the Governor that 
settlers living in North Gundagai had in some ways become reconciled to periodic 
inundations, and that there were benefits from floods, such as improved pasn1re 
following flooding. He wrote that, 'if the inhabitants of North Gundagai formerly 
160 Stuart Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.81. 
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considered it necessary for their safety to exchange their allotments and remove to South 
Gundagai they do not entertain the same opinion now, - and admit that although for a 
short period, or for a few hours only, they suffer inconvenience from floods, they are 
sensible the pasnire is immensely improved' .164 
Indeed, cattle in Gundagai and surrounding stations were well known for their 
quality, and the town became a centre for stock trading. 165 Drover Charles MacAlister 
later recalled trading in Gundagai in 1848. He wrote that, '[e]verything about the 'Big 
Flood' town, except the business men, was as 'green as a leek'; trade was good and the 
cattle in rare order' .166 MacAlister was writing this account after the 1852 flood, the 'Big 
Flood', had occurred. Here he referred to floods as beneficial, indicating that in the late 
1840s they had gained a positive name by making the land green and fertile. Michael 
Norton wrote that in Gundagai at this time, 'people ... were of a nomadic stamp, of the 
peddling order ... and shrewd dealers they were too. Gundagai was then a famous dealing 
place, and speculators would ride over from Melbourne and different parts of Victoria 
three or four times a year to buy our stock. Our cattle was [sic] the first in the market' .167 
Gundagai's businesspeople had gained a reputation for shrewd dealing. 168 
* * * 
Contesting Environmental Knowledge: Government Buildings and Dams 
North, and to a lesser extent South Gundagai, prospered in the late 1840s; and rivalry 
between the two centres increased. Economic competition between the two became 
entangled with disputes over environmental knowledge, specifically which location would 
be more suitable for siting government service buildings. T hese arguments were couched 
164 
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in terms of which lands were subject to flooding and which sites minimised river 
crossings. 
One settler from the South, Robert Pitt Jenkins, argued that the government 
reserve for the Court House and Lock-up in the North was subject to flooding and that 
the buildings should be built in the South. Jenkins was one of only two permanent 
magistrates in the town and he used his official position when lobbying the Governor in 
December 1849 to change the location for these buildings to the South, despite the fact 
that tenders had already been called for the erection of the buildings on the North 
Gundagai site. To convince the Governor, Jenkins referred to the authority of 'the oldest 
residents in North Gundagai' that 'the site chosen is subject to inundation'. 169 
Jenkins reasoned to the Governor that the erection of the buildings in South 
Gundagai would benefit the work of the magistrates. He argued that it was likely the 
Gundagai Bench would join with that of Tumut, with sessions being held in Gundagai. 
For travelling purposes, it would be more convenient for the Tumut magistrates to have 
the building in South Gundagai - so they would not have to cross the river. The Tumut 
magistrates, he argued, would also be 'more disposed to take their share of Police duties if 
the Police Office were on the south side'. Jenkins also argued that 'there is only one 
magistrate on the north side and he will reside there in all probability a very short 
time'. 170 
Hearing reports of Jenkins' letter 'out of doors', the other permanent Magistrate, 
W.A. Smith, wrote to the Governor on behalf of the Bench of Magistrates [meaning 
Smith and the occasional magistrate]. Smith explained that Jenkins' views were from him 
'alone, as a private individual, and not from the Bench' .171 Further, his suggestion was not 
supported by information or the weight of population. Smith wrote that the North 
Gundagai site was 'the most eligible for the purpose owing to its central position in the 
most flourishing portion of the Township and being above 'flood mark'. Further, Smith 
argued that, 
.. .independently of the eligibility of the selection made by us, the very circumstance that 
two hundred and eighty allotments have been purchased in North Gundagai, which has a 
169 
'Copy of a Letter from R.P. Jenkins, J.P., co the Colonial Secretary', 20 December, 1849. 'Gundagai'. 
New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.25 1-278, pp.266-267. 
170 
'Copy of a Letter from R.P. Jenkins, J.P., to the Colonial Secretary', 20 December, 1849. 'Gundagai'. 
New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-278, pp.266-267. 
171 
'Copy of a Letter from the Bench of Magistrates at Gundagai to the Surveyor-General', 4 February, 1850. 
'Gundagai'. New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-278, p.268. 
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population of upwards of two hundred and fifty persons, while South Gundagai has not 
more than twenty residents, who have bought about twenty-five allotments, is of itself a 
sufficient reason why public buildings should be erected in North Gundagai. 172 
North Gundagai had expanded considerably, whereas South Gundagai had fewer 
residents and this in itself, Smith argued, recommended North Gundagai as the best site. 
Indeed, Smith argued that Jenkins had no defensible reason to back his arguments. Smith 
told the Governor that Jenkins' suggestion was instead motivated by the potential for 
personal gain; for 'his own private convenience' of having the buildings close to his own 
place of residence, rather than sound environmental knowledge and demographic logic. 173 
The Governor sought Surveyor Larmer's opinion. Larmer, who five years 
previously had surveyed parts of North and South Gundagai, wrote that the current site 
for the Court House and Lock-up in North Gundagai was 'unobjectionable - but that if 
necessary for its [the building's] removal many others exist' in North Gundagai. Larmer 
had discussed the matter with Smith, and agreed that Jenkins' suggestion was made for 
'personal convenience and accommodation'. 174 The location for the Court House and 
Lock-up d id not change. 
Government knowledge and information about floods in Gundagai was 
insubstantial; and settler experience was limited. Aboriginal knowledge seems to have 
been open to doubt by residents and landowners and generally overlooked by 
Government surveyors and the Governor, who infrequently visited the township and 
lived in distant locations. It could be argued that given the paucity of reliable and valued 
information, environmental knowledge was not only contestable, but vulnerable to 
manipulation and claims by those with ulterior motives. Jenkins, for example, may have 
harboured economic motivations in his attempts to influence the siting of Government 
bu ildings, to bring more trade and stimulate development in the neighbourhood. In the 
money-driven atmosphere of Gundagai, the prospect of economic benefits was linked to 
location firstly on the main travel route at the river crossing and then to population 
density promoted by the introduction of new services, including government buildings. In 
in 'Copy of a Letter from the Bench of Magistrates at Gundagai to the Surveyor-General', 4 February, 1850. 
'Gundagai'. New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-278, p.268. 
173 
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this way the commercial imperative tied most building sites to the river flat despite its 
history of flooding. 175 
* * * 
Gold and Floods: 1851 
The opening up of the Ovens goldfields in 1851 began a new wave of business for those 
in Gundagai as large numbers of prospectors travelled the Port Phillip Road between the 
Turon, Snowy Mountains, Bathurst, Ovens gold fields, and Sydney. 176 The gold fields also 
attracted those living in Gundagai. For example, the three Gormly brothers, James, 
Thomas, and Jeremiah whose parents Patrick and Mary Gormly emigrated from Ireland 
in 1839-40. In 1849 the Gormlys bought a large allotment in North Gundagai, with a 
view to establishing an agricultural business. They moved to Gundagai from nearby 
Nangus Station so that the two youngest of their eight children could attend the National 
School. In 1851, the three eldest brothers - James (15), Thomas (19), and Jeremiah (22) 
- travelled to the Turon River gold fields. Drought conditions, which lowered the river 
level, had induced prospectors to mine the riverbed. 177 Floods in 1851 and early 1852 
washed out many mines.178 The Gormly brothers, however, continued to mine in the 
river under dangerous conditions. They were at the Turon diggings for a year. 
The Murrumbidgee also flooded in 1851. In May that year a fast-rising flood 
deposited a thick layer of mud through Gundagai, but no damage or drownings were 
recorded. 179 In the lower reaches of the river the flood came as a relief to pastoralists. It 
was described by one as a 'seasonal blessing' that came 'just in time to save many, many 
flocks from starvation and death'. 180 The drought had intensified in the first half of 1851, 
and fodder was in short supply. While some sheep drowned in the flood, it was seen to 
have saved the lives of many more. 
175 Wardiningsih Soerjohardjo argued that Jenkins subscribed to the English class system and considered 
himself upper-class. She argued that this class consciousness and sense of privilege influenced his demands 
for the Court-House and Lock-up to be built in South Gundagai for the convenience of magistrates. 
However, economic motivations cannot be underestimated as an additional factor, as Soerjohardjo has also 
argued. See, Soerjohardjo, 'Aspects of Life in Gundagai, 1840-1860', pp.8 1-88. 
176 Michael Norton, Gundagai Independent, 9 September, 1948, p.13. 
177 Maitland Mercury, 7 February, 1852, p.2. 
178 Gou!bum Herald, 6 September, 185 1, p.3. 
179 Argus, 19 June, 1851, p.4. 
180 Maitland Mercury, 12 May, 1851, p.4. See also, Maitland Mercury, 14 May, 185 1, p.2; and, Maitland 
Mercury, 22 May, 185 1, p.2. 
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In August 185 1 the Murrumbidgee flooded again, rising to the height of the 1844 
flood in Gundagai. While there was no loss of life, the floodwaters damaged a number of 
buildings and swept away a recently erected store in South Gundagai. A government 
bridge over the creek was also washed away. 181 After these two floods in 1851, residents 
again petitioned the Governor, Charles FitzRoy (who had succeeded Gipps), this time 
requesting the construction of a dam at the junction of three creeks that fed the 
lagoon. 182 Their letter explained that the three creeks funnelled floodwater into the 
lagoon, which only had one outlet - the anabranch that ran through the town (Morelys 
Creek). The velocity of the water accelerated as it was fed from the wide lagoon into the 
narrow channel, causing large floods to be fast rising, turbulent, and damaging to the 
town. By damming the lagoon, they argued, the town would be safer from 'the yearly 
inundations'; 'the physical evils... [that] retard their [the petitioners'] progress, and 
threaten their ultimate ruin' .183 
The dam proposal marked a new tactic by settlers in their relationship with 
government and rivers. The river could be moved instead of the town. The petitioners 
argued that 'the remedy is merely a matter of money', also hinting at some sort of 
compensation for the damage caused to their property. 184 FitzRoy did not accede to the 
request for a dam nor issue any compensation. 
In June 1852 the Gormly brothers returned to Gundagai to prepare for a new 
enterprise - selling flour and other goods to miners at the gold diggings at a considerable 
profit. By this time, the town was in the midst of substantial economic growth. One of 
the brothers, James, later recalled that the three 'were anxious to start as soon as possible, 
as we heard flour was going at £16 a bag' on the gold fields. In 1915 James Gormly wrote 
that he later discovered that two men (one being his brother-in-law) had sold flour to 
miners for £20 a bag; the profits from this became the basis of at least one of the men's 
future fortunes. Gormly lamented that this was 'what my family missed by the '52 
flood'. 185 
* * * 
181 Goulbum Herald, 30 August, 1851, p.3. 
182 Petition quoted in, Goulbum Herald, 4 September, 1852, p.8. The petitioners included 'the Magistrates, 
Licensed Squatters, Storekeepers, Licensed Victuallers, Mechanics, Labourers, and other residents in the 
Town and District of Gundagai'. 
183 Petition quoted in, Goulbum Herald, 4 September, 1852, p.8. 
184 Petition quoted in, Goulburn Herald, 4 September, 1852, p.8. 
185 James Gormly, 'When It Broke: Drought of 1850-5 1', Gundagai Independent, 4 May, 1915, p.4. 
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June 1852 Flood 
The three Gormly brothers did not leave Gundagai as planned. While gathering supplies 
for their trip, the Murrumbidgee had begun to rise. The Turon River and creeks near 
Ophir remained in flood that year. Rain continued throughout coastal and inland New 
South Wales, and the river stayed high. 186 In May, rain intensified around Gundagai. 187 
The Murrumbidgee, creeks, and lagoon near the town swelled. On about 18 June James 
Gormly went to the punt to cross to South Gundagai. The river was so high that the punt 
could not take passengers. Instead the punt owner, Spencer, allowed Gormly to swim 
with his horse behind the punt ('for which he charged 10 shillings'). The next day, 
Gormly returned to find that the river had broken its banks. He swam his horse across, 
and reached home. After this, however, 'the punt could not again be worked'. The creek 
'was likewise impassable', except by boat or swimming. 188 
On Thursday 24 June the water began to reach houses and businesses in the 
town. Some residents in the lowest areas on the flat moved to higher ground by boat, but 
many stayed, thinking themselves 'safe in their houses' .189 By Thursday evening the flat 
was covered with water and residents became apprehensive 'of having a high flood'. They 
made preparations for an inundation, moving belongings and stores off the floor. 190 The 
next morning the water had reached the height of the 1844 and August 1851 floods. A 
rescue party from South Gundagai was organised to try to save those on the flat. Two 
settlers managed to manoeuvre a boat to the Thatcher family, who had taken refuge in 
the loft. However, on its return the boat filled with floodwater and five children and one 
of the boatmen drowned. After this, a resident later wrote, further rescues were 
'impossible'. 191 The turbulence of the water, its strong current, and the debris it carried 
with it, including large logs, made rescues difficult and dangerous. People cried out for 
help but could not be rescued. 192 
186 There were floods as far north as the Condamine River in June. Maitland Mercury, 24 July, 1852, p.4. 
187 Maitland Mercury, 22 May, 1852, p.2. 
188 James Gormly, 'When It Broke: Drought of 1850-51', Gundagai Independent, 4 May, 1915, p.4. 
189 SMH, 5 July, 1852, p.2; and, James Gormly, 'When It Broke: Drought of 1850-5 1', Gundagai Independent, 
4 May, 1915, p.4. 
190 SMH, 5 July, 1852, p.2. 
191 SMH, 5 July, 1852, p.2. 
192 SMH, 5 July, 1852, p.2. 
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That night the swirling water tore down buildings in which many people had 
sought safety or perched on roofs: 'Crash after crash announced the fall of some house, 
and .. . screams ... followed the engulphing [sic] of those who still clung'. 193 Some became 
trapped inside buildings and could not escape, such as the McKenna family. The family 
lived at the National School, the mother and father being teachers there. The whole 
family drowned at the school (including five children), as well as two of their wards, and 
another man. Their efforts to escape by stacking furniture up to the roof were later 
described by Waight. 194 Most of those in buildings drowned. 195 Some people attempted to 
swim from rooftops to tree tops; while some reached them, others were swept away and 
drowned in the attempt. 
Thirty-six houses were completely washed away. 196 Whole rooms of houses and 
businesses were demolished by the floodwaters, roofs were separated from buildings, and 
other buildings were completely swept away. The flood peaked at 11 o'clock that night, 
and began to fall at 3am on Saturday morning. It reached depths of 40 feet at the river, 
and 14 feet in the highest parts of the flat. 197 
Many of those who survived swam from the buildings to perch in trees. James and 
Thomas Gormly swam from the roof of their family's home as it collapsed. 198 James 
Gormly later recounted that he and Thomas were strong swimmers. So was their father, 
but he drowned trying to save his wife. 199 His father had managed to take 'a goodly sum 
of notes' with him (Gormly explained 'there was no inland banks in those days') and 
these he handed to Thomas, 'the strongest swimmer', foreseeing his own death.200 The 
family (which, besides James, Thomas, and their father and mother, included two 
brothers and a sister) perched on the roof of their house. 'There was no panic in our 
family', James Gormly wrote. 'The three who could swim never thought of deserting the 
193 SMH, 5 July, 1852, p.2; and, James Gormly, 'When It Broke: Drought of 1850-1 ', Gundagai Independent, 
11 May, 1915, p.4. 
194 See, Charles F. Brigstoke, Letter to Bishop Broughton, Bishop of Sydney, 19 July, 1852, in SMH, 26 July, 
1852, p.2; and, 'Copy of a Letter from the Commissioner of Crown Lands, Lachlan District, to the 
Colonial Secretary', 16 July, 1852. 'Gundagai'. New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 
1852. pp.251-278, pp. 245-247. 
195 Richard Mallyon, Goulburn Herald, 10 July, 1852, p.3. See also, Charles F. Brigstoke, Letter to Bishop 
Broughton, Bishop of Sydney, 19 July, 1852, in SMH, 26 July, 1852, p.2. 
196 SMH, 5 July, 1852, p.2. 
197 Petition from Gundagai residents to Governor FitzRoy, 15 July, 1852, in Goulbum Herald, 4 September, 
1852, p.8; and, Butcher, Gundagai, p.84. 
198 James Gormly, Exploration and Settlement in Australia (Sydney: D.S. Ford, printer, 1921), p.5. 
199 James Gormly, quoted in Mary Last, Gundagai Independent, June 1952, in ' 1852 Flood'. Clippings File, 
Gundagai Library. 
200 James Gormly, 'When 1t Broke: Drought of 1850-51', Gundagai Independent, 18 May, 1915, p.2. 
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others' .201 For a time the house held against the strong current and hammering debris, 
but at dusk it 'broke away from its foundations' and was carried by the current.202 When 
the building smashed into a tree, it crumbled. The three strong swimmers attempted to 
rescue three other family members, only managing to hold onto one each - the father his 
wife, and the two brothers a sibling each. Amidst the turbulent water, which swept them 
against debris and trees and sucked them under the surface, Thomas and James lost hold 
of their siblings. The brothers were unable to locate any other family members and nearly 
gave up themselves. James Gormly wrote: 'We both felt inclined to give up the terrible 
struggle but each tried to cheer the other on with words of encouragement. Had it not 
been for this companionship and mutual help we would both have been drowned'. 203 The 
brothers managed to climb into a tree but, deciding it was too weak to hold against the 
water, stripped off their coats and shoes and swam for another, a large oak. This tree did 
not feel safe either but they were too exhausted to swim any further. Gormly described 
how cattle and horses that washed past tried to scramble into their tree. Soon their 
clothes 'froze stiff in the winter night. 204 
They could see others stranded in trees. The brothers talked to a person perched 
in a nearby tree - their conversation suddenly cut off as the person fell into the water. 
Others also fell into the water: 'During the night we heard several cries suddenly cut off, 
as some person was engulfed in the awful water'.205 'It is not at all pleasant', James 
Gormly wrote, 'to see a person perish, and not be able to stretch out a hand to give 
assistance'. 206 People also died in the trees, probably from exhaustion and exposure. 207 
Many remained in trees for two nights (the two Gormly brothers for one night), before 
being rescued when the floodwater became less turbulent. 
Most who were saved were rescued by Aboriginal men, who ferried people to 
safety in bark canoes and boats. Only two men were mentioned by name, Jackey (other 
spellings: Jacky and Jackey Jackey) and Yarri (other spellings: Yarry, Yarde, Yarra).208 
There is evidence, however, that more Aborigines were involved in rescuing settlers at 
Gundagai. The Land Commissioner of the Lachlan District, who later conducted a 
201 James Gormly, 'When It Broke: Drought of 1850-51', Gundagai Independent, 18 May, 1915, p.2. 
202 James Gormly, 'When It Broke: Drought of 1850-51', Gundagai Independent, 18 May, 1915, p.2. 
203 James Gormly, 'When It Broke: Drought of 1850-51', Gundagai Independent, 18 May, 1915, p.2. 
204 James Gormly, 'When It Broke: Drought of 1850-51 ', Gundagai Independent, 18 May, 1915, p.2. 
205 James Gormly, 'When It Broke: Drought of 1850-51 ', Gundagai Independent, 18 May, 1915, p.2. 
206 James Gormly, 'When It Broke: Drought of 1850-51 ', Gundagai Independent, 2 7 May, 1915, p.2. 
207 SMH, 5 July, 1852, p.2; and, Harry Turnbull, 'The Stuff Old-Timers Were made Of', p.197. 
208 For other individual rescues by Jackey and Yarri see: O'Keefe, et al., The Watermen of Gimdagai, p.8; and, 
Soerjohardjo, 'Aspects of Life in Gundagai, 1840-1860', pp.159-164. 
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government inquiry into the flood, wrote to the Governor that, '[flour of the aboriginal 
natives were very active during the flood, and saved many lives and much property'.209 
One rescuer has recently been identified as Long Jimmy.210 A letter from two survivors of 
the flood to the SMH stated that the Murrumbidgee District Land Commissioner, Henry 
Bingham, 'deserves the highest praise for effectually and powerfully exerting that great 
moral influence he had over the aboriginal natives, in urging them to cut canoes ... by 
which many lives have been rescued'. rn Including, the letter implied, Bingham's own 
life.m Aborigines also rescued settlers on the Lachlan.213 
Between them, Jackey and Yarri were credited with saving about 28 people.214 As 
O'Keefe et al note, while Y arri has become a more celebrated hero of the flood in recent 
years, contemporary sources attribute a larger number of rescues to Jackey, totalling 20 
people.215 Indeed, Jackey was more often mentioned in contemporary newspaper reports, 
which were frequently written or informed by survivors. For example, a survivor's account 
to the SMH stated that Jackey, who worked for Andrews, 'afforded in this respect the 
most valuable assistance, saving a great many lives' . 216 J ackey had a connection with 
settlers in Gundagai through his employment with Andrews. Some reports say he was 
'owned' by Andrews and the terms of his employment are unclear.217 From some accounts 
it appears his skill with canoes was well known and settlers sought him out for rescues.218 
James Gormly described how the dangerous conditions created by the flood led 
settlers 'to give the boat to Andrews's Jackey .. . who was known to be capable of managing 
209 
'Copy of a Letter fro m the Commissioner of Crown Lands, Lachlan District, to the Colonial Secretary', 
16 July, 1852. 'Gundagai'. New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.25 1-278, 
pp.245-247. 
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212 SMH, 10 July, 1852, p.6 
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see, Susan Musgrave, Wayback, fifth edition, (West Wyalong, New South Wales: Bland District Historical 
Society and Young Historical Society, 1984), pp.41-43. 
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July, 1852, p.2; Goulbum Herald, 10 July, 1852, p.4; Letter from Donald McDonald, Goulburn Herald, 10 
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a bark canoe'.219 A failed rescue by settlers had led to the drowning of an entire family 
(the Thatchers). The boat had smashed and after its repair, settlers gave the boat to 
Jackey.220 Gormly noted Jackey's method of manoeuvring the boat (much larger than a 
bark canoe): 'Although the course Jackey adopted was slow, it was a sure and safe one ... 
Jackey was a strong, cautious, careful man, but his mode of propelling a boat by standing 
up in the bow, and using one of the oars as a paddle had not the same power to force the 
skiff against the current as two men using the sculls in the ordinary manner would 
have'. 221 Gormly wrote that settlers asked Jackey to rescue the Riley family first, as they 
had young children. This Jackey did by paddling 'half-a-mile upstream' into the current 
'and then drifted back to the house' . According to Gormly, Jackey rescued eight people 
from the house. With 'a full load [in the boat] ... he acted with great caution, and landed 
his passengers late in the afternoon' .222 As night was setting in it was too late to rescue any 
more and the water was reaching dangerous heights and velocity. 
The next day (27 June) Jackey again took the boat out. Amongst those he saved 
were the Turnbull family, numbering at least seven. The family had been stranded for two 
nights on the roof of a house which had, so far, withstood the flood. 223 The family was 
the 'only one rescued in its entirety'.224 Harry Turnbull, the son of Mrs. Turnbull, later 
wrote that his mother ('once Miss Andrews') had nursed Jackey through an illness and he 
had rescued her through loyalty. 225 Harry, recalling the stories his mother told him, wrote 
that after the family's rescue, 'Jacky [sic] was offered a large sum to go back for the 
gentleman who was sitting in the fork of a tree, but he said he dared not try it'. 226 
Although the current had weakened, rescues were still dangerous because of debris. James 
and Thomas Gormly were probably also saved by Jackey.227 
Yarri probably also had a connection with settlers on the flat. James Gormly 
claimed that Yarri had shepherded for his father at nearby Nangus Station.228 Gormly 
described how, on the first day of the flood, Yarri's bark canoe had come close to the 
219 James Gormly, 'When It Broke: Drought of 1850-51 ', Gundagai Independent, 27 May, 1915, p.2. 
220 James Gormly, 'When It Broke: Drought of 1850-51', Gundagai Independent, 11 May, 1915, p.4. The boat 
was repaired by Joseph Morely. 
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223 Harry Turnbull, 'The '52 Flood', Gundagai Independent, 2 June, 1915, p.4. 
224 Harry Turnbull, 'The Stuff Old-Timers Were made Of, p.197; and, O'Keefe et al., The Watermen of 
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Gormly family as they perched on the roof of their house. Yarri came close enough that 
he and Gormly were able to exchange words, but the current swept Yarri past. Gormly 
wrote, '[hJe was on his knees, crouched in the bottom of his frail canoe, which was liable 
to be upset at any moment'. Only the strong current prevented Yarri from rescuing the 
Gormlys from the roof of their house: 'We knew Yarry was willing to run any risk to give 
assistance, but that assistance was then impossible, as even in still water his canoe would 
only carry two light persons'. Gormly continued that, '[nJot withstand ing the danger he 
incurred, Yarry did good work that day'. He was able to rescue a 'large family named 
Reardon'.229 Yarri's use of a canoe and Jackey's use of a boat may account for the larger 
number of settlers Jackey rescued - Jackey could take up to eight people in the boat and 
Yarri only two. 
The danger faced during rescues made those performed by Aborigines a source of 
gratitude, wonder and praise from survivors. A man travelling through Gundagai at the 
time of the flood wrote that Aboriginal rescuers had performed 'a most d ifficult and 
dangerous task .. . These fellows (Black if you like) did splendid service'.230 The Aboriginal 
rescuers were honoured by settlers in poems and stories immediately following the 
flood.231 Material gratitude to Jackey and Yarri was however slow to appear. It was not 
until 1875 that it was announced the heroes of the flood could collect six pence from 
settlers in Gundagai. 232 O'Keefe et al note that J ackey died at an unknown date before this 
announcement.233 Yarri continued to live in and around Gundagai until h is death in 
1880. H e was baptised James McDonnell on 16 August 1875.234 
* * * 
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232 Town and Country Journal, 14 August, 187 5 in, 'Yarri'. ' 1852 Flood'. Clippings File. Gundagai Library. 
Tokens of gratitude also included the presentation of king plates to Yarri and Jackey. These seem to have 
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Gundagai. 'Yarry' (with newspaper reports about Yarri, dated between 1879 and 1880), in 'Yarri'. '1852 
Flood'. Clippings Fi le. G undagai Library; and, O'Keefe et al., The Watermen of Gundagai, p.8. 
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The Immediate Aftermath 
Stories of survival and death began to reach the newspapers in July 1852. A 
correspondent to the SMH wrote of the aftermath : 
The scenes on the high part, where the remains of the inhabitants are congregated, is 
truly distressing. At every step you see someone lamenting the dead. Here and there the 
sorrowing remains of what three days before had been a large and thriving fam ily. Mr. 
Thatcher saved himself but lost sight of his family ... There are few that lived on the flat 
[North Gundagai] that have not to lament the loss of some relation; nearly all are 
·1 235 penm ess. 
James Gormly also described the scene on the banks. He and Thomas had been rescued 
by boat on the afternoon of 25 June and taken to Kimo Hill (east of North Gundagai, 
across Jones' Creek) where a number of other survivors had gathered. Gormly later wrote 
that he and Thomas were in a better condition than most, despite exhaustion and 
exposure. Gormly attributed this to the tough conditions they had withstood while 
mining the bed of the Turon River. Barefooted, with one foot slightly frostbitten, and 
stones d igging into his soles, Gormly walked and ran along the bank meeting other 
survivors. The brothers also swam a creek to where some houses remained on a hill. He 
wrote, 'I was so much excited about the fate of those still in the trees and on the roofs of 
houses, that I walked and ran about until night set in'.236 Two days after the flood many 
still awaited rescue, fighting exhaustion and cold temperatures. The brothers sought warm 
clothes but 'it was impossible to buy articles of clothing' with the money their father had 
given them. There was no store and many had few (or no) possessions left. Those whose 
houses had not been flooded housed those who had been rescued and shared food. James 
Gormly was given a guernsey by a friend who also sat up that night to make him a pair of 
boots.237 
On June 28 the floodwater had receded enough for a search for survivors to 
begin. Gormly described going to the south bank where he counted 19 bodies that had 
washed ashore and been placed in a stable. 238 Gormly wrote that, '[a]lthough nearly all the 
235 SMH, 5 July, 1852, p.2. 
236 James Gormly, 'When It Broke: Drought of 1850-51 ', Gundagai Independent, 27 May, 19 15, p.2. 
237 James Gormly, 'When It Broke: Drought of 1850-5 1', Gundagai Independent, 27 May, 1915, p.2. 
238 James Gormly, 'When It Broke: Drought of 1850-51', Gundagai Independent, 1June,1915, p.4. 
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residences of those drowned were on the north side of the river, most of the bodies were 
found on the south side as the current swept nearly straight across the river channel, 
which ran in a straight line from the highland on the south bank to the foot of Kimo 
Hill'. 239 The strong current was the most dangerous and destructive element of the flood. 
One settler described the impact of the fast and high floodwater in the following way: 
In many places not a tree is left standing. Large trees six or seven foot in diameter, are 
torn up by the roots, or broken short off, and carried to a considerable distance ... All the 
alluvial soil on the banks of the river is washed away and nothing left but large holes, or 
rather yawing gulfs, partly filled up with sand and rocks. Everywhere are to be seen strewn 
about the wreck of houses, fences, carts, furniture of all sorts, hay, straw, and dead 
animals.240 
For months following the flood carcasses of animals such as horses and cattle rotted in 
the forks of trees. A traveller on his way to the goldfields saw a horse carcass lodged in the 
fork of a red gum 39 feet 'above the river's summer level'. The skeleton of the horse was 
'a monument showing the height of the flood', a grim reminder.241 Indeed, two months 
after the flood Waight interpreted such signs of the flood's height and impact as kinds of 
perverse monuments, which told more about the flood than just its height. Such things 
unravelled a history of living on the flat and provoked frustration that was underpinned 
by long accumulating tension with the government. This was the case even for those who 
did not live in Gundagai, such as Waight. 
One of the first bodies found on the north side of the river was James Gormly's 
eldest brother. James and Thomas found some wood to make him a coffin and placed the 
body 'in an out house for the night, so we could have it buried the next day'. 242 'James 
Riley's cook' stayed with the body that night although he was exhausted from being 
stranded in a tree for two nights. Gormly wrote that the cook 'by some means procured 
candles, and, I believe, read his prayer book the greater part of the night' .243 Constable 
Michael Norton organised the burials of those who were not claimed by family or 
239 James Gormly, 'When It Broke: Drought of 1850-51', Gundagai Independent, 1 June, 1915, p.4. 
240 Gou[bum Herald, 24 July, 1852, p.4. 
241 Lachlan Ross, 'From Rossville to the Victorian Goldfields in 1852'. 1908, quoted in Soerjohardjo, 
'Aspects of Life in Gundagai, 1840-1860', p.160. Also quoted in, Gundagai Independent, 28 June, 197 1. 
'Gundagai, New South Wales'. Newspaper Clippings file. Mitchell Library, State Library of New South 
Wales. 
242 James Gormly, 'When It Broke: Drought of 1850-5 1 ', Gundagai Independent, 1 June, 1915, p.4. 
243 James Gormly, 'When It Broke: Drought of 1850-5 1', Gundagai lndependent, 1 June,19 15, p.4. 
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friends.244 Bodies continued to be found in the following days, but many remained 
missing. The flood had swept a think layer of mud through the town, covering the dead. 
The thickness of the mud, Gormly argued over fifty years later, was the reason that many 
bodies were never found. He recalled a chance finding of a body in the days following the 
flood, that had been buried under two feet of flood silt. While searching for the dead he 
'saw the end of a woollen muffler, such as those worn around people's neck'. He 
continued: 'I tugged at this for some time but found it was fast to something under the 
surface. I then removed about two feet deep of mud with my hands, and found the body 
of a girl about eight years of age'. The mud, Gormly asserted, 'accounts for the small 
number of bodies of those drowned that were recovered - in all probability not one-
third'. 245 
While the floodwaters lingered, the dead were counted, as best they could be. A 
SMH headline ran, 'Gundagai - Dreadful Flood, - Sixty-Four Lives Lost - June 28'.246 
Later reports from those in the town put the total number between 80 and 100.247 There 
was some hope people who were missing were still alive.248 The difficulties that were 
apparent in assessing the number who had died may have also been influenced by the fact 
that there had been a number of travellers in the town at the time of the flood and some 
of their deaths may have taken a number of weeks to confirm. The deaths of some 
travellers were, however, included in the official report. Discrepancies in the death toll 
(between official reports, newspapers, correspondence from those in the town, and earlier 
and later accountings), may also stem from the fact that bodies continued to wash ashore 
up to a month after the flood; the bodies of two adults and three or four children were 
found in mid-July.249 Waight, whose account was given at the beginning of this section, 
noted that a body was found when he stopped in Gundagai, two months after the flood. 
The official death toll calculated by the Commissioner of Crown Lands in the 
Lachlan District by 16 July was 75, comprising 68 from North Gundagai and seven from 
South. 250 The Commissioner named those who had died and who had survived. Most of 
the deaths were from North Gundagai, where the number of people at the time of the 
244 James Gormly, 'When It Broke: Drought of 1850-51 ', Gundagai Independent, 1 June, 1915, p.4. 
245 James Gormly, 'When It Broke: Drought of 1850-51', Gundagai Independent, 1 June, 1915, p.4. 
246 SMH, 5 July, 1852, p.3. 
247 SMH, 19 July, 1852, p.2; and, Maitland Mercury, 14 July, 1852, p.3. 
248 By 14 July, 12 people were reported as still missing. Maitland Mercury, 14 July, 1852, p.3. 
249 Lindley, Early Gundagai, p.78. 
250 
'Copy of a Letter from the Commissioner of Crown Lands, Lachlan District, to the Colonial Secretary', 
16 July, 1852. 'Gundagai'. New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-278, 
pp.245-24 7. 
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flood was estimated to be about 200 (including travellers). The 1851 census indicates the 
total population of Gundagai (including North and South and probably also those living 
in the immediate vicinity of the town) was about 400 at the time of the flood.251 If we 
combine available sources: the Lachlan District Land Commissioner's report, 1851 
census, and the estimated number of people in North Gundagai at the time of the flood, 
then just under one third of those in North Gundagai died during the flood. However, 
with estimates of deaths reaching over 100, as much as half the population on the north 
bank may have died. The number of dead remained (and remains) far from certain. 
* * * 
Burials 
The Reverend C harles Brigstoke, a Church of England clergyman, travelled from Yass to 
Gundagai, arriving on 14 July (three weeks after the flood). There he compiled a list of 
those who had died, which he numbered at 76. In a letter to Bishop Broughton in 
Sydney, dated 19 July, he wrote, 'Seventy-six, my lord, I have ascertained, and I think 
correctly, must have perished'. He wrote that 3 1 bodies had so far been buried (but his 
later descriptions indicate he had buried at least 32). Nineteen were buried in South 
Gundagai, 'in hardwood coffins, in one place, without distinction of sect or creed, and 
over which I read the burial service, which ceremony was attended by many of the 
relations and friends of the deceased'. 252 
Brigstoke buried 13 bodies in North Gundagai. These burials were grouped by 
religious denomination (a common practice), with eight 'Romanists' buried a short 
distance from the bodies of five Protestants. Although Brigstoke appears to have overseen 
all the burials, he 'did not interfere' with the traditional reading of the Last Rites over the 
eight Catholics, for which ritual 'the Priest from Yass was daily expected'.253 According to 
Brigstoke's tally there were 45 others who died, the burials of whom he d id not account 
for in his letter, and these were victims who were possibly never found. Names of victims 
could have been gained by eyewitness accounts of drownings. In contrast to Brigstoke's 
251 Goulburn Herald, 10 July, 1852, p.3; and The Blue Book, 185 1. 
m Charles F. Brigstoke, Letter to Bishop Broughton, Bishop of Sydney, 19 July, 1852, in SMH, 26 July, 
1852, p.2. 
253 Charles F. Brigstoke, Letter to Bishop Broughton, Bishop of Sydney, 19 July, 1852, in SMH, 26 July, 
1852, p.2. 
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account of the burials of 32 victims, the Lachlan District Land Commissioner indicated 
that at least 35 bodies had been interred by the time Brigstoke wrote to the Bishop of 
Sydney.254 Brigstoke did not indicate (beyond North or South Gundagai) the places where 
the bodies were interred. The Goulburn Herald reported that the 'bodies that have been 
recovered were interred with little ceremony - what ceremony could be expected? - they 
were wrapped in calico and put into holes!'. 255 
During the initial stages of research I tried to find where the victims were buried 
by finding graves, headstones, and/ or commemoration sites in Gundagai cemeteries. 
With the deaths numbering between 75 and 100, I imagined there would be some sign of 
the burial sites, marked around the time of the flood or in later commemoration. 
Arriving in Gundagai, I went to the Tourist Information Centre to find out where the 
victims of the flood were buried. There are two cemeteries in Gundagai, so I was unsure 
which one to go to. The woman behind the desk told me they had not been buried in the 
(current) cemeteries. She pointed out the window and said they were buried just there, 
under the park (Carberry Park) and up into the garden of the adjoining house. There was 
no plaque or marker to commemorate victims collectively buried in the park, either there 
or elsewhere in the town. There were a few memorial gravestones in North Gundagai 
cemetery to individuals or families. David Lindley, the grandson of one of the survivors, 
built a monument on the flat (now a golf course) to those in his family who had perished 
before he had had the chance to meet them. 
David Lindley recently wrote a biography of his grandfather, Thomas Lindley, 
licensee of the 'Rose Inn' and resident of Gundagai from 1850 to 1853. Thomas Lindley, 
away from Gundagai on business at the time of the flood, lost his wife and children in the 
flood. David Lindley, drawing on a thesis by E. Carpenter, noted that there are probable 
sites where most of the recovered bodies were interred - in South Gundagai in Section 
10 along Ferry Street; and in North Gundagai along Otway Street.256 
Using a combination of Surveyor Larmer's field books of survey dates and a 
variety of survey maps compiled between 1838 and 1850 recording sites and relationships 
254 
'Copy of a Letter from the Commissioner of Crown Lands, Lachlan District, to the Colonial Secretary', 
16 July, 1852. 'Gundagai'. New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-278, 
pp.245-247; and, Charles F. Brigstoke, Letter to Bishop Broughton, Bishop of Sydney, 19 July, 1852, in 
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254 
'Copy of a Letter from R.P. Jenkins Esquire, J.P., to the Colonial Secretary', 7 July, 1852. 'Gundagai'. 
New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-278, p.273. 
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between locations, it appears that by 1852 there was a cemetery (surveyed and in use) in 
North Gundagai that was indeed on Otway Street.257 Larmer's field books show that he 
surveyed cemeteries in North and South Gundagai in 1850 and show the North 
Gundagai burial site was in part located on land that was (and still is today) on Otway 
Street. According to Larmer's field book survey, the cemetery covered parts of four blocks 
(or sections) and part of Otway Street. Most of the cemetery was located on the north-
eastern intersection of Otway and Sheridan Streets (section 3 7), outside the settled areas 
on the flat (north-east of the main part of the town), on the slopes of Mount Parnassus.258 
The question remains, was this cemetery in use by 1852 and was this where those 
who died in the flood were buried? There are four indications that it was. First, Brigstoke 
grouped the burials of bodies found in North Gundagai according to religious 
denomination, but not those in South Gundagai. This suggests that there were areas 
marked (and consecrated) for denominational burial in North Gundagai. Secondly, a 
settler stated in a letter to the SMH following the flood that 'the graves are on the h ill', 
indicating that there was a set burial site on the slopes of Mount Parnassus. 259 (The writer 
continued that 'had they [surveyors] placed the living where they have put the dead, their 
number would have been much larger now').260 Thirdly, there seems no reason for a delay 
in using the burial site once Larmer had surveyed it in detail in 1850. It was close to the 
town and a distinct site. Lastly, this was the exact site indicated by the woman in the 
Tourist Information Centre. By the time of my visit in 2006, the burial ground had been 
taken over by the town's expansion and had now become a park close to the town's high 
street. While the site remains un-memorialised by a statue, stone, or plaque, the place 
holds memories that are held in oral tradition . 
zs7 James Larmer, Surveyors' Field books 1794-186 1; Larmer 1849-50. NRS 13889, 636. State Records 
Authority of New South Wales. Maps: Perry, 'Gundagai', 'Approved by Executive Council'. Survey map. 
1838. NRS 13859, [Map 28 11]. State Records Authority of New South Wales; various surveyors, 
'Gundagai', 'Village Design Plans'. Survey maps. 1840, 1845, 1850. NRS 13859, [Map 2813]. State Records 
Authority of New South Wales; Larmer, 'Gundagai', 'Gundagai North and South'. Survey map. 1850. NRS 
13859, [Map 2830]. State Records Authority of New South Wales; Larmer, 'Gundagai', '40 allotments in 
South Gundagai' . Survey map. 1845. NRS 13859, [Map 2827]. State Records Authority of New South 
Wales; Larmer, 'Gundagai', 'Plan showing proposed extension of North and South Gundagai'. Survey map. 
1850. NRS 13859, [Map 283 1]. State Records Authority of New South Wales. 
zss James Larmer, Surveyors' Field books 1794-186 1; Larmer 1849-50. NRS 13889, 636. State Records 
Authority of New South Wales. A note about survey maps: the dates of when particular sites were surveyed 
is questionable as survey maps are working drawings and continually added to. This is why surveyors' field 
books, which record the dates surveys were made, are important supplements in reading survey maps 
historically. 
259 SMH, 10 July, 1852, p.6. 
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Another cemetery, located further north (the current North Gundagai cemetery), 
was marked on Perry's 1838 survey map, but this site could have been added to the map 
by later surveyors.261 The Otway Street site is likely to be where victims of the 1852 flood 
were buried, but the presence of grave stones dating to the 1850s in the present day 
cemetery, suggest that both were in use by 1850 and had been drawn on the 1838 map by 
Larmer that year or earlier (perhaps even by Perry). 
Larmer also surveyed a cemetery for South Gundagai in 1850. In his field notes 
he marked the cemetery close to a nearby station's ('Willee Poolma') woolshed, along the 
'new road to Tumut' .262 However, this was probably not where victims of the flood were 
buried as it was only roughly surveyed and far from the developed areas of South 
Gundagai. In early survey maps of South Gundagai (compiled in 1845) there was a mark 
labelled 'graves' in a recreation reserve close to the river, on the western side of Mount 
Street and along the old road to Tumut, which was probably where victims of the flood 
were buried. 263 The burial ground was located on the banks of the river, close to where 
the bodies were found.264 Perhaps the South Gundagai cemetery surveyed by Larmer in 
1850 was to offer settlers denominationally segregated grave sites, as the Mount Street site 
seems not to have made this distinction. 
261 Perry, 'Gundagai', 'Approved by Executive Council'. Survey map. 1838. NRS 13859, [Map 28 11]. State 
Records Authority of New South Wales 
262 James Larmer, Surveyors' Field books 1794-186 1; Larmer 1849-50. NRS 13889, 636. State Records 
Authority of New South Wales. 
263 
'Gundagai', 'Village Design Plans'. various surveyors. Survey maps. 1840, 1845, 1850. NRS 13859, [Map 
2813). State Records Authority of New South Wales; and, Larmer, 'Gundagai', '40 allotments in South 
Gundagai'. Survey map. 1845. NRS 13859, [Map 2827). State Records Authority of New South Wales. 
264 This is a different site to the current South Gundagai cemetery, located on Tumut Road, which was, 
however, in use by 1846. The oldest gravestone in the Tumut Road cemetery is that of Edmund Crisp who 
died on 27 August 1846. However, the lack of denomination segregation and location of the Mount Street 
site near the river, where the bodies washed up, suggests it was the place victims were buried. 
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Map 1.6 (left) 
Detail from 1838 survey map by S. Perry (see Map 1.1), showing 
cemeteries. 
[Samuel Perry, 'Gundagai', 'Approved by Executive Council'. 
Survey map. 1838. NRS 13859, [Map 2811). State Records 
Authority of New South Wales.) 
- -·._:· 
.i#' - -...._ 
;(!" 
. "
_. 
/( / , . .c A' 
Map 1. 7 (above) 
Detail from an early survey map of South Gundagai, showing 
location marked 'graves' (bottom right in this detail). 
['Gundagai', 'Village Design Plans'. various surveyors. Survey 
map. 1840, 1845, 1850. NRS 13859, [Map 2813]. State 
Records Authority of New South Wales.] 
* * * 
Survivors of the flood of June 1852 faced a town in ruins. The 'Thatched Cottage Inn' in 
South Gundagai, along with a number of other buildings, had been washed away. On the 
flat in North Gundagai almost all houses and businesses were damaged or washed away 
altogether. The recently erected Court House and Lock-up were completely destroyed. 
Magistrate Jenkins wrote a letter to the Governor in July 1852, one month after the flood. 
His purpose was to seek vindication for his opinion that the Court H ouse and Lock-up 
should have been built in South Gundagai. He wished to 'prove to the satisfaction of His 
Excellency that the late disastrous flood confirms my representation that the site chosen 
was ineligible from the fact of its being subject to inundation'. 265 The flood of 1852 was 
265 
'Copy of a Letter from R.P. Jenkins Esquire, J.P., to the Colonial Secretary', 7 July, 1852. 'Gundagai'. 
New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.25 1-278, p.273. 
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infused with a history of contention over environmental knowledge and feelings of 
resentment from those who felt they had been ignored or treated unjustly. The response 
to Jenkins' letter was short and to the point: 'In reply I am desired to inform you that His 
Excellency can only very deeply regret that the recent melancholy dispensation of 
Providence should have confirmed your opinion'. 266 
In both North and South Gundagai fences, gardens, small farms, business stores 
and domestic goods, along with animals, were washed away, drowned, or destroyed by the 
flood. The combined damage to buildings, fences, produce, and property 'improvements' 
was estimated to be £3, 7 31. Damage or loss of household and store goods was greater, 
estimated to be £4,395.267 
Travellers and visitors in the town robbed the dead and looted property that 
washed to shore.268 Those on their way to the diggings, 'and others', made bark canoes, 
searching for valuables amongst furniture, breaking open cash boxes and chests of 
drawers. A number of Police Constables were 'sworn in' soon after the flood to control 
looting. This action came too late. The day that police began to search for stolen 
belongings looters were leaving town as 'several drays started, loaded with the plunder of 
the unfortunate sufferers' .269 
The flood in Gundagai and its consequences were widely reported in newspapers 
throughout the colony. The tragedy caused an outpouring of feeling for the victims. Soon 
after initial reports of the flood reached Sydney the SMH published a poem, 'Ode to the 
Dead of Gundagai' by 'Theta' - a poet who published widely in newspapers and journals 
in this period. Extracts from the poem reveal the feelings of pathos and tragic loss after 
the flood: 
Sleep dead, who died at Gundagai! 
Upon that dreadful heavy night, 
What then avail'd the piercing cry, 
Which rose above the waters' might! 
Ah what avail' d thee? Thine the fate, 
266 
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By flat seal'd - He willed thy doom; 
In joy, in youth, in health elate 
Unwarn'd-ye met a watery tomb ... 
All living sympathise with thee; 
And nature seems, still on to mourn; 
The very leaves on every tree, 
Ere falling - by the rude blast torn ... 
The pale cold moon, with dewy face, 
Her glistening tears will o'er thee shed; 
And stars which gleam in boundless space, 
Shine on those lone, unburied dead. 
But brightest of all lights which shine, 
The lights that light th ' eternal shore. 
Oh may their gleam, and grace, be thine, 
All Heaven thy lot for evermore.270 
* * * 
Charities and Government: Aid and Responsibility 
Immediately after the flood survivors, whose houses either had been washed away or were 
uninhabitable, were given food, shelter and blankets by inhabitants whose property had 
not been damaged.271 However, supplies of food, especially flour, began to run low and by 
10 July the survivors were 'in a state of starvation'. The floods had cut off supply routes 
and the town itself had few stores left. Further, many had little money to buy or order 
goods.272 
Relief funds were collected - totalling more than £1,800 - in Maitland, 
Braidwood, Sydney, and the goldfields. They came from secular, parish, and synagogue-
270 Theta, 'Ode to the Dead of Gundagai', SMH, 13 August, 1852, p.3. 
27 1 SMH, 5 July, 1852, p.2. 
m Goulburn Herald, 10 July, 1852, p.4. 
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based sources.273 The funds were held in trust by the colonial government for 
distribution.274 The Governor and other government officials in Sydney, hearing of the 
consequences of the flood in Gundagai on 5 July through 'the reports contained in the 
public journals', wrote to the Magistrates in Goulburn and Yass, requesting they send 
flour and blankets for distribution in the town, and to send the accounts to the Auditor, 
General. 275 Government expense for these supplies was supplemented by the public 
subscriptions. Government contributions to the immediate relief effort were later 
estimated to have totalled approximately £892. 276 While some of the money from relief 
funds went to the purchase of these material goods for immediate relief, the remainder 
was probably distributed in the form of tradesmen's tools and monetary grants.277 
By 21 July local Magistrates in Goulburn had organised the delivery of almost six 
tons of flour and 64 blankets to Gundagai, with another three tons of flour to follow. 278 
Charles MacAlister was amongst those who took the provisions from Goulburn to 
Gundagai. On arriving in Gundagai, he recalled that '[w]e found that the accounts of the 
flood had not been exaggerated in the least'. He saw 'several' horse and cattle carcasses 
high in the trees and the damaged buildings.279 The need for supplies in Gundagai was 
pressing. There was less than two tons of flour left in the town. 280 Once the goods arrived 
in Gundagai, however, there was some confusion over handing out the blankets.281 One 
resident (Spencer) claimed that 'one pair of blankets was doled out to a person 
accustomed to the comforts of life, and a whole bale [of blankets] remaining 
273 Maitland Mercury, 4 August, 1852, p.2; Maitland Mercury, 17 July, 1852, p.4; Maitland Mercury, 21 July, 
1852, p.3; Maitland Mercury, 31 July, 1852, p.4; Maitland Mercury, 7 August, 1852, p.2; Maitland Mercury, 18 
August, 1852, p. l; and, Goulbum Herald, 4 September 1852, p.4. 
274 Goulbum Herald, 4 September, 1852, p.4. 
275 Sub-enclosure in, 'Copy of a letter from the Colonial Secretary to the Bench of Magistrates at Gundagai', 
6 July, 1852. 'Gundagai'. New South Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-278, 
p.241; 'Copy of a Letter from the Colonial Secretary to the Bench of Magistrates, Yass', 9 July 1852. 
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untouched' .282 In Gundagai, responsibility for the distribution of relief money, blankets, 
boots, warm clothing, and rations was placed in the hands of the local magistrates and the 
Reverend Brigstoke.283 
Initial government aid was based on what could be gained from newspapers, 
rather than 'official' reports.284 The government commenced relief measures on the basis 
of this information, 'having no reason to doubt the correctness of the published 
reports'.285 However, on 6 July 1852 the Governor requested an official report from the 
Commissioner of Crown Lands for the Lachlan District, Edgar Beckham. Beckham was 
instructed to travel to Gundagai and report on 'the nature and extent of the damage ... 
particularly in respect to loss of human life' . 286 Further, Beckham was asked to organise 
additional relief, as far as possible, in the town, and report on damage in other areas in 
the district.287 Bingham, the Land Commissioner for the Murrumbidgee District, was 
acting as coroner and conducting inquiries into deaths.288 
While Bingham acted as coroner, Beckham compiled an official list of both those 
who had died and survived, as well as property damage and losses from production. 
Bingham.reported in a letter dated 16 July, that none of those living on the hill (Mount 
Parnassus) in North Gundagai had drowned or suffered property damage. He listed a 
total of 110 survivors and calculated that 68 died in North Gundagai and seven on the 
southern bank of the Murrumbidgee. He cou nted the number of buildings on the flat -
78 - writing that 48 were 'entirely swept away', eight were 'so much injured as to be 
untenable', and 13 out of the remaining 16 'were under water'. He added that, 'the whole 
village is now a perfect wreck, and it is impossible for any, but an eye-witness, to imagine 
the fearful devastation committed by the flood'.189 
Beckham reported that, contrary to some newspaper reports, no lives had been 
lost in Wagga and there had been 'very little damage' to property in that town (except for 
282 Goulburn Herald, 9 July, 1853, p.2. 
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an inn). 290 Beckham also wrote that 'several small settlers and mechanics' living between 
Gundagai and Jugiong had 'lost everything'. He made arrangements for them to receive 
the same aid 'as granted the survivors of Gundagai' .29 1 Indeed there had been floods 
along the Murrumbidgee, Tumut, Turon, Hawkesbury and Shoalhaven Rivers, as well as 
in Braidwood and Queanbeyan, and along the Condamine River, and settlers reported 
deaths, damage, and narrow escapes; the flood in Gundagai remained grimly outstanding 
among these accounts. 292 
In July 1852 the extent of farmers' losses in the wider district was not known, but 
the Goulburn Herald estimated that losses of 'growing crops', wheat, and 'other grain' were 
extensive, as well as damage to farm buildings, such as barns, and warned that prices of 
produce, wheat, and hay could rise. The newspaper urged farmers to return to work re-
planting as soon as possible, to guard against a wheat shortage. Further, '[t]he land has been 
prepared by the flood'. 293 
Beckham ended his report with predictions of another flood: 'Both the T umut 
and Murrumbidgee are rising rapidly, and another flood may be expected'. 294 Indeed, 
Gundagai flooded again on 9 August 1852. The flood did not reach the heights of the 
June flood or that in 1844, nor were the waters as turbulent, giving by contrast 'the 
appearance of a great lake'. 295 The river had not fully subsided since the June flood and 
the August high water levels lingered - some places in Gundagai remained flooded for 
months. 
Although the government was active in organising immediate aid to Gundagai, it 
was not enough. Throughout the colony the tragedy of the June 1852 flood was seen to 
be the result of government inaction. 
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* * * 
Government and Settler Accountability 
Early newspaper reports of Gundagai's flood in the regional press and the SMH were 
mostly accounts from residents, as well as from the Gundagai correspondent for the 
Goulburn Herald, John Spencer, and visitors who had seen the effects of the flood. 296 Many 
of these accounts included calls for the government to move the 'ill-fated township', 
arguing that an exchange of allotments should be offered, much as Bingham had 
suggested in 1844.297 Some accounts assumed that the government would institute an 
allotment exchange. One resident wrote to the SMH that '[n]o doubt the government will 
lay out more of the township on high ground, and offer to those who hold flooded 
allotments an exchange'.298 Such an exchange now, they suggested, would be some 
compensation to the living, but 'who can recall the dead?' .299 Spencer wrote in the 
Goulburn Herald (whose account was also published in the SMH), that '[i]t is to be hoped 
that the government will never again sell any land in these flats, for building purposes, 
but give the owners of allotments other land in exchange, on the hill above high water 
mark'.300 Bingham's proposal was clearly the basis for these arguments - his idea of a free 
exchange of allotments was taken up in a way that suggests the concept had become fused 
with the story of the town.301 This is despite residents rejecting the proposal in 1844; not, 
however, on principle, but because they did not agree with the alternative location 
Bingham had suggested at the time. 
In July 1852 the SMH published a full re-print of Bingham's 1844 letter to 
Governor Gipps and G ipps' reply, in order 'to shame the Government into a right 
position'. 302 An editorial accompanied the letters. It criticised the government's history of 
inaction as 'an error of judgement, subsequently aggravated by an act of deliberate and 
inflexible injustice' that amounted to 'false representations' in subsequent land sales. These 
past actions, the editorial cont inued, now 'involves the Colonial Government in a deep 
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responsibility for this appalling sacrifice of human life'. 303 A resident wrote that the 
townspeople were as yet in no state to petition Governor FitzRoy, as 'all seem so 
completely depressed that they can hardly be persuaded to meet and memorialise 
[petition] the Governor-General, from whose wise and liberal policy they may expect 
much. Would that his predecessor had acted similarly'.304 
One letter to the SMH, written by W. Martin, a former resident and storekeeper 
at Gundagai, used very strong language to describe how the government had managed to 
'allure ... a number of people (many of them poor) into such a vortex of danger'.305 'The first 
error', he wrote, 'was an incompetent surveyor'. The surveyor, he argued, had been 'blind' 
to indications of past floods and chosen the only place, 'the very lowest flat', that 
'ordinarily' inundates. Parts of the township were 'more or less under water every winter'. He 
also criticised the surveyor's decision to lay out the town around existing buildings: 'If it 
suits me to live in a waterhole, it is no reason why a town should be laid out around me'. 
The second error, Martin continued, was ignoring Bingham's letter. Although the three 
new allotments had been marked out for sale, government buildings were erected on the 
flat, including the Court House and Lock-up, as well as the National School, 'in the very 
centre of the flood'. This was done, Martin argued, against the wishes of 'a portion of the 
inhabitants'. A bridge had also been erected across the river that divided the northern 
section of the town (later Morelys Creek) in 1850 - against which 'all on dry land' (those 
who lived and traded on the hill) had protested because it was located in such a position 
that it would wash away in a flood. The government had responded that the site of the 
bridge could not be changed because the surveyor had already selected it. It washed away 
in the 1851 flood.306 
The main error, Martin argued, was that surveyors had continually refused to 
listen to those who knew the area. H e argued that '[s]urveyors should be intelligent 
practical men (as many of them are) who would not be ashamed to take counsel of some 
old resident bushman' rather than be pretentious, 'with their classical tastes and poetic 
names to streets'. He suggested that a 'surveyor need take an oath of office ... that no local 
influences should induce him to choose any other than a safe and eligible spot' . To those 
who built on the flat, he wrote, 'I have little to say'. His criticism of them was essentially 
the same as the surveyors, they had not listened: 'They were warned almost every year -
303 Original emphasis. SMH, 7 July, 1852, p.2. 
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the blacks tell of a larger flood, that had been previously known'. He pointed out that 
there were marks near most rivers 'by which we may judge the height they have been wont 
to reach (in this case it was peculiarly so) - logs in trees, &c.'. However, Martin also 
empathised with those in Gundagai, writing that ' [i]f culpable, if in error, how they have 
suffered'. With many new town sites soon to be surveyed, Martin warned: 'remember 
Gundagai'.307 
Another settler, Lachlan Ross, made a similar criticism of residents and 
landowners in Gundagai, that they had not listened to Aborigines' warnings. Ross 
included an account of the flood in a pamphlet that detailed his journey to the gold 
fields. He concluded: 'our sable brethren told the [first settler! builders [in Gundagai] that 
a big flood had covered the flat, and also pointed out the height it had attained'. 'But', he 
continued, 'I expect the colour of their skin was against their being believed. And here in 
1852 is the result: 73 lives lost besides several strangers who were not accounted for'. 308 
Residents defended themselves against allegations that they were in any way at 
fault for living on the flat, arguing they had no choice. One resident wrote, that if he had 
not traded on the flat he would not have survived economically, and so it was erroneous 
to consider 'persons occupying the flat ... blameable'.309 Others argued they were trapped 
into living on the flat; having sunk money into buying and building there they had no 
means to relocate. Still others argued that they had only a choice to buy 'on low land or 
low land'.310 
Letters such as Martin's were overshadowed by a general outcry at the callousness 
of the government, especially in the Goulburn Herald, which published extensive editorials 
and comments made by residents of Goulburn. A public meeting was held in Goulburn, 
a town located north-east of Gundagai (which had also flooded). There, residents of the 
town expressed their anger at the government. A settler who was vocal at the meeting, 
D.H. Thorne, argued that, '[t]he selfishness and cupidity of the Government had 
produced the disaster'. Thorne further argued that a similar flood 'will one day level the 
township of Wagga', which had also flooded to high levels in June. In fact, he argued, 
'[t]he same might be said of half the townships in the colony'. Thorne read out Bingham's 
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1844 letter to Gipps, using it as evidence of the government's responsibility for the recent 
disaster.311 Thorne also defended those who lived and built on the flat: 'It may be said 
that after the warning of the 1844 flood the people are not deserving of commiseration: 
but it must be remembered that many of them had expended their all - and who so 
placed would not stand by their property... Had the Government attended to the 
recommendation of Mr. Bingham, Gundagai would be Gundagai still' .312 In the public 
meeting blame and responsibility were laid entirely with the government. 
One settler who wrote an independent letter to the Goulburn Herald, signed 'a 
squatter', pointed to an additional reason that the government should offer 
compensation to survivors. He proposed that 'a prompt and liberal distribution of 
money, land, and provisions' would offer surviving residents of Gundagai an incentive to 
stay in the town, 'to prevent them departing to the gold fields'. 313 Before the 1852 flood 
Gundagai had been at the height of an economic boom, fed by a combination of 
increasing pastoralism and the early stages of the Victorian gold rush. The flood had 
caused such loss of life and property that economic reasons for settlers to reinvest in the 
town were few, unless the government took some action to secure the town from floods. 
The Reverend Patrick Fitzgerald (who lived in Wagga but whose ministry 
encompassed Gundagai) was also concerned about the survival of the district after the 
flood. The effects of drought and flood, along with the lure of gold rushes, seemed to 
mark the beginnings of a downturn in the economy. Three families from his ministry had 
been killed in the flood. His regular congregation was now reduced to just six families. 
Deaths, economic hardship, and the pull of the gold rushes seemed to him a worrying 
combination. He was pessimistic about the future of the entire area, from Wagga to 
G undagai. One month after the flood he wrote to The Reverend J.D. Lang of his 
concerns: 'In the first place the District had suffered from the great drought, 2. from gold 
mania, 3. from floods, is it any wonder that enterprise has been checked and that objects 
of public utility have suffered from withering neglect'.314 Indeed, Fitzgerald was ready to 
leave the area: 'it would break my heart to leave. I will endeavour to struggle on as I am 
till April next. If circumstances are not more favourable then, I must apply to the Synod 
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to release me from my charge'.315 Almost completely destroyed by the 1852 flood, 
materially and morally, the survival of Gundagai as a township was at stake. 
* * * 
1852 Petition: Pressuring the Government 
Landowners and residents of Gundagai sent a petition to Governor FitzRoy, dated 15 
July. The elected member for the Murrumbidgee District, George Macleay, presented 
their Petition to FitzRoy.316 The petition was more encompassing than past petitions and 
included 'Purchasers and Lessees of Land in the Town of Gundagai and other residents 
of the same' , including settlers in the northern and southern sections of the town. 
H owever , not all residents were consulted about the petition, including Spencer, who 
complained in the Goulburn Herald that the petition had been drafted and sent by only 
one section of the population who had put themselves down for 'goodly sums' of 
compensation and reduced the estimates of losses by others. Spencer generally agreed 
with the petition, however, and reasoned that if the Governor responded favourably then 
'these claims can be easily adjusted'.317 
The petitioners argued that they had located businesses and residences on the flat 
and other places that were flooded in 1852 because they trusted government expertise. 
They stated that they, 
... cannot take any blame to themselves for locating where they did. Gundagai was a 
government township, and its apparent eligibility for commerce, induced your petitioners 
to stake their capital and labour in it, and placing, as they d id, the most implicit 
confidence in the talent and experience of the surveyors employed by the local 
Government, they could not have possibly supposed that the bed of a lagoon or dry basin 
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of a river would have been selected as the site for a town, and much less could they have 
apprehended even the possibility of so disastrous an event.31 B 
The petitioners clearly portrayed the effects of the 1852 flood as the fault of the 
government and surveyors, whose expertise they had 'implicitly' trusted. The petition did 
not request an exchange of allotments, or any specific government action; but included a 
list of those who had died and survived, and details of the estimated cost of damage to 
property. With these documents, the petitioners left 'their lamentable case in your 
Excellency's hands, feeling assured that ... your Excellency will not fail to extend to them 
the benevolence and justice so intimately associated with ... the British Crown'.319 
FitzRoy's reply to the petitioners, dated 6 August, was that the government had 
already acted by coordinating immediate relief, and could do nothing more. 320 FitzRoy 
adopted the position of his predecessor, Gipps. Perhaps the Governors did not want to 
appear to admit that the surveyors had made a mistake or that the government was 
thereby liable. Perhaps also, they did not want to set a precedent for other towns, 
settlements, and farms. Further, an exchange of allotments would reduce government 
revenue from land sales (as Gipps indicated in 1844). 
Macleay, however, continued to lobby the Executive (or Legislative) Council on 
behalf of the petitioners. In the Council, Macleay raised the history of the town's survey 
and continued location on the flat. He argued that the site of the town 'always appeared 
to him a highly improper place for a township, situated as it was at the base of a range of 
mountains'. However, Macleay also described the surveyors' reasoning behind the 
location of the town, giving some justification to the initial decision. The flat was a 
convenient crossing place, already a place of settlement, and 'it was in consequence of the 
representations of persons resident in that neighbourhood that some years after it was so 
occupied by that township'. Macleay also blamed Governor Gipps, who had rejected the 
inhabitants' request for 'permission to exchange their purchased allotments in a more 
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September, 1852, p.8. 
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elevated position' on the southern side of the river.321 Once more, Bingham's request was 
attributed to the residents of Gundagai. 
Macleay continued that Gipps was not, however, wholly to blame. He argued that, 
'from what he had since seen , that that refusal had not been the cause of the loss of a 
single life'. Instead, 'had the prayer been conceded the people would not have availed 
themselves of the opportunity, on account of the superior commercial value of the 
present site being much nearer to the crossing place'. He argued that people had 
continued to live and build on the flat to take advantage of trade from travellers on the 
Port Phillip Road and that, having experienced the flood of 1844, 'they were confident of 
security from any flood that could again occur' .322 On the basis of their experience with 
the 1844 flood perhaps settlers judged themselves knowledgeable about what to expect in 
a large flood and the height to which the river could rise. James Gormly later argued that 
the 1852 flood was unexpected by settlers because the 1844 flood had been so large that 
the possibility of another flood like it soon, if ever, seemed remote. This expectation was 
not entirely guesswork. Gormly later wrote that before the 1852 flood, when he first 
moved into the area along the Murrumbidgee (from 1844), he had spoken with 
Aboriginal people about floods on the Murrumbidgee, who called the 1844 flood 'The 
O ld Man Flood', the highest they had seen.323 The people Gormly spoke with, he trusted. 
He wrote that others later said floods could go higher than the flood in 1852, but on 
consulting with his friends he doubted these reports. Gormly included this anecdote to 
show that settlers as well as Aboriginal people in the area thought the 1844 flood, and 
then the 1852 flood, unusually high. 
Macleay called for 'a copy of all correspondence that has taken place between the 
Executive Government and the inhabitants of Gundagai respecting the adaptability for 
that spot for a township' to be laid upon the table and be made publicly available.324 The 
Colonial Secretary agreed to Macleay's request as the matter was of 'considerable public 
interest' and on 20 July 1852 ordered the correspondence be printed.325 Macleay again 
raised the issue at a meeting of the Council on 24 August, requesting the amounts paid 
for 'allotments that are situated in the highest flood mark' be laid on the table. His 
32 1 Maitland Mercury, 14 July, 1852, p.4. 
322 SMH, 19 July, 1852, p.2. 
323 James Gormly, 'When it Broke: Drought of 1850-51', Gundagai Independent, 11 May, 1915, p.4. 
324 Maitland Mercury, 14 July, 1852, p.4. 
325 Maitland Mercury, 14 July, 1852, p.4; and, Maitland Mercury, 28 July, 1852, p.4. 'Gundagai' . New South 
Wales Legislative Council. Votes and Proceedings, v.2, 1852. pp.251-278. 
84 
Chapter One - Gundagai 1852 
purpose was to keep the question of compensation open: 'to enable the house to assist in 
determining the difficult question of what compensation was due to the unfortunate 
sufferers by the flood from the Government' .326 
* * * 
The Petition and the Press 
FitzRoy' s response to the petitioners was made public. The minutes of the Legislative 
Council, where Macleay championed the petitioners, were also reported in newspapers. 
The residents' petitions of 1851 and 1852, along with FitzRoy's responses were re-printed 
in the Goulburn Herald and SMH.327 Indeed, the SMH, in an earlier issue of the 
newspaper, had also reprinted Bingham's 1844 letter to Governor Gipps, and Gipps' 
response - but not the landowners' petition of the same year, which rebuked Bingham's 
proposal of an allotment exchange. 328 
There was little further reportage in the SMH after it printed the 1851 and 1852 
petitions. There were no more outraged editorials. In September 1852 a letter to the 
SMH, signed 'One of the Survivors', lamented that the 'colonial press' had not taken up 
the petitioners' fight.329 The newspaper had printed the 1851 and 1852 petitions with 
little comment besides '[t]he reply of the Governor-General to the latter [1852 Petition] is 
most unsatisfactory', and indicated that the newspaper had been requested to publish the 
letters.330 Without the support of the press, the 'Survivor' wrote, Gundagai 'is left to fight 
it [sic] own battles, and maintain its own rights single-handed' .331 The 'Survivor' defended 
settlers who lived on the flat, implying that the lack of reportage by the SMH may be due 
to a sense that settlers were somewhat responsible for locating on the flat: 'We are 
informed it has been reported, to our prejudice in the metropolis, that sufferers [those 
who had lost relatives, friends, and property] and survivors had shown an obtuse 
predilection for the inundated flat, obstinately preferring it to any other portion of the 
town ... we had no alternative but to live where we did ... we had not to pick between hill 
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and dale but between low land and low land'. 332 It was argued that even the land that 
bordered the northern limits of the town was under water during the 1852 flood, 'varying 
in depth from three feet six inches to eight feet'. 333 Earlier reports, however, contradicted 
this claim, stating that buildings on the hill were not inundated. Indeed, Beckham's 
report excluded settlers and dwellings on the hill as they were all uninjured, indicating 
there were allotments available for sale on the higher ground. 
In September the Colonial Secretary laid government correspondence 'relative to 
Gundagai' on the table in the Legislative Council. It is very possible that members of the 
public and journalists read copies of these letters and reports. The correspondence 
included the 1844 petition which argued against Bingham's proposal for an allotment 
exchange. Further, no resident or landowner in Gundagai (besides Bingham) had ever 
directly asked the government for an allotment exchange. This may have contributed to 
the lack of support implied by journalists and settlers in Sydney, who appeared to have 
abandoned Gundagai. 
While the cause of the petitioners petered out in the SMH it was taken up with 
vigour locally, especially in the Goulburn Herald, which printed an editorial that was highly 
critical of FitzRoy's reply to the 1852 petition.334 The editorial criticised the government 
for not acting, either in the past or now. Further, 'the Government knew full well that the 
place would likely be deluged, Commissioner Bingham gave notice of the fact' in his 
1844 letter. The locals were of the view that the blame and responsibility lay in the history 
of the government's failure to act to protect residents. 'What', the editorial asked, 'is the 
consequence of this neglect of Government? Eighty human beings are launched into 
eternity'. 335 The article described the government's response to the recent petition as 
being 'cold and unfeeling', arguing that the government had done almost nothing in 
response to the catastrophe except to express sympathy and organise 'immediate relief. 
Even this aid was thought to be lacking, as its cost had not even matched amounts 
donated by subscribers that year. Responsibility, it was claimed, lay with the government 
that had a demonstrated record of neglect. The editorial called for landowners to be 
allowed to exchange allotments, but indicated that this was not the most favoured action 
by residents of Gundagai: 'the more intelligent inhabitants of Gundagai' wanted money 
to be allocated 'for the purpose of damming up the mouths of the three branches of the 
332 SMH, 13 September, 1852, p.2. 
333 SMH, 13 September, 1852, p.2 . 
334 Goulbum Herald, 4September,1852, p.4. 
335 Goulbum Herald, 4September,1852, p.4. 
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river' and 'a bridge over the river that divides North Gundagai into two portions' 
(Morelys Creek).336 
The Goulbum Herald editorial indicated an exchange of allotments was not what 
residents necessarily wanted, although it was what Macleay implied in parliament and 
what was generally believed. Perhaps the absence of a request for an allotment exchange 
in the petition contributed to the SMH's apathy towards Gundagai's cause after the 
printing of the 1852 petition. Technically the petitioners had not asked for anything. The 
press and settlers in other regions of the colony had assumed that survivors would 
demand an allotment exchange and, indeed, immediately after the flood survivors had 
also assumed this was the next course of action. Now, however, some in Gundagai 
appeared to be angling for the fulfilment of the 1851 petition for a dam to be built to 
prevent the lagoon from funnelling water onto the flat. The idea of an allotment 
exchange, which landowners and residents had never directly or collectively sought from 
the government, had grown in public acceptance, stemming from Bingham's 1844 letter 
to Gipps, an idea that was, at the time, dismissed by landowners and residents as unfair 
and unwanted. Bingham's proposal seemed to gain dramatic and mythological 
proportions in 1852. It was also appropriated into the history of the town as part of its 
ongoing struggles with an unresponsive and neglectful government. The initial outcry by 
1844 petitioners against Bingham's proposal went unmentioned. Bingham had died 
shortly after the flood, on 24 August 1852 at the age of 56, and so did not witness these 
fall-outs.337 
Bingham's proposal was sometimes appropriated by the townspeople themselves 
to make certain arguments. For example, the Gundagai correspondent to the Goulburn 
Herald, Spencer, reporting on FitzRoy's reply to the 1852 petition, stated that the 
government had acted like a 'dishonest speculator' by allowing people to purchase 
allotments known to flood, taking the profits and refusing compensation. The 'hardship 
is felt the greater', he continued, 'from the fact that the inhabitants petitioned the 
Government to remove the site of the town as they anticipated this catastrophe would 
some day befall them'. He stopped short, however, of arguing for an allotment exchange 
to now take place, instead arguing, in a general way, 'that a few thousand pounds could 
not be considered more nobly expended than in restoring a whole community to their 
336 Goulbum Herald, 4 September,1852, p.4. 
337 Death notice, Maitland Mercury, 11 September, 1852, p.3. 
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former independence and prosperity'.338 It is strange that Spencer in 1852 should 
attribute the idea of an allotment exchange in 1844 to the town generally as he alone had 
supported Bingham's request in writing at the time. Perhaps he too had succumbed to 
the general momentum and inaccuracy of the town's story. 
Despite the failing interest of the SMH (perhaps an indication of the waning 
attention of its readership), the government gave in to local pressure from Gundagai and 
Goulburn, and internal pressure from Macleay, and agreed to act. On 20 October 1852 it 
issued a proclamation in the Government Gazette that residents in Gundagai could 
exchange allotments 'liable to inundation' for land on higher ground.339 The 
announcement did not specify where the new allotments would be located, but left it to 
land owners who wished to take advantage of the offer to 'address themselves to this 
Office', indicating that there was a choice of sites.340 Landowners would be gifted land on 
surrender of their deeds for flooded allotments. 341 
* * * 
Gundagai: Move? 
Despite the government's offer, some settlers did not exchange their allotments and 
continued living and trading on the flat. Others, such as James and Thomas Gormly, left 
the town for the goldfields.342 The floods in New South Wales and northern Victoria had 
uncovered fresh gold deposits.343 
Even after more floods in June and July 1853 (the latter being two feet higher 
than the June 1852 flood), some residents continued to remain on the flat.344 After the 
first of these floods, the Gundagai correspondent to the Goulburn Herald wrote that the 
force and height of the water was 'quite powerful enough to destroy the fencing of those 
who were foolish enough to fence in paddocks ... under the impression that such a flood 
338 Goulbum Herald, 28 August, 1852, p.5. 
339 New South Wales Government Gazette, 20 October, 1852, p.1533. 
340 New South Wales Government Gazette, 20 October, 1852, p.1533. 
341 Goulbum Herald, 15 January, 1853, p.4. 
342 James Gormly, 'When it Broke: Drought of 1850-51', Gundagai Independent, 4 May, 1915, p.4; and, 
Gormly, Exploration and Settlement in Australia. 
343 See, Maitland Mercury, 5 February, 1853, p.4; Maitland Mercury, 17 July, 1852, p.3; and, The Times 
(London), 24 November, 1852, quoted in Frank Crowley, A Documentary History of Australia. Volume 2: 
Colonial Auscmlia, 1841-18 7 4 (Melbourne: Thomas Nelson, 1980), pp. 23 2-233. 
344 Goulbum Herald, 9 July, 1853, p.2; and, Goulbum Herald, 23 July, 1853, p.2. 
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as had occurred would not occur again for fifty years'. Spencer argued that, '[w]e have 
experienced floods now three years in succession ... a warning, one would think, sufficient 
to make all turn their attention to higher land'.345 Settlers, Spencer wrote, risked building 
on the flat with the belief that large floods would not recur for many years. The potential 
for Gundagai's population to decline due to the floods and drought, as well as departures 
for the goldfields, was somewhat eased in the following years as small quantities of gold 
were discovered near Gundagai in 1853, providing a short-term economic and population 
fillip for the region.346 
Following the 1853 floods some residents once more rebuilt on the flat. The 
economic advantage of trading on the flat was a strong lure. Settlers weighed this benefit 
against (what were probably seen as unlikely) dangerous floods. In 1854 a traveller passing 
through Gundagai on his way to the Victorian gold fields wrote: 'What struck me as 
being somewhat remarkable was that some of the places swept away by the flood had been 
re-built, and were actually occupied as stores and residences... some of the most 
prominent business places were still on the old site, such, for instance, as the post office, 
kept by a highly respectable store keeper, and one of the most frequented and best 
conducted inns'.347 The risks to life and costs of floods, it seemed, were outweighed by the 
risk of conducting business further from the road. The population of Gundagai (North 
and South combined) dropped from about 400 in 1852 to 347 by 1856, possibly as a 
combined result of deaths from the June 1852 flood, settlers leaving for the gold fields, 
and the realisation of the extreme risk of large floods.348 
In November 1858 the government set a deadline of 1 February 1859 for 
residents to take up its offer of allotment exchanges.349 The deadline appears to have 
prompted landowners, who had not already exchanged their allotments, to act, as after 
1859 there are no further reports of settlers living or trading on the flat. An 1857 survey 
map of North Gundagai shows a changed town.350 The flat had been transformed into 
345 Goulbum Herald, 9 July, 1853, p.2. 
346 Moreton Bay Courier, 1 January, 1853, p.3; Moreton Bay Courier, 12 March, 1853, p.2; Maitland Mercury, 12 
January, 1853, p.l; Maitland Mercury, 6 April, 1853, p.3; and, Maitland Mercury, 27 April, 1853, p.2. In the 
1860s larger quantities of gold were found in North Gundagai and the town experienced a gold rush. See, 
Soerjohardjo, 'Aspects of Life in Gundagai', p.18. 
347 SMH, 7 March, 1854, p.2. 
348 The Blue Book, 1856; and, Butcher, Gundagai, p.17. 
349 New South Wales Government Gazette, 9 November, 1858, p.183 7. 
350 E.G. Bennett, 'Plan of lands measured for sale. Parish of North Gundagai. County of Clarendon. New 
South Wales'. 1857. MAP F 449. National Library of Australia. 
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large land divisions that suggest grazing areas (rather than town allotments). In this map, 
town allotments were entirely on the slopes of Mount Parnassus, north of the anabranch . 
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North Gundagai, 1857. Note the absence of town allotments on the flat. 
[E.G. Bennett, 'Plan of lands measured for sale. Parish of North Gundagai. County of 
Clarendon. New South Wales'. 1857. MAP F 449. National Library of Australia.I 
So, why did so many die in the June 1852 flood? Residents, landowners, 
government surveyors, and Governors were embedded in networks of negotiation over, 
and evaluation of, environmental knowledge that were influenced by other 
considerations. Knowledge of floods became a matter of risk evaluation for residents, 
landowners, and surveyors. From at least 1844 (and possibly earlier) residents and 
landowners weighed the risk of potentially infrequent, large floods against living and 
trading on the flat - environmental speculation against economic advantage. Prior to the 
1844 flood, settlers had also evaluated accounts of floods from Aborigines in terms of 
their own experiences and asked: was Aboriginal knowledge accurate? The 1844 flood 
proved to some that it was. Government surveyors, in laying out the original town plan, 
had weighed the risk of possible floods against convenience to travellers and the pre-
existence of settlement on the flat. 
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Some residents and landowners undoubtedly purchased or leased land not 
knowing that the land could flood (as some stated in 1852 to defend their occupation of 
the flat). They were financially 'trapped' on the flat. Others, however, bought land and 
lived on the flat knowing it could flood - as with the Hargreaves family. As Spencer 
indicated in his 1853 newspaper report, those on the flat also 'traded-off estimates about 
when the next flood would occur. This was another element of risk evaluation. 
Were the Governors at fault? Both Gipps and FitzRoy were working within legal 
and financial constraints. However, G ipps and, initially also, FitzRoy, risked the lives of 
those in Gundagai to gain land revenue and to avoid the expense of flood mitigation. For 
example, Gipps, though bound by the law to disallow allotment exchanges (and at the 
risk of establishing a precedent), did not concede to the 1844 petitioners' request to 
purchase allotments they believed to be above flood mark at a set price. Such a solution 
would possibly have helped to re-locate the town centre at the time. FitzRoy did not agree 
to the expense of erecting a dam, probably because of the cost of the structure as well as 
legal constraints. Gipps' and FizRoy's knowledge of floods at Gundagai derived from their 
surveyors. Surveyor-General Thomas Mitchell told Gipps after the 1844 flood that floods 
might never occur again in Gundagai. This reveals both the kind of hypotheses that were 
made about frontier regions and the inland rivers, and the way government expertise 
worked within government decision-making. Surveyors' knowledge was always cumulative 
- the initial survey of the town determined its site, but such knowledge was added to by 
subsequent surveyors. Residents' knowledge was also cumulative. Gundagai and the June 
1852 flood provide a perspective on the ways in which the imperatives of settlement 
connect with attempts to make sense of the unpredictability of weather and river flow. 
By the early 1900s the flat had become a recreation ground and town common, 
used for grazing animals such as pigs, cattle, and cows, as well as for fairs. The opening of 
the Prince Alfred Bridge (a road bridge) across the Murrumbidgee near the Gundagai 
punt in 1867, saw the punt close the same year.351 A new road was constructed for the 
approach to the bridge, on a slightly different route to the original travel route. The 
railway was extended to Gundagai by 1886.352 Originally sited and surveyed as a town 
because of the road to Port Phillip and as the main crossing place over the 
Murrumbidgee, the new infrastructure, altered travel route, and modes of transport 
ushered in a changing economic topography for Gundagai as a stopping place for 
351 Butcher, Gundagai, p.15 . 
352 O'Keefe, et al., The Watermen of Gundagai, pp.18-20. 
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travellers. The town also developed new industries such as asbestos mining. In recent 
decades the 1852 flood and site of the old town has became the foundation of a tourist 
industry in Gundagai. 
Figure 1.3 
View of the flat, the original site of Gundagai, after the northern part of the town was 
relocated. This picture also shows the bridges that were built after the town's relocation. 
[Charles Louis Gabriel, 1857-1927. Gundagai photograph collection, taken by Dr C.L. 
Gabriel, from the Butcher and Bell collections [823] [picture] between 1887 and 1927. 
nla.pic-an8526479-823. National Library of Australia.) 
The hydrology of the Murrumbidgee watershed has changed significantly since the 
1850s, largely because of settler land use practices and the building of Burrinjuck Dam 
(completed in 1907) and Tantangara Dam (completed in 1960 as part of the Snowy 
Mountains Scheme, at the Murrumbidgee's headwaters). The flows of the Murrumbidgee 
were significantly reduced by the dams, with Tantangara Dam diverting 99 percent of the 
river's annual flow into Eucumbene Dam. These water storages on the Murrumbidgee 
have reduced the general flow of the river; however, large floods (over seven metres) have 
continued to occur at Gundagai. After the completion of the dams in 1960, through to 
1991, five floods rose above the seven metre mark, reaching from nine to 11 metres. 
Between 1843 and 1960, 15 floods exceeded seven metres, and were generally higher 
(between nine and 12 metres).353 The flood of August 1853 was the only one greater than 
353 For flood heights see: Butcher, Gundagai, p.84. 
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the June 1852 flood. The June 1852 flood in Gundagai remains one of the largest floods 
recorded in Gundagai since colonisation. 
Figure 1.4 
The flat in flood after North Gundagai was relocated. This photograph was taken from the 
slope of Mount Parnassus, with part of North Gundagai in view. 
[Charles Louis Gabriel, 1857-1927. Gundagai photograph collection, taken by Dr C.L. 
Gabriel, from the Butcher and Bell collections [792] [picture] between 1887 and 1927. 
nla.pic-an8526479-792. National Library of Australia.] 
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2 
Experimentation and Regulation 
Pastoralism and Mining, 1850 to 1890 
The June 1852 flood in Gundagai occurred relatively early in the process of pastoral 
expansion, at a time when little thought had been given to the environmental 
vulnerability of settlement or the government's response. There was little administrative 
provision, beyond land sale, for assisting settlers with the environmental challenges they 
faced. Land was seen primarily as a resource to be exploited and new settlements were 
generally located on the fringes of areas under state control. Gundagai, however, had also 
become a service centre for expanding populations involved in goldmining and pastoral 
exploration. Goldmining influenced the way water was regulated by governments as well 
as social and economic relationships that led to government involvement. Water was also 
a resource critical to pastoralism which, alongside goldmining, emerged as an 
economically important and geographically dominant industry from the 1860s. By 1870 
wool had eclipsed gold as Australia's most lucr ative export. 1 In contrast to government 
regulations around the use of water on goldfields, pastoralists' water use was largely 
unregulated by governments. T here was an element of tension or parallelism between the 
central regulation of miners' water use and a much more fragmented approach to 
pastoralists' water use. 
This chapter tracks pastoralists and miners as they followed the rivers inland 
through New South W ales and Victoria between 1850 and 1890, particularly those who 
travelled through G undagai. Floods presented a significant environmental challenge to 
pastoralists and miners. The combination of drought and flood together presented the 
1 Stuart Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.100. 
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greatest challenge to those industries that relied on a consistent or predictable water 
supply. Pastoralists and miners sought to mitigate floods and simultaneously to harness 
and store floodwater to sustain them during dry periods. These aspects of settler 
experiences were framed by government regulations and legal frameworks around water 
use. I argue that this politically-charged and differential approach to the use of water by 
goldminers and pastoralists contributed to the emergence of two distinct understandings 
of floods and rivers. In the case of mining, the government prevailed and increasingly 
relied on expert knowledge, the issuing of water entitlements, and a system of regulations 
that coordinated individuals' activities; while in the case of pastoralism methods based on 
experience and formed by trial and error were favoured, and led to arrangements for 
storage and diversion of water as well as individuated methods of water supply. 
Government regulation over miners' water use was so great that historian Clem 
Lloyd has argued that, 'the experience of the diggings influenced the course of public 
water policy in New South Wales'.2 It was government 'provision of water for the 
goldfields... [that] raised for the first time splendid visions of comprehensive water 
conservation schemes which were not fulfilled until the twentieth century'.3 J.M. Powell 
has made similar arguments about Victoria.4 Goldmining in this period profoundly 
influenced the way water resources were to be managed. Also within those government 
water regulations for goldmining lay the seeds of future approaches to water, rivers, and 
floods, including a centralised management framework that aimed to optimise settler use 
of limited water resources. Further, governments increasingly sought knowledge of the 
rivers from experts with scientific and specialised perspectives. In the 1860s governments 
introduced a system of 'water privileges', later 'water rights', on the gold fields. This new 
system created a way to coordinate competing demands on river water, but it also 
produced a system of privileged access for certain industries. Government regulations 
over water therefore attempted to ensure a level of economic and environmental security 
for particular industries. 
By contrast, pastoralists' water use and diversions were largely unregulated by 
governments. The differing approach by governments to goldmining and to pastoralism 
must be seen in a wider political and social context. In this period the New South Wales 
2 C.]. Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty: Water Development and Management in New South Wales (Parramatta: 
Department of Water Resources, New South Wales, 1988), p.80. 
3 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.80. 
4 J.M. Powell, Watering the Garden State: Water, Land and Community in Victoria, 1834-1988 (Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 1989), p.50. 
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and Victorian governments formulated policies and laws, such as the 1860s Selection 
Acts, to promote small-scale farming and agriculture in many areas that were held by 
pastoralists. The lack of regulations was a way of limiting pastoralists' rights to water and 
other environmental resources in areas planned for these small selections. Water 
regulations would have been difficult to enforce because the pastoral stations were widely 
dispersed and remote from government centres. Pastoralists preceded government 
surveyors and explorers in many areas, taking up land that was often unstudied by 
government officials and far from administrative centres. While these factors limited the 
development of water regulations for pastoralists, the continued lack of regulations that 
could give pastoralists ' rights' to water and coordinate their storages and diversions also 
reflected government reluctance to fully support the industry. 
The lack of regulation did provide pastoralists with opportunities to innovate in 
methods for water storage and diversion. In their trial and eitror experiments, for example 
with different techniques of diversion and storage sizes, they caused cons iderable 
deterioration of environments. Knowledge gained through experience, especially of 
droughts and floods, became highly valued by pastoralists, whilst governments 
increasingly valued 'expert' knowledge. Pastoralists developed complex and localised 
knowledge of, and relationships with, floods, which were often seen as positive 
occurrences because they rejuvenated pastures. 
Pastoralists, faced with problems associated with private dams and tank-sinking, 
however, also sought government intervention to coordinate competing demands on river 
water and to establish laws to protect water storages. These arguments amounted to 
demands for the establishment of 'water rights'. Pastoralists also became advocates for 
more holistic management of inland rivers. 
This chapter analyses the important roles that pastoralism and goldmining played 
in determining the way in which rivers and floods in the inland were managed and 
understood in this significant period. It also explores the way floods shaped water 
regulations around mining as well as pastoralists' farming methods. Our of this period 
emerged concepts of rights, risks and regulations that were to significantly shape future 
water management and settlers' relations with rivers and floods. 
* * * 
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Mining: Weathering the Fields 
Mining often began with rivers because panning for gold was the easiest way to find it. 
Later, as they followed gold seams into the riverbanks, miners used the river for sluicing 
the seams. River courses and vegetation, and entire environments, changed significantly 
under mining regimes. Early goldminers mostly mined surface reefs. Surface or alluvial 
gold was found in and along rivers. River flow brought sediment from mountain ranges 
(in eastern Australia, from the Great Dividing Range), depositing the heavy metal in 
valleys or gullies as the gradient levelled. 5 Rivers further exposed gold deposits by eroding 
the gravel and sand that covered them.6 Alluvial gold was extracted directly from the 
riverbed or from shallow pits, which were dug on the banks. Common methods for 
extracting gold were through panning and the use of rocking cradles and puddling tubs. 7 
Richer leads, however, were buried beneath old riverbeds , sealed by layers of alluvium or 
lava.8 Deep leads required miners to build shafts and then haul quantities of quartz to the 
surface. At the surface, gold-laden quartz was crushed and puddled, then sifted to isolate 
the gold.9 Both surface and deep lead mining required large quantities of water to extract 
the gold as well as to wash away discarded material. to 
The relatively easy access to alluvial gold allowed large numbers to gather around 
rich deposits. The number of miners on the Victorian goldfields surged from 20,000 in 
1851 to 150,000 in 1858.11 Miners worked limited areas in small groups, described by 
historian Stuart Macintyre as typically the size of a boxing ring, in small groups. 12 While 
mining was in this sense democratic, large populations along the rivers strained water 
(and other environmental) resources. Later, goldmining companies that mined deep leads 
were to experiment in tapping artesian water. The expense of boring for, and pumping, 
artesian water largely limited the practice of this method to companies, creating a 
commercial inequality in water-dependent mining. Artesian water supply was employed 
mostly from the 1870s, enabled by emergent technology. 
5 Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, p.87. 
6 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p. 72. 
7 Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, p.87; Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.72; and, Powell, Watering 
the Garden State, p.49. 
8 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p. 72. 
9 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p. 72. 
10 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p. 72. 
11 Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, p.87. 
12 Macintyre , A Concise History of Australia, p.87. 
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Most of the initial gold discoveries were made in Victoria. 13 At the diggings, 
miners mostly lived in cramped quarters, with tents erected close together or in dugout, 
underground rooms. Miners invested little in localities they planned to leave, instead 
putting their money towards licensing claims. 14 Mining radically altered local 
environments. Thousands descended on concentrated areas, often for a brief, 
exploitative, time - possibly only weeks or months. 15 Environmental destruction was 
extreme. Miners felled acres of trees to line workings and provide fuel for batteries and 
pumps.16 Deforested riverbanks eroded during floods and storms, stripping the land and 
causing dislodged rocks and soil to clog up waterways. As a result, storm water would dam 
up during floods, rising higher than it otherwise would have. 17 Sewerage and chemicals 
also polluted waterways. 18 Lloyd noted that waterways were so polluted, c[v]ery often, 
[drinking] water had to be carted to the goldfields where distribution was irregular and 
prices high' .19 Miners also used hydraulic sluices, where water was forced through a nozzle 
at high pressure to erode compacted earth and rocks, carving away chunks of riverbed and 
rock face, washing more csludge' into watercourses. Hydraulic sluices also required large 
amounts of water and often relied on substantial water reserves.20 The environmental 
impacts of mining were permanent and, as J.M. Powell has argued, interrupted 
hydrological cycles so completely that the full impacts have yet to be played out.21 
Early miners' dependence on river water, as a technology as well as for domestic 
supply, together with the location of their dwellings on riverbanks, also made them 
vulnerable to the effects of droughts and floods.22 Lloyd has argued that '[t]he cycles of 
drought and flood exacted a cruel toll on the goldfields from the beginning'.23 Indeed, at 
some diggings floods came almost immediately. Lloyd gave an example of the Turon 
diggings, where floods in early 1852 (that followed on from the 1851 floods in Gundagai 
and preceded the June 1852 flood there) washed out miners only a few months after its 
13 Victoria had separated from New South Wales in 1851. 
14 Geoffrey Bolton, Spoils and Spoilers (North Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 198 1) pp.69-70. 
15 Powell, Watering the Garden Seate, p.46. 
16 Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, p.91; Bolton, Spoils and Spoilers, p.69; John Rickard, Australia: A 
Cultural History, second edition (New York: Longman , 1996), p.63; and, Powell, Watering the Garden Seate, 
pp.46-49 and pp.68-69. 
17 Powell, Watering the Garden Seate, p.49 and pp.75-76. 
18 Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, p.91. 
19 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p. 77. 
20 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p. 78. 
21 Powell, Watering the Garden State, p.45 and p.49 . 
22 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p. 72 . 
23 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.73. 
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establishment (see chapter one).24 Miners (including the Gormly brothers), had worked 
claims from late 1851, contending with smaller floods that, as Lloyd noted, had 'washed 
away cradles and tools, filled shafts with water, and taken lives'.25 Floods in January and 
February 1852 were the breaking point for miners, many of whom sold off their claims at 
a fraction of their worth. 26 
The loss of labour following the 1852 floods on the Turon was coupled with the 
loss of living quarters: 'The frail tents of hundreds' were damaged or washed away.27 The 
clearing of trees for erecting shelters and working claims may have exacerbated the floods 
by increasing erosion and sediment buildup, thereby increasing the height of the flood, as 
occurred elsewhere. As rain continued, conditions at the diggings deteriorated. Disease 
set in. Four men died during the floods and dysentery killed at least twelve more soon 
after. 28 
After further floods in 1853 the Turon field was all but deserted - from the 
'hundreds' of miners that endured the 1852 flood, there were just 30 counted in a 
newspaper report in February 1853.29 Floods destroyed other gold fields, such as Bathurst 
Point and Sofala in 1852. Floods in Araluen and Braidwood in 1859 and 1860 left the 
fields in a state of 'desolation and ruin'.30 Lloyd noted that recurring floods also hindered 
miners' efforts to begin working claims. At Kiandra 'recurring floods undid much of the 
preparatory work needed to mine the riverbeds'.31 In Victoria too, miners experienced 
floods that presented similar problems.32 
Miners were also greatly affected by water scarcity. Lloyd described how in 1861 
drought caused a near riot at the Lambing Flat diggings. Unable to work their claims 
without water, diggers turned on each other. European miners attacked Chinese miners, 
blaming them for being wasteful in their gold washing techniques.33 Drought was a 
common threat to the survival of mining communities. Other weather conditions, such as 
snow in high altitude fields, where in winter watercourses could freeze over, also forced 
miners to move on. Lloyd has argued that the effects of weather, particularly drought and 
24 Lloyd, Eicher Drought or Plenty, p.73. 
25 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.73. 
26 Maitland Mercury, 7 February, 1852, p.2. 
27 Maitland Mercury, 7 February, 1852, p.2. 
28 Maitland Mercury, 7 February, 1852, p.2. 
29 Maitland Mercury, 5 February, 1852, p.4. 
30 Robyn Maddrell, quoted in, Lloyd, Eicher Drought or P!ency, p.73 . 
3 1 Lloyd, Eicher Droughc or P!ency, p.73. 
32 Powell, Watering the Garden Stace, p.46. 
33 Lloyd, Eicher Drought or P!ency, p.73-74. 
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flood, 'were as much responsible for the incessant movement from field to field as were 
the vagaries of chance, and the choice of new fields was influenced by access to water and 
protection from floods'. 34 
It should also be noted briefly that floods and droughts also aided the quest for 
gold. For example, gold deposits were uncovered in Adelong Creek by floodwaters in 
1852. The floods eroded gold-laced sand and gravel, which diggers mined the following 
year, and which became the centre of a small mining camp.35 Drought along the Turon, 
just prior to the 1851 floods, allowed diggers to mine the bed of the river. Similarly, fires 
that tore through the Victorian ash forests in 1851, aided by drought, revealed gold 
deposits and allowed miners to access them easily. Environmental historian Tom Griffiths 
has speculated that goldminers may have deliberately lit these fires to uncover gold 
deposits as well as clear the site for working.36 Goldminers exploited Australia's 
environment and weather conditions including droughts, floods, and fires, as much as 
the continent's mineral wealth. However, the windfalls miners gained from transient 
weather could be hazardous, creating dangers that outweighed benefits. While drought 
had exposed the bed of the Turon, floods subsequently destroyed the claims. Miners were 
tied to rivers that did not provide the most essential ingredient in mining - consistent 
water supply- and this limited their opportunities. 
* * * 
Mining: Water Regulations 
Miners attempted to combat the effects of drought and flood in a number of ways. They 
built races (artificial channels) to divert floodwater, such as those at Bathurst Point in 
1852 and the Snowy River Diggings in the 1860s, and dammed rivers and creeks in order 
to create permanent water sources. 37 A correspondent for the Mining Record reported 50 
dams around the Grenfell diggings in New South Wales.38 Deep lead mining usually 
relied on water conservation dams, while alluvial miners only required a running stream. 
34 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p. 73. 
35 Maitland Mercury, 5 February, 1853, p.4. 
36 Tom Griffiths, forests of Ash: An Environmental History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
pp.63-64. 
37 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.73. 
38 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.74. 
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However, dry periods often forced alluvial miners to dam gullies and streams. Indeed, 
miners diverted whole watercourses into new channels to feed dams in order to 
simultaneously mitigate floods and store water, such as at the Snowy River diggings in the 
1860s.39 Miners also diverted and dammed streams to expose riverbeds for mining. For 
example, miners often dammed each end of a horseshoe bend in order to mine its 
riverbed. 40 
As miners continued to maximise water supplies and mitigate floods, colonial 
governments were forced to intervene, implementing a system of 'water privileges' (later 
termed 'water rights') to coordinate competing demands on rivers. It was the first time 
that a system of codified rights to water (resembling current systems) was contemplated in 
Australia.41 Lloyd noted that, in New South Wales, the Gold Fields Acts of 1861 and 1869 
implemented the most significant regulations over miners' use of water.42 In Victoria 
similar regulations were passed by legislation in the 1860s.43 The Gold Field 
Commissioners, who had been figures of authority on New South Wales and Victorian 
fields from 1851, was to administer the new regulations.44 
In New South Wales, for example, the 1861 Act gave miners 'water privileges' 
over a specified quantity of water for mining purposes, either through approved race lines 
or from the river channel.45 There were detailed conditions around water privileges, 
which were monitored and measured using sluice-heads, placed at the head of each 
channel. Perhaps in order to guard against hoarding, the Act ruled that water 'privileges' 
could be lost if they were not used for a certain period. The system of 'privileges' reflected 
popular ideas about water running to 'waste', if not used for what were considered 
productive settler purposes, and instated them in policy. Those who registered water 
privileges first were protected from potential infringements on their water supplies and 
water rights from later applications. The Gold Field Commissioners could also grant 
rights to miners to construct new races and dams, or take over existing ones.46 Miners 
could also transfer their water privileges to another claim. Thus, through the Act, water 
was separated from land, as something to be managed and conceived of separately. 
39 South Australian Advertiser, 3 April, 1860, p.3. 
40 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p. 79. 
41 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.74. 
42 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.74. 
43 Powell, Watering the Garden State, p.50. 
44 Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, p.87; and, Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.74. 
45 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.74. 
46 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p. 74. 
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The 1869 Act replaced 'water privileges' with 'water rights', but was in most ways 
similar to the preceding Act. Additions included the issuing of rights to miners to 
construct races to funnel run-off into water storages and to mitigate floods. These 
regulations recognised the damage floods could cause on unprotected fields. They also 
encouraged miners to mitigate floods and control flows, so as to create more consistent 
water supplies for their use. Other new regulations mainly aimed to institute more 
sanitary conditions on the goldfields, such as separate rights to water for domestic use, 
where possible from a separate water source.47 
Through the implementation of specific water regulations, mining gained a 
privileged position in terms of government support. The industry was part of a colonial 
vision of intensively worked land that generated wealth. The system of 'water privileges' 
and then 'water rights' was a new component in water regulations developed especially for 
the mining industry. It gave added security in access to water by regulating and 
coordinating competition. By limiting 'water rights' to mining, such 'rights' were 
simultaneously withheld from others (either in response to demands for water rights or by 
omission), such as pastoralists, as well as other settlers and Aborigines. The system of 
'water rights' meant that the government could now grant or deny 'rights' to water to 
individuals or groups. River water, an essential and valuable asset, became both a subject 
and means of control. Water rights were a means for exercising political and social 
exclusion, as well as acquiring economic advantages. Large-scale dams in the twentieth 
century were an extension of this kind of privileged access to water that supported certain 
industries at the expense of other groups (see chapter seven). Allocations of water 'rights' 
are current sources of concern for many ethnic groups, academics (including historians), 
advocates of environmental justice, some politicians, industries, individuals, and other 
'stakeholder' groups in Australia and around the world. 
Government water regulations were, Lloyd noted, 'effective enough' when 'water 
was plentiful' .48 The Acts in both New South Wales and Victoria provided frameworks 
through which miners could independently work claims and maximise water use. 'Water 
privileges' and 'water rights' ultimately instituted a system of maximum water exploitation 
for a particular industry. The goldfields were riddled with constructions for funnelling 
water and mitigating floods. During droughts, however, water scarcity continued to be a 
problem. Rivers and dams dried up after prolonged dry weather and miners were Left with 
47 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p. 74. 
48 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p. 7 5. 
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little option but to leave or wait out the drought. At other places such as Mount Browne, 
west of the Darling River, it was simply too dry to mine effectively.49 Further, 
entrepreneurial settlers continued to exploit the system of race lines to sell water to others 
- a practice the new regulations had attempted to end.50 The regulations firmly 
positioned river water as a public utility managed ·by centralised government, which 
nevertheless imbued certain individuals with 'rights' to particular quantities in order to 
promote government agendas as well as to coordinate constructions for private water 
diversion. 
Allocations of quantities of water were based on expectations about the total 
amount of water that rivers carried. It was expected that river flow would be able to fulfil 
the quantities of water that were allocated. Such expectations were rooted in assumptions 
about 'available' river flow at all times. Yet there had been little government investigation 
into river flow at mining sites. The government regulations also seem to have ignored 
previous settler experiences of droughts. Allocations of certain amounts of water were 
fixed and did not allow for variations in flows or for drought. They created a false 
certainty that allocations could be met. While government knowledge of the rivers is 
today very detailed, current water allocations similarly work with a calculated average 
amount of water that denies the variable nature of river flow in Australia. 
The 1871 New South Wales Gold Fields Royal Commission raised a number of 
issues about water supply and water rights. One was that the Commissioners could obtain 
little reliable information about river heights and flows to assess how effective the current 
regulations and how realistic estimates for future water supply were. No levels had been 
taken or other inquiries conducted to 'establish the facts' .51 Similarly, Victorian engineers 
and others argued for greater study and monitoring of river flows by meteorologists and 
hydrologists. 52 The government had allocated water rights based on rough estimates and 
without adequate studies by trusted 'experts'. Some of the information from government 
officials proved to be highly inaccurate. For example, when the Commissioners attempted 
to formulate a way to deliver water to the Young field from the Murrumbidgee, they 
found that their information failed to rake account of the principle of gravity, noting that 
49 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.77. 
50 Powell, Watering the Garden State, p.50. 
51 New South Wales Gold Fields Royal Commission, 1871, quoted in Lloyd, Eicher Drought or Plenty, p.75. 
52 Powell, Watering the Garden State, p.85. 
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water supply from the Murrumbidgee would be impossible, 'unless the Murrumbidgee 
River has the astonishing peculiarity of running up hill'. 53 
While the Commissioners cast doubt over current government information, they 
also indicated the kind of knowledge that would be valuable, primarily 'facts' 
accumulated by government investigation. There was an element of denial or doubt about 
the value of knowledge held by those who had lived on the fields. Indeed, information 
and ideas offered by miners and other settlers were often dismissed as suspect, inaccurate, 
or impossible. 54 However, arguments for expert studies also reflected the growing trend 
within government (evident from the 1840s) for 'scientific' knowledge as the pre-eminent 
form for understanding and managing environments. By elevating government and 
'expert' knowledge, other kinds of knowledge, such as local and Indigenous knowledge, 
were suppressed; or, as Tom Griffiths noted for the twentieth century, dismissed as 
'unlearned' .55 
After encountering problems in obtaining river information and establishing the 
costs of construction, the New South Wales Royal Commission considered handing the 
problem of water supply over to private companies - something the Victorian 
government also experimented with. The Victorian government encouraged the 
construction of water storages on goldfields by issuing subsidies. Private companies, such 
as the Bendigo Waterworks Company, undertook the largest of these constructions, from 
the 1870s. The Victorian government was further able to provide water supplies for 
goldfields by constructing government-funded water supply channels, for which miners 
paid a much resented maintenance fee. However, the government encountered a number 
of problems in the construction of water supply infrastructure, such as sediment buildup 
in the artificial channels. Another problem was obtaining adequate 'expertise' to 
construct the complex water supply networks, which the New South Wales 
Commissioners had also noted as a limiting factor to government works. In Victoria, 
however, the limits of colonial expertise were encountered in the process of constructing 
a water supply scheme. In the 1860s the Victorian government had embarked on a 
massive and expensive scheme to supply water to goldfields, as well as to towns and for 
irrigation. It was planned that miners and others would pay for water and so repay the 
cost of the scheme. T he infamous Coliban scheme or Brady scheme (after its designer, 
53 New South Wales Gold Fields Royal Commission, 1871, quoted in, Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.75. 
54 Lloyd, Either Drought of Plenty, pp. 7 6-77. 
55 Tom Griffiths, 'One Hundred Years of Environmental Crisis', Rangeland Journal , 23 , 1, 2001, pp.5-14, 
p.12. 
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J.M. Brady) was conceived as a network of dams and channels along the Caliban River. 
The scheme's construction was beset by political turmoil that focused on the (in)adequacy 
of the colony's engineering expertise, machinery, and workmanship.56 
In 1871, when large parts of the scheme had been built, the government called on 
the expertise of Lieutenant-Colonel Richard H. Sankey from the Corps of Royal 
Engineers in India, to advise on the scheme's completion, or whether it should be 
abandoned altogether. Indian engineers, with experience in manipulating river flow and 
an established tradition of engineering expertise, were part of wider Empire networks that 
Australian governments drew upon to monitor and advise on hydraulic projects. Sankey 
heavily criticised the Brady scheme on a number of points. He argued that the 
workmanship was variable, engineering expertise was not specialised enough, and that not 
enough preliminary investigation had been made before construction. Sankey argued that 
in order to ensure specialised expertise the government should have a branch dedicated 
especially to 'waterworks', much like the Indian Public Works Department which focused 
on hydraulic engineering and controlling river flow.57 
All Australian colonies had appointed engineers and meteorologists by the 1860s. 
However, Australia's large distances, emergent educational institutions, and the rapidly 
changing fields of engineering and meteorology combined to work against the immediate 
establishment of an organisation resembling India's water administration. It was not until 
1881 that Victoria created a specialised water department. The Water Conservation Act 
of 1881 was inspired by a number of factors, including the need for systematic knowledge 
gathering, carrying out plans for irrigation development, and drought during the 1870s, 
which increased pressure for formulating new systems for water supply. The 1881 Act, 
however, inaugurated decentralised waterworks trusts, rather than a centralised water 
department as in India. The trusts were based on a system similar to the method that had 
been administered for mining towns and fields.58 
Although Australian governments sought expertise, local engineers were criticised 
for their lack of skill. A number of leading engineers on the Brady Scheme were dismissed 
when the scheme ran into unforseen, technical difficulties. 59 In his report, Sankey 
commented that many of these technical problems had a common root in the fact that 
the engineers did not know enough about either the rivers or the land. The Australian 
56 Powell, Watering the Garden State, pp. 76-84. 
57 Powell, Watering the Garden State, pp.80-84. 
58 Powell, Watering the Garden State, pp.94-104. 
59 Powell, Watering the Garden State, p.82. 
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colonial governments sought expertise of a standard promoted within the Empire. The 
highly respected British engineers in India were theoretical, mathematical, specialised, 
and elite. This breed of specialised engineers in the Imperial government had gradually 
replaced more generalist knowledge from the 1840s. Such generalist knowledge, which 
recognised and valued local Indian networks and knowledge, was increasingly criticised 
and repressed by the government, new scientists, and engineers in favour of 'expertise', 
which was defined against 'unlearned' knowledge, such as that of lndians.60 However, 
without substantial knowledge of local environments, theoretical principles collapsed. 
The Brady Scheme was eventually completed in 1877 after more than a decade of 
. d 6 1 construction an controversy. 
New South Wales did not attempt anything so comprehensive. Although each 
goldfield presented particular problems in Victoria, in New South Wales this was 
amplified by the extreme diversity of the environments of each goldfield and their 
geographical dispersal. As a result, Lloyd argued that, 'each goldfield lin New South 
Wales] had to be considered in isolation and a means of water supply found that would 
meet the idiosyncratic requirements of that field at least expense' .62 The particular 
topographies of each place had to be considered by the Commission to find a solution 
that accounted for rainfall, river flow, hills, and so on. 
The scheme of 'water rights' was challenged by both drought and flood, which 
made inadequate river knowledge apparent. The full exploitation of gold was limited by 
both variable river flow and insufficient government knowledge. The opening up of new 
fields in the late 1860s and early 1870s, which lacked water to sustain mining, seemed to 
need even more government regulation. Miners and settlers presented ambitious plans to 
the Commission to divert rivers and drain wetlands in order to feed water to gold sites. 
For example, one suggestion was to divert the Tumut River to the Adelong goldfields. 
Such schemes, while ambitious, built on past achievements. Miners at the Hanging Rock 
diggings, for example, had diverted water from the Barwon River through races 20 miles 
long.63 
The Commission considered a number of ideas presented by miners and other 
settlers, but rejected those lacking government or expert information about the rivers. 
60 Benjamin Weil, 'The Rivers Come: Knowledge Systems in the Indus Basin, 1840s-1930s', Environment and 
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Rejected schemes reflected the Commissioners' doubts about the miners' logistics and the 
costs of the schemes. The Commission did note that there were suitable sites for 
reservoirs near goldfields along the Great Dividing Range and suggested private 
companies might be willing to build the necessary dams and then sell the water (or access 
to the water) to miners. Indeed, the Commission was to recommend the construction of 
dams and tanks by private companies generally as a solution to water supply on goldfields. 
The cost of water storages, which were required for future goldmining (mostly deep lead 
mining as alluvial deposits dwindled), and the realisation that there were large gaps in 
government knowledge, went against intervention. In effect, this opened an era of mining 
companies, which constructed huge reservoirs to feed mining operations, and placed large 
amounts of water under private control. In the first decades of the twentieth century 
mining companies began dredging riverbeds for gold, causing massive changes to riverine 
environments. 64 
* * * 
Selection Acts of the 1860s 
Macintyre has described the goldfields as 'the immigrant reception centres of the 
nineteenth century'.65 Gold attracted many immigrants to Australia but large numbers 
looked to settle in Australia beyond the rush and a nomadic existence. Towns that had 
sprung up around goldfields became permanent homes for some; however, many sought 
land for agricultural farming and economic independence. A campaign began in the late 
1850s to 'unlock the land' from the hold of squatters who had taken up large tracts of 
land in Victoria and New South Wales along river frontages. 
In the 1820s and 1830s pastoralists had established runs that covered much of the 
Riverina (between the Murrumbidgee River and Murray River). They had extended north 
from Port Phillip and south into Victoria from New South Wales. They moved west of 
the Lachlan, along the Darling River and its north-eastern tributaries, and north into 
Queensland. North-west of Sydney, in areas around the Namoi and Macquarie Rivers, 
there were also long-established runs. 
64 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, pp. 7 5-80; and Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, p.91. 
65 Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, p.91. 
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From the beginning, the need for grazing land had pushed pastoralists to the 
fringes of settlement. They had ignored the restrictions on the ' limits of settlement' 
(imposed in the 1830s), taking stock, under the care of managers or owners, into the 
inland.66 Historian David Denholm wrote that pastoralism, spurred by 'the natural 
reproductive rate of cattle and sheep' and food and water to sustain them, 'gathered the 
momentum ... to outrun survey' - and the law.67 Pastoralists followed the rivers inland, 
taking up river frontages first and then exploring the less well-watered back-blocks. Lloyd 
noted that the importance of rivers and river frontage meant pastoralists ignored 
government riparian restrictions that determined river frontage could only be one third 
of a run's length. Some runs stretched for tens of kilometres along rivers. One of the 
largest was Ben Boyd's '100-mile frontage' on the Murrumbidgee.68 Colonial laws were 
impractical for pastoralists in the poorly watered inland. Pastoralists also exploited the 
lack of monitoring and enforcement of riparian rights by governments in claiming wide 
river frontages. By the time the campaign to 'unlock the land' began in earnest in the late 
1850s, pastoralists had been advancing their hold on the inland for forty years or more.69 
The Free Selection Acts were passed in 1860 in Victoria and 1861 in New South 
Wales. The Acts allowed selectors to purchase small lots (up to 250 hectares) of vacant 
Crown Land or land under pastoral lease. 70 The desire of the newly formed colonial 
governments to raise land revenue through the sale of Crown Lands followed the 
formation of responsible government and led to the Selection Acts. As Denholm argued, 
'governments harnessed popular opinion to seek a future for yeoman farmers', appealing 
to a popular ideal in order to turn opinion against squatters and so release their land for 
sale.71 
While the establishment of small-scale farms gained immediacy from the need to 
raise government revenue, the Selection Acts were also the culmination of long-held 
government visions to replace pastoralism with small-scale agriculture and mixed farms. 
From the 1830s colonial governments had been determined to install small-scale yeoman 
farmers in many localities. Pastoralism was not seen as a desirable long-term industry and 
officials planned that it would give way to small farming settlements. London's colonial 
66 David Denholm, The Colonial Australians (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1979), p.60-62. 
67 Denholm, The Colonial Australians, p.60. 
68 Lloyd, Either Droughr or Plenty, p.52. 
69 Denholm, The Colonial Australians, p.62. 
70 Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, p.99. 
71 Denholm, The Colonial Australians, p.66. See also, Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, pp.97-98; and, 
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office also pressed for small-scale farms, arguing for intensive cultivation as well as the 
'civilising' influence of well-defined settlements. Powell has argued that these ideas were 
harnessed into policies in the 1830s and 1840s, under the influence of Wakefieldianism; 
however, 'most of the official strategies grossly underestimated the importance of live-
stock grazing as a viable and long-term enterprise' .72 Pastoralism was more viable and 
became more entrenched than colonial governments and Imperial officials foresaw. 
The Acts failed to break the squatters' grip on the inland. Pastoralists bought the 
most fertile and well-watered portions of their land or used underhand means, such as 
bribery and mock selections, to retain them. 73 Experiences of drought and flood and 
knowledge of rivers, runs, and surrounding areas meant that when the Selection Acts 
were implemented many pastoralists knew which areas were most valuable and fertile 
during wet and dry peri_ods. Some used this knowledge simply to retain land that was 
most useful for raising stock. Others used it to push out competition by strategically 
holding land adjacent to key water sources, leaving only badly watered sections for 
selectors. For example, one pastoralist obtained a number of small lots (totalling 27 ,000 
acres) along a river, blocking out all others from accessing adequate water supply, thereby 
effectually claiming a much larger area.74 
Selectors on the other hand struggled to make a living from their farms. The land 
was often unsuited to agriculture and many selectors lacked the necessary farming 
expertise. Many others did not have the capital to invest in equipment for developing 
their property and possessed limited means of transport.75 Macintyre has noted that 
struggling selectors formed a new rural 'underclass'.76 The Selection Acts expressed a 
vision of yeoman farmers where the land and rivers could be moulded to suit particular 
agendas and imaginings. This land and its rivers could not support such intensive 
cultivation. The Acts also underestimated the environmental knowledge and cunning of 
pastoralists. Indeed, the idea of yeoman farmers seemed to have developed into policy 
(and the Acts) that denied the grip pastoralists had on the land and their experiences of 
drought and flood. 
* 
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Pastoralism: Innovations and Limitations 
In general terms, pastoralism in the inland faced environmental challenges broadly 
similar to goldmining, but very different legal contexts and industry needs applied. In 
terms of similarities, pastoralists, like miners, sought to guard against droughts. Both 
pastoralists and miners experienced floods and droughts within particular local 
environments, with distinct hydrologies and geographies. In all regions, the effects of 
drought could be devastating. For example, during the years before the 1851 floods, 
pastoralists in what was to become the Riverina, experienced a drought that killed many 
stock and they expected to lose many more. One pastoralist claimed that the floods of 
1851 saved many of their stock because it encouraged the growth of pasture. 77 
Pastoralists had complex relationships with floods, influenced by personal 
circumstances and local environments. Many floods were seen as beneficial; coming 
mostly after drought, they replenished water sources and stimulated vegetation growth. 
Pastoralists were able to move stock and so avoid extensive losses. It was mostly when 
floods rose higher than expected - beyond previous experience in a particular region -
that settlers and stock became significantly endangered on runs, such as during the 1864 
and 1886 floods along the Darling River.78 Floods could also wash away dams. However, 
Lloyd has observed that many of these dams were temporary and were perhaps no great 
loss.79 Pastoralists did attempt to mitigate the adverse effects of floods whilst still reaping 
their benefits, usually by ensuring that their stations had a mixture of high and low land. 
They also constructed embankments and channels to divert floodwater into tanks and 
dams to lessen flood damage and to use the stored water during dry periods. 
Aside from immediate losses and benefits, floods could have long-lasting negative 
effects. Floods eroded the land and riverbanks. By the 1850s pastoralists in some regions 
recognised that erosion was exacerbated by land clearing and the tracks made by cattle 
and sheep.80 John Robertson's station in south-western Victoria deteriorated under 
intensive pastoralism. He wrote to the government in 1853 describing soil erosion, land-
77 Maitland Mercury, 12 May, 1851, p.4. 
78 See: Argus, 28 May, 1864, p.5; The Courier, 11 April, 1864, p.2; The Courier, 17 June, 1864, p.5; The 
Courier, 9 April, 1864, p.3; The Courier, 4 September, 1886, p.6; The Courier, 19 August, 1886, p.3; The 
Courier, 9 December, 1886, p.6; Argus, 8 January, 1886, p.6; The Courier, 29 January, 1887, p.6; and, Argus, 
29 January, 1887, p.10. 
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slips, vegetation deterioration, and salting.81 Erosion changed the course of rivers and 
floods and disrupted hydrological systems. In localised situations, compacted earth 
trampled by cattle and sheep could also increase flood heights, such as was argued to be 
the case in the town of Wagga in the 1850s.82 Compacted earth, however, seems to have 
had less of an effect on flood heights on pastoral stations. The environmental impacts of 
pastoralism were evident from the 1850s and became an increasingly debated topic into 
the 1880s. 
The publication of G.P. Marsh's Man and Nature in 1864 influenced Australian 
debates about the connections between tree-felling and reduced rainfall (though less than 
elsewhere).83 However, in the 1880s attention turned to the environmental effects of 
overstocking sheep during 'good seasons'. To combat environmental (and economic) 
fluctuations between drought, flood, and 'good seasons', pastoralists stocked paddocks 
heavily when the weather was favourable. This method was criticised by a number of 
scientists who were concerned about the destruction of native plants after years of over 
grazing. The ethics of allowing large numbers of sheep to perish if rain failed was also 
hotly debated.84 
Pastoralists tested the limits of the land and rivers, as well as pastoralism itself, in 
the process causing substantial environmental deterioration. It was a different kind of 
environmental exploitation to mining - more about trial and error and requiring larger 
areas - but it was similarly based on individualised opportunism. In pastoralism such 
individualised opportunism was perhaps heightened by the fact that there was little 
regulation over pastoralists' activities, particularly regarding water. 
In contrast to government legislated regulations around mining, pastoralists' 
constructions such as dams, tanks, and channels were largely unregulated. In part, such 
lack of regulation may have been due to the expansion of pastoralism into the inland 
before government surveys, so that governments found it difficult to control pastoralists' 
early activities. The geographical spread of pastoral stations made enforcing regulations 
nearly impossible. 
Another reason to avoid regulation was that governments planned for pastoralism 
to give way to small-scale farms and intensive cultivation . Pastoralism was not meant to 
81 Powell, Watering the Garden State, pp.45-4 7. 
82 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.66. 
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last. Pastoralists held no 'rights' to water. Water was identified as critical early on but 
remained unregulated as far as pastoralists. Indeed, pastoralists were left so much to their 
own devices that where laws did exist, such as riparian rights, they were commonly 
broken with no recrimination. Riparian rights dictated that landholders must not impede 
river flow (through, for example, dams and water diversion) to downstream users. 
Although this law could have been tempered through legislation, as was done for mining, 
it was not substantially altered for pastoralism in this period.85 
The lack of regulation around pastoralists' water use fostered the separate, or 
distinct, development of the industry's approach to water. Powell has argued that 'two 
distinct systems' of land settlement emerged in this period: limited or bounded 
settlements of intensively worked land that governments concentrated on and 
encouraged, and pastoralism which pushed out into areas difficult for governments to 
control.86 Powell's argument can be extended into an explanation for the very different 
approaches to water, evident in pastoralism and government regulated goldmining in this 
period. The two systems were perpetuated by a combination of pastoralist expansion into 
distant areas and governments' lack of regulation over the industry. By withholding a 
system of water 'rights' to pastoralists and not legitimising their water diversions, 
governments further perpetuated the two systems and ensured that pastoralists had few 
claims over land and water that was intended for the development of small-scale farming. 
Further, the two systems developed distinct kinds of knowledge bases. In this period 
pastoralists' knowledge was largely gained through processes of trial and error and the 
development and dissemination of local knowledge. 1n the 1860s the Pastoral Times 
expressed the importance of trial and error in the development of grazing techniques; it 
wrote that pastoralism in Australia was a 'progressive art which had been nurtured by 
bitter experience' .87 Governments increasingly valued specialised expertise. 
While the lack of water regulations in some ways reduced government support for 
pastoralism, it also created a situation where pastoralists could innovate in methods of 
water storage and diversion, free from government restrictions. Pasroralists innovated and 
experimented with manipulating river flow, floodwater, and run-off, largely driven by 
85 Edwyna Harris, 'Development and Damage: Water and Landscape Evolution in Victoria, Australia', 
Landscape Research, 31, 2, April 2006, pp.169-181, pp.171-176; and, Janice Gray, et al., 'Legal Approaches to 
the Ownership, Management and Regulation of Water from Riparian Rights to Commodification', 
Transforming Cultures eloumal, 1, 2, June 2006, pp.64-96. 
86 Powell, Watering che Garden Scace, p.49. 
87 Pastoral Times, quoted in, Lloyd, Eicher Drought or Plenty, p.51. 
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drought and the problem of supplying water to areas far from watercourses. Pastoralists 
tested different techniques and designs for water supply, such as dams, tanks, and water 
channels. Although they often broke riparian laws, these schemes were publicised as 
possible new technology.ss Pastoralism, at first seen as undesirable, became an industry of 
innovation and governments kept a curious eye on its developments in water 
conservation and irrigation systems, which could potentially support small-scale farming. 
Lloyd has described some of James Tyson's experiments with d ifferent techniques 
for conserving water. On his Lachlan River properties Tyson cut channels from the river 
to fill natural depressions, which he called 'lakes'. He experimented with the gravitational 
flow and lengths and depths of the channels. Through the channels he aimed to harness 
floodwater, which already spilled over his property, into deliberate conservation. Floods 
were a crucial source of water for Tyson. If it were not for floods, and his harnessing of 
their flows, Tyson claimed he would have been 'starved off the country'.s9 Tyson's 
innovations, which broke riparian laws, were only possible because the government did 
not enforce those laws. He discovered useful techniques for harnessing floodwater that 
later inspired other irrigators. Lloyd noted that Tyson's 'lake' systems, developed for 
pastoral water supply, had 'an affinity' with later irrigation systems, such as those 
constructed by Sir Samuel McCaughy and 'the public enterprise irrigators of the 
twentieth century'.90 
Tanks were a common way for pastoralists to conserve water. Environmental 
historian Heather Goodall has persuasively argued that British settlers probably brought 
the technology to Australia from India.91 Tanks were excavated depressions that worked 
to conserve run-off from higher land. Siting tanks to capture run-off was important. 
Pastoralists experimented with designs, especially to increase tank capacity.92 Lloyd noted 
that many tanks in inland Australia were very successful; however, some failed or were left 
half finished due to poor siting, cost, siltation, or because the sites were difficult to access 
or had little water supply for the workforce and horses (which were used to cart dirt out 
of the tanks).93 Pastoralists also built dams across rivers and creeks, and tapped artesian 
88 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, pp.51-52. 
89 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.53. 
90 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.54. 
91 Heather Goodall, 'Digging Deeper: Ground Tanks and the Elusive Indian Archipelago', in Alan Mayne 
(ed.), Beyond the Black Stump: Histories of Outback Australia (Kent Town, South Australia: Wakefield Press, 
2008), pp.129-160, especially pp.150-153. 
92 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, pp.50-52. 
93 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p. 70. 
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supplies by sinking wells. Well-sinking was expensive, as it required an extensive 
workforce, machinery, and potentially a lot of time as finding artesian water was a matter 
of trial and error. Indeed, wells became symbols of wealth.94 Pastoralists also sometimes 
cooperated to construct more complex networks of water conservation and diversion. For 
example, a group of pastoralists in the Riverina shared the costs of constructing a 12-mile 
channel from the Murrumbidgee River to Yanko Creek to increase water supply to their 
properties on the Yanko, Billabong, and Colombo Creek system.95 
Although pastoralists experimented, innovated, and sometimes cooperated in 
order to ensure steady water supplies, the lack of regulation and coordination also created 
a situation of highly individuated opportunism. 
Pastoralists stored water in private dams and tanks, thereby reducing water flow to 
downstream stations. The result was often conflict between upstream and downstream 
pastoralists over access and rights to water. For example, on Billabong Creek in the late 
1850s, angry downstream landowners armed themselves to confront dam owners, and cut 
(or destroyed) a number of their dams, arguing that the dams significantly impeded water 
flow downstream.96 One dam owner, William Brodribb (who had established a punt at 
Gundagai in 1838 and moved to Billabong C reek in 1855), took his case before the 
courts. He had had two of his dams cut. The bench ruled, against Brodribb, that the 
principles of riparian rights held. Some pastoralists nevertheless rebuilt their dams and 
hired armed watchmen to stand guard; and so a stand-off developed between upstream 
and downstream pastoralists. Downstream landowners maintained their rights were being 
infringed. Dam owners argued that their dams were necessary to make their properties 
pay. Their runs were otherwise too dry.97 Dams were also cut in other parts of New South 
W ales. Lloyd described the practice of dam-cutting as 'common' from the 1860s.98 The 
government remained largely uninvolved in the Billabong Creek controversy. 
Clearly the principle of riparian rights did not work effectively for pastoralists in 
the inland who relied largely on surface water for water supply. Riparian rights worked in 
places such as England where more regular and substantial river flows meant there was 
less need for individual dams. In Australia, aridity and intermittent river flows led 
pastoralists to seek individual water security through illegal (and legal) dams. Riparian 
94 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, pp.60-61. 
95 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.54. 
96 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.56-58. 
91 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.57-58. 
98 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.58. 
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rights prevented water diversion or damming on upstream properties, without which 
pastoralists would likely fail economically. The Billabong Creek controversy demonstrates 
the incompatibility of riparian rights with pastoralism in inland Australia. Lloyd wrote of 
the Billabong Creek conflicts that, '[t]he existing system set neighbour against 
neighbour'.99 Riparian rights were an environmentally and socially impossible system in 
inland Australia. Pastoralists competed with each other for water. 100 
The many claims on river water seemed to suggest that an overarching system of 
regulation be established along rivers to mediate the interests and needs of upstream and 
downstream landowners. However, no regulation or legal provision to solve pastoralists' 
needs for water was attempted until the 1880s. This was despite the colonial 
governments' regulations over water use and flood mitigation on goldfields. Indeed, Lloyd 
has shown that pastoralists along Billabong Creek, 'envied what had been done to give 
miners some rights over their water resources' .101 By establishing a system of water rights 
for miners the government had inaugurated a new legal framework that both controlled 
water use and diversion and also provided some level of protection to miners from 
competitors for water. It also gave the assurance of certain amounts of water supply to 
individuals, however much of an illusion this proved to be during dry periods. Pastoralists 
sought similar centralised coordination, certainty, and protection as an alternative to the 
inadequate laws of riparian rights and personal conflicts. However, 'rights' and 
coordination were withheld from pastoralists. Although pastoralists enjoyed a kind of 
freedom through a lack of regulation, they were also limited by it, as individual interests 
were largely uncoordinated. 
99 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenry, p.57 . 
100 The doctrine of riparian rights and common law was imported from England by the colonial 
government. This system of law held the definition of 'a river' which carried over to colonial government 
water regulations. This definition did not reflect the behaviour of many Australian rivers nor was adequate 
for addressing legal issues of river flow and altered river flow (for example flooding, changed flood flows 
through dams and floodplain development, or reduced river flow from, for example, dams). The definition 
of 'river' in riparian rights and common law was a significant issue in colonial government regulation and 
settler compliance with the law, and as Mark Patrick Taylor and Robert Stokes have argued, continues to be 
a problem in Australia today. Mark Patrick Taylor and Robert Stokes, 'When is a River Not a River? 
Consideration of the Legal Definition of a River for Geomorphologists Practising in New South Wales', 
Australian Geographer, 36, 2, July 2005, pp.183-200, especially pp.187-188. 
IOI Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p. 74. 
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In 1884 William Brodribb tried to bring the 'two systems' of pastoralism and 
government together. 102 He put forward a bill in the New South Wales Legislative 
Assembly that would provide legal mechanisms to protect private dams for pastoral use. 
The Dams for Pastoral Purposes Bill set out guidelines for the construction of dams, such as 
a limited dam wall that allowed water to flow over and regulations that aimed to prevent 
damage to neighbouring properties, such as resultant flooding. 103 In effect this bill argued 
for a degree of rights for pastoralists over water resources. It presented a legal system 
where pastoralists had the right to store and use certain amounts of water. It also 
presented a way of coordinating disparate claims over water. Brodribb argued that the b ill 
was necessary, 'to render a great deal of our country capable of being profitably 
operated' .104 The bill gained the support of Attorney-General William Dalley. Dalley 
stated that, 'the storage of water is undoubtedly one of the questions which in this 
country is of absolute primary importance'. 105 Despite this support, Brodribb's bill was 
defeated in the Legislative Assembly. Water rights were again denied to pastoralists. The 
legal and knowledge gulf between the 'two systems' was perpetuated. 
Early government regulations around water use for mining significantly shaped 
future water management in Australia. Centralised regulation offered coordination of 
disparate individual interests, as well as government resources to address the challenges of 
drought and flood. Such resources included the knowledge of experts, particularly 
government engineers and meteorologists. Experts, however, largely set themselves apart 
from 'unlearned' forms of knowledge (such a local knowledge). They also faced the 
problem of gaining understandings of regions that had been little studied by 
governments. Regulations around miners' water use and government provisions for 
addressing flood and drought embedded a utility approach to water in government 
management. In this period water entitlements were issued which gave a degree of 
security to miners, but simultaneously excluded or denied rights to others. In contrast, 
water use for pastoralism was largely unregulated by governments fixed on visions of 
small-scale farms. Far from government centres, pastoralists also relied on knowledge 
102 In 1880 William Brodribb was elected to the New South Wales Legislative Assembly as the 
representative for Monaro. He had sold his Billabong Creek property in 1861 when selectors claimed parts 
of his property, and retired to a life of poli tics, entering the Victorian Legislative Assembly the same year. 
Janette Finch and Ruth Teale, 'Brodribb, William Adams (1809-1886)' , Australian Dictionary of Biography 
Online, http:ijwww.adb.online.anu.edu.au/bio2s/A030222b.htm?hilite= Brodribb, accessed 4 October 
2008. 
103 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.59. 
104 William Brodribb, quoted in Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.59. 
105 William Dalley, quoted in Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, pp.59-60. 
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gained from trial and error. While pastoralists enjoyed relative freedom to innovate in 
methods of water supply, government coordination offered a way to overcome disputes 
over access to water, and pastoralists sought government intervention. 
This period indeed saw the development of forms of water policy that were to 
dominate in the future, particularly river engineering, industry privileges, and centralised 
administration. However, these were to be held in tension with other ways of 
understanding and relating to rivers and floods as well as changes in government policies. 
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Bourke 1890 
The Birth of Engineering 
Driving towards Bourke in the early hours of the morning, the dense vegetation suddenly 
opened into grassland and the soil changed from a brilliant red to an ashen black under 
the wheels of the car. I was on the floodplain. I remembered what Heather Goodall wrote 
of these Darling River floodplains: 'Graziers constantly refer to the blacksoil areas of their 
land as ' the flooded country', not 'flood-prone' but 'flooded'. The floodwaters are always 
present in the imagination of the observers, even when there has been no flow for years 
beyond the ban ks'. 1 The floods remain, their presence lingering in the landscape, marked 
on the land by black silt deposits of previous inundations. The black soil and grasslands 
stretched out on either side of the road and into the horizon, the flatness relieved only by 
a solitary mountain: Mount Oxley. I had read that the mountain during floods would 
sometimes be an island. I was, in an unconventional sense, in the bed of the Darling 
River. 
I was travelling to Bourke to do further research on a flood that occurred in 1890. 
I had read about the town, river, and floodplains, but this was my first trip to the Darling 
River. Arriving in Bourke and stopping at the Darling River, which runs through the 
town, I stood on the high bank and looked across the green-brown water. The river was 
calm, reflecting the tall red gums growing along its banks. The opposite bank was thickly 
vegetated with red gums and coolabahs, distinctive of the floodplains. Coolabah trees 
typically germinate at the edge of floodwater. Red gums grow closer to the river, on land 
1 Heather Goodall, 'The River Runs Backwards', in Tim Bonyhady and Tom Griffiths (eds.), Words for 
Country: Landscape and Language in Australia (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2002), pp.31-5 1, 
p.42. 
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chat is more regularly inundated. Signs of past floods were everywhere, revealing the story 
of the river. 
The Darling River begins at the confluence of the Barwon, Culgoa, and Bogan 
Rivers, between the towns of Brewarrina and Walgett in New South Wales. The rivers 
meet about 200 kilometres upstream from Bourke, feeding water from the Great Dividing 
Range into the Darling. Before reaching the Darling they receive water from other rivers 
and creeks (including the Macintyre, Macquarie, Namoi, and Gwydir) whose headwaters 
are also in the Great Dividing Range and stretch from southern Queensland regions of 
the Range into northern New South Wales. The Great Dividing Range tributaries water 
more fertile, higher altitude areas before flowing through the lower, flat, western regions, 
bringing with them the black silt. The Darling River's flows are largely determined by the 
amount of water carried by these rivers and creeks, along with that of the Warrego and 
Paroo Rivers, which join the Darling downstream of, or just south of, Bourke. Areas 
adjacent to the Darling receive little rainfall. When they do, the rain contributes to local 
changes and variations in river flow ('freshes'), vegetation growth, and animal behaviour.2 
It is a land of boom and bust. The Darling has the most variable river flow in the 
world and many native plants (for example the red gums), fish (such as the golden perch) 
and other animals rely on its intermittent flows for both health and reproductive cues. 
During floods water spills onto the floodplains and it can stay high for months, the silt 
staining the earth as water soaks into the land. In the upper Darling floodwater soaks into 
the earth and replenishes the underground aquifer of the Great Artesian Basin. The 
Darling drifts south, feeding Menindee Lakes and joins the Murray River at the town of 
Wentworth. The southwest gradient of the land is slight and floodwater drains away 
slowly. The Darling rarely experiences 'flash floods'; they more often rise in increments, 
built by the tributaries' water and the washing away of snags and blockages in waterways. 
In 1890 all of the feeding tributaries of the Darling River flooded. 
In March and April that year, paid workers sent from Sydney by the government, 
along with residents of Bourke, built an embankment (or levee) around the town to 
protect it from the threatening flood. As the floodwater slowly rose, media reports 
increasingly became focused on the strength and height of the embankment and whether 
it would prevent the town's inundation. If the wall was breached, the town would flood. 
Although built quickly, within a month of the flood's peak the embankment was 
2 Goodall, 'The River Runs Backwards', pp.40-41. 
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intended as a permanent structure, one which would protect the town from future floods. 
The construction of the embankment was financed by the colonial government, in 
response to petitions by representatives of Bourke to protect the township, which was of 
particular cultural and economic significance to the colony and nation.3 In addition, and 
at the request of those in the town, the government contributed other aid by sending 
boats from Sydney, aiding the evacuation of a large number of residents, and providing 
various facilities to help the flood effort. The flood was reported widely in urban 
newspapers and the embankment gathered symbolic importance in these reports. The 
embankment came to symbolise Bourke's 'battle' against the flood and the hard work of 
the citizens, aligning with contemporary traits of a cultural identity rooted in rural 
Australia. 
The high degree of media attention the flood event received hints at the 
importance of Bourke to the cultural identity of New South Wales, and the nation, at the 
time. By 1890 the town had come to connotate 'the bush '. In 1890 Bourke was the largest 
trade centre for the wool industry in rural New South Wales, and Australia, a symbol of 
the success of settlement and industry in the inland. As Tim Bonyhady has noted, when 
the flood occurred, 'public attention was fixed on town not country', despite the land 
being heavily stocked with record numbers of sheep and stock losses running into the 
millions.4 Bourke was the immediate focus of the colonial government and urban media. 
The 1890 flood in Bourke and along the Darling River was unprecedented in 
colonists' experience. Its impact was more devastating because government meteorologists 
did not (or were unable to) forewarn colonists of its likely severity. A previous large flood, 
in 1864, had caused some damage to the town, but many had thought this flood to be an 
exceptional occurrence. The 1890 flood revealed that it was not and that large floods 
could periodically threaten the town. Meteorologists' predictions, reliant on limited 
records of rainfall and river flow, were not enough to protect the settlement. 
The government-funded embankment signalled colonists' calls for new forms of 
flood protection by the government. The colon ists turned to engineers to guard against 
flooding as faith in meteorologists waned. Abstract long-range forecasts and emergency 
3 Edmund Fosbery, et al., 'Floods in the Town and District of Bourke (Report of the Board Appointed to 
Inquire Into)', New South Wales Legislative Assembly. Votes and Proceedings, 8, 1890, p.3. The Western Herald 
indicated total govern ment grants toward the construction of the embankment may have reached as much 
as £5,500 pounds. Western Herald, 2 July, 1890, p.2. 
4 Tim Bonyhady, 'The Flood in the Darling', in The Colonial Earth (Carlton, Victoria: Miegunyah Press, 
2000), pp.280-307' p.286. 
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aid did not guarantee the safety of the townspeople and future of their town - a 
guarantee that they sought from the government. Following the 1890 flood the people of 
Bourke requested more funds for the construction of a more solid embankment. 
This chapter explores the role of government science in trying to come to terms 
with, and manage, floods for the sake of cultural identity and the economic future of 
Bourke, the inland, and the colony. It examines who had a stake in protecting Bourke, 
both during and following the flood, focusing on the town's position as an important 
symbol of cultural identity for urban dwellers in New South Wales and more widely in 
Australia. I also explore the colonial government's investment in the town as the centre of 
western New South Wales' wool industry; the role of government meteorologists; and the 
interests of the townspeople. Protecting Bourke from flooding, and preventing both 
industry and individual losses, became invested with a level of importance that 
distinguished it from other threatened towns and regions in the colony. In 1890 there 
was widespread flooding throughout New South Wales. Bourke received more media 
attention and government funds than any other place. 
This chapter also explores the tensions and changing relationship between the 
government and the town, during and following the flood, that stemmed from 
ambiguities and negotiations over who was responsible for ensuring that Bourke was 
secured against floods. I will examine the power plays between the government and local 
authorities as they negotiated this changing relationship, which was complicated further 
in 1890 by the effect government-built works had on increasing the flood's height. 
In the aftermath of the flood, and against a history of successive floods and 
drought in the inland, colonists looked to the colonial government for permanent 
solutions to the erratic flows of the rivers. Colonists argued for engineering works such as 
permanent levees, flood mitigation, water conservation structures, and irrigation, that 
would provide greater environmental security and bring the hostile rivers to order. 
* * * 
Bourke and the Darling 
Bourke was laid out in 1862 at the 18 Mile Point from 'Fort Bourke' in order to service 
the increasing number of pastoral properties that began to be established in the area in 
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the late 1850s. Surveyor-General Thomas Mitchell had established Fort Bourke barricade 
(named after Sir Richard Bourke) in 1835, to protect his exploring party from attacks by 
Aborigines. It is the country of the Ngemba language group. At that time Mitchell 
commented that it would be a good place for a future town. In the 1850s pastoralists 
requested a town in the Fort Bourke area. The land Mitchell recommended however, had 
since been taken-up by a pastoral prospector. The only available land, large enough for 
town growth and on the Darling River, important for produce transport and water 
supply, was the 18 Mile Point from Fort Bourke. Further, two public buildings had 
already been erected at 18 Mile Point. Surveyor J. Glean Wilson marked out lots, which 
began to be sold in 1863. 5 
After its establishment, Bourke quickly became an important trade and export 
centre. By 1890 Bourke had a population of approximately 3,000 and was 'the largest 
wool-loading centre in Australia', serving an industry which counted well over 15 million 
sheep in the region.6 The Central pastoral Division of New South Wales exceeded the 
Western Division's sheep numbers by 10 million, however Bourke (located in the 
Western Division) was also the centre of trade for the Central Division's wool industry. 
Within Australia, New South Wales had early dominated the wool industry, with a total 
of 59 million sheep by 1890, as compared to Q ueensland's 20 million and Victoria's 14 
million.7 
The economic booms of the 1860s and 1880s saw good wool prices and increased 
British (and to a lesser extent domestic) investment in pastoral properties. In the 1880s 
sheep numbers in the Western Division rose to 9 million, eclipsing the number of cattle. 
Sheep were increasingly preferred because they required less water and fewer rotations for 
grazing. Many farmers also switched from cattle to sheep because of the ease of 
transporting wool (rather than droving cattle overland). Cattle were moved to wetter 
niches, such as the Macquarie Marshes and Narran Lakes. 
5 Bourke and District Historical Society, Bourke: A History of Local Government, (Surry Hills, NSW: 
Wentworth Books for the Bourke and District Historical Society, 1978), pp.22-23. The site of the current 
town was originally called 'Prattenville' by early settlers. 
6 Bonyhady, The Flood in the Darling', p.286; Fosbery, et al. , 'Floods in the Town and District of Bourke', 
p.2; Sydney Morning Herald (SMH), 28 April, 1890, p.8; and, 'Western Division of New South Wales. Royal 
Commission to Inquire into the Condition of the Crown Tenants'. 'Report and Summary of Evidence. Part 
l', New South Wales Legislative Assembly. Votes and Proceedings, 4, 1901, p.ix. Bonyhady estimates Bourke's 
population at the time to have been 2,500. However, the government Inquiry into the flood and the SMH 
put the population at approximately 3,000. 
7 N.G. Budin, 'Distribution of the Sheep Population: Preliminary Statistical Picture, 1860-1957', in Alan 
Barnard (ed.), The Simple Fleece: Studies in the Australian Wool Industry (Melbourne: Melbourne U n iversity 
Press, 1962), pp.281-307, p.283. 
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Paddle steamers were an important part of the wool economy, the chief means for 
transporting wool and delivering supplies to towns and stations.8 One can still see the 
port on the Darling River at Yanda Station (now part of Gundabooka National Park) 
where delivery-boats docked. Paddle steamers preceded the establishment of a township, 
the first steamer was recorded in the area in 1859. Paddle steamers plied the rivers to and 
from Adelaide and Echuca, on the Victorian side of the Murray River, and then on to 
Melbourne. Echuca was the largest port on the river system, servicing the wool industry in 
New South Wales and the gold fields in Victoria. When Bourke township was laid out, a 
wharf was hastily established (and a bigger wharf built in the 1890s). Although the river 
flows were erratic, paddle steamers proved faster and more reliable than coach transport 
which could take up to a year to complete a return trip from Sydney. The Great Western 
Railway, which reached Bourke in 1885, added to the town's importance as a trade and 
supply centre. 
* * * 
Steady Rain and Breaking Banks 
Steady rain across Queensland and New South Wales in 1889 continued in 1890 and the 
south-western Queensland rivers swelled. The Paroo, Warrego, Culgoa, Balonne, 
Condamine, and Macintyre rivers broke their banks in late February and were in full 
flood in mid-March, inundating Cunnamulla, Inglewood, Warwick, and Toowoomba. 
The local newspapers in each township wrote of record flood heights that caused 'The 
Calamity of the Age'.9 In 1864 and 1887 floodwaters had come down the Queensland 
rivers and many looked to these floods as the largest possible. The 1890 flood, however, 
surpassed even these heights in most towns. 
As the floodwaters moved southward through the Queensland rivers, the large 
flows attracted the attention of the media to Queensland towns. While stations and 
towns to the north were recovering from the floods and counting stock losses, the local 
press in Bourke ran stories expressing fears of what could happen when the high waters 
8 Painter, The River Trade. 
9 Darling Downs Gazette, 15 March, 1890, p.4. 
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finally reached Bourke. 10 Live sheep and export wool from the largely pastoral south west 
Queensland were sent via Bourke, to be shipped on paddle steamers to Adelaide or 
Echuca, or transported by rail to Sydney. On 14 March 1890 the Sydney Morning Herald 
(SMH) reported that '[m]any old residents predict that should further rains occur up river 
high floods must ensue. In 1864 the water was 4 ft. in the town [of Bourke] ... should the 
same volume of water come down, either miles of railway will be swept away, or Bourke 
will be entirely demolished as the railway embankment would force the waters to a great 
height and cause a very strong current' .11 Human changes to the landscape changed the 
behaviour of floods and experienced colonists suspected these changes would be to 
Bourke's detriment. The government-built railway embankment, constructed along one 
side of the town in 1885, had reduced the width of the natural floodway from 12 to two 
miles. 12 It was predicted early in the flood that the railway embankment would act as a 
dam, forcing floodwater back and into the town. 
On the Queensland and New South Wales coastal rivers heavy rainfall was 
causing floods too. Brisbane and Rockhampton flooded in March and the Hunter and 
Clarence Rivers flooded in the same month. The New South Wales coastal rains moved 
inland and the Namoi and Barwon Rivers, the far north-east feeders of the Darling River, 
were in flood by mid March. There were widespread floods across the colonies, drowning 
500,000 sheep and cattle, and damaging crops of maize worth half a million pounds on 
the Barwon, Culgoa, and Narran Rivers. Nevertheless media attention remained fixed on 
Bourke.13 
* * * 
Wool and the National Imagination 
Bourke's significance for the wool industry marked it as a cultural icon and as symbolic of 
'the bush'. The media's focus on Bourke's plight in 1890 drew on (and reinforced) the 
town's significance for the cultural identity of New South Wales and, indeed, other 
colonies in Australia. By the 1880s, with a largely Australia-born population, Australians 
10 Toowoomba Chronicle, 27 March 1890, p.3; Toowoomba Chronicle, 14 April, 1890, p.3; and, Darling Downs 
Gazette, 2 April, 1890, p.3. 
11 SMH, 14 March, 1890, p.6. 
12 SMH, 14 March, 1890, p.6. 
13 Bonyhady, 'The Flood in the Darling', p.286; and, SMH, 15 March, 1890, p.9. 
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searched for a source of national identity, looking away from empire and Britain, into the 
nation. 14 Debates about federation spurred on the search for national identity, as 
Australia sought independence from Britain. National industries and development, while 
ensuring national economic security, were also sources of identification for colonial 
Australians. As an important rural industry, wool production became a focus for such 
'nation-building'. 15 
Tom Roberts' painting Shearing the Rams, for example, reflects this search for 
national identity in the wool industry. The painting (made on his visits to Brocklesby 
station in the Riverina) was first exhibited in 1890 and was part of Roberts' 'attempt to 
develop a national art' through explorations of pastoral and agricultural practices that 
centred on 'strong masculine labour'. The painting, which depicted a scene in a shearing 
shed, soon 'came t_o be considered the definitive image of an emerging national 
identity'. 16 Roberts was part of the Heidelberg School of painters which produced some of 
the most self-consciously 'national' images of the 1880s and 90s. The painters sought to 
create an art movement that was Australian rather than European and they did this 
largely through local content, while drawing on European impressionist techniques. They 
aimed to create popular works that gave Australians a source of identiy. Their artwork 
remains a strong point of reference for Australians today. The artwork as a whole is rural 
in focus, reflective of the nationalistic 'Sydney and the bush' ideas of the same period. 17 
For the first time in settlement history Australia's population was largely urban, but the 
urban, coastal dwellers looked inland to 'the bush' for markers of national distinction. 18 
In the 1890s urbanity was inflected with negative ideas of low living standards and ill 
health, while 'the bush' stood for robust good health and masculine vigour. 
The pastoral economy of 'the bush' also held symbolic importance for urban 
dwellers as a nostalgic link with earlier frontier life in the inland. Historian Richard 
14 See, J.M. Powell, An Historical Geography of Modern Australia: The Restive Fringe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), p.15. 
15 Libby Robin, How a Continent Created a Nation (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2007), 
p.57. 
16 Helen Topliss, 'Roberts, Thomas William (Tom) (1856 - 1931)', Australian Dictionary of Biography (ADB) 
Online, http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A 1104 l 9b.htm?hilite=Roberts%3BTom, accessed 11 
August 2008. 
17 Powell, An Historical Geography of Modern Australia, p.15. 
18 R.A. Golian, 'Nationalism, the Labour Movement and the Commonwealth, 1880-1900', in Gordon 
Greenwood (ed), Australia: A Social and Political History (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1955), pp. 145-193, 
p.145. Between 1880 and 1900 'the Australian people became fully conscious of their nationhood'. By 
1881, the number of Anglo-Australians born on the continent oumumbered immigrants. Australia's 
population comprised 61 percent Australia-born residents, compared with 34 percent born in the United 
Kingdom. By 1901, the number of Australia-born had reached 77 percent. 
125 
Waterhouse has described representations of 'the bush' made by, and for, urban dwellers 
as 'a culture of nostalgia' that referenced the height of the gold rushes and bushrangers. 19 
The wool industry offered a link with the past and with characters such as shearers, 
swagmen, and shepherds of the 1860s and 1870s. Frontier conflict and settler 
relationships with Aborigines were also incorporated into nostalgic portrayals of bush 
life.20 The pastoral industry had changed significantly since the 1860s. For example, more 
shearers were married and there was more travel between rural regions and urban centres 
through the expansion of railway networks.21 Such a 'culture of nostalgia' also promoted 
the idea that the simplicity of rural life was imbued with the core values of egalitarianism 
and mateship. 22 
Bourke's importance extended nationally. It had become, in the minds of urban 
Australians, representative of 'the bush'. The town was where Henry Lawson, poet and 
shaper of a rural national identity through portals of 'the bush', was sent by the Bulletin in 
1893-4 to experience the 'outback'. His experiences in Bourke and in the surrounding 
towns and country formed the substance of much of his work. He wrote of 'the bush' as a 
harsh environment of drought and flood, creating stoic white men. Despite his dark 
picture of ' the bush' the stereotypes he depicted shaped identities of settler roguishness 
and struggle against a hostile environment. 
The 1890 flood in Bourke occurred against this background of national self-
consciousness, national development, and the fascination of urban dwellers for 'the 
bush'. It also occurred at the height of a pastoral boom, where high wool prices were 
attracting the attention of city investors. 
* * * 
Building the Embankment 
In mid March 1890, about a month before its expected peak, fears about a serious flood 
in Bourke were reported in many newspapers, although its height remained uncertain. 
The Bourke town Council had held a meeting in early March, deciding it was necessary to 
19 Richard Waterhouse, The Vision Splendid: A Social and Cultural History of Rural Australia (Frernantle: Curtin 
University Books, 2005), p.170 and pp. 166-167. 
20 Waterhouse, The Vision Splendid, pp.170-174. 
21 Waterhouse, The Vision Splendid, p. 169 and pp. 177-179. 
22 Waterhouse, The Vision Splendid, p.166. 
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build a flood embankment (or levee) around the entire town.23 A smaller levee had been 
built to protect some parts of the town when a flood threatened in 1879 (the cost of 
which was supplemented by a £150 grant from the government).24 While effective against 
that flood (which proved to be small), it was thought that this flood could be much 
higher. 
Building a levee was, at first, considered a precautionary measure. In mid March, 
as the town Council and community discussed how to finance a levee, some people 
speculated that a very large flood was unlikely. They reasoned that the Darling would 
need to rise another 7 feet (reaching a total height of 38 feet) before floodwater would 
enter the town. Since the flood in 1864, 'there has been none high enough to do much 
damage in Bourke, except that of 1873, when the water found its way round to the old 
court house, where the police barracks now stand'.25 Further, Bourke's streets had since 
been raised. It was thought that even if this flood gained in magnitude such changes to 
the town would be sufficient to prevent damage to buildings and infrastructure.26 
The metropolitan and local newspapers reported on 14 March that news had been 
received from Walgett that the river was over 40 feet there.27 The height of the flood in 
Walgett was thought to be some indication of how high the flood in Bourke might be; 
but, as one paddle steamer worker noted, 'all the important feeders of this river [the 
Darling River] fall into it below Walgett ... every one of which are bankers [full to their 
banks], and out of which will come four times as much water as ... comes out of the 
Barwon and Namoi at Walgett' .28 Continued rain in March and new waves of floods in 
the tributaries caused sceptics to believe what they had previously thought unlikely: a big 
flood was inevitable. The town's safety now depended on the embankment. But was it 
going to be built fast, high and solidly enough to keep the flood out? It was widely 
predicted that the town had four weeks to prepare. 29 
23 SMH, 14 March, 1890, p.6; SMH, 19 March, 1890, p.9; SMH, 21 March, 1890, p.8; and, Western Herald, 
15 March, 1890, p.4. 
24 Western Herald, 15 March, 1890, p.4; and, Western Herald, 2 April, 1890, p.2. 
25 Western Herald, 15 March, 1890, p.4. 
26 Western Herald, 15 March, 1890, p.4. 
27 SMH, 14 March, 1890, p.6; SMH, 19 March, 1890, p.9; and, SMH, 21March,1890, p.8; and, Western 
Herald, 15 March, 1890, p.4. 
28 Gro. R. S. Pickhills ('Steamer Sturt'), letter to the editor, March 24, 1890, Western Herald, 26 March, 
1890, p.2. The G.R. S. Pickhills who wrote this letter is probably the same G .R.S. Pickhills who first 
captained steamers on the Darling in the 1860s. See, Gwenda Painter, The River Trade: Wool and Steamers, 
second edition (Wahroonga, NSW: Turton & Armstrong Publishers, 1987), p.55; and, Adelaide 
Photographic Co., 'G.R.S. Pickhills'. photograph. 1865. B 3201. Mortlock Pictorial Collection. State 
Library of South Australia. 
29 Western Herald, 26 March, 1890, p.2. 
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The predictions and knowledge of 'old residents' of Bourke, who had experienced 
past floods, often provided newspapers with perspective on the potentials of the current 
flood. Comments such as, '[m]any old residents predict that should further rains occur up 
river high floods must ensue', were common.30 Expectations of a large flood in Bourke 
were supported by the forecasts of 'old residents' and information passed on through 
telegraphs, letters, and newspapers about upstream and tributary river rises and rainfall. 
In anticipation of a large flood, the Bourke Council requested and was granted 
£7 50 pounds from the government towards the embankment in late March and another 
£1000 pounds in early April when the amount was found to be insufficient.3 1 When 
requests for further funds continued, the government advised the Bourke Council to 
spend whatever was needed to protect the town at the colonial government's expense.32 
Total government expenditure for the embankment was to reach D,500.33 These were 
the only amounts granted by the colonial government for embankment works anywhere 
in New South Wales that year.34 The local newspaper, the Western Herald, reported that 
the grants were a sign that 'the Government appears to acknowledge the importance of 
Bourke, and to have some idea of the extent of damage that would ensue if the town were 
flooded'.35 
The embankment was planned as a permanent structure, not only to protect the 
town from the immediate threat but to guard against similar floods in the future.36 
Twelve contracts were let for separate sections of the embankment work, the workers 
digging up the town common for soil.37 Two hundred and fifty 'unemployed nawies' 
were brought from Sydney to build the embankment and who, after sunset, laboured 
under electric lights that had been ordered by the Council, from Sydney, especially for 
the embankment work.38 Proprietors and homeowners built levees around their own 
properties. The SMH reported that this was because people did not have 'faith in the 
30 SMH, 14 March, 1890, p.6. 
31 Western Herald, 26 March, 1890, p.2; Western Herald, 5 April, 1890, p.4; and, Western Herald, 21 June, 
1890, p.2. 
32 Western Herald, 21 June, 1890, p.2. 
33 Western Herald, 5 April, 1890, p.4; and, Fosbery et al., 'Floods in the Town and District of Bourke' , p.3. 
The Western Herald indicated total government grants toward the construction of the embankment may 
have reached as much as £5,500 pounds. Western Herald, 2 July, 1890, p.2. 
34 SMH, 21 March,1890, p.8; SM H, 15 April, 1890, p.7; and, Western Herald, 5 April, 1890, p.4. 
35 Western Herald, 5 April, 1890, p.4. 
36 SMH, 21 March, 1890, p.8. 
37 SMH, 15 Apri l, 1890, p.7; and, SMH, 19 March, 1890, p.8. 
38 Western Herald, 24 May, 1890, p.2. The electric lights were paid for by the Council and cost £718. 
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outer embankment'.39 There was some speculation that local soil, 'peculiar to this 
neighbourhood' of 'very fine vegetable silt', used to build the embankment, would be 
eroded by the lapping floodwater and that the levee would not hold. The embankment's 
strength could be further undermined by the speed with which it was being erected; if it 
were not compacted properly the loose foundations would be more prone to seepage and 
erosion.40 
From 9 to 19 April, the flood approached its highest level around Bourke. During 
this period urban newspapers reported extensively on the town's crisis. Although the 
1890 flood extended into western Queensland and most of New South Wales where the 
coastal rivers were also in flood, the fate of Bourke occupied a special place in newspapers 
and popular imagination. Bourke's position as an important wool loading centre and its 
location near the junction of the flooding tributaries gave it colonial, and national, 
significance. The Town and Country Journal wrote on 19 April 1890 that, '[i]t was at once 
realised that Bourke, the chief and the historic town of the wild west, was in imminent 
danger'.41 Journalists from around the country descended on Bourke in April to report 
first hand the suspense of the unfolding drama; the behaviour of the water, animals and 
people. 
In Late March the SMH had reported that 'the biggest flood in the history of the 
colony is expected at St George, Bourke and other places', with the 'ground so saturated ... 
every shower runs off and helps to make up the flood-waters, and the rivers everywhere 
are becoming surcharged'. Pastoralists reported that foot rot was affecting their sheep, 
and rumours of heavy stock losses on stations reached the town by 1 April; but these 
reports remained 'unconfirmed'.42 As the flood peaked in the north-eastern tributaries, 
the water was reported as '20 miles wide at places'. Floodwater isolated towns from 
surrounding country, and stations were separated from towns and each other. The flood 
created boundaries, allowing newspapers to focus almost exclusively on Bourke's plight 
rather than those of the pastoral stations, as communication with outlying areas was 
limited or non-existent. 
By 10 April the river at Bourke had reached a height of 38 feet and 10 inches. 
'The greatest anxiety and alarm prevail', one journalist wrote. 43 That week women and 
39 SMH, 10 Apri l, 1890, p.8. 
40 Western HeraUl, 29 March, 1890, p.4 
41 Australian Town and Country Journal (ATCJ), 19 April, 1890, p.12. 
42 SMH, 25 March, 1890, p.8; and, SMH, 1 April, 1890, p.8. 
43 SMH, 14 April, 1890, p.8; SMH, 16 April, 1890, p.7; and, ATCJ, 19 April, 1890, pp.1 2-13. 
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children were urged to leave Bourke. Two hundred took free rail passes issued by the 
government, and a further one hundred reduced rail fares, to Nyngan, many continuing 
on to Dubbo and Sydney, to stay with relatives.44 Although evacuees were initially 
required to declare themselves 'paupers' to receive free passes, as evacuations became 
urgent this requirement was removed.45 The Bourke Council relied on government aid 
for the costs of building the embankment, rail passes for residents and embankment 
workers, and boats. The Council, already £7 ,500 in debt before the flood, was unwilling 
(or unable) to expend money on the costly environmental event.46 It had turned to the 
government: the safety of residents and the 'honour of the town was at stake' .47 
Many residents who had decided to stay in the town went to North Bourke, a plot 
of high land with a small settlement, where an encampment had been established. With 
the bridge to North Bourke submerged, the only way from the town to North Bourke was 
by steamer, and the only way into and out of the town itself was by rail, the train line 
having been built on an embankment that remained above the floodwater.48 
Bourke's plight attracted the attention of the Governor and his wife, Lord and 
Lady Carrington, who visited the town by train, offering their sympathy and support and 
reportedly staying on the train in order to ease the pressure of organising their visit.49 The 
visit by the Governor and his wife raised Bourke's standing in the 'public mind' within 
both the colony and throughout Australia. The Governor had singled out the town for 
attention and had not visited any other flooded areas that year. As the head of the colony 
(and representative of the Queen) the Governor had offered Australia-wide and Imperial 
support and bestowed an 'official' significance on the town. 
On 15 April the SMH reported that the workers building the embankment had 
taken part in 'something like a strike' and the Mayor called on the citizens to replace the 
strikers and complete their work. The 250 workers had been offered one shilling an hour 
or eight shillings per day. Unhappy with the pay, many refused to work. The workers 
from Sydney had, no doubt, been exposed to, or involved in, the groundswell of 
unionism and political action of the labour movement that sought better pay and 
conditions for trade workers. The labour movement, based on growing conflict between 
44 SMH, 14 April, 1890, p.8; SMH, 16 April, 1890, p.7; and ATCJ, 19 April, 1890, pp.12-13. 
45 SMH, 16 April, 1890, p.7. 
46 Western Herald, 5 July, 1890, p.2. 
47 SMH, 24 April, 1890, p.8. 
48 SMH, 10 April, 1890, p.8. 
49 SMH, 16 April, 1890, p.7; and, SMH, 17 April, 1890, p.7. 
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trade union members and employer organisations, gathered momentum in 1889-90 as 
trade unions took steps towards the creation of the Labor Party. The New South Wales 
Trades and Labour Council approved an election platform for candidates in April 1890 
as the embankment workers went on strike. In August that year maritime workers went 
on strike, beginning an intense four-year period of conflict between workers' unions and 
employers. Indeed, in the year following the flood, Bourke became an important centre of 
the conflicts between the Amalgamated Shearers' Union and the employers' Pastoralists' 
Unions.50 
Although there was a general strike by the embankment workers an unspecified 
number continued to work; and citizens joined them, filling the labour gap produced by 
the collective, union-like action. A SMH reporter wrote: 'It thus happened that to-day 
[sic], which was regarded as a critical time, some of the most well-to-do merchants, clerks, 
and bank assistants were to be found taking the place of the ordinary navvy in building 
up the entrenchments which were to save the township' .51 The strike had occurred at a 
crucial moment in the building of the embankment. The report continued: 
The town, which lies between the river Darling on one side and the railway on the other 
is about 720 acres in extent. It is simply a flat ... the water in some instances is 6in. from 
the top of the wall, and at the time of writing it is reported as still rising. It thus became a 
matter of fighting the floods. This is being done inch by inch ... For every inch the water 
rises an inch of soil is placed on the embankments'.52 
The reporter was describing the scene to those unfamiliar with the town and the effort to 
save the town was now a battle by the citizens against the water. Two days later the paper 
reported: 
... the town is an island, level almost as a billiard-table, there being an entire absence of 
hills .... The citizens are making, as they say, one big effort to save the place. Neither time, 
money, nor energy is being spared ... the main road is being cut and the soil utilised. The 
town is a mass of small barricades and entrenchments, and looks as though preparations 
are being made for war ... as the dam continues to stand, increased confidence is felt in 
50 Greg Patmore, Australian Labour History (Melbourne: Longman Chesshire, 1991), pp.64-66; and, 
Waterhouse, The Vision Splendid, pp. 108-109. 
5 1 SMH, 15 April, 1890, p.7. 
52 SMH, 15 April, 1890, p.7. 
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it ... The other floods [in the Darling) have risen in a different way, and there are so many 
conditions regulating the flow of water into the Darling River towards Bourke, that it is 
almost impossible to gauge the extent of mischief likely to be done' .53 
Bourke was receiving floodwater from all of the Darling's upper tributaries 
simultaneously and there was also the as yet untested potential damming effect that the 
railway embankment might have. By mid April the embankment was 10 feet high and 30 
feet wide in places. 'So long as the dams hold, the town is safe'.54 
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Map of Bourke showing the levee built in 1890 in anticipation of the flood peak. The 
levee is indicated by the solid dark line. 
[From: Edmund Fosbery, et al., 'Floods in the Town and District of Bourke (Report of the 
Board Appointed to Inquire Into)', New South Wales Legislative Assembly. Votes and 
Proceedings, 8, 1890, Appendix D.J 
53 SMH, 16 April, 1890, p.7. 
54 SMH, 16 April, 1890, p.7. 
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* * * 
Meteorology and the Rise of River Engineering 
While the 1890 flood in Bourke was framed in terms of cultural identity, it was also 
conceptualised within scientific paradigms, especially with reference to the theories and 
pragmatics of government science. The local Bourke newspaper, the Western Herald, 
reported on the flood in terms of longer weather fluctuations and the predictions of 
government meteorologists, particularly in relation to the effects of the flood on the wool 
industry. Before the flood reached its record height, the Western Herald argued that the 
benefits of floodwater could outweigh any damage. Despite the losses of stock, crops, and 
human life, and damage to private and government buildings, it claimed that reparation 
work after the water subsided would create jobs. It also argued that the floods might 
result in a pastoral 'good season' that would benefit communities and businesses.55 It was 
unclear, however, whether floods in Queensland and other parts of New South Wales 
would lead to a string of good years, or years of drought. 
The Western Herald turned to the predictions of Charles Egeson, an assistant 
meteorologist at the Sydney Observatory. Egeson's predictions were based on a theory of 
33-year weather cycles. He had arrived at 33-year increments through past rainfall data, 
'which', the Western Herald editor wrote, 'to say the least was absurd, because authentic 
records of the rainfall and climatic influences, could only be obtained for one period of 
that number of years'. Nevertheless, his theory was deemed to be so detrimental to 
business that he had been 'restricted from publishing any more of his theories'. Although 
ridiculed by both metropolitan and regional press (including the Western Herald) as well as 
other Government Astronomers (whose duties encompassed meteorology), the Western 
Herald urged pastoralists to consider Egeson's predictions before the peak of the flood. 
Some of his forecasts had not been fulfilled in the past, the editor wrote, but he had 
predicted the current flood. Further, according to Egeson a three-year drought would 
follow. The editor was not fully convinced that a drought would occur, but warned that 
'nothing will be lost by being prepared, as fully as possible', by conserving floodwater, 
'should a drought ... come' and Egeson be proved correct.56 
55 Western Herald, 15 March, 1890, p.4. 
56 Western Herald, 15 March, 1890, p.4. 
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The Western Herald contributed to the ongoing national debate about rivers and 
how to manage their unpredictable flows. As meteorologists attempted to predict 
droughts and floods, the benefits of engineering, as a way of mitigating these 
environmental events, were discussed within government and newspapers from the 
1880s. Suggestions for 'locking the Darling', to trap floodwater in order to sustain 
pastoralists during drought and to potentially support an irrigated agricultural industry, 
were raised and argued in newspapers during the 1880s, intensified by drought in 1879 
and again in the mid 1880s. 
The debates had attracted high profile figures such as the Anglican Bishop of 
Melbourne, James Moorhouse, who was credited with, but denied, coining the phrase, 
'Don't pray for rain, dam it'. Moorhouse thought that the prayer for rain in the Book of 
Common Prayer was a futile plea to God and that the remedy lay with colonists in 
building dams. He wrote and preached a new prayer that asked forgiveness for breaking 
'Thy natural laws' by letting floodwater disappear into drought and 'chastisement, that 
we may bestir ourselves to conserve and employ Thy precious gift of water, to the 
fertilising of our fields, the relief of our necessity, the replenishing of our land with 
prosperous and happy people, and the glorifying of Thy holy name' .57 Despite widespread 
support for trapping floodwater in New South Wales in the 1880s, the Government had 
deemed it too expensive. The 1890 flood renewed calls for such schemes. 
Some colonists declared that meteorologists' incomplete rainfall data was not 
enough. What was needed was more attention to the hydrography of a river, such as the 
study of the Darling River presented by F.B. Gipps in a paper to the Geographical Society 
in 1885.58 Others, such as a former member for the Water Conservation Commission, 
Frederick Franklin, thought enough study had been done and it was time 'the 
conservation of water along the main rivers of this colony ... be practically dealt with '.59 
New South Wales Government Astronomer, chief meteorologist at the Sydney 
Observatory, and Egeson's superior, Henry C hamberlain Russell, also advocated an 
engineering solution to drought and flood. 
At the height of the Darling River flood, Russell wrote a letter to the SMH: 
57 Quoted in, Bonyhady, 'The Flood in the Darling', pp.292-293. 
58 SMH, Letter to the Editor, 18 April, 1890, p.6. 
59 SMH, Letter to the Editor, 8 May, 1890, p.5. 
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Since the commencement of the present flood I have been collecting every available fact 
in reference to it with a view to publication, but I hope ... the engineer will be sent into all 
that country, and told to store up the flood waters and make them a blessing, and not a 
terror, to mankind. At present ... all the forces at work are tending to make the floods 
worse, but as soon as people wake up to the advantages of the complete system of 
irrigation, means will be found to turn them to our advantage ... 60 
This was one of few places where Russell set out his views on water conservation. 
Russell's words reflected the growing call in the late nineteenth century for engineers to 
mitigate floods and droughts through dams, which would also support irrigation. He 
seems to imply that in the absence of 'scientific' data through which meteorologists could 
comprehensively understand the river's flows, it was time for action. 
* * * 
Meteorologists Compromise: H.C. Russell and the Darling River 
In Bourke, warnings of the 1890 flood that moved from western Queensland rivers into 
the Darling in February, came from newspaper reports, 'old residents' and local 
communication such as telegrams sent from town to town. The Darling River had been 
studied by government scientists and hydrographers since the 1870s. However, in 1890 
Government Astronomers were still struggling to comprehend the behaviour of 
Australian rivers and climate. Government Astronomers looked for patterns or cycles in 
the erratic weather and river flow of the Darling, and throughout Australia. If such a cycle 
could be found, floods and droughts could potentially be predicted years, even decades, 
in advance. Deciphering a wet/ dry cycle would, it was hoped, give settlers environmental 
and economic security against drought and flood, and aid government planning. In the 
face of the 1890 floods, however, colonists questioned the value of meteorology as a 
means to protect them from environmental events. Despite government meteorologists' 
influence in shaping environmental knowledge in colonial Australia, its practitioners, 
especially long-range forecasters, were not fully accepted as 'scientific'. 
In March 1890 the Sydney Bulletin published a cartoon, depicting the New South 
Wales Government Astronomer, Henry Chamberlain Russell, and his assistant at the 
60 SMH, 16April, 1890,p.7. 
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Sydney Observatory, C harles Egeson, as 'soothsayers', playing on the 'weather prophet' 
title popularly given to long-range forecasters at the time. The two were shown standing in 
the rain, in a conspiratorial pose, laughing. The caption read: 'It was said in ancient times 
that two soothsayers could not meet without laughing outright. Here is depicted a 
meeting of the Prophet Egeson and Astronomer Russell' .61 The cartoon appeared in the 
Bulletin as floodwater moved from the Queensland and New South Wales tributaries 
towards Bourke, threatening the town and large portions of western pastoral land. The 
1890 floods put meteorologists under the media spotlight. 
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Figure 3.1 
The 'Weather Prophets' cartoon in the 
Bulletin, 1890. 
The caption: 'It was said in ancient times 
that two soothsayers could not meet 
without laughing outright. Here is 
depicted a meeting of the Prophet Egeson 
and Astronomer Russell' . 
C. Egeson has his back to us and H.C. 
Russell is facing us. 
[From: Bulletin, 29 March, 1890, p.11.] 
Both Russell and Egeson had predicted the 1890 floods through long-range 
weather forecasts. Their forecasts projected which years floods would occur based on 
recurring weather cycles. That 1890 fell into their formulated systems of cycles, the 
cartoon insinuated, was a coincidence or fluke, rather than the result of scientifically 
defensible investigation. The laughter of meteorologists-cum-soothsayers was because of 
their success in fooling the public of the validity of their theories and convincing them 
that meteorology was a science, and thus useful to settlers. While the 1890 flood could be 
used as proof of their theories, the Bulletin was sceptical. The cartoon raised the question 
61 Bulletin, 29 March, 1890, p. l l. 
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of whether the two meteorologists were really 'weather prophets' or merely corrupt 
fortune-tellers out for easy fame and money? 
Russell and Egeson had forecast the floods through different theories. Egeson 
had predicted the floods through a theory of 33-year weather cycles based on rainfall 
records. Russell's prediction was made from his theory of 19-year cycles based on rainfall, 
river flow records, and lunar cycles. The differences in the theories no doubt contributed 
to settlers' reservations about the predictions they proposed. Further, colonists were 
suspicious of their theories as they did not appear to be supported by lengthy data sets. 
While the Bull~tin published the 'Weather Prophets' cartoon, the editor of the 
Western Herald wrote that the usefulness of Egeson's theory was compromised by the lack 
of rainfall records in the colony.62 Russell's theory suffered similar criticisms. Australian 
colonies lacked the crucial element in long-range weather forecasting and in ascertaining 
climatic averages - data, accumulated over decades and centuries, of suitable 'scientific' 
quality, which meant: consistent observations by reliable observers. Settlers may have also 
been suspicious of Russell's theories because of the unorthodox methods of data 
gathering which he used to supplement 'scientific' records. 
Russell's approach needs to be understood within the broader context of the 
position and practices of meteorologists in this period. Practitioners of meteorology 
provided a means for environmental interpretation for settlers and governments in 
colonial Australia. By the mid 1860s all colonial governments in Australia included 
departments that studied meteorology - departments that usually encompassed 
astronomy and post and telegraph duties.63 Meteorology was not a discrete discipline. It 
was a new branch of science that drew on established fields such as astronomy. 
Meteorology also included some geography and hydrology, forming a meeting ground of 
skills, which aided the colonies' search for environmental knowledge. It also relied on 
new technologies such as telegraph networks, which fed information from regional areas 
to key hub observatories. 
62 W estern Herald, 15 March, 1890, p.4. 
63 In 1859 Georg Balthasar von Neumayer was appointed Government Astronomer in Victoria. Neumayer, 
a magnetician by training, was convinced of the importance of meteorology in studying environments; and 
meteorology was a key duty in his government role, which he combined with hydrology and astronomy. In 
South Australia, Charles Todd became Government Astronomer and Superintendent of Telegraphs in 
1855. His department was responsible for meteorological observations, establishing observing stations as 
telegraph networks were expanded in New South Wales, Victoria and Darwin. See, W.J. G ibbs, Origins of 
Australian Meteorology, Metarch Papers No.12 (Melbourne: Bureau of Meteorology, 1998). 
137 
Meteorology developed as a discipline anchored in modernity. Technologies that 
provided the ability to quickly communicate data from observation out-posts to a central 
observatory, for example telegraphs, invented in the 1830s, became a determinant of the 
practice of meteorology, allowing regional forecasts from a centralised hub. Charles Todd 
declared in 1893 that the telegraph, 'is to meteorology what the telescope is to the 
astronomer' .64 Regional climates took on abstract forms through isobar maps and 
statistical evaluations of weather, based on data collected from throughout the colony, 
around the nation, and sometimes from other countries. Environmental historian Kirsty 
Douglas has observed that the use of telegraphs, 'enabled meteorological workers to build 
a synoptic view of prevailing weather on a regional scale, assisted prognostication and 
hinted at possibilities for long-range weather forecasting'.65 
The potential of meteorology to aid government and settlers by deciphering 
weather and river hydrology was indeed high. It also answered a call of modernity to 
know and categorise, and in so doing control, the non-human environment. Douglas has 
linked meteorology to the project of modernity in useful terms: 'Modernity as it 
developed in western Europe gave rise to new notions of human agency. Weather, with 
its embodied consequences, undermines this autonomy, or demonstrates its fragility. 
Meteorology, whose practitioners seek to understand, codify, and manipulate weather 
and climate, is thus in contrast quintessentially modern'.66 
Russell's methods, in many ways, epitomised meteorology's position as modern. 
Appointed Government Astronomer for New South Wales on 12 July 1870, he increased 
the number of observing stations reporting to Sydney.67 In addition, he organised 210 
'unofficial' observers (for example, farmers) to report daily rainfall totals to Sydney. By 
1898 there were 1600 observers reporting results.68 To standardise results, Russell issued 
equipment to observers, mostly designed by himself.69 To further ensure comparable 
data, Russell published an instruction manual for observers, which he updated twice 
between 1870 and 1885. He also published the first newspaper weather map, which 
64 Quoted in, Kirsty Douglas, 'Under Such Sunny Skies ': Understanding Weather in Colonial Australia, 1860-
1901, Metarch Papers No. 17 (Melbourne: Bureau of Meteorology, 2007), p.4. 
65 Douglas, 'Under Such Sunny Skies', p.4. 
66 Douglas, 'Under Such Sunny Skies', p.4. 
67 Russell increased weather stations from 43 in 1870 to 50 by 1882. Gibbs, Origins of Australian Meteorology, 
p.12. 
68 G.P. Walsh, 'Russell , Henry Chamberlain (1836-1907)', ADB Online, 
http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/ biogs/ A060085b.htm?hi1ite=Russell%3BHenry, accessed 15 April 
2008. 
69 Walsh, 'Russell' , ADB Online. 
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appeared in the SMH in 1877. Through his technical developments and observation 
guidelines, Russell established standards of investigative methods that aimed at scientific 
rigour through guidelines for data collection and interpretation. Further, he developed 
theories of long-range weather forecasting and speculated on the extent of subterranean 
aquifers. In these ways he tested the potentials of his and others' meteorological 
methodologies. 
In a paper to the Royal Society of New South Wales in 1879, Russell attempted to 
explain the dynamics of floodwater in the Darling River as follows: heavy rain could fall 
in a catchment but a flood could be slight, whereas similar rainfall could occur and cause 
substantial flooding. Further, rainfall in the headwaters of the Darling watershed did not 
correlate to the amount of water that flowed past Bourke. Russell calculated that the 
percentage of rainfall that passed down the Darling was 1.5 percent as compared to the 
Murray's 25 percent, although they had similar weather conditions. He theorised that 
there were extensive artesian aquifers that received Darling river water, reducing the 
river's flow as it soaked through the ground.70 His theory was accurate, although little was 
known at the time about artesian supplies. Further, today's hydrographers calculate that 
the aquifers below the Darling watershed need to be saturated and at capacity before a 
large flood, such as the one in 1890, can occur. 
Weather cycles were Russell's passion. In 1876 he presented a paper to the Royal 
Society of New South Wales with the following opening quote from (astronomer) Sir 
Joseph Norman Lockyer's 1874 text, Contributions to Solar Physics: 'Surely in meteorology, 
as in astronomy, the thing to hunt down is a cycle ... If there be no cycle, then despair for 
a time if you will, but yet plant firmly your science on a physical basis and wait for 
results' .71 In the same book, Lockyer argued for, 'the pursuit of meteorology as a physical 
science, and not as a collection of weather statistics'.72 Cycle hunting, Lockyer suggested, 
was one way for meteorologists to definitively position themselves as scientists and 
interpret weather and river hydrology in a meaningful and useful way. 
Russell first proposed a theory of 19-year weather cycles in 1870, based on data 
collected to that time within Australia, and from around the world. It was a theory he 
70 H.C. Russell, 'The River Darling: The Water Which Should Pass Through It', Journal and Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of New South W ales, 13, 1879, pp.169-170. See also, John Merritt, That Voluminous Squatter: 
W.E. Abbott, W ingen (Bungendore, NSW: Turalla Press, 1999), pp.20-22. 
71 H. C. Russell, 'Meteorological Periodicity', I oumal and Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, 
5, 1876, pp.15 1-177, p.15 1. 
72 Joseph Norman Lockyer, Contributions to Solar Phys ics (London: Macmillan, 1874), p.432. 
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was to re-visit for the rest of his career.73 Through this work he made early connections 
between the weather in India, South America, and Australia, which would later echo in 
meteorologists' conceptions of El Nino/Southern Oscillation.74 
In 1890 suitable 'scientific data' for colonial capitals in Australia did not stem 
back even a century. In most parts of inland Australia meteorological observations had 
been collected for less than half a century. Russell established the first meteorological 
observing station on the Darling River, in western New South Wales, in 1871. While 
'scientific' records accumulated through increased observing stations the lack of data 
continued to plague meteorologists. 
In 1886 Russell had read a paper to the Royal Society of New South Wales, 
'Notes Upon the History of Floods in the River Darling'. The purpose of Russell's paper 
was twofold: to set out data in support of his 19-year weather cycle as a way of predicting 
wet and dry periods, to aid pastoralists and townspeople to prepare for droughts and 
floods; and to establish the average number of months the river was navigable each year. 
In his paper, Russell drew attention to the lack of scientific data available to formulate an 
adequate record of flooding since settlement in the area in the 1840s. He had 
experienced, ' insuperable difficulty, in getting such an account of them as to the height 
and continuance as we require ... No record of the state of the river at Bourke seems to 
have been kept prior to 1871'.75 
In the absence of meteorological observations before 1870, Russell turned to the 
observations of pastoralists and paddle steamer skippers, as well as explorers and 
surveyors - their observations and recollections became his data. These were, in a 
scientific sense, informal observations, and Russell acknowledged the problem of 
bringing this data into a scientific paper and the additional problem of some of the 
accounts being retrospective, stretching back over 20 years. However, for him they were 
the most reliable available.76 Anxious not to mislead his audience about the 
representation of unscientific data in the chart of river heights that he presented, he 
wrote: 'I must explain that prior to 1870 it does not rest upon actual measures of river 
73 Russell, 'Meteorological Periodicity', p. 158. 
74 H.C. Russell, 'Periodicity of Good and Bad Seasons', Journal and Proceedings of the Royal Society of New 
South Wales, 20, 1897, pp.70-115; and, see Neville Nicholls, 'Climatic Outlooks: From Revolutionary 
Science to Orthodoxy', in Tim Sherratt et al. (eds.), A Change in the Weather: Climate and Culture in Australia 
(Canberra: National Museum of Australia Press, 2005), pp.18-29, pp.19-20. 
75 H.C. Russell, 'Notes Upon the History of Floods in the River Darling', Journal and Proceedings of the Royal 
Society of New South Wales, 20, 1886, pp.155-210, p.155. 
76 Russell, 'Notes Upon the History of Floods in the River Darling', p. 155. 
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heights, excepting in a few places'.77 The Engineer-in-Chief for Harbours and Rivers had 
established a river gauge at Bourke in 1870 to measure the river's height and ascertain 
the number of months in a year it was navigable. Russell had established a rain gauge at 
Bourke in 1871. 
The river gauge and rainfall records at Bourke from 1870-71 onwards helped 
Russell in his quest to understand the Darling River, but his science required lengthy 
records of river heights that he did not have. Russell sought out not only the observations 
of explorers and surveyors, but also pastoralists and paddle steamer skippers, who had 
keen eyes for changing weather and associated changes in river flow. 78 
Early explorers' diaries, such as those of Charles Sturt and Thomas Mitchell, 
provided some information on river heights, noted as they passed through an area, but 
they did not provide continuous data. Russell added the river observations of pastoralists 
and skippers from about 1850. Such observations were more reliable on the intensive 
scale that was important to weather warnings. Russell did not include Aboriginal 
accounts. 
Pastoralists and skippers recorded in diaries and logbooks, and recalled directly to 
Russell in interviews and letters, the condition of the land and river and when there had 
been droughts and floods. All of the accounts by colonists were linked to experiences of 
the river, with observations such as, '[i]n 1846, again, the river got very low, and could 
easily be crossed on horseback in many places'. 79 The accounts were peppered with local 
landmarks that were used to indicate changes in river height and everyday experiences, 
such as riding horses. They were very different from the rigid calculations and data 
collections that Russell imposed across the colony on his appointment as Government 
Astronomer. 
It is common in Russell's collection of observations for colonists to refer to the 
passage of paddle steamers, or their stranding, as a sign of the Darling River's height. For 
example, one colonist observed that the, '[f]irst steamers up the Darling were the 
"Albury" and "Gemini", in January, 1859, the latter going as far as W algett'.80 These 
observations held meaning for the height of the river. Paddle steamers could not pass 
without a certain amount of water in the river. Russell could roughly calculate the height 
of the river through these observations. 
77 Russell, 'Notes Upon the History of Floods in the River Darling', p.156. 
78 Russell, 'Notes Upon the History of Floods in the River Darling', pp.189-190. 
79 Russell, 'Notes Upon the History of Floods in the River Darling', p.170. 
80 Russell, 'Notes Upon the History of Floods in the River Darling', p.173. 
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Paddle steamers were also carriers of news, including warnings of floods. 
Manoeuvring the boat themselves to catch the floodwater down the rivers, the crew 
passed on information of approaching floods, as they often just preceded it. For example, 
in the river observations made at Cultowa Station in May 1870, the note taker remarked: 
'Steamer "Jupiter," from Bourke, reports river rising fast, the town of Bourke is in danger 
of flood'. 81 Russell compiled such notes and recollections into tables and graphs, charting 
the fluctuations of the river. The value of this local knowledge to Russell is clear 
throughout his paper, indeed it forms the main body of it. 
Russell also presented a table of the months of the year showing when the river 
had been navigable between 1877 and 1886.82 Some colonists thought the work he was 
doing was important enough to volunteer information for his study. One wrote, 'As one 
of the early pioneers of the Darling, I would like to add my mite to the data you are 
accumulating, and from which I trust you may in time be able to furnish valuable hints to 
the dwellers in these dry regions' .83 
The purpose of Russell's paper was to help colonists predict floods and so avoid 
damage to property and stock losses. From his data, Russell argued that every 19 years the 
'general character of the weather returns' and 'if their [squatters' and pastoralists'] 
intelligent use of the cycle h ad been at all general... many ruinous losses would have been 
avoided' .84 His efforts to compensate for official meteorological records by using settlers' 
and explorers' observations, however, did not further the acceptability of his theory. As a 
result, four years later he could be publicly satirised as a 'soothsayer' by the Bulletin. His 
data did not meet cultural and public expectations of what constituted 'science' and his 
theory had not significantly aided settlers in preparing for, and combating, the 1890 
flood. 
Colonists also questioned Russell's knowledge of the current hydrography of the 
Darling River. Changes wrought by European settlement brought a new dimension to the 
river's natural variability. Some of settlers were aware of this. In the 'Discussion' of 
Russell's paper on flooding in the Darling River, John Frederick Mann, an explorer and 
surveyor, raised this issue: 
81 Russell, 'Notes Upon the History of Floods in the River Darling', p.177. 
82 Russell, 'Notes Upon the History of Floods in the River Darling', p.156. 
83 E. Morely in Claremont, quoted in, Russell, 'Notes Upon the History of Floods in the River Darling', 
p.171. 
84 Russell, 'Notes Upon the History of Floods in the River Darling', p.157. 
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... the theory of nineteen years, as stated by Mr. Russell, would be greatly modified by the 
number of cattle in the flood district. The beds of the rivers have been filled up and made 
sand beds by cattle tracks. Cattle on their way to water invariably make tracks; after heavy 
rains these tracks become water-courses, and eventually a gully is formed. Immense gorges 
have thus been cut, and if this is carried on to any great extent it must affect the 
fl d o 85 oo mg ... 
Russell had not accounted for human and non-human changes to the floodplains and 
rivers that could alter the course of floods. In 1890 such changes to the floodplains, such 
as the damming effect of the railway embankment, were to impact on the flood in 
Bourke. 
Russell's attempts to understand flooding in the river reveal some of the 
difficulties Australian meteorologists faced in the last two decades of the nineteenth 
century. They attempted to decipher patterns in the continent's variable weather through 
scientific methodologies. It was an essentially modern field, engaged in the scientific 
quest for knowledge of the non-human world. Yet meteorologists faced the problem of 
few lengthy data sets through which to interpret weather patterns and codify 
environmental knowledge in modern scientific terms. As meteorology's practitioners 
strove to establish their field as a scientific discipline, the recency of western scientific 
practice in Australia hindered their attempts. So too did the many variables influencing 
the course of floods. The impacts of stock and farming practices were radically altering 
the hydrology of the inland rivers. In 1890 settlers openly questioned the usefulness of 
the government science to protect them from floods. 
Environmental historian Tim Bonyhady has argued that in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century, '[m]ost settlers judged the seasons by 
economics as much as meteorology' .86 The material effects of floods and droughts were a 
way of judging their severity. In 1890 many pastoralists along the Darling and its 
tributaries suffered severe stock losses. The flood occurred when sheep numbers in 
western New South Wales had reached unprecedented heights and pastoralism was 
booming. And yet we have only sketchy reports of 'stock losses' that reveal little of the 
effect of the flood on pastoralism in the district. Bourke's economy and growth as an 
85 Russell, 'Notes Upon the History of Floods in the River Darling', p.209. 
86 Tim Bonyhady, 'The Flood in the Darling', p.283. 
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important trade centre was, however, determined by the resilience of the industry it 
serviced. 
* * * 
Yarawa Station: 'Your Sheep Are All Drowning'. 87 
There were few newspaper reports about exper iences of the flood outside the town and, 
although those that know the country can show you today the height of the flood, there 
are few surviving written records from 1890. The diary entries from a sheep station called 
Yarawa, located on the New South Wales side of the Barwon River and approximately 
300 kilometres from Bourke, are an important historical rarity, offering insight into rural 
experience and the impact of the flood on the wool industry. The Barwon flows into the 
Darling from Queensland. The river peaked o n the station on 1 April 1890, over two 
weeks earlier than the flood at Bourke. Yarawa lost a third of its 60,000 sheep in the 
flood, either by drowning directly or later suffering starvation and exposure.88 
The diary was kept by the owner of the station, Adrian Wentworth Bucknell, one 
of four sons of a grazier and a first generation Australian. Yarawa was the only station 
Bucknell owned in his lifetime. 89 Yarawa was about 70,000 acres in area, divided into 
twelve paddocks. With an estimated 60,000 sheep it was heavily stocked at a rate of one 
sheep to 1. 7 acres. Although the property had three ridges of high land (one, Gidde 
Ridge, 20 feet high), it was flooded by three main watercourses: the Barwon River, which 
adjoined the property, as well as the Boomi River and Gilgill C reek which ran through it. 
The homestead was located close to the Boomi River which rose rapidly and on 6 March 
Bucknell '[g]ave up hope of keeping water out of the house' and of finishing the dam 
87 Adrian Bucknell, diary entry, Saturday 22 March, 1890, Yarawa Station, 'Diary of Part of Year 1890', p.4. 
General File HF 25 19. In: William Wentworth Bucknell - 'Ledger No.l Phoenix Park', 1839-1858, 
ca. 1890. MLMSS 6856. Mitchell Library. State Library of New South Wales. 
88 Bucknell, diary entry, Friday 4 April, 1890, 'Diary of Part of Year 1890', p. 12. 
89 Adrian's father, William Charles Bucknell, had arrived in Australia with his wife as free settlers in 1820. 
They had brought with them a flock of sheep. However the sheep had been thrown overboard during a 
storm to lighten the ship's load. William Bucknell leased Elms Hall, a 1000-acre station on the Paterson 
River. Three of his sons went on to become pastoralists in the Barwon River area, including Adrian. One of 
his other sons, Adrian's brother Theo, features in Adrian's diary entries as they helped each other move 
stock and warned of river rises. A History of Mungindi (Mungindi: Mungindi and District Historical Society 
Book Committee, 1988), pp.39-40 and p.114; and, Bucknell, diary entry, Tuesday 18 March, 1890, 'Diary 
of Part of Year 1890', pp. l-4. 
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around it, as water reached the stairs to the front door.90 The water eventually reached 
three feet and six inches inside the house. He turned his attention to the sheep and 
horses, swimming them onto high land. A few days later he wrote this entry: 'At dark on 
Saturday night, heard a call at the Sandridge, I replied 'who's there' and the answer came 
loud and clear over the water, 'Frank Carmody with a letter, your sheep are all 
d . ,, 91 rownmg. 
Over the next 10 days, as the flood peaked, sheep were selectively saved from his 
own and a neighbour's (Carmody's) selection, with the help of station hands. Some sheep 
were 'too far gone to trouble over'. 92 They tried to save stud rams and ewes that were still 
on dry land either by swimming them to higher ground or loading them into a flat-
bottomed punt they had made. In one voyage they took 26 sheep but 'left the rest, about 
40, to drown'.93 The water rose quickly and on the day of the peak Bucknell estimated it 
rose '10 inches in less than three hours'. The land lost its familiarity as landmarks and 
vegetation went under water: 'I found it difficult to know the country, it all looked so 
different'. 94 
The need to move sheep to safety became ever more pressing. The sheep did not 
always cooperate. After receiving the news that his sheep were 'all drowning', a messenger 
brought another letter from a station hand working with a flock, saying that some sheep 
they had moved to higher land had 'left the ridge ... and they were then between a walk 
and a swim, and he could not get them back onto dry land' .95 
Leaving his own property to help his neighbour, Carmody, he describes 
ruthlessness born of the urgency of the situation. They were moving a flock of 1,900 
sheep with 14 men, and decided to swim the sheep across a body of floodwater in small 
groups. Swimming sheep in groups of 100 to 300 sheep in single file, five workers 
shepherded them across. They were, 
... constantly working from head back to tail giving each sheep a poke with a long stick as 
he went by, and any sheep that showed decidedly that it would go no further was 
ruthlessly pulled to one side to make room for those that would move ... at 10 a.m. five 
90 Bucknell, diary entry, Thursday 6 March, 1890, 'Diary of Part of Year 1890', General File: HF 2519. 
Yarawa. p.3. 
91 Bucknell, diary entry, Saturday 22 March, 1890, 'Diary of Part of Year 1890', p.4. 
92 Bucknell, diary entry, Wednesday 26 March, 1890, 'Diary of Part of Year 1890', p.6. 
93 Bucknell, diary entry, Tuesday 1 April, 1890, 'Diary of Part of Year 1890', p.9. 
94 Bucknell, diary entry, Tuesday 1 April, 1890, 'Diary of Part of Year 1890', p.7. 
95 Bucknell, diary entry, Saturday 22 March, 1890, 'Diary of Part of Year 1890', pp.4-5. 
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men would be seen about 1 Y2 miles from the dry ground with 200 sheep [sic] three hours 
later the same five hands would be seen 100 yards nearer the longed for haven with 170 
sheep, the remaining 30 showing the dismal track, some dead and dying, and so this 
hopeless task kept on ... we could see that what we were doing was profitless.96 
Whether he was writing about the death of the sheep or the economic failure of the 
station is unclear. The flood had exceeded any in their experience. Stock losses in the area 
were so great that in order to salvage some of the economic losses, settlers plucked wool 
from dead sheep, which became so common, 'men would hire themselves as professional 
' l k " 97 p uc ers . 
In his final entry in his flood diary on 4 April, Bucknell wrote that urban 
newspapers, 'did not mention the Mungindi D istrict [in which his station was located] 
where ... of my knowledge, 400,000 sheep were drowned within 100,000 miles ... Bourke 
town suffered, but the water was a month going from Goondiwindi to Bourke, and 
people had time to dam the water out of th e towns'.98 As settlers along the Darling 
tributaries experienced unprecedented flooding, and pastoralists attempted to mitigate 
the effects through moving stock, the floodwater rose around the fortified site of Bourke. 
* * * 
'The Bursting of the Embankment'99 
On 18 April the levees around Bourke gave way. The correspondent from the SMH 
described it: 
The gallant efforts made by the citizens of Bourke to keep the water out of the town have 
proved in vain ... The break which has now inundated the town took place at a quarter-
past 4 o'clock ... The break occurred quite unexpectedly. In its neighbourhood 70 men 
had been working. They had just laid down their shovels, everything appearing all right, 
and were enjoying a smoke on the bank ... Suddenly a portion of the wall gave way ... The 
men rushed to the spot, calling all available hands to it, and in five or six minutes there 
were 75 labourers there [including citizens and hired workers] ... The men made desperate 
96 Bucknell, diary entry, Sunday 23 March, 1890, 'Diary of Part of Year 1890', p.5. 
97 Bucknell, diary entry, Thursday 27 March, 1890, 'Diary of Part of Year 1890', p.6. 
98 Bucknell, diary entry, Friday 4 April, 1890, 'Diary of Part of Year 1890', p. 13. 
99 SMH, 19 April, 1890, p.9; and, ATCJ, 26 April, 1890, p.32. 
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attempts to stop the breach. They rushed into it in a body with water up to their waists, 
and even had their backs up against it to prevent it coming in. The force of the water, 
however, was too strong for them, and threatened to upset them. 100 
Tarpaulin, then sandbags, and finally steel drums packed with sand were used in turn to 
try to heal the breach while 4 foot high water that had been held up, rushed through. The 
15-yard breach could not be closed and slowly grew. Two thousand spectators gathered 
and cheered those trying to stop the water from flowing through, saying '[d]on't let it go 
without a struggle' .101 Steadily the town was flooded. As levees encircling individual 
buildings gave way, brick structures began to crumble as their mortar became saturated. 
The thousands of pounds of stores they contained were lost. 102 
Both the Australian Town and Country Journal and the SMH dramatised this 
moment as the 'Bursting of the Embankment'. 103 The Australian Town and Country Journal 
published a picture depicting the imagined scene as water rushed through the breach, 
with men, shovels in hand, running in a desperate attempt to stem the flow and redeem 
their efforts to build a strong embankment. 104 
- 9 f. 'tl\e Flooct11 i.t llour\t~-au r&llnil o r Iha f.rnbanl<mOlnl- Briwo 
,. ) UUt r1.1t11._ &:ffbrl1t t4 Btop l hr 1ncomlna Walor. 
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100 SMH, 19 April, 1890, p.9. 
101 SMH, 19 April, 1890, p.9. 
102 SMH, 19 April, 1890, p.9. 
103 SMH, 19 April, 1890, p.9; and, ATC], 26 April, 1890, p.32. 
104 ATCJ, 26 April, 1890, p.32. 
Figure 3.2 
The 'Bursting of 
the Embankment', 
1890. 
[From: Australian 
Town and Country 
Journal, 26 April, 
1890, p.32.] 
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The 'Bursting of the Embankment' was choreographed to capture the urban 
imagination. It was the flood's equivalent to 'Fighting the Fire' or the 'Breaking of the 
Drought' .105 It became a threshold moment, a turning point that changed fortunes. 
Although the flood peaked the same day the embankment gave way, the loss of the wall 
was the symbolic moment. Such moments signified rural Australian environments and 
settler relationships to them, reflecting economic change in fortunes and local experience. 
The lived experiences of Australia's fickle environments were perceived as punctuated 
with dramatic and historic moments such as the first showers that signalled the end of a 
drought, the change in wind direction that swept fire through scrub and homes, and the 
bursting of the flood embankment that inundated the town. These moments have 
become iconic of life in the inland. They govern economic windfalls and losses, and 
create waves of boom and bust. Rural experiences, in turn, became part of larger national 
iconography. 
Fighting fires, droughts breaking, and flood embankments bursting are 
experienced in many countries and cultures, but have become markers of an Australian 
experience, for both rural and urban Australians. The 'Bursting of the Embankment' 
became the ending of the story about the flood in Bourke as told by urban newspapers 
during 1890; it was a story of Australian significance with a moral for the country: 
The story of all this ... may fairly rank as unique in the history of the colony. The one 
thing that stands out clearly is the pluck and determination exhibited by the men of 
Bourke in what their junior member not unjustly has termed their darkest hour. This is a 
fitting climax to the long fight they have made against adverse odds so long. They have all 
shown real Australian grit all through this trying time, and if they have not achieved 
success, they have perhaps done better, in a certain sense by deserving it.106 
The rhetoric of stoicism was invoked, tying the m oment to the nation. 
T he town's embankment had been the frontline of the 'never-to-be-forgotten-fight' 
of 'man versus water' .107 The wall was the human-built defence of the town, a structure 
for controlling the floodwater as well as an exertion of power and coercion over the river. 
Within this language of war, the water was the victor, and the breach revealed 
105 See, Tom G riffiths, Forests of Ash: An Environmencal Hiscory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), especially p.185; and, Michael McKem an, Droughc: The Red Marauder (Crows Nest, New South 
Wales: Allen & Unwin, 2005). 
106 SMH, 19 April, 1890, p.9. 
107 Cencral Auscralian and Bourke Telegraph, 25 April, 1890, p. l. 
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vulnerability in the defences of the settlement. Settlers were determined that such 
vulnerability would be overcome, and soon looked to re-establish Bourke through the 
building of a stronger, more permanent embankment. 
On 25 April the Central Australian and Bourke Telegraph stated: 'Bourke will be a 
great inland city, the Chicago of the West, its financial position not only restored, but on 
a solid basis, a high wall forming a carriage drive round the town and ensuring the 
protection of life and property'. 108 The Legislative Assembly member for Bourke, William 
Nicholas Willis, spoke in a similar vein in a speech to residents encamped at North 
Bourke, as he and other representatives were about to depart for Sydney, and parliament: 
'When the water broke over us ... I thought Bourke was lost, but out of the ashes ... will 
rise the Chicago of the colony'. His words resonate with some of the stories of survival 
and resilience that those in the town told one another. It was their futures, as well as the 
place of the town within the economic and cultural milieu of the colony, and nation, that 
was at stake. Bourke's significance, however, would aid the townspeople's attempts to 
secure their own futures. Willis promised he would ' insist upon the Government building 
a wall around the town that would keep out the greatest flood ever known by man, either 
white or black. Their case was in good hands, as Australia would help them'. 109 
Willis' words also reveal the particular kind of security settlers sought at that time, 
namely built works and engineered structures. Meteorologists' limited data sets did not 
stretch back far enough to provide sufficiently comprehensive records of the potentials of 
the river and how to protect the town. 11° For those in the town, the bursting of the 
embankment became the reason for seeking permanent protection from floods through a 
stronger, ever-present, and ever-ready embankment as it was only through such on-the-
ground defences that Bourke could be ensured against floods and its future secured. Calls 
for a permanent embankment to be funded by the government became an undercurrent 
in media reportage during the immediate aftermath of the flood, which described the 
effects of the flood on the town. 
* * 
108 Central Australian and Bourke Telegraph, 25 Apri l, 1890, p.1. 
109 SMH, 26 April, 1890, p.12. 
110 Western Herald, 15 March, 1890, p.4. 
* 
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The Immediate Aftermath 
The flood in Bourke was reported in terms of stoicism in the face of environmental 
adversity. 'Battling the elements' became a catchcry for national identity, perhaps partly 
through this event. What is told through the articles is a story of the townspeople's fight 
against the river, which in the end was lost, but not because they failed to 'battle' the 
hostile elements. 111 In the aftermath, stories of survival were also important, as the 
community faced the challenge of rebuilding its town. 112 Other stories relate the ongoing 
struggle with the floodwater. The railway station and North Bourke were the only dry 
places in the town and reporters described both places in detail, as people and animals, 
including bullocks, horses, goats, and 'a solitary camel' crowded on the rail platform to 
live, sleep and receive rations. Food was running short and meals for the people were 
reduced to bread and meat. 113 One hundred and thirty people left Bourke after the 
embankment burst, escaping the effects of the floodwater as private levees continued to 
give way and buildings periodically collapsed. 114 In the days following the flooding of the 
town, the question became '[w]hose building will go next?' .115 
North Bourke, or 'Canvas Town' as it was dubbed, housed a large group, 
comprised of 600 children, 200 women and 150 men. Alcohol was flowing and the 
Mayor's visit to boost morale was met with loud cheers. 116 The water presented an 
obstacle to the reporters too, one writing the day after the embankment broke, '[t]he 
pursuit of art had to be made under difficulties, and I admire the perseverance of several 
photographic artists who with their apparatus were 4ft. deep in water' . 11 7 Journalists 
travelled by train with evacuees, and one travelled part of the way by boat with a 
Legislative Assembly member, who was on his way to Sydney to request aid at the sitting 
of parliament. 
No longer needed, the embankment workers from Sydney and elsewhere were 
urged to leave. With 'fully 400 strange men in the town' because of the embankment 
111 SMH, 19 April, 1890, p.10. 
11 2 SMH, 19 April, 1890, p.10. 
113 SMH, 24 April, 1890, p.8. 
114 SMH, 26 April, 1890, p.12. 
115 SMH, 26 April, 1890, p.12. 
116 Fosbery, et al., 'Floods in the Town and District of Bourke', p.3; SMH, 23 April, 1890, p.8; and, SMH, 
26 April, 1890, p.12. 
11 7 SMH, 21 April, 1890, p.8. 
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work, '[a]n effort is being made to get rid of the nawies' . 118 They were paid and driven out 
of the town, 'but they take it good humouredly', although forced to walk along the rail 
lines to leave. 119 
Boats, sent by the government, did rounds through the town. The boats were an 
important means of connecting people in the flooded town, being described as 'like 
angels', visiting 'the few and far between'. 120 Privately owned boats were rented for as 
much as £3 a day. The government boats were used to take the doctor, who was 'giving 
his professional services for free', from house to house and were also used to rescue those 
stranded in flooded dwellings. 121 One report detailed the personal dramas of rescues: 'In 
one case the inhabitants of a cottage had taken to the roof, in another an old couple were 
found in a wooden house the floor of which had 3 ft. of water upon it. They were 
clinging together in the dark'. 122 
J 
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Illustrations from the lllustrated Australian News, 1890, shortly after the flood embankment burst 
and Bourke was inundated. 
Figure 3.3 (left):'The Inundation at Bourke. (From photographs specially taken for the 
"Illustrated Australian News.")' picture. l May, 1890. Accession Number: IANOl/05/ 90/ 1. 
Image Number: mp006012. State Library of Victoria. 
Figure 3.4 (right):'Sketches at Bourke During the Inundation. From photographs specially taken 
for the "Illustrated Australian News'" picture. 1 May , 1890. Accession Number: 
IANOl/05/90/4. Image Number: mp006013. State Library of Victoria. 
118 SMH, 19 April, 1890, p.8; and, SMH, 21 April, 1890, p.8. 
11 9 SMH, 21 April, 1890, p.8. 
12° Central Australian and Bourke Telegraph, 25 April, 1890, p. l. 
121 Central Australian and Bourke Telegraph, 25 April, 1890, p. l. 
122 SMH, 21 April, 1890, p.8. 
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This was reportage for an urban audience which gave stories and detail, plotting 
ind ividual events within the larger story of the flood. The detail of the descriptions, along 
with illustrations, created scenes for readers far away, who had perhaps never been to 
Bourke. Although the articles were event-oriented in their purpose of reporting the 
floods, they are also in many ways part of a longer tradition of reporters from urban-based 
newspapers recreating life in the inland for their readers. 
Henry Lawson, himself part of this tradition, wrote a short monograph, 'The 
Great Flood of '90', when he was in Bourke in 1893. In this work he drew attention to 
the extensive press coverage of the flood in Bourke, and the journalists' dramatisation of 
the town's crisis: 
The press reporter has caused numbers of his unfortunate fellow men to be gaoled, 
flogged, and hanged in Australia and yet he isn't satisfied. He wants to drown the entire 
country. He wants to wash Australians off the face of the earth. As a boomer of murders, 
rapes, and fires he rises supreme; but when he is turned loose on a flood, he beats the 
United States of America ... Bourke had a flood in 1890, and the newspaper reports were 
enough to frighten Noah's ghost. 123 
For Lawson the press reports of the flood were extensive enough to warrant comment. 
The influence on the newspapers' urban readership, he wrote, was that 'we were 
reasonably impressed' by the experiences and hardships of Bourke's townspeople. 124 
According to Lawson , however, those in the city had been duped. Having seen remains of 
the embankment and spoken to locals, he felt that the reports had exaggerated the impact 
of the flood. Rather than being drowned by water, Bourke's major threat was a drought of 
alcohol: 'the chief danger', he wrote, 'was the liquor would give out - the water having 
gotten into some of the pub cellars ' . 125 His cynicism is in keeping with his well-known 
position of depicting a harsh, brutal rural Australia that created rough and roguish men 
(as opposed to 'Banjo' Paterson's romantic portrayals). 
Journalists, Lawson argued, had exaggerated the flood's height and impact to 
incite the empathy of unwary city folk. He claimed that the town had barely been flooded 
at all and '[o]nly one small brick house collapsed': 
123 Henry Lawson, 'The Great Flood of '90', quoted in, Robyn Burrows and Alan Barton, Henry Lawson: A 
Stranger on the Darling (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1996), pp.40-41. 
124 Lawson, 'The Great Flood of '90', quoted in, Burrows and Barton, Henry Lawson, p.41. 
125 Lawson, 'The Great Flood of '90', quoted in, Burrows and Barton, Henry Lawson, p.41. 
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We believed that some chaps did start to drag a boat through Mitchell Street, in order 
that they might say they had rowed though the principal street of the town during the 
flood - which they say, and which they still tell jackeroos. But the boat bogged all the 
way; so they gave the job best and sent the craft back on cart. 126 
Photographs of the flood tell a different story, but Lawson's point, that newspapers geared 
their reports to an urban audience, is 
noteworthy. It was the drama and 
symbolism of the town, not the detail .... 
of the story, that sold newspapers. 
The descriptions in the press 
were mainly of flooded rural scenery, 
written by people unfamiliar with the 
town, for people who had never been 
there. Reportage of the 11 who died 
at Bourke and were buried in a plot 
of crown land because the cemetery 
was flooded, was brief. However, the 
emotional pull of the 'struggle of 
Figure 3.5 
Photograph of Bourke during the 1890 flood. 
[Arthur Laycock, 1881-1960. 'Looking down 
Richmond Street, Bourke, during 1890 flood' 
[picture]. 1890. nla.pic-an24668307. National 
Library of Australia.] 
Bourke' is revealed by the fact that so much money was raised through donations from 
across the eastern states that government relief was not needed for the townspeople. 127 
This is despite the fact that an inquiry into the flood, conducted while the town was still 
flooded, confirmed citizens' claims that the government-built railway embankment had 
aggravated the flood. The ground swell of national feeling that the flood in Bourke 
produced became starkly apparent in the attention it received from around Australia and 
the amount of aid the town received in the form of donations, perhaps in no small part 
due to the reportage of the aftermath . 
* * * 
126 Lawson, 'The Great Flood of '90', quoted in, Burrows and Barton, Henry Lawson, p.41. 
127 Fosbery, et al., 'Floods in the Town of and District of Bourke', p.3. 
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Relief Funds and Government Grants 
In this era before private flood insurance, colonists relied on charitable donations to 
recuperate from individual losses or else they repaired damage at their own expense. 
Although district councils sometimes sought financial assistance from the colonial 
government to aid individuals, councils more often looked to the colonial government for 
grants towards repairing infrastructure such as roads and railways. Charitable donations 
to aid those who experienced property losses and damage in 1890 were coordinated by 
relief funds, often organised by town mayors. 128 Regions and towns across the colony had 
experienced floods in the first months of 1890. The way that relief and aid was organised 
and distributed is important, as it reveals the degree to which Bourke's crisis was elevated 
above the needs of other districts. Bourke not only received more aid from the 
government than other areas, but charitable organisations were clearly biased towards the 
town, perhaps due to the extensive media coverage of the flood in Bourke and the town's 
cultural status throughout the colony and the nation. 
Journalists estimated the damage in the town, immediately following its 
inundation, to be £40,000. 129 The government estimated the damage to real property in 
the town at £300,000, exclusive of damage to government buildings (which they valued at 
£48,000) and merchandise and other goods. 130 The government report was not made 
public until May 1890; h owever, journalists' more conservative estimates of the damage in 
Bourke were sufficient to attract widespread support. 13 1 But the unpublicised plight was 
similar in other districts. 
In New South Wales, in 1890, charitable relief funds were secular, non-
denominational organisations which collected subscriptions from those in the shire 
(rather than parish). They donated money to nominated flood-affected areas, often 
through organisations that were formed in a council meeting precisely for the purpose of 
relieving financial stress in a particular town or region. 
In 1890 locally formed relief funds were given the option to be further 
coordinated by a central relief fund based in Sydney, chaired by the Sydney Lord Mayor. 
If shires wished, rather than selecting an area to donate to, they could donate to the 
128 SMH, 14 March 1890, p.6. 
129 SMH, 30 April, 1890, p.5. 
13° Fosbery, et al., 'Floods in the Town and District of Bourke', pp.2-3. 
131 
'Papers', Parliamentary Debates. Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly. Session 1890. l May, 
1891, p.387. 
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general relief fund in Sydney (called the 'central relief fund'), which would distribute 
money to a variety of flooded areas. 132 However, most local relief funds chose to operate 
independently. Flooded areas also established relief funds, chaired by their mayors, to 
distribute donations that the town and surrounding area received from individuals and 
charitable funds. 133 
In 1890 shires overwhelmingly elected to donate to Bourke rather than to other 
flooded areas such as the Hawkesbury River district or towns like Walgett, Brewarrina, 
Mungindi, and Yetman. The town of Bourke received donations from Orange and 
Bathurst, and from Adelaide and Melbourne with amounts ranging from £70 to 
Melbourne's £1,135 17 shillings 6 pence. The Argus established its own relief fund for 
Bourke, raising £2,814 for the town and £77 for the Darling River generally. 134 In a letter 
to the SMH it was suggested that unused money raised for relief during a past flood in the 
Hawkesbury River area be donated to Bourke.135 The Hawkesbury fund was re-mobilised 
but the new secretary argued that the money was needed for ' the Hawkesbury and other 
districts' .136 Sydney's general relief fund was more even-handed, distributing the total 
raised, £2,000, equally between the Hawkesbury and Darling River flood areas. 137 
There was obvious public bias towards Bourke's predicament. The publicity 
Bourke received had the effect of reducing donations to relieve pastoralists. The lack of 
coverage of pastoral losses, because they were isolated by water, perhaps contributed to 
inaccurate measures of losses, and meant they were not high profile cases. Perhaps 
pastoralists were even further removed from public attention than other townships, as 
many stations remained isolated for months after the flood, and their losses were still not 
fully known at the time relief funds were donating the money they had raised. 
Government commissioners, appointed to inquire into the flood in the Bourke 
municipality, although unsure of the amount of damage to pastoralists (not having visited 
them), thought they, 'would appear to be inconsiderable, as ample time was afforded for 
removal [of stock!'. 138 
132 SMH, 10 April, 1890, p.8. 
133 SMH, 25 April, 1890, p.6. 
134 SMH, 21April,1890, p.8; SMH, 23 April, 1890, p.8; SMH, 24 April, 1890, p.8; SMH, 25 April, 1890, 
p.6; and, SMH, 29 April, 1890, p. 7 
135 SMH, 19 April, 1890, p. 10. 
136 SMH, 21 April, 1890, p.8. 
137 SMH, 25 April, 1890, p.5. 
IJS Fosbery, et al., 'Floods in the Town and District of Bourke', pp.2-3. 
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The minutes of council meetings of shire relief funds were published in 
newspapers, detailing the balance of the funds and the sentiments behind them. There 
was a swell of national feeling for the rural New South Wales town. At a meeting of the 
Sydney fund, the Mayor's speech was reported, which further intensified national 
sentiment for Bourke: 
... the telegrams he [the Mayor] had received from all parts of Australia, alike 
demonstrated the fact that the citizens desired an opportunity of testifying their sympathy 
with the sufferers of the late disastrous floods. (Cheers.) All of them had watched the 
noble conduct shown by the men of Bourke, who had done all that men could do to save 
their town ... the people of Sydney now, as in times past, were ready to nobly do their 
duty, and show practical appreciation for the heroic conduct of the men of Bourke. The 
conduct of these men argued well for the future of Australia, proving that Australians 
were not unworthy descendants of the grand old stock from which they had sprung. 139 
The national imagery the Mayor conjured made Bourke 'men' the connotative and ideal 
Australians, and Bourke a symbol of the nation. An anonymous Queensland donor sent 
£50 to Bourke, wishing only 'to be known as "An Australian"'. 140 The stories and 
discussions that revolved around the 1890 flood were infused with conceptions of nation, 
foreshadowing and shaping the formal declaration of Australian nationhood in 1901. 
Aspects of the flood, such as the attention Bourke received as a township that 
characterised qualities of all Australians and the flood's spotlighted position in water 
conservation debates, were part of a larger political, social, and economic context: that of 
national consolidation as the momentum for federation grew. The inland became a focus 
for national consolidation and the 1890 flood interwove with this context. 
There was some criticism of the attention and aid that Bourke received. A letter to 
the editor in the SMH urged that although the flood in Bourke was a 'national calamity', 
'it will not be out of place to call public attention to the fact that there are many persons 
who have suffered floods in other districts of the colony besides this one on the Darling ... 
they have equal claim on our sympathy and practical aid' .141 The writer listed the regions 
of Maitland, Narrabri, Walgett, and the Clarence River, but many others could be added 
to this list. 
139 SMH, 25 April, 1890, p.5 
140 SMH, 16 April, 1890, p.7 . 
141 SMH, 24 April, 1890, p.8. 
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Shire councils sought government grants for repairs to road and bridge 
infrastructure and, to a lesser extent, to compensate individuals. 142 Repair work, such as 
road mending, could provide work for farmers and labourers who would be unemployed 
for some months while their fields were flooded. For example, Coraki on the Richmond 
River applied for £1,000 with such a plan: To support farmers with damaged maize crops 
and stock losses by providing an alternative source of income, in the form of flood 
reparation work for the shire. 143 Bourke received a comparatively large amount of aid, 
with government grants associated with the flood totalling £7 ,080; £3,550 for the 
embankment work, and the remainder for rail passes, government boats and food 
rations. 144 
* * * 
The Government and 'Emergencies': Possibilities for Centralised Control 
The financial involvement of the colonial government in the 1890 flood in Bourke in 
part led to a government inquiry into the effect of the flood on the town. Three high-level 
government officials travelled to the town soon after the flood peak to investigate how 
government funds had been spent, as well as to assess damage to government buildings, 
the prospect of future floods, and the situation of the townspeople. Edmund Fosbery 
(Inspector-General of Police), Whittingdale Johnston (former Commissioner in Charge of 
the Western Gold District), and Stephen Perdriau (surveyor) arrived on 22 April - after 
the embankment had been breached and water still pervaded many streets and 
buildings. 145 They met with the Mayor, 'and other prominent citizens', on their first day 
142 Individuals, for example, at Kempsey: see, SMH, 2 April, 1890, p.8. 
143 SMH, 18 March, 1890, p.8. 
144 SMH, 24 April, 1890, p.8; and, Fosbery, et al., 'Floods in the Town and District of Bourke', p.3. The 
Western Herald indicated total government grants toward the construction of the embankment may have 
reached £5,500 pounds. Western Herald, 2 July, 1890, p.2. 
14; Brian Dickey and Martha Rutledge, 'Fosbery, Edmund Walcott (1834-1919)', ADB Online, 
http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A040224b.htm?hilite=Fosbery. accessed 21 April 2009; G.P. 
Walsh, 'Perdriau, Stephen Edward (1858-1931)', ADB Online, 
http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A 110700b.htm?hilite=Stephen%3BPerdriau, , accessed 21 April 
2009; and, 'Agency Detail - 5123 - Commissioner in Charge of Crown Lands for the Western Gold 
District', State Records Authority of New South Wales, 
htt;p://investigator. records.nsw.gov.au/Entity.aspx?Path= \Agency\5123, accessed 21 April 2009. 
Whittingdale Johnston was Commissioner in Charge of the Western Golf Fields from 1866 until the 
position was abolished in 1874. His position/employment at the time that he was inquiring into the 1890 
flood in Bourke is unclear. 
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in order to gain insight into the local uses of government funds and facilities, including 
the railway and three government boats that had been sent from Sydney. 146 
The local figureheads approached the meeting as a means to directly 
communicate with the government. They requested more boats be sent from Sydney to 
ferry citizens to their homes and businesses (to watch for looting) and to establish police 
patrols of the streets. Fosbery (who chaired the inquiry) told the meeting that no more 
government boats were available and that it seemed to him that government boats 
currently in the town were sufficient - they were just not being used effectively. He 
argued that to maximise the use of boats by the townspeople, the boats should be placed 
under police supervision, with one policeman in charge of each boat. The lack of 
coordination of government facilities by town leaders was a sign of their greater 
disorganisation managing the effects of the flood. He declared that, '[a]t present 
everything appeared in the utmost confusion' .147 
In their final report, the officials suggested that the colonial government could 
learn from the way that flood support had been managed in Bourke. They suggested that 
in future 'emergencies', government involvement should be extended to placing explicit 
conditions on how utilities and funds were managed in the local community. Further, the 
officials recommended that the government appoint individuals to assume responsibility 
for the local response. They wrote: 
The direction of affairs and the control of special expenditure, should be at the outset 
entrusted by the Government to thoroughly qualified persons, who should be in sole and 
supreme control, and thus unnecessary expenditure, imperfect arrangements, and 
personal disagreements, all of which have been experienced at Bourke to the disadvantage 
of the service, would be avoided in the future. 148 
In essence their recommendations argued for direct government involvement in the 
internal workings of communities faced with 'emergencies'. Government direction, they 
suggested, could overcome local politics. Further, a single authority figure could control 
resources and people in a more efficient manner than a variety of local leaders. To 
illustrate their point, the officials noted that funds had been applied for, and spent, by a 
number of different individuals with, they implied, little coordination. The officials 
146 SMH, 24 April, 1890, p.8. 
147 SMH, 24 April, 1890, p.8. 
148 Fosbery, et al., 'Floods in the Town and District of Bourke', p.3. 
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identified the Mayor, the Police Magistrate, the Commissioners for Railways, and the 
local members of parliament as each having independently claimed funds. 'Even the boats 
provided by the Government', they wrote, 'were placed under such divided and indefinite 
authority that many of them were diverted by irresponsible persons from the service of 
the public, and the sufferers for whom they were intended'. 149 
The report suggested that government ties to community 'emergencies' through 
financial grants and physical aid not only made local authorities accountable for the 
spending and use of those resources, but that those connections and dependencies in 
effect transferred power from the townspeople and local officials to the government to 
direct how situations were approached. The government's distance from local upheavals, 
they argued, made government agents less self-interested decision-makers in community 
' . ' emergencies . 
In the aftermath of the flood, however, decisions made by some colonial 
government agents caused tension with local authorities . Willis (later a Commissioner in 
the 1900- 1901 Royal Com mission into Crown Tenants in the Western Division) 
criticised the actions and decisions of the Chief Commissioner of Railways to the 
Legislative Assembly in May 1890.150 The Chief Commissioner had visited Bourke to 
make arrangements to employ local workers, and left a number of officials to direct the 
workers and supply them with food rations. According to Willis, the Chief Commissioner 
had stayed only 'ten minutes or a quarter of an hour, surrounded by a lot of officials' 
giving 'directions left and right' like 'the Czar of Russia'. Willis argued that in the short 
time the C hief Commissioner was in Bourke '[h]e had not time to review the situation' 
and so had not given adequate instructions to those left to organise the workers and 
distribute food. The Chief Commissioner, Willis continued, also chose officials who were 
incapable and whose actions amounted to 'imbecility'. The officials had withheld food 
rations from the workers; in fact, the workers had been left 'starving'. The workers 
received no breakfast, although there were 'thousands of loaves of bread, carcasses of 
meat, and tinned fish sent there by the Government and other people'. 
Willis' account is full of frustration about the unquestioning obedience of 
colonial government officials to a (then) distant master who did not know the extent of 
the local situation; and depicts the C hief Commissioner as an insensitive official visiting 
149 Fosbery, et al., 'Floods in the Town and District of Bourke', p.3. 
150 Martha Rutledge, 'William Nicholas Willis (1858-1922)', ADB Online, 
http:U www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/ bioe"s/Al 20575b.htm?hilite=Willis, accessed 18 August 2008. 
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Bourke at a time of local upheaval. This was not the only criticism Willis and other 
Bourke parliamentary representatives made against the Chief Commissioner of Railways. 
* * * 
Responsibility and Blame: The Railway Embankment 
Another key matter raised by representatives of Bourke in the Legislative Assembly was 
the damming effect of the railway embankment on the floodwater. Bourke was the 
terminus (or railhead) of the Great Western Railway, completed in 1885. The new rail 
line created a highly anticipated overland transport link between major sheep farming 
regions in New South Wales and Sydney. It added to Bourke's importance as a trade 
centre, but in 1890 it had become a liability. The railway terminus skirted the eastern and 
southern edges of Bourke. Raised on an embankment to limit the effects of erosion and 
other forms of damage and weathering, the railway line became a dam wall in parts of the 
town during the 1890 flood. 
Willis claimed he had warned the Railway Commissioner '[l]ong before the 
floodwaters were approaching Bourke', that the railway may increase the flood in the 
town. Having consulted 'some of the principal residents of Bourke', Willis telegraphed 
the Railway Commissioner, pointing out that the culverts through the embankment were 
too narrow to let floodwater flow out of the town. Willis told the Legislative Assembly 
that the Railway Commissioner had ignored these early concerns: 'I received the usual 
stereotyped answer to my telegram, to the effect that the matter was receiving attention ... 
The embankment was allowed to remain as it was, to block the water, and submerge and 
destroy one of the most beautiful towns in the colony'. Willis argued that the 
Commissioner and his colleagues were not fit to govern the railways and they 'should be 
put on trial for a criminal proceeding'. 
The potential effect of the railway embankment was discussed in newspapers a 
number of weeks before the flood peaked in Bourke and continued to be a topic of 
discussion after the levee was breached. 15 1 There was little doubt that the embankment 
had caused the town to be more severely flooded than if it had not been there or its 
culverts had been larger. The government officials, who conducted the inquiry into the 
151 SMH, 30 April, 1890, p.5. 
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flood in Bourke, agreed that the embankment had raised the height of the water: 'there 
was an additional 9 inches of water in the town owing to this cause'. 152 Others 
maintained that the embankment had raised the water 12 inches or more. 153 The most 
densely built parts of the town were trapped between the flooded river to the north and 
the embankment to the south. When the levee was breached the floodwater was confined 
in the town by the railway embankment. 
Some argued that as the building of the railway embankment was a colonial 
government initiative and design, the government was partially responsible for damage to 
property in Bourke and should now ensure the railway embankment would not dam 
floodwater in the future. Willis claimed that even as the embankment was being built, 'it 
was constructed despite the entreaties of the people of the district, that the line should be 
made on piles'. 154 It was argued that because of the effects of the embankment, Bourke 
now had a 'special claim' on government funds. The government incurred further 
responsibility in the view of one member, as the 'township also was a Government one, 
and the land sold as dry land, not as the bed of an inland sea'. 155 
Those in Bourke, and those who represented the town in parliament, looked to 
the government to provide money to secure the town against future floods. Legislative 
Assembly representatives argued that the railway embankment, which itself required 
repairs, should be rebuilt on pylons, or with widened culverts, or as a loop line to form a 
flood barricade around the town. 156 Further, Thomas Waddell, also a representative of 
Bourke, put forward a motion in the Legislative Assembly to request government funds of 
up to £20,000 (in addition to the £7 ,080 already granted for flood relief), to be used to 
build a permanent flood embankment around the town. 157 
* * * 
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Engineering Solutions: Permanent Levee 
Waddell argued that a government grant for the building of a permanent, more solid, 
embankment was necessary for the town's protection and economic future. He argued 
that without protection against floods investors would not buy there and property prices 
would plummet. Bourke's current status, and future, as 'one of the most important 
inland towns in New South Wales', demanded it. 158 Willis reiterated this point, arguing 
that, '[i]f some action is not taken to protect the town against future floods, what man will 
speculate there?' .159 
There was already some evidence that property prices in Bourke were falling. Soon 
after the levee burst, a SMH journalist, travelling with a friend by boat in the town, came 
upon a sign that read 'This Land for Sale'; 'my friend assured me', he wrote, 'that the 
price would now be considerably reduced'. The journalist speculated that most properties, 
especially town allotments, would be reduced by as much as one-half, for which 'up to 
now very fancy prices have been asked' .160 The 1890 flood revealed that the town could 
periodically severely flood. Past floods, such as the 1864 flood, had been seen as 
exceptional, while others, such as in 1870, had not entered the town. The 1890 flood 
shook establ ished environmental knowledge by demonstrating that large floods could 
happen intermittently and at any time. Further, the fact that Bourke was located on 
floodplains had now been 'well advertised' by newspapers. 161 Besides these arguments, 
there was also the question of current residents' future safety from floods. Those in the 
town considered a permanent levee necessary to protect them from future floods: 'the 
citizens have set their hearts upon one thing and that is that the Government must build 
them a dam'. 162 
Waddell and Willis argued that the government had a responsibility to flood-
proof Bourke, as it was the government built railway embankment, 'which has done all 
the damage'. 163 Willis suggested that the government construct a railway loop-line around 
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the town, which would double as a levee. It would further fulfil the government's 
responsibility to mend the damming effect of the current rail line. 164 
Waddell argued that flood-proofing the town was in the government's direct 
interest. There were government buildings in Bourke and it was likely more would be 
built. Bourke 'is situated at the extreme end of the Great Western Railway, and is likely to 
be the terminus of that railway for many years ... a great deal of money will be spent there 
by the Government in erecting buildings, in addition to the large number of buildings 
that have been, and will be, erected there by private individuals' .165 Before the flood the 
town had been an important site of investment as well as trade: government investment, 
in terms of infrastructure, services, and administrative branches followed the town's 
expansion and added to its potential for growth. The flood had compromised the 
interests of all who had a stake in Bourke's future. A permanent embankment, Waddell 
argued, would secure the future of the town as well as government interests there, 
including buildings and revenue earnings (from custom duties, land sales, industry 
development, and so on). 
Despite these arguments to support Bourke's 'special claim' to government aid, 
there were those who opposed Waddell's request. Some members of the Legislative 
Assembly, representing other regions, disputed Bourke's claims on the grounds that 
'towns should protect themselves [from floods], and the Government should not always 
be appealed to'.166 Willis argued that Bourke's appeal to the government was not in 
substitute of self-reliance, but of necessity; and the funding of an embankment would 
represent a partnership between the town and the government. He stated that: 
... the Bourke people have shown an example in the past of trying to protect themselves. 
Now, when they come here, through their representatives, and ask the Government to 
protect their own property, as well as the property of the citizens, they should receive 
something more than sympathy ... This is a Government town. The Government have 
acres and acres of unsold land there, which must be protected. The Government land, 
which is now of no value at all, must be made of commercial value, and whilst they are 
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doing that in the interests of the country, I think the least they can do is to raise this wall 
around Bourke, and protect the property of the people as well. 167 
While Willis argued that the government should build an embankment around the town, 
representatives of other regions argued that Bourke was attracting favour because of its 
place in 'the public mind' and that other areas and towns in New South Wales were 
equally, if not more, damaged and deserved at least comparable treatment. 168 Legislative 
Assembly members were not free from bias toward the cultural significance of, and 
reports of distress in, Bourke. One member cautioned that 'the question now before the 
House seems to me to be one which necessitates the disconnection of the head and the 
heart'. 169 If the government bound itself to funding the embankment, the parliamentarian 
continued, it would create a precedent for many towns and regions to apply for similar 
funds for embankments. 
James Gormly, who had been rescued during the 1852 flood in Gundagai and 
who in 1890 represented Wagga, argued that the government should deal holistically with 
flood protection, and address towns' and stations' safety across the colony. He thought, 
however, that damages in Bourke were 'greatly exaggerated'. 170 Others asserted that 'no 
great loss comes from these floods'; rather, there were significant advantages as the flood 
would ' irrigate the land, and next year the people will recoup themselves tenfold for losses 
now sustained' .171 Many who spoke (including Gormly) said that they would not support 
Waddell's motion, and he eventually withdrew it. 172 He received a number of assurances, 
however, that some government money would reach the town for embankment works 
through 'municipal bodies' .173 
Indeed, shortly after these parliamentary debates, town representatives and the 
government began negotiating for the building of a permanent embankment. By July 
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1890 the government had submitted two plans for an embankment for consideration by 
the Bourke Council. One plan (echoing Willis' suggestion) was to create a partial railway 
loop-line around the town, with earthworks completing the loop; the other plan was to 
build earthworks to encircle the town, joining with the current railway, which would form 
one edge of the embankment. The government agreed to pay half the construction costs 
of the plan that the Council selected. The government also agreed to loan the Bourke 
Council the money for their share of the embankment work, but only if such a loan was 
deemed legal by government lawyers. At a meeting of the Council and rate payers to 
consider the building of an embankment, the costs involved, and the two schemes, Willis 
argued in favour of the earth embankment, which was the cheaper option. While the 
town would have to pay half, the government had agreed to lend the town this amount. 
According to the Western Herald's report of the minutes of the meeting, Willis insinuated 
that it was not necessary to honour such a government loan. The newspaper reported 
Willis' argument with the following, subtle phrasing: 'The people would have to pay their 
share ([£)3000), but the Government would lend the money and (ironically) 'they would 
pay it back.' (Laughter.)'. 174 The Council, along with ratepayers, agreed to proceed with 
the second option, of an earth embankment. This plan was estimated to cost a total of 
£6,000, less than half that of the £14,000 estimated for the alternative plan of extensive 
railway works. 175 This, however, seems to be as far as the embankment came to being 
built. 
It appears to have come down to finances. The government withdrew the offer of 
a loan a few days after the plans were submitted to Bourke's Council. 176 Perhaps the 
government's lawyers had found such a loan illegal. Bourke's existing Council loans, 
totalling £7 ,500, had reached the legal limit before the flood. This maximum amount of 
deficit was determined by the total value of five years' worth of rates. 177 Perhaps, also, 
those in government were aware of Willis' comments insinuating that the money might 
not be repaid. 
Following the withdrawal of the loan offer, the Council and ratepayers met to 
consider the government's decision. The aldermen's motions to seek alternative loan 
arrangements were defeated by unenthusiastic ratepayers (whose taxes would repay the 
174 Western Herald, 2 July, 1890, p.2. 
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loan). One person at the meeting suggested that 'it would be better for the ratepayers to 
remain as they were than being burdened with a heavy rate'. Another said that those in 
the meeting had 'better let the matter slide', and wait 'until another flood actually 
threatened to inundate the town'. The meeting carried only one motion: for the 
government to finance the entire embankment. The motion was put in the following 
terms: 'That considering the present state of the town, and the indebtedness of the 
Council, the ratepayers were not in a position to bear any more rates, and that the 
Government should bear the whole of the expense of the earthworks to protect the 
town'. 178 The Mayor thought the motion 'a splendid one, if the Government would only 
lend the money... But the Government had refused, no doubt because it would be 
forming a precedent'. One individual argued, 'lb Jut ... [other towns] are not half so 
important as Bourke'. 179 The government, it seems, did not agree with the Council's 
resolution and did not alter its earlier decision. In August the Council formed a sub-
committee to investigate the exact costs of building a permanent earth embankment, but, 
the W estern Herald noted, the lack of enthusiasm shown by the ratepayers was likely to 
quash plans for its construction. 180 The matter did indeed slide, and the permanent 
embankment did not materialise. 181 
The tension between the local representatives of Bourke and the government over 
the funding and building of a permanent embankment to protect the town was, in 
essence, a contention over who was responsible for protecting (and paying for the 
protection of) towns and regions from floods. There was general agreement in the 
Legislative Assembly that the government was partially responsible for the flood in 
Bourke. Did this make the government responsible for the town's protection from future 
floods? On this point the Legislative Assembly was divided. Some argued that towns 
should be self-reliant and erect (and finance) their own protective works. Others argued 
that the government should, at least, partially fund the building of a permanent 
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embankment. However, if the Legislative Assembly had voted for the government to fund 
embankment works in Bourke (or, as was alleged later, if the government funded the 
scheme through municipal channels), a precedent would have been created, allowing 
other regions and towns subject to floods to apply for similar grants (or council funds). 
Many towns that were built on floodplains were government surveyed, and it could be 
argued that these also had a claim to government finances. This would place 
responsibility for individual townships' flood protection largely with the colonial 
government. 
The initial agreement between the government and Bo.urke's Council, of each 
funding half the cost of a permanent embankment, was a financial compromise. It also 
seemed to divide responsibility between the town and government for protecting the 
town; however, even this moderate responsibility created an increased role for the 
government in mitigating against floods in Bourke. 
Besides these issues of responsibility there was the issue of dependency. Bourke's 
Council, already in significant debt before the flood, was financially dependent on the 
colonial government to at least partially fund the cost of a permanent embankment (but, 
as Willis and others argued, hopefully all of it). Further, the Council was dependent on 
colonial government aid during the flood event, for facilities (such as boats), as well as for 
finances (to build a temporary embankment). The Council's need for government 
support ind icates that it had not budgeted for such an extensive, unforeseen expenditure. 
The town's financial and material dependence on the government and requests 
for government aid had created a particular kind of relationship between the town and 
government during, and in the aftermath of, the flood. Financial requests by the town 
also created an avenue for direct government involvement in local affairs during 
'emergencies'. This potential was reflected in the recommendations of the government 
officials who conducted the inquiry into the flood. As unexpected and unbudgeted 
environmental events, floods created circumstances in which centralised governments 
could potentially assume direct control over dependent local authorities. For example, it 
was colonial government departments which designed the permanent embankment in 
Bourke. 182 In the aftermath of the flood, representatives of Bourke negotiated a new 
relationship between the town and government, where the government was directly 
182 There were three colonial government departments involved in the two alternate designs for a 
permanent embankment. These were: The departments of Works, Roads, and Railways. Western Herald, 2 
July, 1890, p.2. 
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involved in mitigating floods through engineering works. However, the government was 
not willing to take total responsibility and the Council's failure, or inability, to raise its 
share of the costs for the permanent embankment in some ways released the government 
from even partial responsibility and financial support for mitigation. 
The calls by the Bourke Council, Legislative Assembly representatives, and the 
townspeople for a permanent embankment joined the growing chorus of calls, from other 
regions that experienced flood and drought, for a permanent solution to the erratic flows 
of the rivers. These calls for expensive engineering infrastructure were directed at the 
colonial government, since they required more resources and financial capital than local 
authorities could raise. Engineering solutions to combat fluctuating river flows in 1890 
were configured amid a backdrop of debates over, and government investigations into, 
water conservation in the 1880s. The 1890 flood re-ignited the debates over water 
conservation, and/or damming the rivers to drought-proof the inland, mitigate floods , 
and improve the navigability of the rivers. 
* * * 
Engineering and the Government 
Henry Chamberlain Russell's argument for a 'complete system of irrigation' as set out in 
his letter to the SMH in 1890, probably referred to medium sized storages recommended 
in the reports of the 1885-87 Royal Commission on Water Conservation (or Lyne Royal 
Commission), to be built along the Darling and Barwon rivers. Russell had presented his 
paper on floods in the Darling River at the same time that the Commission was 
investigating possibilities for conserving water on the inland rivers of New South Wales. 
The dams recommended by the Royal Commission, headed by (Sir) William Lyne, were 
for irrigated agriculture on the inland rivers, diverting and conserving the water at the 
expense of navigation. Russell was no doubt aware of the Commission's activities, and of 
their report, and had perhaps also been influenced by their recommendations for water 
conservation and closer settlement schemes. 183 
The Royal Commission had been initiated by the arguments of Lyne, in the 
Legislative Assembly in 1884, for government investigations into methods for conserving 
183 C loser settlement was the settlement o f people on the land at a high density, usually wi th the aim of 
increasing faming production through d efined and limited farming plots with in defined areas of settlement. 
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rainfall, exploring the potential of underground aquifers, and the practicalities of a system 
of water conservation storages to guard against drought. Parts of the colony were in the 
midst of drought, including the inland regions, and the New South Wales government 
formed the Royal Commission the same year. 184 The Commissioners conducted extensive 
research to determine the potentials of the inland rivers for irrigation networks and water 
conservation storages, interviewing many landholders. They travelled to the Darling River 
when it was flooding in 1886. The Commission's photographer, Charles Bayliss, 
photographed extensive tracts of flooded land. The flood may have further revealed to the 
Commissioners the possibilities of trapping floodwater in creeks and 'natural depressions' 
to form 'permanent lakes', which they had reported on in the previous year. 185 While the 
Commission generally recommended that there were many sites suitable for water 
storages on the Darling and other inland rivers, both to mitigate floods and for water 
supply, they made no specific recommendations for particular sites. 186 
The Chief Engineer for the Commission was Hugh McKinney, a Northern 
lrelander who had worked in India before arriving in New South Wales. McKinney 
argued for the role engineers could play in water conservation: 'No one is more entitled 
to be heard on the general principles of water supply of a country than an engineer, who 
has practical experience of both of the value of good laws, and the mischief caused by bad 
ones' .187 The Commissioners' recommendations were accompanied by a draft bill (of new 
laws) that aimed to overturn the constraints of common law riparian rights (that 
prevented large irrigation works). Common law caused 'mischief' for advocates of 
irrigation. The recommendations hinged on the draft bill which was, however, not 
accepted by parliament. H istorian Clem Lloyd has suggested that the bill was 'too 
ambitious' for the young colony. He speculated that if it had been passed into law it 
would have 'transformed the evolution of water policy and administration' by developing 
decentralised water administration, based on local water trusts. 188 The decentralisation of 
administration advocated by the draft bill did not survive as an idea, although other 
aspects of the bill are evident in New South Wales' 1896 Water Rights Act and 1912 Water 
184 C. ). Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty: Water Development and Management in New South Wales (Department 
of Water Resources: Parramatta, 1988), p.170-171. 
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Act which, together with the Constitution, unravelled common law doctrines of riparian 
rights and introduced statutory water rights. 
The 1885-87 Royal Commission did, however, have significant policy 
implications. It had focused almost exclusively on the potential for water conservation on 
the inland rivers of New South Wales. Although the Commission conducted substantial 
research into some coastal rivers, such as the Clarence and Richmond, and to a lesser 
extent into others, it remained largely concerned with inland hydrologies. It did not 
exclude coastal rivers by design; this was, rather, a result of the Commission's budget, 
which confined its scope. 189 Lloyd has argued that '[a]n important, although perhaps 
unintended, consequence of the Commission's investigations was the irrevocable 
separation of the coastal rivers from the western rivers in policy terms.. . it failed to 
develop even a basic policy rationale for the coastal rivers; its focus was on the river basins 
of the interiors' .190 The Royal Commission had put the inland rivers on colonial 
government policy agendas, with a focus on the potentials for developing the inland 
through engineering. In some ways this foreshadowed the partitioning of the inland rivers 
from those on the coast, in terms of policy, post-Federation with the creation of the River 
Murray Commission. McKinney's appointment to head a new Water Conservation and 
Irrigation Branch of the Department of Public Works in 1891 is evidence of the colonial 
government's commitment to investigate engineering as a way of managing flood and 
drought, while also developing new irrigative industries. 191 However, Bonyhady has 
argued that McKinney's new government branch was instead a concession to advocates of 
water conservation and irrigation, serving as a 'sop' to their arguments. 192 Bonyhady's 
argument is supported by the fact that the colonial government remained uncommitted 
to water conservation and irrigation throughout the 1890s. 
The 1890 flood not only demonstrated the vulnerability of the inland to the 
erratic flows of the rivers, but also revealed the potential for trapping vast amounts of 
floodwater. In the aftermath of the 1890 flood colonists discussed the benefits of an 
engineering approach by the government to mitigate floods and impound water for future 
use. Some wrote to newspapers to make their case. For example, one colonist, in a letter 
189 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.171. 
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to the SMH in May 1890, urged that anabranches along the Darling, which now 
overflowed, should be dammed so that the water did not 'run to waste'. 193 
Representatives of Bourke had suggested to the government officials who were 
conducting an inquiry into the flood in the municipality the 'necessity of having a flying 
survey made with a view of determining if the water could be preserved in dams or 
utilised in any way'. Although the town was recovering from the flood, experiences of 
drought had attuned colonists to opportunities for water supply. Further, the 
representatives suggested, 'information might be obtained relating to irrigation, which 
would be very valuable in the future'. The government officials said that 'this was beyond 
the scope of the commission' .194 However, the request of the local representatives is 
telling. Their statement that information on irrigation would be valuable in future 
indicates an undercurrent of anticipation for irrigative industries. At the time, irrigation 
was linked to larger themes of consistent river flow and water supply (to mitigate the 
effects of drought and flood, and supply irrigation channels), as well as associated 
engineering infrastructure for water conservation, such as dams. 
In the 1880s and 1890s the Murray River was also receiving significant attention 
from the South Australian, Victorian and New South Wales governments, with a view to 
establishing irrigation and improved navigability. By 1890 the Chaffey brothers had 
established two irrigation settlements on the river: Mildura in Victoria and Renmark in 
South Australia (both in the late 1880s). Both colonial governments had backed the 
C haffey Brothers' company and had implemented special legal arrangements to overcome 
common law restrictions for these 'trial' settlements (see chapter four 'Federation, 
Engineering, and a 'Watershed' Perspective, 1890 to 1956'). Some thought these 
settlements heralded a new future for the inland rivers. An article published by the 
Western Herald in August 1890 captured this sense of anticipation and desire for engineers 
to control the waters of the two large river systems: 
Proposals for locking the Murray and Darling rivers [sic] ... have been made from time to 
time, but up to the present time no active measures have been taken to give effect to any 
schemes of this kind. Reports have been prepared and pigeon-holed, awaiting a more 
favourable opportunity, when freedom from political complications shall enable a strong 
193 SMH, 6 May, 1890, p.9. See also, SMH, 16 May, 1890, p.7. 
194 SMH, 24 April, 1890, p.8. 
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and vigorous Government to place measures of utility before those of convenience ... 
information which will hereafter be of use is accumulating. 195 
This writer was generally in favour of river control through engineering; but his 
sentiments also reflected some people's reservations about the effect of such diversion 
and associated structures. 'There are some people in South Australia', the article stated, 
'who object to the Chaffey irrigation colonies on the ground that there will soon be no 
water left for navigation'. Some, especially those in the pro-navigation colony of South 
Australia, saw irrigation and navigation to be competing uses for the waters of the 
Murray. The article provided another argument against engineering, detailing plans to 
barrage the mouth of the Murray from the sea, to prevent salty tidal inflows and preserve 
fresh water in Lake Alexandrina and Lake Albert. The Engineer-in-Chief who proposed 
the scheme forewarned that the barrages would be likely to accumulate silt, affecting their 
operation and efficiency. 196 
Such reservations also extended to proposals for flood mitigation strucnires on 
the Darling after the 1890 flood. Some argued that water conservation strucnires would 
increase floods on the Darling, rather than mitigate them. A colonist (who had 
experienced the 1864 flood) on the Darling wrote to the SMH, in the aftermath of the 
1890 flood, that his views, 'once comprehended, overthrow all theories relating to the 
damming-up of the Darling waters'. He continued: 'I don't care what obstacle, from stone 
wall to wire fence, is thrown across the waterway, it impedes the flow, and the result is 
that the water rises higher' and potentially spills through openings or over the dam, 'with 
unnatural velocity, thus adding to the danger'. 197 Such reservations, however, seemed to 
be overshadowed by calls for government action to protect towns and rural areas against 
floods, through engineering works. 
Arguments for engineering structures to mitigate floods were made in relation to 
other areas that had been flooded in 1890. The Grafton Borough Council, on the 
recently flooded northern New South Wales coast, passed a resolution in June to lobby 
the colonial government to ensure flood protection along 'all the rivers of the colony'. 
The need for protective structures to be built by the government, the Council wrote, was 
'both necessary and expedient' . The Grafton Council indicated that the means by which 
195 Western Herald, 30 August, 1890, p.2. 
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the government should ensure safety from floods were through different forms of 
engineered flood mitigation. It asked for: Direct action to prevent erosion to riverbanks, 
embankments to protect towns, and the impounding of floodwater in channels away 
from settled areas: 
... a measure should be framed and introduced by the Government for the approval of 
Parliament for the purpose of making provision for general and approved systems of 
protecting the banks of all the rivers of the colony from erosion after floods, for the 
construction of embankments, or to open up additional and alternative channels to 
confine floodwaters, and thereby prevent the loss of life and destruction of property 
caused by the immense spread of water in times of flood, and for keeping out as far as 
possible floodwaters from towns and villages in these districts ... if these were protected, 
[they] would be at all times available for profitable and safe occupation. 198 
The Grafton Council further resolved to request other councils across the colony to 
'adopt a similar resolution' .199 The resolution is significant as it argues for the colonial 
government to ensure safety from floods across New South Wales through engineered 
manipulations of river flow, and for the government to take responsibility for protecting 
towns from floods. The Council argued that such flood protection works were important 
for the 'profitable and safe' development of settlements and economies in regions 
affected by floods. 
Calls for engineering works in Bourke, along the Darling, and in other places in 
New South Wales signalled a new demand on government science. Bourke and other 
regional centres requested greater government involvement in protecting settlers from 
floods and controlling the fluctuations of river flow and weather more generally, through 
engineering. This marked a shift from the more distant role of government 
meteorologists, who tried to predict environmental events, but whose duties did not 
encompass intervention in flood flows through 'on the ground' mitigative works. 
Discussions and plans for building a permanent levee around Bourke indicated the 
changing role of government science, as it tried to come to terms with floods for the 
economic future of Bourke and the colony. It was with Federation, however, that 
198 Western Herald, 18 June, 1890, p.2. 
199 Western Herald , 18 June, 1890, p.2. In the aftermath of the floods in Queensland, settlers were also 
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possibilities for river engineering were liberated from the legal constraints of common 
law and the financial limitations of colonial budgets. 
174 
4 
Federation, Engineering, and a 'Watershed' 
Perspective, 1890 to 1956 
The birth of the nation was in many ways also the birth of large-scale river engineering in 
Australia. This was no coincidence. The potential uses and benefits of the Murray River, 
and its tributaries, to New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia for navigation, 
water conservation, and irrigation were a significant impetus to Federation in 1901, 
because intercolonial collaboration was essential to river planning. 1 Many political 
leaders, bureaucrats, and settlers hoped that the fluctuations of floods and droughts could 
be overcome with engineering. The question arose as to whether the Murray's limited 
river flow should be harnessed for navigation or irrigation. Trapping floodwater and 
snowmelt to augment river flow was a significant part of these contested plans. Post-
Federation river engineering projects were to profoundly change flood regimes and the 
wider ecology of the Murray River and its tributaries. 
The Murray was the focus of several engineering projects following Federation. 
The intense interest shown in water conservation, irrigation, and improved navigation on 
the Darling River during the 1890 flood had waned. As politicians debated a constitution 
that paved the way for water conservation and irrigation settlements during the 1890s, 
the important sheep-farming district of the Western Division, through which the Darling 
flows (and where Bourke is located), slid into economic decline. In 1895 the eastern states 
entered a period of intense drought, which was to span approximately seven years and 
which is now known as the 'Federation Drought'. It is still one of the worst droughts on 
1 Don Wright, 'The River Murray: Microcosm of Australian Federal History', in Bruce Hodgins, et al. (eds.), 
Federalism in Canada and Australia: The Early Years (Canberra: Australian National U niversity Press, 1978), 
pp.277-286. 
record. Although drought catalysed the decline of pastoralism in the west, other factors 
also contributed. In 1900 the New South Wales government established a Royal 
Commission to investigate the reasons for the economic depression in the Western 
Division. Pastoralists gave testimony to the Royal Commission. They described a 
combination of causes for the depression, including falling wool prices, changes to the 
environment from graziers' farming practices, the effects of introduced plants and 
animals on the land and rivers, a flawed land rental scheme, and a succession of floods 
and droughts. Through the farmers' stories, and the Royal Commission's 
recommendations, there came a strong sense that pastoralism in the region, along with 
the land, could never recover. The 1890 flood held promise for irrigation and water 
conservation along the Darling at the time, for those in towns and cities, but just 11 years 
later farmers told the Royal Commission that the flood had compounded, and in some 
cases triggered, their economic decline and the deterioration of the land (in conjunction 
with other factors). The 1890 flood led to stock losses in the short term; while longer 
term effects included vegetation growth and the spread of prickly pear, which contributed 
to the spiralling decline of the wool industry. The Commissioners in 1900, investigating 
the possibilities for closer settlement in the region recommended against it, in 
consideration of the deteriorating condition of the land, erratic river flow, scarce rainfall, 
the experiences of pastoralists, and South Australian experiments in closer settlement. 
The Commissioners ruled that closer settlement was just not feasible in western New 
South Wales. 
The shared waterway of the Murray became the focus of the question of riparian 
of rights for the three colonies that shared it (New South Wales, Victoria, and South 
Australia). While drought had detracted attention from water conservation, irrigation, 
and improved navigation on the Darling, it became a prime motivator for engineering 
works on the Murray. It was argued that a national government could mediate disputes 
between the colonies over water rights and the competing uses of the Murray River for 
navigation (to aid the wool industry and the transportation of other goods) and irrigation 
(to support the agricultural industry). The Murray and its upper tributaries were widely 
perceived to be able only to support either navigation or irrigation along the main 
channel. There was not enough water for both.2 Navigation and irrigation, while in 
competition, both depended on river engineering to ensure more consistent and available 
2 Daniel Connell, W ater Politics in the Murray-Darling Basin (Leichhardt, New South W ales: Federation Press, 
2007), pp.56-61. 
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river flow when and where the water was needed. Flood mitigation did not figure 
significantly in these pre- and post-Federation debates. While small and large floods 
occurred in the Murray and Darling river systems, it was drought that politicians, 
bureaucrats, and settlers sought to mitigate through river engineering. Floods that 
occurred in this period tended to be catalysts for debate about drought mitigation 
through water conservation, irrigation, and improved navigation, as floodwater could be 
harnessed and river flow regularised, rather than the water being 'wasted' or left to 
damage property and endanger lives. Large floods occurred, for example, along the 
Murray in 1917 and 1927, the northern Darling River tributaries in 1909, western 
Victorian Murray tributaries in 1909, and the Murrumbidgee in 1900 and 1925.3 In the 
midst of intense drought, water supply remained the focus of debate. The lack of 
attention to floods themselves, in terms of mitigation, general river management, and 
data collection, shaped settler perceptions of later floods, especially the 1956 floods on 
the Murray River, which were regarded as a failure of engineering to know and control 
river flow. 
The constitution and federal bureaucratic frameworks created new opportunities 
for the states to invest in river infrastructure and to work collaboratively, sharing the costs 
of expensive dams and locks with each other and the Federal government. Federation 
liberated the possibilities of large scale engineering politically, legally, and financially. The 
new constitution abolished many of the remaining common law restrictions on 
manipulating river flow. A national political framework also fostered a 'watershed' view of 
river systems necessary for large scale river engineering, rather than purely sectional 
interests in relation to parts of rivers that flowed within administrative boundaries. The 
overarching Federal government allowed for a cross-border perspective and provided a 
mediating framework between the states. However, after Federation the states remained 
deadlocked over decisions as to the most appropriate works for the Murray. Settlers along 
the Murray and Murrumbidgee pressed for a resolution. 
In response to intense drought, the River Murray Main Canal League - an 
umbrella organisation for a number of smaller leagues mostly comprised of Riverina 
graziers - initiated a convention held in Cowra in 1902, in order to lobby decision-
makers to provide greater security from erratic river flows. 4 The Cowra convention led to 
3 Murrumbidgee floods: see, Cliff Butcher, Gundagai: A Track Winding Back (Gundagai: A.C. Butcher, 
2002), p.84. 
4 Wright, 'The River Murray: Microcosm of Australian Federal History', p.281. 
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an interstate investigation into improved navigation and potential water storage sites on 
the Murray. The interstate committee catalysed large-scale engineering on the Murray and 
established the pre-eminence of irrigation over navigation. 
This chapter focuses on three issues in turn. First, New South Wales' shift in 
interest from the Darling to the Murray, in terms of river engineering and land settlement 
agendas. Secondly, the rise of intercolonial, and then interstate, engineering on the 
Murray as influenced by environmental factors and changes to the political frameworks 
around rivers, which created administrative space and opportunity for large-scale, 
interstate river engineering. Thirdly, the international influences on engineering 
approaches and bureaucracies in Australia. 
In addressing these themes and arguments I begin by examining the decline of 
pastoralism and the environmental deterioration in the Western Division of New South 
Wales, focusing on the 1900-01 Royal Commission, particularly in regard to the 
combined effects of the 1890 flood, successive droughts, and the deterioration of the 
land. Pastoralism had reached, and exceeded, its environmental limits. The Royal 
Commission and other government inquiries reported that the Darling's erratic flows, 
dramatically demonstrated in the intense drought, would not support irrigation nor 
justify expense on navigation infrastructure, which was simultaneously declining in 
importance with the expansion of railways. 
Next I consider the eastern colonies' (later states') focus on the Murray River for 
engineering works and river development in the context of intercolonial cooperation in 
the lead-up to, and after, Federation. Unlike the Darling, the Murray offered significant 
topographical and hydrological opportunities for water storage, irrigation, and navigation 
works. Fed by snowmelt, the Murray's flows were also more regular. After Federation a 
permanent, watershed-focused administration was established for a large portion of the 
Murray and Darling river system, the River Murray Commission (RMC). The RMC, 
formally established in 1917, comprised state and federal representatives and focused its 
energy almost exclusively on the Murray and its upper tributaries for the next seventy 
years. 
Finally, I consider the international links and influences on the development of 
the RMC watershed bureaucracy in Australia and subsequent river engineering projects, 
focusing on influences from British India and the United States. 
This period saw the establishment of major political frameworks for large scale 
engineering in the Murray and Darling river systems, which were to facilitate the next 80 
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years of dam-building, immigration programs, agricultural production, hydro-electric 
schemes, and profound changes to floods and floodplains. The frameworks that were 
established in this period were to have other far-reaching effects: a focus on the Murray 
saw massive transformations on that river and many of its tributaries, but was also to leave 
the upper Darling and its tributaries open for development by New South Wales and 
Queensland until the 1980s.5 
* * * 
Royal Commission 
The 1900-01 Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of Crown Tenants was 
established to investigate the reasons for the extensive economic failure of pastoralists in 
the Western Division of New South Wales. The Royal Commission was held in the midst 
of a seven-year-long drought across rural New South Wales, now known as the 
'Federation Drought', and after a decade-long economic depression in the eastern 
colonies. The number of sheep in the Western Division had fallen by 10 million since 
1890, from fifteen and a half million to less than six million.6 In the process of its 
investigation the Royal Commission conducted a series of interviews with a variety of 
people connected with the pastoral industry in the Division, many of whom had lived in 
the area for over twenty years. The Commission concluded with recommendations that it 
deemed would ensure the region's economic recovery. Pastoralists' testimony to the Royal 
Commission lent weight to arguments for water conservation. Their experiences of 
fluctuating river flow seemed to indicate that such environmental uncertainty could be 
mitigated by water conservation structures. However, pastoralists recognised that the land 
had radically changed and many accounts contained in the Royal Commission conveyed 
a sense that even these means of water security could not redeem its pastoral value or 
secure small-scale farming, which the Commissioners had also been instructed to 
investigate. 
5 In 1996 Queensland joined the Murray-Darling Basin Initiative (which had replaced the RMC in 1993 
with a tripartite structure, which included the Murray-Darling Basin Commission as the 'public face' of the 
Initiative). 
6 See, N.G. Budin, 'Distribution of the Sheep Population: Preliminary Statistical Picture, 1860-1957', in 
Alan Barnard (ed), The Simple Fleece: Studies in the Australian Wool Industry (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1962), pp.281-307, p.286. 
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Map 4.1 
The Western Division, New South Wales, 1884. 
[Map of the Western Division New South Wales 1884 [cartographic material] 
1884-1924. MAP G897 l.G46 1924 (Copy 1) Photocopy. Land and Property Management 
Authority (formerly New South Wales Department of Lands). National Library of Australia.] 
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In the Royal Commission's minutes of evidence, as Tom Griffiths notes, 'there 
was a recognition that European settlers had disrupted earlier Aboriginal systems of 
habitation and management and tipped the land into an escalating instability'.7 The 
Commission's report stated, '[t]he pastoralist entered upon the period just ended with the 
country in its virgin condition. He enters upon the coming period with the country 
immensely depreciated'.8 Following the pastoral expans ion of the 1860s and 1870s the 
land had drastically altered under the changed system of use. The introduction of hoofed 
animals, such as cattle and sheep, had caused erosion and compacted soil. These animals 
also tore out shrubs and grasses by their roots, preventing the regeneration of vegetation. 
Land clearing had caused erosion; rabbits, sheep, and cattle had aggravated erosion; 
woody weeds had invaded denuded paddocks; and native plants and animals had 
7 Tom Griffiths, 'One Hundred Years O f Environmental C risis', Rangeland]oumal, 23, 1, 2001, pp.5-14, 
p.5. 
8 C.J. McMaster, et al., 'Royal Commission to Inquire into the Conditio n of the Crown Tenants' . 'Report' . 
Part 1. New South Wales Legislative Assembly. Votes and Proceedings, 4, 1901, p.vii. 
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retreated from the damaged lands. Together with such destructive by-products of 
European settlement, the 1880s and 1890s saw a succession of droughts and floods: a 
flood in 1879, a drought in the early-mid 1880s, a flood in 1886, the 'centennial drought' 
two years later, flood in 1890 and 1893, and then the long 'Federation Drought' that 
intensified just as the Royal Commission commenced. 
The appointed Commissioners included both current and former district 
representatives, some of whom, such as William Nicholas Willis, had land holdings in the 
Division and were directly affected by the drought and depreciation of the land.9 The 
interviews with pastoralists read as a retrospective of environmental, and concurrent 
economic, boom and bust. Pastoralists told stories of struggles for economic survival in an 
unpredictable environment shaped alternately by scarcity and abundance of water, as well 
as a realisation of the damage that they, the new occupants and their animals, were doing 
to the land. The 'booms' were good seasons, allowing pastoralists respite from previous 
droughts. But these 'good seasons' could be undone by devastating floods as in 1890, and 
long droughts. 
The 1890 flood figured in many of these interviews. Some identified it as the 
beginning of their troubles. It was, William J. Dickson stated, 'the turning point'. 10 Initial 
stock losses caused pastoralists to suffer financially and borrow heavily. Those who spoke 
of the direct effects of the flood numbered their stock losses, or their neighbours', at 
between 7 ,000 and 50,000 sheep. The ewes were lambing at the time and many lost 
between 3,000 and 25,000 lambs as well. 11 One pastoralist from the Walgett district, John 
Archibald Campbell, lost a total of about 70,000 sheep and lambs. Some sheep drowned 
and, as his property was still flooded in August, many isolated sheep starved. He 
explained that he had also 'lost the whole of the lambing .... I felt that for five years ... I lost 
the use of their wool. I had to keep old sheep to breed with .... Which I was getting little 
9 Martha Rutledge, 'William Nicholas Willis (1858-1922)', 
http://adbonline.anu.edu.au/biogs/A120575b.htm?hilite=Willis%3BWilliam, Australian Dictionary of 
Biography (ADB) Online, accessed 24 April 2008. 
10 William J. Dickson, pp.187-188. 'Western Division of New South Wales. Royal Commission to Inquire 
into the Condition of the Crown Tenants' . 'Minutes of Evidence, Appendices, and Returns'. Part 2. New 
South Wales Legislative Assembly. Votes and Proceedings, 4, 1901; and, Griffiths, 'One Hundred Years of 
Environmental Crisis', p.5. 
11 These figures were obtained from a selection of six interviews in the Royal Commission's minutes of 
evidence with pastoralists and Homestead lessees. The interviews were with: William J. Dickinson, pp.186-
188; John Archibald Campbell, pp.289-291; Colin Sinclair, pp.628-632; Thomas Clark, pp.636-637; 
Richard William Chase, pp.651-653; and, William Godfrey Ferris, pp.685-686. 'Royal Commission to 
Inquire into the Condition of the Crown Tenants' . 'Minutes of Evidence, Appendices, and Returns'. Part 
2. 
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wool from' .12 However, Campbell predicted he would not have made a profit even 
without the flood, because of drought and other economic and environmental 
pressures. 13 
Whilst pastoralists identified the flood as a trigger of decline, they did not 
attribute their overall economic failure to it; drought was the bigger enemy. William J. 
Dickson told the Commissioners that while the 11,000 sheep and lambs he lost in the 
flood (about 96 percent of his stock on his small 10,240 acre property on the Culgoa 
River) was his 'first loss', his overall situation was attributable to, '[u]ndoubtedly ... the 
drought' . 14 He stated that if the sheep he lost during the flood had not died, they would 
have died in any case from starvation and dehydration in the subsequent drought. He 
had not carried that many sheep on his station since. 15 After the flood, drought put 
additional pressure on farmers who carried fewer stock when those stock died from 
starvation. Another pastoralist, Colin Sinclair, when asked to explain the 'non-success' of 
his holding, answered: 'In the first place there are the droughts; secondly the land is 
subject to floods, and that means disastrous losses ... What with floods and droughts I 
have not made anything out of it at all...'. 16 Pastoralists were trapped in an unrelenting 
sequence of droughts and floods. 
Pastoralists also drew attention to the 1890 flood's ongoing environmental effects. 
The flood caused long-term vegetation changes on the floodplains. It had caused a 'wheat-
field' to become 'water grass', which stock would not eat when it was dry. 17 'Noxious 
growth' also became a problem. Sinclair stated the flood had brought prickly pear to his 
property by washing seed onto the floodplain. 18 For Richard William Chase, who had 
been at Llanillo Station for over 19 years, the flood of 1890 had damaged the country by 
bringing increased amounts of native Coolabah. 19 Sheep could not be seen amongst the 
12 John Archibald Campbell, pp.289-291. 'Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of the Crown 
Tenants' . 'Minutes of Evidence, Appendices, and Returns'. Part 2. 
13 John Archibald Campbell, pp.289-291. 'Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of the Crown 
Tenants' . 'Minutes of Evidence, Appendices, and Returns'. Part 2. 
14 William J. Dickson, pp.187-188, 'Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of the Crown 
Tenants' . 'Minutes of Evidence, Appendices, and Returns' . Part 2. 
15 William J. Dickson, pp.187-188, 'Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of the Crown 
Tenants'. 'Minutes of Evidence, Appendices, and Returns'. Part 2. 
16 Colin Sinclair, pp.628-632, 'Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of the Crown Tenants'. 
'Minutes of Evidence, Appendices, and Returns'. Part 2. 
17 William J. Dickson, pp.187-188, 'Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of the Crown 
Tenants'. 'Minutes of Evidence, Appendices, and Returns'. Part 2. 
18 Colin Sinclair, pp.628-632, 'Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of the Crown Tenants'. 
'Minutes of Evidence, Appendices, and Returns'. Part 2. 
19 Richard William Chase, pp.65 1-653, 'Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of the Crown 
Tenants'. 'Minutes of Evidence, Appendices, and Returns'. Part 2. 
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trees and scrub, and many pastoralists could not afford the expense of clearing the land.20 
Pastoralists also spoke of the impacts of rising rabbit numbers and overstocking on the 
land and vegetation. Stock had added to the vegetation changes, grazing saltbush until it 
was scarce and 'will never recover'.21 For the pastoralists, the vegetation in many areas had 
substantially changed for the worse, lowering the value of their stations. 
Some pastoralists saw the country as having suffered irrecoverably, through 
climate and the impacts of stock and humans. Chase thought that even with extended 
leases, pastoralism in the Western Division would remain 'a risky business', and that the 
environment was permanently damaged.22 Others, however, maintained hope that they 
would be able to make their stations profitable and that the land would recover.23 Despite 
these differences, almost every pastoralist interviewed argued for larger runs and extended 
leases of 42 years. Pastoralists, often heavily in debt, were tied to their stations through 
debt. Longer leases and extended grazing areas would help them absorb the costs of bad 
seasons and give them an opportunity to recover financially, if the drought broke. Many 
were on the verge of bankruptcy and if the government did not allow longer leases to 
absorb the costs of bad seasons, their properties would be resumed by creditors. 
In the period from 1890 to 1901 ten leaseholds in the Western Division were 
abandoned and sixty-three resumed. Some of these areas were re-leased at much reduced 
rates. For example, Boulka Lake's annual rental dropped from £1,314 to £420 and 
Brewarrina Downs from £116 to £12 15s. The rent was determined by an assessment of 
the stocking capacity of the land, which had fallen so dramatically that the rents attached 
to the original leases could not be met. 24 
The reappraisals reflected the Western Division's changed pastoral value under 
settler and environmental pressures. It also indicated a weakness in the rental system. The 
Commissioners reported on the disjuncture between the rental system and environmental 
fluctuations. They argued that land appraisals which occurred every seven years, to 
determine rent for the next seven years, were an abstraction and did not take into 
zo John David Daly, pp.632-634, 'Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of the Crown Tenants'. 
'Minutes of Evidence, Appendices, and Returns' . Part 2. 
21 Richard William Chase, pp.651-653, 'Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of the Crown 
Tenants'. 'Minutes of Evidence, Appendices, and Returns'. Part 2. 
22 Richard William Chase, pp.651-653, 'Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of the Crown 
Tenants'. 'Minutes of Evidence, Appendices, and Returns' . Part 2. 
23 See for example, Colin Sinclair, pp.628-32, 'Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of the 
Crown Tenants'. 'Minutes of Evidence, Appendices, and Returns' . Part 2. 
24 McMaster et al., 'Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of the C rown Tenants'. 'Report'. Part 
1, pp.x-xi 
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account t hat the stocking capacity could change dramatically in this time. T h is meant that 
t he rent inaccurately reflected the real value of the land and locked pastoralists in to 
ren tal payments that they may not be able to meet.25 
The 1901 Royal Commission came at a time when closer settlement and 
agriculture were under scrutiny from the Victorian and New South W ales governments, 
wh ich were each investigating the possibilities for irrigation along the inland rivers. T he 
Commissioners were instructed to investigate 'areas of land suitable for agriculture' and 
closer settlement in the W estern Division. Pastoralists widely rejected the notion that the 
country may be suitable for closer or small settlement and agriculture. Land that was 
claimed for closer settlement would reduce the sizes of pastoral runs and reduce graziers' 
opportunities to earn a profit. W hen asked if it would be harder to move stock during 
floods if the country was fenced off into smaller areas, a pastoralist gave the wry reply 
that, ' I do not think people would hesitate to cut fences if they were moving their sheep; I 
know I would not ... '. 26 T he Commissioners recognised the bias that pastoralists had 
against closer settlement and wrote in their report that they avoided 'altogether evidence 
given by pastoral lessees, whose minds migh t be regarded as somewhat biased on the 
question [of closer settlement]' .27 
The Commissioners themselves, however, also rejected closer settlement. 
H omestead Leases that divided the land into small blocks of no more than 16 square 
miles had been offered in the region . The Com missioners interviewed Homestead lessees 
from the W estern Division and other d istricts. T he lessees stated they had, at best, made a 
'bare livelihood' and that the H omestead scheme overall was a failure.28 The 
Commissioners also sought advice from South Australia, which had embarked on 
irrigated closer settlement. Interviews with members of the Pastoral Board and farmers 
from that state gave more negative opinions on closer settlement for western New South 
W ales. In the view of the Commissioners, the land in the region could be parcelled into 
blocks not smaller than 150 square miles, but preferably much larger.29 T he 
25 McMaster et a!., 'Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of the Crown Tenants'. 'Report'. Part 
1, p.xiii. 
26 Will iam Godfrey Ferris, pp.685-686, 'Royal Commissio n to Inquire into the Condi tion of the Crown 
Tenants'. 'M inutes of Evidence, Appendices, and Returns'. Part 2. 
27 McMaster et a!., 'Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of the Crown Tenants' . 'Report'. Part 
1, p.xvi. 
28 McMaster et al., 'Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of the Crown Tenants'. 'Report'. Part 
1, p.xvi. 
29 McMaster et al., 'Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of the C rown Tenants' . 'Report'. Part 
1, p.xvii. 
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Commissioners instead recommended extended leases and reduced rents for pastoralists 
that included significant conditions. These recommendations aimed to reinvigorate 
pastoralism in the Western Division by making grazing more economically and 
environmentally sustainable. 
The Commission resulted in the W estern Lands Act 190 1 and the establishment of 
an independent Pastoral Board, each of which carried through the recommendations of 
the Commission almost unaltered. The Western Lands Act 1901 remains in force to this 
day, albeit with many amendments.30 
Earlier government reports on the use of inland rivers for irrigation and improved 
navigation had also recommended against development on the Darling. In 1896 the New 
South Wales government had commissioned a report on the potential for irrigation and 
improved inland river navigation in the colony from a retired British Indian Army 
Colonel, Frederick J. Home. He concluded that most of the inland was unsuited to 
irrigation as river flow was too erratic. Historian Clem Lloyd described Home's view of 
the Darling: 'Assessing the Darling as a whole, Home rejected any suggestion that public 
money could profitably be spent on it for irrigation, and market forces were continu ing to 
move against the river trade' .31 The extension of railways through the New South Wales, 
and the continent, had made long distance river trade less necessary and less attractive to 
pastoralists, in terms of commerce. Moreover, low river flow often stranded paddle 
steamers making rail carriage a more reliable form of transport between industry and 
colonial centres. Paddle steamers remained important to the wool industry as a form of 
transporting wool between pastoral stations and railheads, particularly along the upper 
Darling. The decline of the wool industry and intense drought, however, even threatened 
the survival of local river trades. 
Government and settler interest in 'developing' the Darling had radically altered 
in less than a decade. International assessment had brought to the fore the financial and 
hydraulic difficulties of water conservation, irrigation, and improved river navigation in 
the region. To this, the 1901 Royal Commission added its report, which detailed the dire 
condition of pastoralism, the land, and the rivers in the W estern Division. The effects of 
the 1890 flood and the 'Federation Drought' in Bourke and along the Darling River 
30 Michael Quinn, 'Committed to Conserve: the Western Lands Act, 1901, and the Management of the 
Public Estate of the Western Division of New South Wales', Australian Geographical Studies, July 1997, 35, 2, 
pp.183-194. 
31 C J Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty: Water Development and Management in New South Wales (Parramatta: 
Department of Water Resources, New South Wales, 1988), p.179. 
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highlight the deep vulnerability of settlements and settlers in the region, as their lives and 
livelihoods were tied to the erratic river flow of the Darling and its western tributaries. 
Such vulnerability continued, and will be explored in the final case study of this thesis 
(chapter seven). 
An experimental lock and weir built on the Darling at Bourke in 1895-97 still 
stands, testimony to the plans that were once held for the Darling in this period. It was 
the first navigation lock in the colony, built to test the financial and construction 
possibilities of improving navigation along the river. While the weir was not replicated on 
the Darling, it demonstrated that navigation locks could, as Lloyd wrote, 'be built at a 
reasonable cost'. 32 
The New South Wales government was already turning its attention to the 
Murray in the 1890s.33 In his 1896 report, Home had advised that irrigation projects on 
the Murrumbidgee and Murray rivers were viable, noting that as the Murrumbidgee was 
completely inside New South Wales' boundaries it was a simpler choice.34 Home's report 
reiterated recommendations made by New South Wales government engineer Hugh 
McKinney in 1886 for water conservation structures on the Murray and Murrumbidgee.35 
The Murray's flows were the most consistent of the inland rivers. The river was 
characterised by seasonal high flows or small floods fed by spring snowmelt from the 
Great Dividing Range. These seasonal inflows largely insulated settlers along the river 
(more than other inland rivers) from the long-term effects of droughts. In making the case 
for extensive water conservation and irrigation works along the Murray in 1900, 
McKinney wrote that, 'the Murray is by far the most regular of our rivers in flow, and a 
good discharge can always be depended on during the later half of the year', after the 
snowmelt. 36 The regular, annual rhythm of the river led meteorologist William Stanley 
Jevons to liken the Murray to the Nile in 1859, an analogy that was to gain increasing 
political currency in the nationalist and progressionist inter- and post-war years of 
32 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.179. See also, E.A. Amphlett, 'The Bourke Lock and Weir', The 
Australian Technical!ournal, 28 March, 1898, pp.57-62; and, William Poole, 'The Locking of the Darling 
River', The Australian Technical!ournal, 30 April, 1898, pp.99-101. 
33 See, Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, pp.176-187, especially p.177. 
34 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p. 17 8-179. 
35 H.G. McKinney, 'Intercolonial Water Rights as Affected by Federation', Journal and Proceedings of the Royal 
Society of New South Wales, 14, 1900, pp.233-555, p.234; and, Katrina Proust, 'Learning From The Past For 
Sustainability: Towards an Integrated Approach', PhD thesis, The Australian National University, 2004, 
pp.293-3 12, 'Appendix E, Hugh McKinney: A Colonial Engineer', pp.302-303. 
36 McKinney, 'Intercolonial Water Rights as Affected by Federation', p.237. 
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extensive river engineering.37 The analogy perhaps also gained a degree of engineering 
boosterism when the Nile was dammed by the British at Aswan in Egypt in 1898-1902.38 
The 'Federation Drought' and the drying-up of the Murray in the 1920s spurred popular 
and government support for the construction of dams.39 
Lewis Ronald East, chairman of the Victorian State Rivers and Water Supply 
Commission (SRWSC) from 1936 to 1965, concluded a 1939 pamphlet, The River Murray 
Waters: Harnessing the Nile of Australia, by drawing attention to the wider political, social, 
and economic goals of river engineering. Engineering structures, he wrote, 'are destined 
to play a very important part, in fact, possibly the most important part in the future 
development of rural Australia ... we all look forward to the time when there will be in the 
Murray Valley a great and increasing population utilising to the full extent our greatest 
national asset - the waters of the Murray'.40 Hydraulic engineering was a means to 
increase population and production by controlling the river and ensuring environmental 
security. 
The Murray offered a kind of redemption for the inland rivers in the Federation 
years of intense and prolonged drought. Yet, the idea of regular rhythms on the Murray 
was a generalisation that not only disguised regional variations and intricate 
hydrological/biological relationships but was occasionally undermined by dramatic, river-
long changes in flow; for example by a small snow fall and therefore reduced river flow 
(that could be exacerbated by little or no rainfall), which led to the Murray almost 
completely drying up in the mid-l 920s; as well as large floods fed by high snowmelts and 
rainfall, such as in 1852, 1870, 1917, and 1927. 
The snow-fed Murrumbidgee, although recognised as more erratic than the 
Murray, also presented opportunities for irrigation in New South Wales. McKinney and 
Home argued that floods along the river (and there had been many floods through the 
river system between settlement and 1890) could be harnessed for government-funded 
irrigation through building a canal below Yanko Creek and that there was also a number 
37 W.S. Jevons, 'Some Data Concerning the Climate of Australia and New Zealand', Waugh's Australian 
Almanac, 1859, pp.47-104, p.87. 
38 See, Timothy Mitchell, The Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002), p.21. The Aswan Dam wall was subsequently raised twice, between 1907 and 1912; 
and between 1929 and 1933. 
39 See, LR. East, Development of Australia's Natural Resources: Water (Melbourne: State Rivers and Water 
Supply Commission, 1954); and, LR. East, The River Murray Waters: Harnessing the Nile of Australia 
(Melbourne: State Rivers and Water Supply Commission, 1939). 
40 East, The River Murray Waters: Harnessing the Nile of Australia, p.10. 
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of suitable dam sites. 41 However, the costs involved in such works as well as the 
changeability of the watercourse (from accumulation of flood silt) presented significant 
limitations to New South Wales' pursuit of irrigation projects in this period of economic 
depression, and then recovery, before Federation.42 
Federation brought new possibilities for cooperation and jointly funded 
engineering projects along the Murray (and complicated potential irrigation along the 
Murrumbidgee). In the period leading up to Federation, and indeed throughout the 
drafting of the constitution, the south-eastern colonies debated the relationship between, 
and hierarchy of importance of, irrigation and navigation in the future of the Murray. 
* * * 
(Dis)unity: The Murray River and Federation 
Before he was Australia's official war historian, C.E.W. Bean wrote about the inland , in 
part focusing on the synergy between the wool industry and the Darling River in western 
New South Wales. He was writing in the first two decades of the twentieth century, at a 
time when government and national attention was fixed on irrigation and the Murray 
River. Yet, at the same time settler identity was rooted in the wool industry, floods, and 
droughts. Bean was self-conscious about this national context and wrote in order to 
describe the kind of living heritage of pastoralism in the west and the erratic flows of the 
Darling River, to urban Australians.43 Floods figured in Bean's accounts, especially in the 
series of newspaper articles that later became his book The Dreadnought of the Darling.44 
Bean invoked floods and droughts as fundamental to Australian pioneering identity 
formed over the previous century and urged Australians to remember their past and the 
41 McKinney, 'Intercolonial Water Rights as Affected by Federation', pp.237-239; and, Lloyd, Eicher Drought 
or Plenty, pp.178-9. Flood along the Murrumbidgee: see, Butcher, Gundagai, p.84. 
42 McKinney, 'Intercolonial Water Rights as Affected by Federation', pp.237-244; and, Lloyd, Either Drought 
or Plenty, p.179. 
43 C.E.W. Bean, 'Preface', The Dreadnought of the Darling, second edition, first published in 1911, (Sydney: 
Angus and Robertson, 1956), pp.vii-viii. Bean was brought up at Bathurst until the age of 10 (when his 
family moved to England) and was educated at Clifton and Oxford. After missing out on first class honours 
at Oxford he studied law, and arrived back in Australia at the age of 25. Not yet settled in a career he tried 
journalism, writing for the Evening Standard and London Spectator. Altho ugh Australia-born, Bean 
considered himself a 'new chum' in Australia. At the time he wrote the newspaper articles that were later to 
be published as the books On the Wool Track and The Dreadnought of the Darling, he was a journalist for the 
Sydney Morning Herald and Sydney Mail. K.S. Inglis, C.E. W. Bean: Australian Historian (University of 
Q ueensland Press: St. Lucia, 1970), p.9. 
44 Bean, The Dreadnought of the Darling, p. 155. 
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pastoralists. Bean linked the fortunes of pastoralists to the fluctuations of river flow, as 
well as the survival of river navigation at a time when irrigation looked to supersede it as a 
profitable use of river water. 
Navigation and irrigation were associated with two different types of settlements 
and industries. In essence, debates over navigation and irrigation were about which kinds 
of settlements and industries should be supported by governments through interstate 
river engineering. Navigation was linked closely with pastoralism and especially the wool 
industry, while irrigation promised the expansion of irrigated agriculture but within 
defined settlements, especially vegetable, fruit, and grain production (but also dairy 
farming). 
In the 1880s and 1890s the Victorian and South Australian governments were 
expanding irrigated agriculture, establishing the irrigation settlements of Mildura in 1886 
and Renmark in 1890 on the Murray (in partnership with the Chaffey brothers). Victoria 
had transferred its water rights to the Crown in the 1886 Irrigation Act in order to avoid 
the strictures of riparian law (imbedded in common law) and develop irrigation 
settlements.45 New South Wales waited to see the outcome of Victoria's move and 
followed suit in 1896 by passing the Water Rights Act. Despite this legal action, New South 
Wales was not wholly committed to irrigation. At a Constitutional Convention in 1898 
New South Wales delegate (Sir) Joseph Carruthers declared that, 'I pay little attention to 
the discussion today on the subject of irrigation, because irrigation is one of those things 
that may perhaps come in the distant future. At the present it does not present its 
possibilities to my mind with any great force'. 46 
Throughout the 1890s New South Wales remained uncommitted to irrigation 
and while it considered navigation important, it was not wholly committed to it either. 
Along with the effects of drought and the expansion of railways, inland river trade routes 
also worked against New South Wales government support for improving river 
navigation. Inland river trade routes had traditionally taken goods either to Victorian or 
South Australian river ports and out of the colony. Although agreements over 
intercolonial custom duties somewhat mitigated the financial losses to New South Wales 
from export revenue, New South Wales ultimately had little to gain from improved river 
45 English common law was implemented in Australia in 1824. It was based on both legislat ion and the 
application of legal precedent. Through common law, riparian rights were established to give riparian 
landholders rights to 'reasonable use' of water, but it was illegal for them to impede the flow to downstream 
users. 
46 Quoted in, Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.154. 
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navigation.47 The improvement of river navigation was, however, supported by sectors of 
the population, such as the politically influential Riverina graziers. 
Victoria's plans for irrigation and South Australia's interest in navigation led 
these two colonies into heated and lengthy debates with New South Wales over the use of 
Murray River water for seemingly incompatible industries. Both sought New South 
Wales' support and leverage against the other colony. The main channel of the Murray 
was entirely within New South Wales' jurisdiction, excepting only the southern end of 
the river in South Australia. When the boundaries of the colonies had been established, 
the Murray had become the border between New South Wales and Victoria, but New 
South Wales had retained sole rights to the river's water, which it frequently reminded 
Victoria about at intercolonial meetings. 48 
The development of the Murray for irrigation and/ or navigation was a 
contentious issue during intercolonial discussions. At the many Constitutional 
Conventions of the 1890s engineering works to regulate river flow along the Murray 
loomed large as a future issue between the federated states.49 Development of both the 
navigation and irrigation industries through r iver engineering required agreement and 
cooperation between the (future) states over development programs and the projected 
effects of changed river flows. South Australia and Victoria clearly favoured different 
industries. New South Wales increasingly supported irrigation, although it did so behind 
a veil of ambiguous arguments and uncooperativeness.50 
Lloyd has described New South Wales' position on navigation during the 
Constitutional Conventions as 'ambivalent' while its 'political leaders differed remarkably 
in their attitudes to irrigation'. New South Wales appeared to keep 'its options open' on 
navigation and irrigation, which frustrated both Victoria and South Australia: 'In the 
circumstances New South Wales' attitudes were often hard to follow, and Victoria and 
South Australia were perplexed by its frequent lack of logic and bellicose outbursts'.51 
47 See, SMH, 21 April, 1890, p.7. The battle between New South Wales and Victoria over the Murray early 
on focused on the proportion of river trade custom duties that went to each colony. For a summary of the 
history of this debate between New South Wales and Victoria and also South Australia over custom duties, 
see, Wright, 'The River Murray: Microcosm of Australian Federal History', pp.277-280. Territorial debates 
between the riparian states were also linked to ownership of Murray waters. See, Lloyd, Either Drought or 
Plenty, pp.152-154 
48 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plen ty, p. 153. 
49 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p. 152 and p. 154. 
50 Lloyd, Eicher Drought or Plenty, p. 154. 
51 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p. 154. 
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New South Wales refused to cooperate with Victoria over irrigation and with South 
Australia over navigation, giving little ground at intercolonial meetings. 
Yet, senior New South Wales government officials made detailed investigations 
into the way irrigation development might play out after federation, as well as how water 
use along the Darling River system might be affected by federation and interstate rights. 
Large scale river works required a 'watershed' perspective, as tributaries, along with the 
main channel flows , would need to be secured, harnessed, and controlled. Hugh 
McKinney, a pro-irrigation engineer, director of the New South Wales Water 
Conservation Commission, and Commissioner-in-Charge of the Murray River from 
1890, is widely credited with compiling the first map of the Murray-Darling Basin.52 The 
map was, however, titled the 'Drainage Area of the Murray River'. Terms such as 'the 
Murray river system' and 'the Murray river basin' came into common use in this period, 
and for decades afterwards referred to the whole Murray and Darling river system -
which historian J.M. Powell noted, reflected 'the spatial drift of the debate' about river 
engineering. 53 
The map, although compiled by 1891, was first published in 1900, as part of a 
paper by McKinney in the proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, titled 
'lntercolonial Water Rights as Affected by Federation'.54 McKinney had been instructed 
to compile the map by the Premier of New South Wales, Henry Parkes.55 In his paper, 
McKinney cautioned that the unified depiction of the basin 'was likely to give a very 
incorrect impression regarding the quantity of water which might be expected to flow off', 
which would vary from season to season, and year to year.56 The map also hid the 
variation in discharge rates between rivers. McKinney attempted to overcome the short-
comings of his map, shading in parts of rivers to indicate greater average discharge. The 
map also concealed the political limitations of managing the river system as a whole. 
52 J.M. Powell, The Emergence of Bioregionalism in The Murray-Darling Basin (Canberra: Murray-Darling Basin 
Commission, 1993), p.61; and, Proust, 'Learning From The Past For Sustainabiliry: Towards an Integrated 
Approach', pp.293-312, 'Appendix E, Hugh McKinney: A Colonial Engineer', p.301. 
53 Powell, The Emergence of Bioregionalism in The Murray-Darling Basin, p.64. 
54 McKinney, 'Intercolonial Water Rights as Affected by Federation', Plate V 'Drainage Area of the Murray 
River'; H.G. McKinney, 'Map shewing the drainage area of the Murray River. Prepared under special 
instructions from the Hon. Sir Henry Parkes, G.C.M .G, Premier of New South Wales'. 1891. MAP 
RM2462. National library of Australia. 
55 McKinney, 'Intercolonial Water Rights as Affected by Federation', p.234; McKinney, 'Map shewing the 
drainage area of the Murray River'. Parkes was Premier of New South Wales from 1872 to 1875, in 1877, 
1878 to 1883, 1887 to 1889, and 1889 to 1891. 
w McKinney, 'Intercolonial Water Rights as Affected by Federation', p.234. 
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Map 4.2 
H. G. McKinney's 1891 map of the Murray and Darling river systems. 
The dimensions of the original map are substantial (each of the four panels measures 
approximately 2 x 1.5 metres). Here, digital images of the panels have been cropped in order to 
give a sense of the whole map. As a result, sections of the map may not be to scale. 
[Top left, top right, and bottom right panels: 
H. G. McKinney, 'Map shewing the drainage area of the Murray River' [cartographic material]. 
1891. MAP RM 2462. National Library of Australia. 
Bottom left panel: 
H. G. McKinney, 'Map shewing the drainage area of the Murray River' [cartographic material]. 
1891. M3 806/1891/1. Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales.] 
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McKinney's paper analysed the likely effects of federation on the development of the 
rivers, especially the probable amplification of tensions between the need to treat the river 
basin as a unit for the development of irrigation and the political fragmentation of the 
basin. McKinney argued in favour of irrigation and proposed that navigation could be 
simultaneously 'augmented' by irrigation water storages.57 
McKinney further raised issues around federation as well as plans to establish an 
interstate commission. He argued that federal and interstate management of the inland 
rivers presented opportunities for New South Wales to pass on costs of works along the 
inland rivers, such as snagging and any navigation locks built along the Darling. Indeed, 
McKinney argued that the difficult question of improved navigation along the Darling 
could be passed entirely to the Federal government.58 He also raised some scenarios, 
however, about how interstate and federal management could limit the way New South 
Wales used the water from its rivers. New South Wales river waters, while flowing entirely 
within jurisdictional boundaries, were linked with the basin's river networks. Whilst 
admiring of Victoria's irrigation schemes, McKinney also pointed out the complications 
they presented for establishing interstate water rights. Victoria, and to a lesser extent 
South Australia, had established irrigation infrastructure and sanctioned water extraction 
from the Murray itself, and in Victoria's case large extractions along many Murray 
tributaries (such as the Loddon, Campaspe, and Goulburn rivers).59 These extractions 
would need to be factored into equitable water rights for each state. 
Although few interstate disputes had as yet arisen over the Darling and political 
attention focused on the Murray, McKinney foresaw potential problems that centred on 
the important role of floods through the Darling system: 'The very important part played 
by the Queensland tributaries in supplying floodwater to the river Darling and 
maintaining the facilities for navigation will render it necessary for the Inter-State 
Commission to watch the steps which may be taken to utilise these rivers to the greatest 
advantage'.60 Indeed, McKinney devoted much of his paper to the role of floods as a 
source of water supply for irrigation along many of the rivers within the basin.61 
57 McKinney, 'Intercolonial Water Rights as Affected by Federation', p.237. 
58 McKinney, ' Intercolonial Water Rights as Affected by Federatio n', p.245-246. 
59 McKinney, 'Intercolonial Water Rights as Affected by Federation', p.251-254. 
60 McKinney, 'Intercolonial Water Rights as Affected by Federation', p.251. 
61 McKinney, 'Intercolonial Water Rights as Affected by Federation', p.236-245. McKinney also argued for 
the benefits of 'natural irrigation' from intermittent floods along the Murrumbidgee, but that artificial 
flood irrigation could regularise flooding over limited areas of riparian land for the production of fodder 
crops such as lucerne and sorghum. McKinney, 'lntercolonial Water Rights as Affected by Federation', 
p.248. See also, Powell, The Emergence of Bioregionalism in the Murray-Darling Basin, p.32. 
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Engineering development of the rivers, including the Murray, would need to harness 
flood flows and drastically alter the hydrology of the rivers in order to achieve the goals of 
closer settlement irrigated agriculture. 
As Powell has argued, interstate debates over the Murray in the lead-up to 
Federation had 'degenerated into a muddle of 'pettifogging quibbles" in which state 
government '[p)arochialism triumphed time and again' .62 No definite resolutions were 
made about the Murray for post-Federation works. In the final form the Constitution 
took, Section 100 gave the states ultimate rights over rivers and waters within their 
boundaries, with Sections Sl(i) and 98 placing navigation under federal control. 
However, New South Wales and Victoria were concerned that if state usage of the waters 
for conservation and irrigation impeded navigation the clause may be invoked, in effect 
giving the Federal government power over irrigation. The New South Wales Governor, 
George Reid, moved to temper the federal navigation power, so it 'shall not abridge the 
rights of a State or its citizens to the use of the waters or rivers for conservation and 
irrigation'. As Lloyd points out, it was South Australia, the colony at the tail end of the 
system, that inserted the word 'reasonable' before 'use'.63 Section 100 was inserted to 
preserve the rights of the states.64 
Section 100 defined how the water could be legally used and thereby shaped 
scientific enquiry into, and public perception of, the rivers. Further, the Constitution 
dismantled English common law in Australia, with the 1912 Water Act completing this 
action with respect to water rights in New South Wales. In so doing the Constitution 
made way for an era of 'private water exploitation under public licence' and large 
. . . h 65 mterstate engmeermg sc emes. 
The Constitution also made provisions for an interstate commission, as 
anticipated by McKinney. Section 101 stated that: 'There shall be an Inter-State 
Commission, with such powers of adjudication and administration as the Parliament 
deems necessary for the execution and maintenance within the Commonwealth, of the 
provisions of the Constitution relating to trade and commerce, and of all laws relating 
62 Powell, The Emergence of Bioregionalism in the Murray-Darling Basin, p.60. 
63 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.162. 
64 Connell, Water Politics in the Murray-Darling Basin, p.50. 
65 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.124. 
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thereunder' .66 This section did not specify relevance to the use of river water, but as a 
source of both 'trade and commerce' related directly to it. 
* * * 
The RMC: Engineering and the Murray River Watershed 
Historian Don Wright has noted that '[t]he paradox of the Murray .... was that it did not 
only divide. It also united' .67 Although a political boundary and source of intense debate 
between New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia, the Murray often united those 
who lived along its banks.68 The drought which had crippled the pastoral industry along 
the Darling had also severely affected farmers along the Murrumbidgee and Murray. 
Towards the end of 1901, the drought intensified, prompting farmers to take matters into 
their own hands. Small lobby groups emerged along the Murray and Murrumbidgee, who 
campaigned for engineering works to ensure steady water supply to their drought-stricken 
properties. The smaller groups soon united into the pro-irrigation River Murray Canal 
League.69 
In order to lobby decision-makers directly, the League organised a conference and 
invited parliamentary representatives from districts in New South Wales and Victoria as 
well as state Premiers and the Prime Minister. At the conference, held in Cowra in April 
1902, the League delegates, mostly 'practical farmers', called for action to ensure a stable 
water supply for both navigation and irrigation and for the states to overcome their 
differences. 70 The conference resulted in the governments of New South Wales, Victoria, 
and South Australia establishing an interstate commission to investigate possibilities for 
water storages, irrigation, and improved navigation on the Murray. 
The interstate commission consisted of representatives from the three states. 
Despite the potential for the commission to implode through disagreements between the 
state commissioners, it finally established the primacy of irrigation over navigation. There 
was neither enough trade nor water to warrant the predominance of navigation. Although 
66 Helen Irving, The C entenary Companion to Australian Federation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 'Appendix 3', pp.443-461, p.458. 
67 Wright, 'The River Murray: Microcosm of Australian Federal History', p.283. 
68 Wright, 'The River Murray: Microcosm of Australian Federal History', p.281. 
69 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.181. 
70 Wright, 'The River Murray: Microcosm of Australian Federal History', p.281. 
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the needs of irrigation would be put first, the commission also recommended navigation 
locks be constructed along the Murray. It also recommended various dam sites for water 
storages to feed irrigation, with the cost of the structures to be shared between the 
states.71 
Wright noted that another important and lasting resolution of the commission 
regarding the Murray was that, 'the whole river system must be treated as a unit under the 
joint management of the three States'.72 However, the subsequent River Murray Waters 
Agreement and RMC rather consolidated a watershed administration around the Murray. 
Further, the upper Darling and its tributaries remained outside interstate policies. The 
Commission had discussed the basin in holistic terms, including the Darling and its 
tributaries. Its focus, though, remained on the Murray. The eventual River Murray 
Waters Agreement and RMC created a political and administrative gulf between the 
Murray and Darling systems, dividing the basin rather than uniting it. In 1915 the 
governments of New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia signed the River Murray 
Waters Agreement and two years later formed the RMC. Queensland and the upper 
tributaries of the Darling were not included in the Agreement or the RMC. Queensland 
had little development on , or future plans for, the Darling tributaries within its 
boundaries and its involvement seemed negligible. Further, New South Wales 
government reports had strongly advised against putting money towards expensive and 
fruitless irrigation projects and improved navigation on the Darling River. The upper 
Darling and its tributaries were treated merely as inconsequential Murray feeders, thrown 
into the shadows by the intense focus on the Murray itself. 
In some ways the focus of the RMC on the Murray River was a recognition of the 
hydrological differences between the Murray and Darling river systems. Although the two 
river systems shared a common river mouth, they were fed by seasonally different rainfall 
patterns, local weather, and other hydrological conditions. In part these differences led to 
the exclusion of the highly erratic upper Darling and its tributaries from the RMC and its 
focus on the Murray. However, the limited focus of the RMC also left the upper Darling 
and its tributaries open for both state-funded and private irrigation works in New South 
Wales and Queensland, unmediated by the interstate commission. This eventuated in the 
1960s and 1970s (see chapter six). In 1996 Queensland joined the RMC, which had been 
re-named the Murray-Darling Basin Commission in 1993, largely in order to address 
71 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, pp.181-183. 
72 Wright, 'The River Murray: Microcosm of Australian Federal History', p.281. 
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basin-wide rising soil salinity (that mostly stemmed from changed flood and river flows 
due to dams and water diversions for irrigation). 
Perhaps another consequence of the upper Darling's and its (especially western) 
tributaries' erratic flow and exclusion from the grand vision of the New South Wales 
government, was that local knowledge of floods developed in these areas over the next 
decades and the custodians of such knowledge were relied on by settlers, rather than state 
or federal knowledge gathering and flood warning networks. Such government resources 
were concentrated elsewhere. After New South Wales centralised flood aid and 
emergency responses in the 1970s, local residents and regional governments were to clash 
with state government officials over how to approach threatening floods (see chapter 
seven). 
Lingering disputes between competing use of the Murray for navigation and 
irrigation were resolved when the relevant states agreed, after 1917, to the canalisation of 
the river, as this would ensure irrigation supply without restricting navigation.73 Although 
New South Wales had not fully committed to irrigation in the lead-up to Federation, 
Victorian success, the possibility to establish a broader production base (with the prospect 
of more exports) and the potential to attract immigrants gradually brought the state more 
in to line with its southern neighbour after Federation. Lloyd has argued that '[a] crucial 
factor in the development of irrigation [in New South Wales] was the political drive for 
closer settlement ... The period from 1902- 03 to the outbreak of war in 1914 was very 
much the era of closer settlement in New South Wales'.74 A blossoming of irrigation 
settlements along both sides of the Murray and many of its tributaries followed 
Federation, including the establishment of the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area in 1906 in 
which McKinney was heavily involved.75 
In Victoria, the establishment of closer settlement irrigation was spearheaded by 
Elwood Mead, an American engineer who migrated to Victoria in 1907 to head the State 
Rivers and Water Supply Commission (SRWSC). The SRWSC was established in 1905. 
It abolished the regional Irrigation Trusts (with the exception of the Mildura First 
Irrigation Trust) which had managed localised water supply and were financially in debt 
to the government. Rural water supply was centralised by the creation of the SRWSC. 
Mead was an expert on irrigation with an international reputation and his work on 
73 Wright, 'The River Murray: Microcosm of Australian Federal History', p.282. 
74 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.184. 
75 Proust, 'Learning From The Past For Sustainability: Towards and Integrated Approach', pp.293-312, 
'Appendix E, Hugh McKinney: A Colonial Engineer', p.293 and pp.302-304. 
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irrigation settlements was regarded especially highly by Australian engineers. He was given 
the task of developing Victoria's water administration and engineering capabilit ies, in 
order that state policies of irrigated closer settlement could be fulfilled. Mead used the 
Commission's reach to resolve inefficiencies in water management and initiate and 
expand irrigation settlements. Under his leadership the SRWSC strengthened the links 
between closer settlement and irrigation in Victoria, aided by the 1904 Closer Settlement 
Act. Mead returned to America in 1915, where he later drew on his Australian 
experience, for example in his role in planning Californian government irrigation 
settlements. 76 
* * * 
American Connections 
After Federation, Australia increasingly looked to American irrigation and water 
management expertise to harness river flow, especially along the Murray, its tributaries, 
and (other) snow-fed rivers. Mead's employment by the SRWSC was part of an effort to 
learn from America's innovations in irrigation and water conservation technology and 
techniques, as well as ideas about the role of small irrigation settlements as a way to, as 
Powell wrote, 'further settlement expansion into marginal country' . 77 Previously, India 
had been Australia's primary international source of water management and engineering 
expertise.78 Colonial hydraulic engineers with experience in India were invited to 
Australia to consult on river engineering and were also hired into government water 
management departments. For example, McKinney had a decade of experience as an 
hydraulic engineer in India before his migration to Australia in 1880.79 New South 
76 Powell, Watering the Garden State, pp.150-167; and, J.M . Powell, 'Mead, Elwood (1858-1936)', ADB 
Online, htro://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/Al 00456b.htm?hilite= Mead, accessed 12 February 2009. 
77 Powell, Watering the Garden State, p.150. 
78 Historian Ian Tyrrell also explored Australia's turning away, in terms of international influence, from 
predominantly British Indian, to American expertise from the 1880s. See, Ian Tyrrell, True Gardens of the 
Gods: Californian-Australian Environmental Reform, 1860-1930 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 
p.121. 
79 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.119; and, Proust, 'Learning From The Past For Sustainability: Towards 
an Integrated Approach', 'Appendix E, Hugh McKinney: A Colonial Engineer', pp.293-3 12; and, Katrina 
Proust, 'McKinney, Hugh Giffen (1846-1930)', Bright Spares, 
http://www.asap.unimelb.edu.au/bsparcs/bio~s/P004573b.htm, accessed April 30 2008. 
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Wales' commissioning of Colonel Home to report on government irrigation and river 
navigation is another example. 
Alfred Deakin, Australia's 'Father of Irrigation', was enamoured of the status of 
the British engineer in India as 'a ruler of men'.80 However, it was American irrigation 
developments and management techniques that inspired his shaping of Victoria's 1886 
Irrigation Act. This Act overcame many limitations of common law on the development of 
irrigation and facilitated the establishment of the Mildura Irrigation Colony on the 
Murray in the same year by American entrepreneurs, the C haffey brothers.81 While 
Deakin admired the status of British engineers in India, by the 1880s they had become 
recognised figures of colonial autocracy and local repression. Historian Ian Tyrrell noted 
that emulating irrigation in India would undermine the public support required for 
government irrigation in Australia, needed to 'justify the expenditure of large sums of 
money' .82 Further, connections between Australia and western America were made, 
especially with California, as they shared similarities both in climate and in their colonial 
histories of land use. They were perceived by experts to face similar problems in 
developing irrigation, such as the exacerbation of soil salinity, and to be able to gain 
much from each others' experiences and expertise.83 
After the First World War, Australia drew even more on the United States of 
America (USA). Tyrrell has argued that Australia's increased modelling of the USA's 
irrigation and water conservation techniques from the 1930s was influenced by a closer 
convergence of government organisations. The establishment of the RMC in 1917, which 
facilitated federal intervention administratively and financially, made the country closer 
to the USA' s system, where federal intervention had seen the development of large 
engineering river projects that coordinated states' interests, such as the Mississippi River 
Commission (MRC) and later the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Similar 
80 Alfred Deakin, fndian Irrigation, quoted in, Heather Goodall, 'Digging Deeper: Ground Tanks and the 
Elusive Indian Archipelago', in Alan Mayne (ed), Beyond the Black Stump: Histories of Outback Australia (Kent 
Town, South Australia: Wakefield Press, 2008), pp.129-160, p.158. Goodall explores Deakin's ideas about 
irrigation in India. 
81 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.175; Tyrrell, True Gardens of the Gods, pp.121-143; Powell, Watering the 
Garden State, pp. 104-135; and, Proust, 'learning From The Past For Sustainability: Towards and Integrated 
Approach', pp.153-163. 
McKinney brought knowledge and ideas about the connection between irrigation and soil salinisation as 
well as the opportunities for irrigation in Australia, from Ind ia. See, Powell, The Emergence of Bioregionalism 
in the Murray-Darling Basin, p.80; and, Hugh McKinney, 'Irrigation In Upper India', Journal and Proceedings of 
the Royal Society of New South Wales, 17, 188 1, pp.139-148, especially, pp.146-8. 
82 Ian Tyrell, True Gardens of the Gods, p. 122; and, Proust, 'Learning From The Past For Sustainability: 
Towards an Integrated Approach', pp.153-163. 
83 Tyrrell, True Gardens of the Gods, pp4-5. 
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bureaucratic systems, Tyrrell implied, fostered exchanges of knowledge and techniques.84 
Further, during the inter- and post-war period the USA embarked on massive dam 
building projects for water supply, irrigation, flood control, and hydro-electricity that 
clearly marked it as the international leader in modern river engineering by the 1940s. 
Closer political alliances between the countries through the two world wars, and after, 
also favoured greater synergy over technology, expertise, and crops. 
Mead in turn applied his Australian experiences to America on his return. Ideas 
about water management and irrigation development did not flow one-way across the 
Pacific. For example, Powell has suggested that the SRWSC influenced the bureaucratic 
structure of the TVA, created in 1933.85 The watershed focus and interstate mediatory 
role of the RMC perhaps also influenced the TVA. The RMC's role had not been limited 
to particular issues, such as navigation and flood control (as the MRC's had), and it was 
able to coordinate (albeit in a somewhat makeshift manoeuvre) responses to inter-war 
concerns over the interrelationship of floods, eros ion, deforestation, and salinity, which 
the TV A also aimed to address.86 The TV A (as well as other large hydro-electric and 
irrigation supply dams in the USA) influenced the Snowy Mountains Scheme, and 
American engineers (along with engineers from other countries, such as Norway, Italy, 
Czechoslovakia, and Germany) were contracted to work on the scheme. 
In the inter-war and Cold War period Australia and America shared similar 
management frameworks and goals of government-backed irrigated closer settlement and, 
through that, national self-sufficiency. National food supply, population growth, land 
settlement, and power generation for manufacturing underlay the drive of both countries 
towards extensive irrigation programs and large water supply and hydro-electric projects. 
Both America and Australia created centralised watershed bureaucracies to foster 
irrigation and dam construction. Australia's connection to America can, however, be 
over-stated. Australian state water bureaucracies and the RMC continued to draw on a 
wide range of irrigation, water conservation, as well as flood management and warning 
84 Tyrrell, True Gardens of the Gods, pp.172-173. 
85 Powell, The Emergence of Bioregionalism in the Murray-Darling Basin, pp.48-50; and, J.M. Powell, 'Australian 
Water Marks: Resource-Environment Transactions in an Emergent Democracy' , in Marnie Leybourne and 
Andrea Gaynor (eds.), Water: Histories, Cultures, Ecologies, (Clawley: University of W estern Australia Press, 
2006), pp.53-66, p.6 1. 
86 Powell, The Emergence of Bioregionalism in the Murray-Darling Basin, pp.35-3 7. 
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technologies and techniques from many countries, including Britain, France, Italy, Egypt, 
The Netherlands, and, of course, India.87 
Further, post-war immigration brought people with a variety of skills, 
environmental knowledge, and expectations. Post-war immigration programs, that aimed 
to bring 70,000 new immigrants each year, were designed to increase Australia's national 
security through population growth and to increase the labour force. Programs targeted 
Europeans, many of whom had been uprooted by war. Immigrants from a variety of 
countries, such as The Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Poland, and Greece were placed or 
sought work with reconstruction projects in Australia such as the Snowy Mountains 
Scheme and as farmers in irrigation settlements.ss 
After the two world wars, which delayed major river works, irrigation along the 
Murray and many of its tributaries was boosted and secured by ambitious water storage 
schemes, including the Snowy Mountains Scheme. These major works were a result of 
joint funds and federal coordination. Through its mediatory role and involvement in 
irrigation and water supply, the RMC also emerged as an important research organisation 
and authority on the Murray River. 
* * * 
Australia began the new century and its nationhood with the germs of large-scale river 
engineering built into its very foundation. By the 1950s the Murray had become a highly 
regulated river. T he Hume Dam, Lake Victoria Reservoir, Snowy Mountains Scheme, five 
barrages on Lake Alexandrina blocking the Murray mouth, and 14 locks spanning the 
Murray were completed between 1915 and 1974, and all were at least under construction 
by the mid 1950s. In the 1950s faith in engineering was at a its zenith. Australia and 
other nation-states emerged from two world wars with nation-building programs that 
87 See, for example, R.A. Horsfall. 'International Commission on Irrigation (First Congress) and ECAFE 
[Economic Commissiom for Asia and the Far East] Conference on Flood Control. New Delhi, India. 
January, 1951. Report Submitted to the Commonwealth Government.', 28 February 195 1. 'International 
Commission on Irrigation (First Congress) [Report by Horsfall RA]'. VPRSl 1186/POOOl/10. Public 
Records Office Victoria. Advice from Dutch authorities was sought during the 1956 floods for draining 
irrigation lots: Letter from R. Fack (Dutch Embassy) to H. G. Raggatt (Secretary, Department of National 
Development). Folio 94. 'Flood Control - investigation of flood control and mitigation in the Murray 
Valley'. Item E1077 PART l. Series A987. National Archives of Australia. See also, Lloyd, Either Drought or 
Plenty, p.182; and, Proust, 'Learning From The Past For Sustainability: Towards an Integrated Approach'. 
pp. 153-163. 
88 J.M. Powell, An Historical Geography of Modem Australia: the Restive Fringe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), p.192 and pp.206-2 16. 
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aimed at national security, including military weapons testing, increasing immigration, 
and water and food security. In the post-war era, technological skill worked hand-in-hand 
with national security and advancement, within a context of fragile, global Cold War 
politics. State and national governments channelled money to the Snowy Mountains 
Scheme, which also promised to catapult Australia into international recognition for its 
engineering achievements and expertise. It was a national development project of 
unparalleled proportions. Engineers seemed to be rapidly moving towards the creation of 
the long desired stable river and nation. At the height of the engineering boom, their 
success was challenged by one of the largest floods since settlement. 
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Mildura and the Murray River 1956 
The Failure of Engineering 
In 1956 Ted Lawton photographed the Murray River in flood from the air. In his 
photographs irrigation farms are partially submerged by floodwater, the straight lines of 
agricultural growth just visible by the tops of citrus trees and vines protruding through the 
water. The places where levee banks hold back floodwater from farms and towns are 
clearly visible sharp edges. Lawton's aerial photographs are of the extensive floodwaters 
around the towns and irrigation areas of Mildura, Buronga, and Gol-Gol in north 
western Victoria and south western New South Wales. These areas are in the irrigation 
region known as Sunraysia, reliant on regular river flow for irrigation water supply. The 
photographs were taken in late-August, as the floods peaked. 
Lawton was not a professional photographer, but a Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) employee who had access to a camera through 
his work. He took the opportunity to photograph the floods . 1 His photographs are now 
valuable records, and part of a tradition of important work undertaken by CSIRO 
employees in their spare time.2 Lawton's photographs appear throughout this chapter. 
Along with his aerial photographs, Lawton documented the floods around Mildura and 
Red Cliffs on the ground. Many of these photographs are of Council workers and 
volunteers, who were building up levee banks in order to hold back the floodwater from 
homes, orchards, and machinery. These photographs were taken between one and two 
1 Ted Lawton, pers. comm., 31 August, 2006. 
2 Libby Robin and Leo Joseph, 'The Boom and Bust Desert World: A Bird's Eye View', in Libby Robin, 
Robert Heinsohn, and Leo Joseph (eds.), Boom and Bust: Bird Stories for a Dry Country (Canberra: CSIRO 
Publishing, 2009), pp.7-17. 
weeks before the flood peaked in the area. There is an air of urgen cy about the work 
being undertaken, the scale of the job at hand clearly evident in the masses of earth being 
moved to raise and reinforce the levee banks. The other main subjects of Lawton's 
photographs were the irrigation pumps and generator at Red Cliffs. The pumps fed 
irrigation farms in Mildura and Red Cliffs and became an important focus for local levee-
building efforts. If the pump and generator flooded, the irrigation season would be lost. 
They were a clear priority for a district reliant on irrigation. For many who lived along the 
Murray River, the 1956 floods were experienced as a local threat. They were also 
perceived as a failure of government engineering to create a stable river and to manage 
floods. 
Figure 5.1 
Aerial view of flooded Murray River in the Buronga area (New South W ales), near 
Mildura, 1956. 
[Ted Lawton, 22 July, 1956, Mildura Library.] 
In 1956 settlers experienced the first, and to date the only, basin-wide floods since 
colonisation. The Darling and Murray rivers and their tributaries all flooded in that year. 
Pulses of water were sent through the catchments for ten months, with final peaks in the 
Murray in July and August, and the Darling in late August and early September. The 
floods along the Murray created social and political upheaval that came to focus on the 
effects of regulation on r iver flow, responsibility for the floods, and future flood 
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mitigation and management. Occurring in the post-war development era and at the 
height of national faith in engineering, particularly in hydraulic engineering, the flood 
shattered expectations of successful harnessing and control of the inland rivers. 
The 1956 floods were seen as a failure of engineering on the Murray and 
exacerbated tensions between government and settlers over responsibility for flood 
mitigation and expert knowledge, river flow, and aid. Regulation shaped settler 
conceptions of the rivers. Those along the Murray were experiencing one of the most 
dramatic inter- and post-war environmental interventions, the regulation of the Murray 
simultaneously for drought mitigation, navigation, irrigation, and hydro-electricity. Dam 
building was part of an almost world-wide post-war pursuance of progressionist 
development that provided employment for the unemployed and immigrants, new 
production bases and symbols of nationalism. It was underwritten by a renewed faith in 
human ability and technology. 
The 1950s was a crucial decade of change in Australia. Political and 
environmental historian Nicholas Brown has argued that this decade bears 'a particular 
weight as a point of separation between an old and a new Australia'; from 'an Australia of 
class, hardship, Empire and assertive nationalism' to 'the cultural diversity, the 'quality of 
life' issues, the protest movements and the liberations of the 1960s'.3 This chapter adds 
environmental weight to Brown's analysis of the 1950s. It was not a period in Australian 
history that was conservative and static. Rather, the evidence of this chapter supports his 
argument that it was a decade of transition. 
The Murray had been dammed and diverted by settlers since the 1850s. However, 
twentieth century engineering projects had a significant impact on the river, transforming 
it into a 'regulated river' in just one generation. By 1956, watershed management systems 
heralded a new kind of relationship between settlers and the rivers. The seasonal flows of 
the Murray River were reversed for irrigation needs and eastward flowing rivers turned 
westward by the Snowy Mountains Scheme. The fearless ideologies of control and 
management that underlay the construction of river engineering had expression in the 
construction of dams and irrigation planning and farming. Such ideologies were rooted 
in ideas of holistic, watershed manipulation. It was an era when large-scale enterprises, 
3 Nicholas Brown, Governing Prosperity: Social Change and Social Analysis in Australia in the 1950s (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.2. 
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'bigness', commanded national and international respect - both in the size of dams and 
control over entire river systems.4 Big achievements promised 'great rewards'.5 
The scale and financial cost of the projects on the Murray - with costs shared 
between the relevant states and the Commonwealth - drew on an important aspect of 
Federation: Commonwealth funds and federal mediation between the states. 
Cooperation to construct engineering schemes, involving the three states that laid claim 
to parts of the Murray (Victoria, New South Wales, and South Australia) and its 
tributaries, was facilitated by Commonwealth coordinated organisations with state 
representatives.6 The River Murray Commission (RMC) and Snowy Mountains Hydro-
Electric Authority (SMA) were both jo int federal/ state organisations. One of their 
primary interests was to ensure water security to state government-backed soldier and 
closer settlements along the Murray and its tributaries, which were mainly irrigation 
settlements. The dams were built to control and secure river flow, to ensure there was 
water in the river at the right times for citrus and vine cultivation (and for other irrigation 
crops) and to minimise the effects of drought. 
Drought mitigation was a dominant environmental imperative behind the 
construction of the Hume Dam and other regulatory structures built on the Murray and 
its tributaries in the inter- and post-war periods, ensuring water supply to planned 
irrigation settlements and (initially) controlling Murray water levels for navigation. 
Harnessing snowmelt and small flood flows was an important aspect of controlled water 
supply on the Murray, but no specific flood mitigation strategy was included in any dam 
designs before 1956. Although the Murray River had flooded periodically (such as in 
1870, 191 7, and 192 7), it was rather experiences of drought and the possibilities for 
irrigation (including increased population and production), that dominated settler and 
government desires for engineered works. Flood mitigation was not included in the 
designs for the Hume Dam nor, later, for the Snowy Mountains Scheme. The 1956 floods 
revealed to settlers on the Murray and to Federal and state governments flaws in 
engineering; indeed , the 1956 floods on the Murray River were seen as a failure of 
engineering. 
4 Right Honourable Lord [Richard Gavin Gardiner) Casey, 'Preface', in Lionel Wigmore, Struggle for the 
Snowy: The Background of the Snowy Mountains Scheme (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp.v-vi, p.v. 
5 Right Honourable Lord [Richard Gavin Gard iner) Casey, 'Preface', p.v. 
6 In referring to Murray River tributaries in this thesis, the Darling (sometimes seen as the major Murray 
tributary) and its tributaries are excluded and will be referred to as 'the Darling and its tributaries'. 
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In an era of 'bigness', the 1956 floods conformed. A later RMC report estimated 
that the floods in the Murray watershed covered approximately 1.75 million acres (as in 
the floods of 1870 and 1917) - it was one of the largest floods along the Murray in terms 
of peak heights and submerged area.7 Government investigations into flood mitigation 
following the 1956 floods concentrated on possibilities for mitigating large floods; 
however, the floods also became intertwined with other issues of flood management, 
including emergency aid and river management. 
Even in its failure, the engineering that scaffolded the river became the frame 
through which the 1956 floods were understood and reflected upon. Settlers were 
concerned not only that mitigation now be addressed but that a watershed-wide 'flood 
control authority' be established, that addressed mitigation through dams and other 
methods, issued warnings, and provided immediate aid. The key question is: could 
engineering, a watershed approach, and a more centralised management framework, 
provide security against floods generally, and large floods in particular? 
I focus on the Victorian state government's response to the Murray River floods. 
Victoria had larger areas under irrigation than either New South Wales or South 
Australia and was using the most Murray water for irrigation. Settler and newspaper 
accounts from the irrigation district of Mildura on the lower Murray, and retrospective 
memoirs, provide the key sources, along with the Mildura regional newspaper, the 
Sunraysia Daily. Mildura was (and remains) the heart of the largely irrigated fruit-growing 
district of Sunraysia, which spans parts of north-western Victoria and south-western New 
South Wales. Mildura, located on the Victorian side of the Murray and near the river's 
junction with the Darling, was at a crucial convergence point for floodwaters. There, 
settlers experienced floods from both rivers. The town was a centre from which farmers 
lobbied state and Federal governments after the flood. Mildura, then, provides a uniquely 
cross-jurisdictional perspective into different aspects of the flood The photographs taken 
in Mildura and Sunraysia are also important for this analysis. 
I explore how the floods were experienced as a failure of engineering by settlers on 
the Murray who relied on (and expected) the security of a controlled river; and by Federal 
and state governments which funded, constructed, and controlled major engineering 
infrastructure. Settlers blamed the governments for not delivering the environmental 
security promised by dams, irrigation, and government river regulation authorities. Most 
7 G.L Harrison, 'Report on the River Murray Flood Problem (with particular reference to the 1956 flood)', 
River Murray Commission, 1957, p.12. 
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dramatically, settlers as well as members of parliament called into question the 
effectiveness of the Australian constitution to adequately manage a river system that 
crossed borders. State governments were seen not to have provided sufficient mechanisms 
to protect settlers from erratic river flow and many looked to hand flood control to the 
Federal government. 
In order to better understand the context in which the 1956 floods occurred, I 
begin with a brief account of the establishment of Mildura and the nearby townships of 
Red Cliffs and Merbein, some of the philosophies behind the establishment of irrigation 
settlements and dams and the role of government water management bureaucracies, 
particularly the Victorian State Rivers and Water Supply Commission (SRWSC), River 
Murray Commission (RMC), and Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority (SMA). 
* * * 
Mildura, Irrigation Settlements, and River Management 
Mildura is a small town situated on the Victorian bank of the Murray River. Two satellite 
towns, Red Cliffs and Merbein, are located near Mildura, to the east and west 
respectively. Together they form the centre of a large irrigation and pastoral district 
associated with the Murray in north-western Victoria. This area also forms part of the 
regional, irrigated fruit-growing and manufacturing district of Sunraysia, which also 
includes part of south-western New South Wales (including Wentworth). Each of these 
townships was established as an irrigation settlement and together they represent 
successive approaches to irrigation by the Victorian government. The Chaffey Brothers 
Irrigation Company, a government-supported private enterprise, laid out Mildura on a 
grid site plan as an irrigation community in 1887. The American brothers had earlier 
succeeded in establishing profitable irrigation settlements in California. Encouraged by 
Victorian politician Alfred Deakin, they founded Mildura and also Renmark in South 
Australia in 1886. The Chaffey Brothers experienced near bankruptcy in 1893 following a 
drought, economic depression in the eastern colonies and a Royal Commission into 
operations at Mildura, after which settlers ran Mildura irrigation and finances regionally, 
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under the Mildura Irrigation Trust Act.8 Merbein was established by the SRWSC in 1909 as 
an Irrigation Trust settlement under the highly influential Water Act 1905 and Murray 
Settlements Act 1907 (that aimed to provide a legal mechanism for the establishment of 
closer settlements in the Mallee region). Red Cliffs Estate was established as a Soldier 
Irrigation Settlement in 1919-20.9 
Map 5.1 (above) 
Current map of Mildura, Merbein, Red C liffs, and the wider Mildura district. 
[From: Mildura Rural City Council, 'Our Region', 
http://www.mildura.vic.gov.au/ Page/page.asp?page Id= 167, accessed 7 August 2009.] 
Map 5.2 (right) 
Current map of the Sunraysia region. 
[From: Mildura Development 
Corporation, Grow Mildura Region, 
http://www.growmilduraregion.com. 
au/mildura region.php, accessed 7 
August 2009.] 
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8 Peter Westcott, 'Chaffey, George (1848-1932)', Australian Dictionary of Biography (ADB) Online, 
http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A070609b.htm?hilite=Chaffey%3BGeorge, accessed 20 October 
2008. The Royal Commission investigated charges that the Chaffey brothers were illegally charging for 
water use. 
9 J.M. Powell, Watering the Garden State: Water, Land and Community in Victoria, 1834-1988 (Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 1989), pp. 146-147, p.150, pp.167-170, and p.150. 
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Under the Water Act 1905 the SRWSC was created to coordinate existing 
Irrigation Trusts, create new irrigation settlements, and manage rural water supply in 
Victoria. Irrigation settlements called for a particular type of engineering which involved 
district planning as well as hydraulic engineering. Mildura, although a planned irrigation 
settlement, did not fall into this category of government district irrigation planning as it 
was established earlier, though many of the same principles still applied. Merbein and 
Red Cliffs were, however, included. The SRWSC became the 'author' of distinctly 
engineered industrial landscapes in parts of rural Victoria, designing Closer and Soldier 
Settlement irrigation schemes, including Merbein and Red Cliffs. State governments, as 
well as being key players in the erection of dams, played a significant and related role in 
developing irrigation, including the establishment of closer and soldier settlement 
schemes in New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia. States were active 
participants in what J.M. Powell has termed 'landscape authorship'. '0 Settlers built canals 
and installed pumps according to state surveys and planning authorities, authoring 
distinctly engineered landscapes divided into blocks within a mood of national faith in 
progress and engineering. 
The SRWSC worked closely with interstate and federal dam construction and 
regulatory organisations such as the RMC and SMA. The relationship between dams and 
irrigation settlements was an important consideration in holistic river system regulation, 
particularly as soldier settlements were being established in the inter- and post-war periods 
when construction of regulatory dams, such as the Hume (completed in 1936), were 
being initiated on the Murray River. Irrigation settlements were also river regulators, as 
they controlled the flow of water into blocks for prime seasonal timing. Irrigation 
effectively meant that parts of the land were artificially flooded, regularising inundation. 
The SRWSC was responsible for formulating adequate irrigation networks that would 
not damage the water channels, yet cater for growers' requirements. What was formulated 
was effectively an irrigation settlement template that took into consideration the type of 
crop, administrative capacity, rainfall, temperature, and soil type. 
SRWSC mechanical and civil engineer Robert Allan Horsfall published a paper in 
1950 titled 'Planning Irrigation Projects' in the Australian journal of the Institution of 
10 Powell, Watering the Garden Stace, p. 177. See also, R. Wright, The Bureaucrat's Domain: Space and che Public 
Interes t in Victoria, 1836-84 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
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Engineers. 11 At the time Horsfall was assistant chief designing engineer with the 
Commission and his Australian Dictionary of Biography entry notes that he 'exerted 
considerable influence in the investigations and designs branch'. 12 In his paper he 
brought together SRWSC data from 1940 to 1950, presenting a study of the logistics of 
irrigation planning in Victoria. Horsfall selected eight settlements as comparative 
examples of irrigation planning in different regions of the state, one of which was Red 
Cliffs. The kind of crops grown in the settlements determined the size of the blocks and 
their seasonal water requirements. In Red Cliffs in 1950, 94 percent of irrigated crops 
were vines, requiring a fairly consistent water supply with a couple of breaks for 
harvesting (in June/ July and late February/early March). Red Cliffs, Mildura, and 
Merbein were all described in this article as 'compact irrigation systems', formed from 
smaller blocks, which would support viticulture. 13 Red Cliffs, with an average block size of 
16 acres, was unusually compact, with the 1950 planning for vine-growing in the area 
using 20 to 25 acre block dimensions as a rule. 14 Engineers aimed to balance block sizes 
(for the maximum number of settlers) with the water capacity of channels. Therefore, 
despite variations in crops and environments, general rules applied and it was these that 
interested Horsfall. 
One of the rules for irrigation settlements Horsfall described, was that they were 
divided into self-contained sections under supervision of a bailiff, and then into 
subsections of irrigation canal networks. The planning rationale was that each bailiff 
could only oversee a certain amount of irrigated land and settlers, and so the settlement 
plan was in part administratively determined. The subsections, linked by canals, served to 
spread out water extraction as each subsection (labelled A, B, C and so on, or 1, 2, 3) 
took its turn extracting water from the main channel on a rotational basis. 
11 R.A. Horsfall, 'Planning Irrigation Projects', The Institution of Engineers, Australia, Journal, 32, June 1950, 
pp.129-139, p.136; and, R. Wright, 'Horsfall, Robert Allan (1909-1974)', ADB Online, 
http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/Al40564b.htm?hilite=Horsfall, accessed 13 October 2008. 
Horsfall had travelled to India in 1951 as the SRWSC delegate to the International Commission on 
Irrigation (First Congress) and E.C.A.F.E Conference on Flood Control. See, R.A. Horsfall. 'Internat ional 
Commission on Irrigation (First Congress) and ECAFE [Economic Commissiom for Asia and the Far East] 
Conference on Flood Control. New Delhi, India. January, 1951. Report Submitted to the Commonwealth 
Government.', 28 February 195 1. 'International Commission on Irrigat ion (First Congress) [Report by 
Horsfall RA)'. VPRSl 1186/POOOl/10. Public Records Office Victoria. 
12 Wright, 'Horsfall, Robert Allan', ADB Online. 
u Horsfall, 'Planning Irrigation Projects', p.136. 
14 Horsfall, 'Planning Irrigation Projects', p.130. 
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Settlers in each section could then receive the necessary water within the small windows 
of about 21 days allowed for extraction by dam releases. 15 Each section was planned to 
support 7 5 to 100 settlers, depending on block size and crops. In the 1880s, the Chaffey 
brothers used a similar method of planning their Mildura and Renmark settlements, 
laying them out in A, B, C (and so on) blocks which were self-contained sections. 16 While 
the principles were not new - indeed the administrative model was not unlike ancient 
systems in China - the technology was, and irrigation water was now delivered along the 
river as dam-controlled releases. 17 Irrigation and dams, along with navigation locks, 
changed the Murray into a regulated river, altering the riverine environment as well as 
engineering the authorship of industrial landscapes, which altered local floodplain 
environments. 
Dam controlled irrigation was seen as a way of combating erratic rainfall, as well 
as a way of increasing settlement. Horsfall wrote in support of irrigation: 
The important point, which is not always fully appreciated, is that irrigation supplies are 
available at regular intervals throughout the season, and, in general, the correct amount 
of water can be supplied when it is most needed. On the other hand, rainfall tends to be 
either a feast or a famine, and, in fact, 12 inches depth of controlled irrigation in eight 
months is likely to be much more effective than the same amount of rain falling at regular 
intervals over the same period. 18 
Engineering could ensure regular water supply and overcome the uncertainties of rainfall 
variation. Irrigation networks and dams established systems of carefully controlled water 
usage and distribution. The precise amounts that were needed (factoring in evaporation 
and loss to vegetation) could be calculated from dam to settler. Droughts were further 
factored in to the long-term calculations for water storage as the Snowy Mountains 
Scheme (which began construction in 1949) planned to connect the Snowy River to the 
Murrumbidgee as well as other headwater streams and the Murray, so that water could be 
d istributed evenly between the rivers by opening or closing the darns. 
15 For example in Robinvale, Horsfall, 'Planning Irrigation Projects', p.138. 
16 See, for example, Chaffey Brothers and, E.W. Cross and Sands & McDougall Limited. 'Plan of 
subdivision of blocks D, E, & F. Mildura, irrigation colony of Victoria' [cartographic material). 1887. 
htq>://nla.gov.au/nla.map-rm3656, accessed 16 June 2009. National Library of Australia. 
17 Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American W est (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985). 
18 Horsfall, 'Planning Irrigation Projects', p.134. 
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Since the 1930s the Hume Dam has been the primary regulatory structure for 
irrigation releases along the Murray. Initiated in 1919 and completed in 1936, the Hume 
was built as a joint venture between the Victorian and New South Wales governments. 
Construction was overseen by the RMC. The RMC was also responsible for the operation 
of the dam and, therefore, for the release of the majority of irrigation water for down-
stream Victorian and New South Wales farmers. The RMC was the earliest Australian 
federal/ state cross-border, watershed-defined, bureaucracy. While not specifically a 
construction authority, the RMC required the states to submit plans for engineering 
structures within the Murray catchment (including the Murrumbidgee) for approval. 19 
Through the expertise and research of its members and its watershed focus the RMC also 
became an important authority on the hydrology of the Murray watershed. The 
Commission installed river gauges at different points along the Murray to mon itor its 
flows and was involved in research into other aspects of hydrology, such as soil erosion.20 
Indeed, the commission issued many of the flood warnings in 1956, although such 
warnings lay outside its formal duties. 
The Snowy Mountains Scheme, which began construction in 1949, was envisaged 
as an engineering masterpiece of post-war reconstruction: an intricate system of dams 
would feed the Murray and Murrumbidgee irrigation industries and harness the regular 
seasonal snowmelt for hydro-electricity. Hydro-electricity would supply an increasingly 
consumer-oriented society with electricity and power for the production of new materials, 
such as aluminium (used in aeroplanes).21 Historian George Seddon has drawn attention 
to another underlying motive for the massive engineering scheme: to utilise Australia's 
water resources to the maximum. The use of water resources on the dry continent needed 
to be maximised.22 Post-war Australia aimed at national security, including food 
production, and the Snowy was an integral part of this plan as it would create a stable 
river for agricultural farming. Whilst a product of post-war anxiety, it was also part of the 
1950s self-conscious drive towards modernity, following the examples of America's 
massive water diversion and hydro-electric projects, such as the Hoover Dam, dams along 
19 LR. East, The River Murray Warers: Harnessing the Nile of Australia (Melbourne: State Rivers and Water 
Supply Commission , 1939), p.4. 
20 See, J.H.O. Eaton, A Short History of the River Murray Works (Adelaide: River Murray Commission, 1947), 
p. 19 and pp.46-4 7; and, John Merritt, Losing Ground: Grazing in the Snowy Moun rains, 1944-1969 (Canberra: 
Turalla Press, 2007), p.22. 
21 Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American Wesr and Its Disappearing Water (New York: Penguin Books, 
1993, first edition 1986), pp. 161-162. 
22 George Seddon, Searching for the Snowy: An Environmental History (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1994). See 
also, Powell, Watering the Garden State, pp.248-249. 
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the Mississippi River and the Tennessee Valley weirs.23 Indeed, the Snowy Mountains 
Scheme's Commissioner, Sir William Hudson, recruited experienced hydro-electric 
engineers from America.24 
The project was vested with national pride. Hudson articulated the importance of 
the scale of the project, which was 'teaching us ... to think in a big way ... to be proud of 
big enterprises'. 25 Seddon likens the impact of the Scheme to the Gallipoli myth in the 
rhetoric of heroism that surrounded it. It was also similar in the public unity and support 
it generated, and sense of national pride. 26 Environmental historian John Merritt recently 
recalled that in the 1950s '[v]irtually every Australian knew something about the dams 
and tunnels in the mountains that would boost the country's electricity supply and make 
the Riverina a vast food bowl - even, as the author can attest, school children in far off 
W estern Australia'. 27 The Scheme also attracted international attention for its 'complexity 
and size'.28 It was a symbol of post-war prosperity and is still referred to as 'the greatest 
engineering scheme in Australian history' . 29 
Within this highly engineered landscape that aimed to produce a more 
pred ictable, stable river, and within a mood of national faith in techno-culture, the 1956 
floods amorphously moved through the Murray and Darling river systems, over dams, 
threatening irrigation areas. 
* * * 
Rivers, Rain, and Flow 
Flooding in 1956 was caused by a series of floods that cumulated to cause an optimal 
peak in each area. All the rivers and tributaries of the Darling and Murray rivers were in 
23 Ian Tyrrell has documented early Australian and American (especially Californian) exchanges of 
irrigation techniques, water management bureaucracy, knowledges, and engineers. See, Ian Tyrrell, True 
Gardens of the Gods: Californian-Australian Environmental Reform, 1860- 1930 (Berkeley: Universiry of 
California Press, 1999). 
24 John Merritt, Losing Ground: Grazing in the Snowy Mountains, 1944-1969 (Canberra: Turalla Press, 2007), 
pp.59-60. 
25 Quoted in, Seddon, Searching for the Snowy, p.36. See also, Right Honourable Lord [Richard Gavin 
Gard iner) Casey, 'Preface', and Sir William Hudson, 'Foreword', in Lionel Wigmore, Struggle for the Snowy: 
The Background of the Snowy Scheme (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp.v-vi and pp.vii-ix. 
26 Seddon , Searching for the Snowy, p.36. 
27 Merritt, Losing Ground, p.59. 
28 Merritt, Losing Ground, p.59. 
29 
'The Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Scheme', Australian Bureau of Statistics, www.abs.eov.au, accessed 
18 January 2007. 
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flood during 1956. Each tributary experienced localised floods and also, in most cases, a 
series of peaks. If the total area of the Murray and Darling systems is taken into account, 
floods were occurring from January until November, with the major peaks in the Murray 
in August and in the Darling in September. The floods were nebulous, spreading, 
peaking and pulsing through the watershed in irregular bursts and cumulative waves. 
Rainfall in April along both major rivers dramatically increased river heights, contributing 
to higher floods in August and September. In January 1956 the rivers and their tributaries 
were already high from heavy rainfall and flooding throughout the Darling and Murray 
watersheds in 1955, so that relatively little rain in 1956 could cause them to rise.30 The 
story begins not when the river broke its banks in Mildura, but when the rain began to 
fall, in Queensland. 
1955 had been a wet year in Queensland. Rain had flooded parts of the state 
several times in the first half of that year, including the central west. In the last weeks of 
January 1956, a monsoonal trough moved southward, swelling the already full Mcintyre 
and Condamine rivers. By February the Mcintyre and Condamine catchments were so 
waterlogged that the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) recorded a 100 percent runoff rate, 
causing increased flooding from relatively minor amounts of rain (25 to 100 millimetres). 
Each rain burst over the watersheds sent pulses of water down the rivers so that three 
flood peaks were recorded at Goondiwindi on the Mcintyre River in one month, on 7, 
11, and 20 February.31 
Rain in Queensland extended west in February and was still falling in July when 
reports reached the BoM that the Warrego was 13 kilometres wide at Cunnamulla, while 
the Paroo and Balonne were also in serious flood. Evacuations were already underway on 
the Warrego in April, though many pastoralists stayed to save isolated stock.32 
The water moved southward with the gradient, towards New South Wales and the 
Darling River, where the Queensland rivers combined. With water flowing down the 
rivers in irregular bursts, towns in northern New South Wales experienced several floods 
over a number of months. The February rains from the north flowed past Bourke in 
30 See, H.G. Bond and C.J. Wiesner, 'The Floods of February 1955 in New South Wales', Australian 
Meteorological Magazine, 10 September, 1955, pp. l-33. 
31 
'Queensland Flood History', Bureau of Meteorology, 
http://www.bom.gov.au/hydro/flood/gld/fld history/floodsum 1950.shtml, accessed 18 January 2007; 
and, A.T. Brunt, 'The Record Floods in Southeast Queensland, January 1956', Australian Meteorological 
Magazine, 15 December, 1956, pp.12-30. 
32 
'Queensland Flood History', Bureau of Meteorology, 
http://www.bom.~ov.au/hydro/flood/qld/fld history/floods um 1950.shtml, accessed 18 January 2007 . 
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March, and the Darling peaked in the town on 22 and 23 March at 45 feet 1 Yz inches.33 
More water flowed from Queensland, combining with rain in the new host state to cause 
two more flood peaks in Bourke before the year ended, in June (about 39 feet) and early 
August (about 45 feet).34 
The water flowed west over the floodplains, as well as south. The Darling River, 
drifting westward from Bourke, enters country with even less gradient and the floodwater 
slowed, spreading out to fill lagoons carved by past idle floods. The flood peaks gained on 
each other, and water spread across the floodplains so that Menindee, unlike Bourke, 
experienced two smaller flood peaks, one in April at 33 feet, the other on 2 September at 
3 3 feet 4 Y2 inches. 35 
With a flood crisis threatening Menindee, a developing irrigation town (that 
housed a number of soldier settlers) within the Sunraysia district, the Darling flood 
entered the pages of the Sunraysia Daily, published in Mildura. On 23 April the 
newspaper reported that roads between Wentworth and Menindee had been cut and 
that: 'Rising Darling River floodwaters are threatening to isolate Menindee, 100 miles 
north of Wentworth'.36 With a rise of six inches in 24 hours around Menindee, due to 
high river flow and local rain, the newspaper reported that in the town '[m]ore than 15 
families have been forced from their homes' to live in 'tents and lean-to buildings on high 
ground'. The article described the water's transformation of not only social conditions, 
but also of the landscape: 'Water to the east of Menindee now spreads over that country 
in a huge sheet more than 10 miles wide', also filling large lakes to the south.37 The water 
kept rising, though more slowly, putting pressure on levee banks built around homes on 
the outskirts of the town until, on 30 April, water broke through, forcing more 
evacuations. More banks were breached on 3 May.38 The water kept moving south but 
there was still enough time to prepare for the Darling flood entering the Murray; 
however, those on the Murray were preoccupied elsewhere. 
* * * 
33 Harrison, 'Report on the River Murray Flood Problem', p.19. 
34 Harrison, 'Report on the River Murray Flood Problem', p.19. 
35 Sunraysia Daily, 25 April, 1956, p.3; and, Harrison, 'Report on the River Murray Flood Problem', p.19. 
36 Sunraysia Daily, 23 April, 1956, p.2. 
37 Sunraysia Daily, 25 April, 1956, p.3. 
38 Sunraysia Daily, 30 April, 1956, p.2; and, Sunraysia Daily, 3 May, 1956, p.2. 
217 
The Murray River Floods 
The Murray was flooding independently, irrespective of water entering the lower parts of 
the river from the Darling. The Murray, as well as the Darling, had flooded in October 
1955 and the river and its tributaries were still high.39 By April 1956 the Murray was 
flowing past Mildura at seven times its 'normal flow'.40 Rainfall had continued over many 
parts of the Murray in the first months of the year and in May heavy rain over the 
watershed further increased the flows of the already swollen rivers. An atomic bomb test 
on Monte Bello Islands (130 kilometres off the northern Western Australian coast) on 16 
May was thought to have affected the weather on the mainland, changing the movement 
of weather fronts and increasing rain. The test created a radio-active cloud that drifted 
north towards the continent, before dispersing into the atmosphere.41 The Sunraysia Daily 
reported on the following day that the bomb's impact may be speeding weather fronts 
towards Mildura. The Weather Bureau in Melbourne had predicted the depression to 
move over Mildura at 9am on 17 May, ' [h]owever', the newspaper reported, 'indications ... 
were that the front would be here well ahead of that time'. 42 The following month a 
report by researchers at Adelaide U niversity indicated that rain across South Australia 
had tested radio-active (radio-active rain was recorded as far away as Brisbane). However, 
the South Australian government argued it to be ' impossible' that the recent atomic test 
was the cause.43 An opinion column in the Sunraysia Daily in July reveals continu ing 
concerns over the effects of the May test, and a subsequent test on 19 June (also at Monte 
Bello Islands), asserting that '[t]hroughout Australia, people are asking whether the A-
bomb tests have anything to do with the weath er's behaviour'. Despite the assurances of 
politicians and many scientists, the writer of the article thought that 'the masses ... will... 
blame the atom-bombs every time it rains and we plough through ankle-deep mud in our 
streets'.44 
By 14 April floodwater from the upper Murray was reported to be travelling past 
Euston, posing a threat to the renovation of the Red Cliffs water pump pipes operated by 
39 Sunraysia Daily, 4 October, 1955, p. l; Sunraysia Daily, 5 October, 1955, p. l; and, Sunraysia Daily, 19 
October, 1955, p.5. 
40 Sunraysia Daily, 17 April, 1956, p.3. 
41 Sunraysia Daily, 15 May, 1956, p. l ; and, Sunraysia Daily, 17 May, 1956, p. l. The Monte Bello tests were 
conducted by British authorities with Australian assistance. 
42 Sunraysia Daily, 17 May, 1956, p. l. 
43 Sunraysia Daily, 6 June, 1956, p. l. 
44 Sunraysia Daily, 9 July, 1956, p.4. 
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the SRWSC which, along with a State Electricity Commission (SEC) generator, 
distributed irrigation water to the district.45 Engineers had removed parts of the Mildura 
navigation lock, succeeding in lowering the river's height by 8 inches at the pump and 
generator site. It was hoped that the removal of parts of the regulatory strucntre (which 
acted as a dam, raising the height of the flood) would help to reduce the flood height 
around Red Cliffs, and avoid damage to the important irrigation infrastrucnire. However, 
the Sunraysia Daily reported, '[t]here was a danger that the level of the Murray River could 
not be dropped sufficiently to avert flooding at the Red Cliffs pumps, Mildura lockmaster 
(Mr H. J. Phillips) said last night'.46 The SRWSC engineer at the pump asserted that it 
was now up to the RMC to order the closure of the Euston lock to save the pump works, 
or he would have to build a levee bank.47 
Lockmaster Phillips was also concerned that releasing more water from the 
Mildura lock by opening valves or removing the remaining sections, while potentially 
lowering the water locally, could increase the overall flood at Wentworth, a town located 
downstream at the junction of the Darling and Murray rivers. He was quoted as saying, 
' [w]e couldn't put too big a stream on top of Wentworth because they've got a big Darling 
running and we didn't want to flood them out by dropping another foot of water on 
them'.48 Regulation of the Murray put people in this flood in a very direct way, where 
they were partially responsible for the direction and height of large amounts of 
floodwater. Flooding at the pump was averted, for the moment, with the river level 
stabilising, albeit at a high level, in the following days. 
By 17 April anxiety over the rising Darling and Murray water, and a merging of 
the floods, was building. The Sunraysia Daily drew attention to the precarious position of 
Wentworth, located at the junction of the rivers (Map 5.2). Wentworth was, in a sense, 
being cornered on each side by floods. At the same time further large floods were being 
predicted on each of the two rivers. The Darling was receiving almost continuous run-off 
from rain throughout the watershed. The Murray was also taking on water from the 
flooded Lachlan and Murrumbidgee rivers, which entered the Murray between Euston 
and Swan Hill. In addition, a system of marshy wetlands, Billabong Creek (connected to 
45 Sunraysia Daily, 14 April, 1956, p.2. 
46 Sunraysia Daily, 14 April, 1956, p.2. 
47 Sunraysia Daily, 14 April, 1956, p.2. 
48 Sunraysia Daily, 14 April, 1956, p.2. 
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the Murray at the same place) was flooding.49 With all the rivers high and the land water-
soaked, water was not being absorbed. 
On 27 April, RMC Executive Engineer Geoff L. Harrison announced that the 
remainder of Mildura lock would be removed, along with locks at Wentworth and 
Euston, to 'flatten out' the river and release water pressure.so The removal of the three 
weirs aimed to reduce flood heights along that stretch of river.st It was also preparation 
for increased Murray flows in two weeks' time.sz The weirs remained out of the Murray 
and the river peaked, fell, and peaked again.s3 
By 10 May the Darling flood was entering the Great Anabranch and attention 
turned to getting 'the approaching high water through the [Great] Anabranch without 
breaching any of the dams across the stream'. All dam gates had been opened over the 
previous months in preparation and officials made plans to divert floodwater into large 
lakes to reduce the overall flood peak.s4 However, dams blocking the entrance to Pepie 
and Yellow lakes could not be saved and 'were expected to break'.ss The lockmaster at 
Mildura assured readers of the Sunraysia Daily that 'it was unlikely that the Darling water 
would have any effect on the Murray upstream'.56 Knowing that the floodwater was 
coming, graziers along the Great Anabranch moved their stock to higher ground. s7 
Aerial surveys of the rivers revealed the extent of the water, being described as an 
'inland sea' in a newspaper report published on 23 June. The report described a pilot's 
experience of western New South Wales and Victoria. The pilot was Alan D. Matthews, 
chief pilot of Sunraysia Air Taxi Service. He was hired by graziers to carry out searches for 
lost and stranded stock from 'the floods of three rivers' , the Darling, Murrumbidgee and 
Murray. Matthews had carried out searches for 14 graziers from the Balranald area in the 
past week. With the Murrumbidgee '40 miles wide in places' and the Murray and Darling 
in flood, ' thousands of acres' of grazing country was now 'an inland sea dotted by small 
islands which in normal times were grassed sandhills'. These pockets of high land became 
49 Sunraysia Daily, 17 April, 1956, p.3. 
50 Sunraysia Daily, 25 April, 1956, p.2; Sunraysia Daily, 28 April, 1956, p.2; and, Sunraysia Daily, 10 May, 
1956, p.3. 
51 Sunraysia Daily, 25 April, 1956, p.2; Sunraysia Daily, 28 April, 1956, p.2; and, Sunraysia Daily, 10 May, 
1956, p.3. 
52 Sunraysia Daily, 28 April, 1956, p.2. 
53 See, Mitta Mitta River: Sunraysia Daily, 19 April, 1956, p.l; Wangaratta/Ovens River: Sunraysia Daily, 20 
April, 1956, p. l; and, Avoca River: Sunraysia Daily, 18 May, 1956, p. l. 
54 Sunraysia Daily, 10 May, 1956, p.3. 
55 Sunraysia Daily, 15 May, 1956, p.2. 
56 Sunraysia Daily, 16 May, 1956, p.3. 
57 Sunraysia Daily, 17 May, 1956, p.3 . 
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filled with both domestic and wild animals. Matthews described the scene: 'It became 
common to see 30 or 40 wild pigs, together with a similar number of emus and 
kangaroos, sharing the islands with sheep and cattle'. The graziers and Matthews agreed 
that as long as there was enough grass on the islands all would be well between the 
different species, and the stock could stay there until the flood fell. Some islands were 
bare, however, and in one case 300 hundred sheep were rescued by boat so that they did 
not starve. Similarly, 20 to 30 head of cattle were found and swum through the flood to 
land with more vegetation. The aerial taxi service enabled graziers to locate stock relatively 
easily and to judge their welfare. The article reported that neighbouring graziers, 'some 
who had no idea of the extent of the flooding on their own properties', pooled their 
resources, going up 'three at a time to do aerial surveys of their properties' .58 The RMC 
later advised that undeveloped floodplains were beneficial in reducing the amount of 
water being channelled by the rivers. Floodplains (such as Barmah Forest), billabongs, 
lakes and anabranches were seen as successful areas of 'temporary storage' for floodwater 
and it was recommended these not be built in by levee banks or other flood mitigation 
works.59 
Although Mildura was not yet declared to be officially in flood, the Sunraysia Daily 
told of distant and nearing devastations. The Murray continued to rise with many places 
in the upper regions experiencing prolonged inundation, causing damage and dangerous 
conditions. In Ballarat, the Sunraysia Daily told regional readers, a Maryborough 
policeman perished while attempting to save sheep from the water. He had overturned a 
boat, throwing others in his group into the turbulent water. The others reached shore but 
Constable W. J. Harnetty was last seen being swept downstream caught in a current.60 In 
New South Wales, the Murrumbidgee River was in high flood by June, and 2,000 people 
were evacuated from Wagga to a nearby evacuation centre that month. The New South 
Wales State Emergency Services (SES) were stationed in the town, organising and 
distributing supplies to evacuees, while Army 'ducks' did rounds of the town to rescue 
stranded residents. 61 By 2 July the water was receding in the town, but many people 
remained homeless.62 
58 Sunraysia Daily, 23 June, 1956, p. l. 
59 Harrison, 'Report on the River Murray Flood Problem'. p.14. 
60 Sunraysia Daily, 17 May, 1956, p. l. 
61 Sunraysia Daily, 29 June, 1956, p. l. 
62 Sunraysia Daily, 2 July, 1956, p.2. 
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The floods, while slow in rising in a cumulative sense, at some places arrived in 
localised bursts. In Charlton in mid-May muddy water from the 'raging Avoca River' 
swirled across pavements and into shops and homes. Although some residents had sand-
bagged their properties the water seeped through. The town prepared to build levee banks 
in anticipation of further flooding. Pastoral losses were believed to be 'minimal' as stock 
had already been moved to higher ground.63 
On 19 and 20 May, river flats between Mooroopna and Shepparton on the 
Murray flooded severely and eight Aboriginal families (40 people) were rescued by police. 
Shepparton itself flooded on 21 May.64 However, the Sunraysia Daily reported that 
prospects of large floods at Wentworth had lessened.65 There was 'no cause for concern' 
as the town was protected by permanent levee banks and the Wentworth Town C lerk 
pointed out that, 'provided the river rose no higher than the 1950-51 peak no part of 
Wentworth was exposed to danger'.66 
All the rivers continued to rise and predictions of the peak heights of the 
cumulating floods were reassessed. By the end of June, Wentworth's situation once more 
appeared critical. The National Emergency Services regional officer stated that, '[w]e have 
to get the [sand] bags and build levee banks now while we still have time', the flood at 
W entworth now being predicted as 'the worst ... for 25 years'. 67 On 20 June a photograph 
of Wentworth, taken by Mildura photographer Frank Zaetta from the air, appeared in the 
Sunraysia Daily. The town was entirely surrounded by water, 'isolated' .68 The floods were 
turning out to be more serious than predicted a month earlier. In the same edition the 
newspaper reported that, contrary to earlier predictions, the Murray was likely to flood to 
the 1955 level, although the 'peak date [was] uncertain' .69 By July the levees that protected 
W entworth were beginning to crumble and volunteers were engaged in a 'battle' to hold 
the embankments.70 
That month the flooded Ovens River created an 'inland sea' around 
W angaratta.71 Other major Murray tributaries, including the Mitta Mitta, Goulburn, 
Edward, Avoca, and Lachlan rivers, and Billabong Creek, continued to feed floodwater 
63 Sunraysia Daily, 18 May, 1956, p. l. 
64 Sunraysia Daily, 2 1 May, 1956, p. l. 
65 Sunraysia Daily, 22 May, 1956, p.2. 
66 Sunraysia Daily, 22 May, 1956, p.2. 
67 Sunraysia Daily, 28 June, 1956, p.2. 
68 Sunraysia Daily, 20 June, 1956, p. l. 
69 Sunraysia Daily, 20 June, 1956, p.2. 
70 Sunraysia Daily, 3 July, 1956, p. l. 
7 1 Sunraysia Daily, 10 July, 1956, p. l. 
222 
Chapter 5 - Mildura and the Murray River 1956 
into the main river, as rain kept falling over many parts of the catchment. Along the 
Murray many towns, including Echuca and Nathalia, were evacuated by the Army as 
levees broke and floodwater entered residential areas. In irrigation regions, such as Swan 
Hill, thousands of acres of farm land went under water.72 By 18 July, 1,100 families in 
New South Wales, South Australia, and northern Victoria had been flooded out of their 
homes.73 
In the irrigation settlement of Robinvale settlers reinforced levees, attempting to 
save their homes, crops, and the irrigation pump from the rising water.74 Within the 
district the timber huts of several Aboriginal families were flooded. Fourteen tents were 
borrowed from the Army to temporarily house the families. These tents were eventually 
bought by the Victorian Flood Relief Committee (established in September 1956) and 
given to the families. 75 Downstream, Lockmaster Phillips warned Mildura residents in 
June that '[t]here's so much water on the way that it is difficult at this stage to say just how 
much we will get here, but there is every possibility that we will reach last year's peak'.76 
* * * 
Mildura, Red Cliffs, and Merbein 
The floods were building around Mildura throughout April and May, and the region 
itself received twice the average May rainfall.77 Although by the end of May water 
surrounded the nearby township of lraak 'Island', so nicknamed because of its isolation 
during even the smallest flood, and in early June pictures of the flooded lawns near 
Mildura lock were described as a 'familiar sight', Mildura was not declared officially 
flooded until 14 June.78 For Mildura to be officially flooded the level the river needed to 
72 Sunraysia Daily, 11 July, 1956, p.l; and, Sunraysia Daily, 11 July, 1956, p.2. 
73 Sunraysia Daily, 18 July, 1956, p. l. 
74 Sunraysia Daily, 1 August, 1956, p.5. 
75 Victoria Police. General Police. Form No.4 7. 'Flood Relief 1956 General File'. Inward Correspondence 
Files. Item 64/3703. VPRS 1163/P008/5. Public Records Office Victoria; letter from Brigadier in Charge 
of Administration to the Secretary, Premier's Department, Victoria. 30 April, 1957. 'Flood Relief 1956 
General File'. Inward Correspondence Files. Item 64/3703. VPRS 1163/P008/ 5. Public Records Office 
Victoria; and, 'Floods (1956) Relief Committee. Report and Statement of Account'. Appendix 1. 'Flood 
Relief 1956 General File'. Inward Correspondence Files. Item 64/3703. VPRS 1163/ P008/ 5. Public 
Records Office Victoria. 
76 Sunraysia Daily, 20 June, 1956, p.2. 
77 Sunraysia Daily, 2 June, 1956, p.2. 
78 Sunraysia Daily, 26 May, 1956, p.2; and, Sunraysia Daily, 7 June, 1956, p.l. 
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reach was 22 feet. On 14 June it reached 22 feet and 2 inches, after sitting just below the 
mark for several days.79 By 18 June, in the nearby town of Pomona, flood levels had 
reached the '19 31 level' and the water around Mildura rose steadily. 80 Permanent levees 
around roads near Mildura, which had been reinforced the previous year, were increased 
and again reinforced from June by shire workers as water lapped at the base.81 
On 28 June Murray floodwater, which had received the majority of the 
Murrumbidgee floods, reached houses in Red Cliffs and '[m]ore than six families [were] 
forced from their homes near the Red Cliffs Pumping Station' .82 Hail pelted the region 
the same day, damaging crops and hindering levee work. 83 In the Mildura districts, levee 
banks and sandbags were seen to be the only possible way to keep floodwater out of 
properties and infrastructure. It was these walls against the water that shire council 
workers concentrated on and that began to dominate reports in the Sunraysia Daily.84 The 
main areas that the Mildura Shire Council aimed to protect by increasing the 1955 levee 
bank by three feet were the sewerage farm, glasshouses and crops on irrigation blocks, as 
well as vulnerable parts of the town.85 
The Council could not meet the expenditure of the new levees because it had 'not 
expected a repetition' of the previous year's floods. Emergency action in 1955, such as 
building levees, had cost £4,000, leading the Council to request aid from the state 
government at the time.86 By July 1956 the Council was estimated to have spent 
'thousands of pounds' on levee work for the year. Council workers were being paid 'big 
money for working 12-hour shifts, both day and night, in shocking conditions'. 
Machinery such as trucks and bulldozers wore out, needing maintenance or replacing. 
Council workers had 'moved more than 229,000 cubic yards of dirt to build miles of 
levee banks with equipment that had a plant rate of about £5 an hour' . T he question 
became, 'who pays for it all?' .87 
While money was an issue, the availability of building materials and labour 
became more significant. In Mildura, radio appeals for volunteers went out along with 
requests for Army equipment and sand bags on 8 July, when the water rose dramatically 
79 Sunraysia Daily, 14 June, 1956, p. l. 
80 Sunraysia Daily, 18 June, 1956, p.2. 
81 Sunraysia Daily, 19 June, 1956, p.3. 
82 Sunraysia Daily, 28 June, 1956, p.5. 
83 Sunraysia Daily, 28 June, 1956, p.3. 
84 Sunraysia Daily, 3 July, 1956, p. l. 
85 Sunraysia Daily, 4 July, 1956, p.2. 
86 Sunraysia Daily, 14 October, 1955, p.3; and, Sunraysia Daily, 6 July, 1956, p.3. 
87 Sunraysia Daily, 18 July, 1956, p.3; and, Sunraysia Daily, 10 July, 1956, p. l. 
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in a matter of days.88 The flood had moved from a shire council matter to a community 
threat. The paper reported a response of 200 volunteers and 1,000 bags, with men 
working through the night under hurricane lamps to fix a seeping bank and women 
forming an 'amenities squad' that supplied tea, coffee, and food. Shire employees worked 
overtime too, operating bulldozers only 'by the light of their headlamps'. Members of the 
8/7 Infantry Battalion in the Mildura district also volunteered.89 
Army equipment arrived quickly. Personnel set up a walkie-talkie system to 
coordinate levee building efforts and repairs to breached banks. An Army 'duck', flares, 
and other equipment were also supplied by the military.90 Army jeeps were used to 
transport sand bags from the Mildura bridge area, where they were filled, to the far end of 
the bank that protected farms, as the road had turned to mud and become impassable to 
trucks. The initial support of volunteers dwindled, however, as the weekend call for help 
was not carried through to the beginning of a working week, with only a reported 50 
turning up on Monday.9 1 Over the next weeks reports of the flood reaching record 
heights brought continual, if reduced, aid from volunteers. 
Rain continued throughout July over many parts of the Murray, including 
Wentworth and Mildura, bringing cold temperatures and causing delays to levee work.92 
On 11 July the Sunraysia Daily reported that 'river men', such as Mildura Lockmaster 
Philips, were predicting the flood would 'at least equal the 1931 level of 35 ft 3 ins'. At 
the time of the report the flood was over 33 feet at Mildura.93 On 13 July, the Sunraysia 
Daily reported the anticipation of the flood's peak along major stretches of the Murray: 
'Vic. Flood Near Peak: Watch On Levees', a headline ran. The Murray would peak within 
a week from Echuca to Swan Hill and 'close watches were kept on miles of levee banks 
protecting hundreds of homes', while downstream towns in Victoria and South Australia 
were starting to flood.94 The Murray had still not received all the water from its tributaries 
and places like Echuca were yet to feel the intake from the Goulburn River, while 
Deniliquin on the Edwards River was already a tent-town.95 
88 Sunraysia Daily, 9 July, 1956, p. l. 
89 Sunraysia Daily, 9 July, 1956, p.2; and, Sunraysia Daily, 10 July, 1956, p.2. 
90 Sunraysia Daily, 10 July, 1956, p.2. 
91 Sunraysia Daily, 10 July, 1956, p.2. 
92 Sunraysia Daily, 12 July, 1956, p.2. 
93 Sunraysia Daily, 11 July, 1956, p.2. 
94 Sunraysia Daily, 13 July, 1956, p. l. 
95 SunraysiaDaily, 14July, 1956, p. l;and, SzmraysiaDaily, 16July, 1956,p.l. 
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Mildura Migrant Centre was converted to an evacuee centre, preparing to take up 
to 1,200 people seeking refuge from the flood.96 Evacuees from surrounding districts were 
also housed at the centre. Indeed, Mildura became a regional base for Army aid and 
equipment, such as rescue teams on Army ducks which were deployed to nearby areas, 
including Wentworth and other New South Wales towns, as they faced crises.97 Mildura 
also formed the centre of a Flood Emergency Committee, established in July to 
coordinate relief within parts of the Sunraysia district. Importantly, the committee was 
formed to address personal losses and the needs of settlers on both sides of the Murray 
River, centring on the Mildura and Wentworth shires. The committee, chaired by 
Mildura Mayor R. R. Etherington, included local members of the Victorian Parliament, 
representatives of the City and Shire Councils of Mildura, representatives of the town of 
Wentworth, the Army, the Commonwealth Irrigation Department, the Victorian 
Education Department, the Victorian Police Department, SRWSC, Australian Red 
Cross, Country Women's Association, and other local bodies.98 The evacuee centre in 
Mildura was directed by the Flood Emergency Committee, and police worked to 
transport those flooded from their homes to the centre, which averaged 229 evacuees 
over four and a half months.99 
The Committee was initiated on the suggestion of Victorian Assistant Minister for 
State Development and Decentralisation, Alexander John Fraser, who argued for a cross-
border approach in the district on humanitarian grounds: 'If we have to give assistance to 
NSW [New South Wales] people it will be done without quibble, and in the spirit of good 
fellowship - the costs can be worked out later'. 100 An opinion piece in the Sunraysia Daily 
pointed to another potential benefit. Through the Committee the district could present a 
united front and 'be able to speak with one voice when seeking outside assistance', 
particularly, the article continued, 'when dealing with the Government' .10 1 The article 
implied that in the aftermath of the flood, regional solidarity could increase the district's 
chance for government financial aid to individuals and reimbursement to the shire 
96 Sunraysia Daily, 30 July, 1956, p.2; and, Sunraysia Daily, 10 August, 1956, p.3. 
97 Sunraysia Daily, 9 July, 1956, p.2. 
98 
'Victorian Floods (1956) Relief Committee. Report and Statement of Account', pp.4-5. 'Flood Relief 
1956 General File'. Inward Correspondence Files. Item 64/3703. VPRS 1163/ P008/ 5. Public Records 
Office Victoria. 
99 
'Victorian Floods (1956) Relief Committee. Report and Statement of Account', pp.4-5. 'Flood Relief 
1956 General File'. Inward Correspondence Files. Item 64/3 703. VPRS 1163/ P008/5. Public Records 
Office Victoria. 
100 Sunraysia Daily, 28 July, 1956, p.3. 
101 Sunraysia Daily, 28 July, 1956, p.2. 
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council. The formation of the committee reflected the cross-border nature of the flood, as 
watersheds became an organising principle for response. Further, the Committee was 
formed by representatives from areas that were bound by industry (irrigated fruit-growing) 
and vicinity, rather than government districts (states). Indeed, the Committee attempted 
to override the administrative limitations of state boundaries, as Fraser's comments 
indicated in his response to the emergency. The committee was, at the same time, 
inflected with boundaries of governance, reflected in its membership which was partly 
based on shires, and included various representatives of state departments and federal 
(Defence Force) members. In some ways it echoed the interstate and federal cooperation 
over the Murray watershed for hydraulic engineering and irrigation, formalised and 
developed over the preceding decades through the RMC and SMA. 
Mildura's airport became an important asset during the floods, allowing the fast 
delivery of supplies to threatened and flooded districts. For example, the RAAF 
distributed 13,000 sand bags to Wentworth from Mildura, after they were flown on a 
Dakota aircraft from Sydney. 102 Although water surpassed the 1931 flood level in the 
Mildura district at the end of July, Mildura township, built on high ground and with 
several levees, looked as though it would not flood. 103 However, Mildura's tourist 
industry, the district's second largest industry after dried fruit production, d id suffer. 
Hoteliers and others who benefited from tourism, faced with cancellations from 
'misleading Press reports' of the danger posed to Mildura, met to consider ways of 
marketing the floods to tourists, such as tours of flooded areas. '04 Mildura township was 
an exception, however, as other places in the district faced devastating damage to 
irrigation and pastoral properties. The New South Wales side of the river experienced 
worse flooding, as the steep riverbanks near Mildura caused high water rises on the 
opposite side of the Murray. 105 
Directly opposite Mildura, residents of the New South Wales irrigation area of 
Buronga had built extensive levees around the town, irrigation properties, and glass 
houses (where mostly tomatoes were grown). Some of these embankments reached up to 
20 feet in height and held back 19 feet of water.106 At the end of July major sections of 
toz Sunraysia Daily, 2 August, 1956, p. l. 
103 Sunraysia Daily, 26 July, 1956, p. l. 
104 Sunraysia Daily, 11 July, 1956, p.2; Sunraysia Daily, 12 July, 1956, p.2; and, Sunraysia Daily, 23 July, 1956, 
p. l. 
105 Harrison, 'The River Murray Flood Problem', p.19. 
106 Sunraysia Daily, 14 July, 1956, p. l. 
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levees were breached, and more threatened to topple. Homes and 17 5 glasshouses, 
comprising 'half the town' were flooded in the area and crops worth £120,000 were 
ruined. 107 Before the levees broke, farmers had considered breaching the levees 
themselves or flooding the glasshouses used for growing tomatoes. They hoped to limit 
damage to the expensive glasshouses by slowing the velocity of floodwater, which would 
be greater if the levee was left to break of its own accord under the pressure of the flood 
or crashed against the fragile, insubstantial glasshouses. 108 It was collectively decided not 
to breach the levee. This decision was reached through a vote by residents, including glass 
house farmers and market gardeners, and counting '24 Italians', who were told of the 
plan through an interpreter. 109 A few days later the levees were breached by the 
floodwater and, while the force of the water was strong, many glasshouses looked as 
though they might survive. However, anticipated breaches in remaining levees could 
release greater force. On 30 July Harrison (RMC Executive Engineer) inspected the area 
and warned remaining residents to evacuate before more levees broke. He argued that, 
'[h]owever distasteful it is to advise the abandonment of homes and crops, it is felt that 
the safety of human lives should be the first consideration'. 110 
Figure 5.4 
A worker patrols a levee at Curlwaa, New South Wales, during the 1956 
floods. A close watch was kept for breaches and weaknesses in levees. 
[Ted Lawton, 15 August 1956, Mildura Library.] 
107 Sunraysia Daily, 30 July, 1956, p. l. 
108 Sunraysia Daily, 20 July, 1956, p.2. 
109 Sunraysia Daily, 21 July, 1956, p. l. 
110 Sunraysia Daily, 30 July, 1956, p. l. 
228 
Chapter 5 - Mildura and the Murray River 1956 
* * * 
Red Cliffs Water Pump and Generator: Protecting Irrigation Infrastructure 
The SRWSC water pumps at Red Cliffs which fed the area's irrigation networks, became 
an important focus for volunteers around Mildura. 111 The Red Cliffs pump, built 
alongside the generator, was close to the river. m Mildura and Red Cliffs were closely 
connected in 1956, as Mildura relied on Red Cliffs' SEC run generator and SRWSC 
water pump to supply irrigation networks. Although the SRWSC and SEC had been 
building levees to protect the machinery, sharp rises in the river level meant that there 
was a renewed danger that the flood would rise faster than the levee could be built. In the 
last days of July, the SR WSC and SEC requested help from volunteers and the response 
was immediate. The generator and pump attracted the largest number of volunteers 
(reaching over 300) in the district during the flood, showing a clear priority for a district 
reliant on irrigation. 113 
If the generator and pump were flooded, the irrigation season would be lost. 
Regulation of the river influenced local experiences of floods in this area. The technology 
of regulation was a focal point of shared community interests. Levee bank building was 
the favoured way to combat rising floodwater, as shire employees were shuffled from one 
levee bank to another along the river frontages of Merbein, Mildura, and Red Cliffs. 
Volunteer labour, however, remained focused on the Red Cliffs generator and pump site. 
'Blockies', or irrigation block holders, comprised the majority of this volunteer work 
force. Blockies, so called because of the squares of irrigated land they occupied, invested 
time, tools, and machinery into building the banks, forming 'crash gangs' based on cores 
of old battalion comrades, now soldier settlers. The initial distribution of where and 
when each gang was going to work was published in the Sunraysia Daily. 114 Efforts towards 
building the bank became a 24 hour-a-day project in the final days before the peak of the 
flood, volunteers dividing their time between the communal focus and their own 
properties. 
111 Sunraysia Daily, 3 1July,1956, p.2. 
112 Sunraysia Daily, 3 1 July, 1956, p.2. 
113 Sunraysia Daily, 1 August,1956, p. l ; and, Sunraysia Daily, 4 August, 1956, p.2. 
114 Sunraysia Daily, 3 August, 1956, p.2. 
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There were about fifteen days between the arrival of volunteers at the pump and 
generator, and the peak of the flood on 13 August. Volunteers and SEC staff supplied a 
labour force; however, the availability of machinery and tools became a source of concern 
at Red Cliffs and along many other parts of the Murray. 115 In the Sunraysia Daily an 
opinion piece by journalists argued that because each district was facing its own crisis 
there was nowhere for settlers to turn for help and extra equipment. The article blamed 
the governments, stating that 'there is no authority in a position to take overall control... 
It is a fault of the system in providing essential services, and one which all governments 
must take immediate steps to remedy' .116 The opinion piece was validated a few days later 
when the newspaper reported that in the township of lraak people thought everyone else 
was in more trouble than they were and so did not ask for help. 'Now', the article stated, 
'floodwater has taken most of their crop' .117 lraak 'Island' had gradually reduced in area, 
from 350 acres to 20 acres by 11 July. Some settlers decided to stay, one stating '[a]s long 
as we get three meals a day, a bed to sleep in, a nd we can pay our way, we'll stay'. Snakes 
sought refuge on the 'island', forty being killed in one week. After a child 'narrowly 
escaped an attack by a 4ft 6in reptile', all children but one were evacuated. 118 
The Army, and by association the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and Navy, 
became the main point of contact for areas requiring equipment and labour. 119 Resources 
usually reserved for battle were common sights in Mildura; camouflage nets being placed 
down the slopes of the levee banks to cushion the lapping, eroding water; troops setting 
up walkie-talkie short wave radio communication systems along the line of the banks; and 
Army 'ducks' transporting stranded machinery and live stock to higher ground. 120 In 
Renmark, South Australia, where the flood peak was expected to be higher than in 
Mildura, Army presence was greater, with, amongst other things, a military mobile 
kitchen brought in to help supply food to those working on the main levees. 
Army aid during floods in Australia only began after the end of World War IL It 
could be argued that Army involvement in relief operations was part of an attempt by the 
Federal government to find a civil role for an extended military force after the war. In 
post-war United States of America the government had similarly positioned the Army in 
115 Sunraysia Daily, l August, 1956, p.4. 
116 Sunraysia Daily, 1 August, 1956, p.4. 
117 Sunraysia Daily, 9 August, 1956, p.2. 
118 Sunraysia Daily, 11 August, 1956, p.2. 
119 Sunraysia Daily, 2 July, 1956, p. l; Sunraysia Daily, 9 August, 1956, p. l; and, Sunraysia Daily, 9 August, 
1956, p.2. 
no Mary Chandler, '56 Memories Flood Red Cliffs (Mildura: Sunnyland Press, 1996), p.9, p.12, and p.3 1. 
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civilian life by placing river regulation under the control of the Army Corps of 
Engineers. 121 Australia did not exactly follow the American example in terms of river 
management. With a surplus of well-trained personnel and innovative equipment, 
however, the Army was used for civil welfare in situations that were not strictly military. 
In New South Wales, the State Emergency Services (SES), established as a volunteer 
organisation for Civil Defence during the Cold War, was mobilised to aid threatened 
regions. Post-war security networks, already organised for emergency response, became 
important sources of aid in other kinds of 'national disasters', particularly floods (and also 
during bushfires). Victoria similarly had a civil defence organisation, the Civil Defence 
Directorate. However, in the 1950s the Directorate remained small and, unlike the New 
South Wales organisation, remained focused on mobilisation in the event of a war until 
the 1960s.122 This may be the reason why it was not involved in the 1956 floods. 
The Mildura district received substantial aid during the flood. The Army, along 
with the SRWSC, SEC, and Commonwealth government prioritised the highly 
productive irrigation area, diverting equipment from other places to help protect the 
pump and generator and the irrigation season. 123 The SEC sent employees from around 
Victoria to ensure technical support to local staff. The SEC dedicated its August-
September Journal to the Red Cliffs-Mildura attempt to save the generator. 124 
Indeed, the plight of Red Cliffs pumping station attracted the attention of the 
Chairman of the SRWSC, Lewis Ronald East. In a memorandum distributed on 2 
August to SRWSC officials, East made it clear that protecting the pumps was of the 
highest priority for the Commission during the floods . The district generally was to 
receive special attention. East emphasised 'the importance of safeguarding pumping 
stations' and instructed 'any mechanical plant required for levee construction or levee 
strengthening at Red C liffs, Merbein or Robinvale ... to be made available from other 
works regardless of the effect of taking such plant on the progress of these works'. The 
Red Cliffs pump received even more favour. East explained to his colleagues that he had 
121 See, John McPhee, The Control of Nature (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1989). 
122 
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personally telephoned a local SEC employee, Eric Larsen, at the pumping station at Red 
Cliffs. East told Larsen that 'the Commission regarded the protection of the pumping 
plants as having the highest priority ... The Commission was prepared to send to Red 
C liffs whatever equipment and resources might be needed'. Larsen, the memorandum 
went on, had then asked for 'four (4) bulldozer drivers, four (4) front end loader drivers, 
and six (6) truck drivers' as 'the men at Red C liffs were becoming exhausted' .125 
Figure 5.5 
Building a levee at Red Cliffs, 1956. Bulldozers and front end loaders were used to 
build and reinforce levees. 
[Ted Lawton, c.6 August 1956, Mildura library.J 
The levee was not a success, despite efforts to bolster the equipment and workforce 
protecting the pump and generator. Wind caused erosion and water seeped through the 
bank, undermining its strength.126 Volunteers and some employees worked on the banks 
24 hours-a-day, while others patrolled those already built, watching for breaks and raising 
alarms for emergency repairs. Towards the end of July and in early August, as the floods 
neared their peak, some levee banks in the Mildura area gave way. On 23 July the main 
levee protecting Mildura was breached. As a section of the levee gave way, just upstream 
from the Mildura Bridge, five feet of water rushed through, flooding homes, the 
125 LR. East, '4. River Murray and Associated Works'. '(i) River Murray Floods - Pumping Station (action 
for the prevention of damage'. Memorandum. 2 August, l956. 'State Rivers and Water Supply 
Commission, River Murray Floods, Pumping Stations at Red Cliffs and Merbein'. LR. East's Reports and 
Papers, 1907- l966. MS 8847. Volume 11, 1955-58. State Library of Victoria. 
126 Sunraysia Daily, 1 l August, 1956, p.2. 
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Sunraysia Brick Kilns, citrus groves, and vineyards between Mildura township and 
Nichol's Point. The Sunraysia Daily reported that the noise from water rushing through 
the breach 'could be heard miles away' and woke nearby residents in Cureton Avenue, 
who had been warned that if the levee broke they would need to evacuate. 127 Gradually 
other levees were breached, including the one built to protect the River Road between 
Mildura and Merbein. 128 
When the river stabilised at a height of 3 7 feet on 13 August, the Red Cliffs 
pump and generator were safe. 129 Orchards, vineyards, houses, farm equipment, and 
sheds had been flooded, with over 200 acres of citrus orchards inundated in Sunraysia, 
five percent of the region's citrus crop. 130 Growers harvested crops by boat. However, 
there was some concern that the hardy fruit trees, and 'even gumtrees', may drown from 
such prolonged flooding. 131 Cold temperatures and hail had also affected various crop 
yields. By the end of July the Victorian and Federal governments had developed 
emergency financial relief packages for individuals' and farmers' losses, including a 
£1 ,050,000 Commonwealth grant to the Victorian government for distribution, a portion 
of which was earmarked for dried fruit growers. 132 The Australian Dried Fruits 
Association (based in Mildura) later estimated that 63 percent of the raisin crop, 22 
percent of the currant crop, and 27 percent of the sultana crop had been destroyed. 133 
Further, the floods had caused the water table to rise, endangering crops with highly 
mineralised water. 
Figure 5.6 
Floodwater engulfs a house and 
vineyard in Mildura, 1956. 
[Ted Lawton, 11August1956, 
Mildura Library.] 
127 Sunraysia Daily, 24 July, 1956, p. l. 
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Irrigation and Salinity 
In the irrigation fruit-growing districts of northwest Victoria the researchers at the CSIRO 
station in Merbein were watching the effects of the floods on their salinity research.134 
Control experiments on the effects of irrigation on salinity took a new turn as the already 
raised water table broke the surface of the soil. Irrigation, and then floods in 1955, had 
raised the water table, increasing salt levels in the already salty soil. The 1956 floods 
raised the salt level further. In Mildura, the exacerbation of soil salinity through irrigation 
was recognised as a problem soon after it was first established as an irrigation area. Water 
in unlined irrigation channels leached alkaline minerals from the soils and raised 
mineralised underground water tables, which further mobilised salt contained in deep 
mineralised layers of the soil, contaminating surface soils. In addition, the use of heavily 
mineralised, sometimes alkaline, artesian water for irrigation in the past had aggravated 
soil salinity. 135 Many trees, including citrus trees, could not survive in the highly alkaline 
soil. 
The officer in charge of the CSIRO research station warned the Commonwealth 
that releasing irrigation water (due in September) on top of this, would cause toxic levels 
of salt. Open cut drainage canals were dug to bleed the mineral ground water and salt 
from the soil in badly affected irrigation districts. The officer estimated that the irrigation 
area of Renmark in South Australia could lose up to 500 acres of plantings, and Curlwaa 
in New South Wales up to 200 acres (from a total of 2,000 planted acres) from soil 
1. . 136 sa m1ty. 
In a Commonwealth Parliament session during late October 1956, the Minister 
for National Development, W.H. Spooner, was pressured by the Senate to investigate 
134 The research station was established at Merbein in 1919. Research was originally funded by the 
Australian Dried Fruits Association. See, Terry Gange, A Century of Challenges: The Remarkable History of the 
ADFA and the Dried Fruits Industry (Mildura: The Australian Dried Fruits Association, 2007), p.43. 
135 Katrina Proust, 'Learni ng From The Past For Sustainability: Towards an Integrated Approach', PhD 
thesis, The Australian National University, 2004, pp.157-163. 
136 Letter from F. Penman (CSIRO Officer-in-Charge at Merbein) to H. G. Raggatt (Secretary, Department 
of National Development). Folio 95. 'Flood Control - investigation of flood control and mitigation in the 
Murray Valley'. Item El077 PART 1. Series A987. National Archives of Australia. Advice from Durch 
authorities was also sought: Letter from R. Fack (Dutch Embassy) to H. G . Raggatt (Secretary, Department 
of National Development). Folio 94. 'Flood Control - investigation of flood control and mitigation in the 
Murray Valley'. Item E1077 PART 1. Series A987. National Archives of Australia. Salinity, see: 'Rising 
Water Tables', Riverlander, January 1957, p.36. 
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solutions to seepage and drainage in the Murray Valley, especially in South Australia, 
which was most affected by increased salt levels. The Minister played down the floods' 
effect on salinity, placing irrigation and salinity in one category, and high water tables and 
floods in another. However, the interrelatedness of the factors and their impact on citrus 
and stone-fruit growers became evident in his subsequent explanation. The Minister said: 
'In the areas previously affected by seepage due to irrigation, drainage was already 
inadequate to prevent injurious effects'. The situation was serious and he warned that 
'[i]n applying irrigation water this season, tree and vine safety will be a greater 
consideration than crop yield'. 137 Irrigation had exacerbated flood damage. 
In Mildura the raised water table, rain, rising floodwater and seepages in the levee 
combined to make the soil turn into sticky, slippery mud or, in resident Jack Bate's 
words, 'a muck heap'. 138 Mary Chandler, then a twenty-year-old returning to Mildura after 
finishing university in Melbourne, recalled delivering food to the levee bank volunteers: 
'It was pitch black, freezing cold and the mud squelched as the truck I was in slithered 
along from place to place' .139 The biggest delay in building the levee was caused by tractors 
bogging or falling from the top of the levee banks. 
The soil in some places seemed to be more water than earth. Kevin Webb recalled 
that 'the ground was so saturated .. . [that] in the switch yard you could push a 4 x 4 red 
gum straight into the ground over four foot just like that'. 140 The electricity pylons 
supporting large cables in the SEC compound threatened to fall, because they were 
floating in the water-mud. All that could be done was to prop them up by timber 'pig 
stying' and hope they would stay upright. 14 1 
After the flood peaked in Mildura, Red Cliffs, and Merbein, and the pump and 
generator were safe, the Sunraysia Daily focused on the high floods peaking at Wentworth 
and Renmark. 142 In Wentworth, the Murray peaked at 32.1 feet on 15 August. The 
Darling floods had been feeding into the Murray since April but its main peak was not 
experienced at Wentworth until early October. The unexpectedly low August peak in 
Wentworth was explained in a later RMC report, which claimed that most of the Darling 
137 Extract from Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 30 October, 1956, Flood Damage and Relief, Senator 
Butterfield and W.H. Spooner (Minister for National Development). Folio 118. 'Flood Control -
investigation of flood control and mitigation in the Murray Valley'. Item El077 PART 1. Series A987. 
National Archives of Australia. 
138 Mary Chandler, '56 Memories Flood Red Cliffs, p.14. 
139 Mary Chandler, '56 Memories Flood Red Cliffs, p.13. 
140 Mary Chandler, '56 Memories Flood Red Cliffs , p.16. 
141 Ted Lawton pers. com., September 2006; and, Mary Chandler, '56 Memories Flood Red Cliffs , p.12. 
142 Sunraysia Daily, 16 August, 1956, p.2. 
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flood had bypassed Wentworth. The report noted that below Menindee (peaked on 2 
September at 33 feet 4Y4 inches) the Darling flood had divided into the main channel 
and the Great Anabranch. The Great Anabranch took a substantial amount of water 
from the Darling River, rejoining the Murray below Wentworth and reducing the peak 
around the town. Water also flowed into breakaways (floodplains or flood ways) near 
Pomona, further reducing the amount being carried by the Darling. The breakaways 
rejoined the Murray below Wentworth as well, after taking water an estimated '1,000,000 
acre feet outside the main channel of the river'. 143 
The twists and turns of the river held one last surprise. At the height of the 
Murray River flood in August, water had broken away and joined the Darling from 
Tuckers Creek. 'Thus', the RMC report asserted, 'of the 22,000 cusecs entering the 
Murray from the Darling, only 13,000 cusecs were from the Darling Catchment'. While 
the rivers appeared to be flooding at similar heights simultaneously in August, it was 
almost half Murray water flowing into Wentworth from the Darling.144 
While most of the Darling flood missed Wentworth, Renmark in South Australia 
received the full brunt. The Murray peaked first in Renmark in August, with the 
tributaries' floodwater in tow, causing large, damaging floods in the low lying district. The 
water was still high as the Darling flood peak reached the Murray and inundated the town 
in October. Renmark was the worst hit area during the 1956 flood, later receiving the 
largest proportion of both state and federal aid. 
* * * 
Damage and Relief: Federal Responsibility for Aid 
The 1956 flood tested state bureaucratic avenues for flood relief, emergency aid, and 
reparation. The flood stretched municipal and state budgets and each state in turn 
applied to the Commonwealth for assistance. States argued for the Commonwealth to 
take increased financial responsibility for the damage. 
One year after the flood, the RMC assessed the total damage in the Murray and 
Darling watersheds to be £5 million. Damage to private property, in New South Wales, 
Victoria, and South Australia combined, was estimated to be £1.5 million, two thirds of 
143 Harrison, 'Report on the River Murray Flood Problem' , p.26. 
144 Harrison, 'Report on the River Murray Flood Problem' , pp.19-20. 
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which was in South Australia. The remaining portion of the estimate referred to damage 
to infrastructure and other government works and facilities. 145 In 1997 Emergency 
Management Australia (EMA) estimated the 1956 floods, between May and December, to 
have cost £30 million ($840 million, 1997 values) in New South Wales, Victoria, and 
South Australia, increasing the initial assessment by £25 million. EMA listed 650 
buildings as damaged and 200 destroyed; however, a large proportion of the overall cost 
was attributed to losses in agricultural production. 146 
States argued for Commonwealth funds to reimburse municipal councils for 
expenditure on flood response and prevention, such as the cost of building levees, as well 
as to aid state governments in repairing damaged infrastructure and to supplement aid to 
individuals. Early in the flood, the Victorian government had promised municipal 
councils at least partial financial reimbursement. Municipal councils, such as Mildura, 
were adamant that such relief be made available; if not from the state government, then 
from the Federal government. In July 1956, the Mildura Mayor stated that the Council 
would seek full reimbursement for expenditure on flood control. He argued the point on 
the grounds that such costs should not be the responsib ility of ratepayers: 'We don' t 
know what we will be called on to spend, and it is not fair that the financial responsibility 
should fall on our ratepayers ... This is a Federal matter - we are not responsible for the 
River Murray's behaviour' .147 
The responsibility of the Commonwealth to contribute towards state relief, 
reparation works on roads, emergency action, municipal expenses, and personal losses, 
was contested. Federal ministers argued that all flood aid and costs were state 
responsibilities and that any money contributed by the Commonwealth would need to be 
part of a loan scheme.148 Dairy farmers and cane growers, however, had successfully 
lobbied the government in 1955 to provide flood relief under its unemployment benefits 
responsibility. In 1956, shadow ministers criticised the Commonwealth for having 
inconsistent fire and flood relief policies that varied from state to state and event to 
145 Harrison, 'Report on the River Murray Flood Problem', p.23. 
146 
'EMA Disasters Database', '1956 Floods', Emergency Management Australia, 
http://www.ema.gov.au/ema/emad isasters. nsf/c859 l 6e930b93d50ca256d050020cb1 f/ Ofc5da61368c5094 
ca256d3300057e35?0penDocument&Highlight•0.1956, accessed 6 June 2008. 
147 Sunraysia Daily, 13 July, 1956, p.Z. 
148 Extract from Parliamentary Debates, Senate 30 October, 1956, Flood Damage and Relief, Senator 
Pearson to Senator O'Sullivan. Folio 120. 'Flood Control - investigation of flood control and mitigation in 
the Murray Valley'. Item E 1077 PART l. Series A987. National Archives of Australia. 
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event. 149 One Senator also queried the Commonwealth government's dedication to 
soldier settlers who represented a large proportion of those affected and who the 
1-o government had helped to settle. ' Under pressure from state governments, local 
councils, and settlers, Prime Minister Menzies standardised aid for New South Wales, 
Victoria, and South Australia in this flood with a 'pound for pound' contribution that 
was not to be repaid. 151 Victoria distributed combined state and federal funds, as well as 
private donations (a total of £72 from three donors), to settlers and councils through a 
government committee, the Victorian Floods (1956) Relief Committee. By 1957 
Municipal Councils throughout Victoria together claimed expenses of £70,000 for flood 
protection work in the previous year's floods. 152 Personal applications for aid, submitted 
to the committee, reached 533 claims, amounting to £819,093. The total amount 
awarded by the committee for personal claims was £77,483, delivering financial aid to 
452 of the claimants.153 Residents of Mildura shire made the highest number of 
applications, reaching 136 (the next highest claiming shire was Swan Hill, with 76 
applicants), with 12 7 of the claimants receiving financial grants. 154 
Private donations were also made directly to flooded areas. 155 However, the sources 
of flood relief in 1956 contrast with those in the 1852 flood in Gundagai and the 1890 
flood in Bourke. In the aftermaths of the earlier floods, financial and material relief to 
individuals and municipalities were mostly financed by private donations. By 1956, 
government responsibility for financial assistance had dramatically grown. It signalled the 
beginnings of humanitarian ideas towards flood response within government 
149 Extract from Parliamentary Debates, Senate 30 October, 1956, Flood Damage and Relief, Senator 
Pearson to Senator O'Sullivan. Folio 120. 'Flood Control - investigation of flood control and mitigation in 
the Murray Valley'. Item El077 PART l. Series A987. National Archives of Australia. 
150 Extract from Parliamentary Debates, Senate 30 October, 1956, Flood Damage and Relief, Senator 
Pearson to Senator O'Sullivan. Folio 121. 'Flood Control - investigation of flood control and mitigation in 
the Murray Valley'. Item E1077 PART l. Series A987. National Archives of Australia. 
151 Telegram from Prime Minister Menzies to Playford, Premier of South Australia, n.d. Folio 167. 'Flood 
Control - investigation of flood control and mitigation in the Murray Valley'. Item E1077 PART l. Series 
A987. National Archives of Australia. 
m Letter from F. Kenny (Secretary, Victorian Flood Relief Committee) to Secretary of the River Murray 
Commission, 5 March, 1957. 'Flood Relief 1956 General File'. Inward Correspondence Files. Item 
64/ 3703. VPRS l 163/ P008/ 5. Public Records Office Victoria. 
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'Victorian Floods (1956) Relief Committee. Report and Statement of Account'. Appendices 2 and 3. 
'Flood Relief 1956 General File'. Inward Correspondence Files. Item 64/3703. VPRS 1163/ P008/ 5. Public 
Records Office Victoria. 
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'Victorian Floods (1956) Relief Committee. Report and Statement of Account'. Appendix 2. 'Flood 
Relief 1956 General File'. Inward Correspondence Files. Item 64/3703. VPRS 1163/ P008/ 5. Public 
Records Office Victoria. 
155 Sunra:ysia Daily, 18 August, 1956, p. l. 
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bureaucracies. The environment was acknowledged as a state responsibility, particularly 
where its vagaries interfered with national aspirations. 
In 1956, states were required to request financial aid from the Commonwealth, 
and relief was regarded as a government donation, rather than, for example, an absolute 
Federal government responsibility, or a loan scheme. In some ways Federal government 
aid remained uncodified. Perhaps such a stance by the Commonwealth also avoided 
constitutional restrictions on federal intervention in state matters. The government, 
occupying a position of benefactor, held almost no responsibility for the rivers - except 
for its regulation through the Hume Dam and the Snowy Mountains Scheme. 
* * * 
Flood W arnings 
While towns on the floodplains of both rivers received intermittent RMC warnings, and 
so could prepare to some extent, no-one knew how high the eventual peak of the flood 
would be.156 As it became clear that flood heights were exceeding the predictions, 
attempts to increase and reinforce levees in the final days before the peak were common. 
Predictions had kept increasing and towns had little time to build or reinforce levees, or 
evacuate. Mildura Shire Council received a revised warning of the Murray peak that 
indicated a 'very sudden rise' over the initial estimate, just over two weeks before the full 
force of the floods arrived.157 Residents in Mildura became embittered as trusted 
authorities were seen to have failed to provide accurate or timely warnings. One resident 
commented, forty years after the flood, that settlers had depended on the 'la]uthorities 
who blithely made statements down-grading level peaks, leaving everyone unprepared for 
what did eventuate' .158 In the view of settlers, the 'authorities' had not given adequate 
warnings and, according to the quote above, had in fact given inaccurate warnings. The 
'authorities' were blamed for the lack of preparation in many areas. Perhaps one reason 
that river management authorities such as the RMC (which settlers expected to have 
156 Warnings from Executive Engineer of the RMC, G.L. Harrison, were intermittently reported in the 
press. See, Sunraysia Daily, 22 May, 1956, p.2; Sunraysia Daily, 16 July, 1956, p.2; and, Sunraysia Daily, 30 
July, 56, p. l. Some also followed the predictions of long range forecaster Lennox Walker. See, Sunraysia 
Daily, 31 July, 1956, p.2; and, Sunraysia Daily, 24 April, 1956, p.3. 
157 Mildura City Council Minutes, 'Special General Committee 29/ 7/ 56', in Chandler, '56 Memories Flood 
Red Cliffs, p.3. 
158 Chandler, '56 Memories Flood Red Cliffs, p.20. 
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responsibility for warnings and knowledge of the rivers, as well as networks of employees 
and gauges to issue warnings) did not issue the expected warnings, was that flood 
warnings were not the responsibility of any particular government commission or 
department at that time. 
The RMC had no official duty to issue flood warnings. Many river gauges along 
the Murray, however, had been established and operated by the RMC and so it had access 
to information that could provide some indication of changed river levels. 159 The RMC 
voluntarily communicated information on river rises to settlers during the floods, but 
flood warnings were not systematic. The federal BoM was not responsible for flood 
warnings either, because of legislation made the previous year. When a Designing 
Engineer of the SRWSC forwarded a copy of the recently amended Commonwealth 
Meteorology Act 1955 to the Chief Designing Engineer in November of that year, he 
attached a memorandum which brought attention to a point of difference between the 
old and new Acts. The new Act, the engineer explained, 'differs from the previous Act in 
that no reference is made to the display of "flood signals". It still does not give the Bureau 
specific power to issue "River Reports" as river levels cannot be construed as "weather 
conditions'". Floods, which moved over the land, the memorandum implied, had no 
place in a Bureau based in an atmospheric science. The engineer concluded the 
memorandum with assurances that, despite the change in the Act, 'the Deputy-Director 
(Mr. Lilywhile) [of the Bureau] does not contemplate any change in their practice in this 
respect' .160 The Bureau did not, however, have any actual or 'official' responsibility to 
issue warnings in 1956 and it apparently issued few, and these were based on rainfall 
(rather than stream gauge) data. 161 Rainfall did not directly correlate to floods, as rainfall 
in one area could cause floods in another. The amount of water forced onto floodplains 
by the velocity of floodwater and topography also influenced the height, depth, and 
velocity of floods locally and downstream. Further, run-off from rainfall, which fed floods, 
was affected by the amount of rainfall that was absorbed by the land and depended on 
the type of soil, moisture already contained in the earth, and so on. 
There was no federal body with responsibility to issue flood warnings, nor indeed 
at a state level in Victoria, in 1956. In that year of disastrous floods there were very few 
159 Harrison, 'Report on the River Murray Flood Problem'. 
160 
'Memo. Chief Designing Engineer. "Flood Warning Stations". Meteorology Act 1955'. 9 November, 
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Diagrams'. General Correspondence Files. Item 56/ 23436. VPRS 6008/ POOOl/16. Public Records Office 
Victoria. 
161 Sunraysia Daily, 12 July, 1956, p.l. 
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warnings as the environmental event was an administrative anomaly. Further, the flood 
heights broke settler records in many areas, rising to unexpected and unexperienced 
heights which meant that residents' and officials' estimates of flood peaks may have been 
lower than the eventual peak heights. The floods were also unprecedented in their 
duration, the area they covered, and the frequency of peaks along the Murray River. 
By taking river administration out of the official duties of the BoM, the legislation 
helped to pave the way for state departments, centred predominantly on hydraulic and 
irrigation engineering, to assume management and control of the rivers. Meteorology was 
being limited to the atmosphere and bureaucratically positioned to support engineering. 
In Victoria, the SRWSC had become an avenue for the development of engineering 
works on the Murray and its tributaries. In 1957, the SRWSC and regional bodies took 
responsibility for gathering river data for flood warnings in Victoria and transmitted the 
data to the BoM, which reassumed official responsibility for issuing flood warnings. 162 
Settler disappointment in the 'authorities' for not providing adequate flood 
warnings reflected an underlying grievance that floods in the Murray watershed had not 
received enough government attention. In an era when state, interstate, and federal 
organisations were putting extensive resources towards developing river schemes, settlers 
called for more government attention to floods. The 1956 floods revealed to settlers that 
government flood management was inadequate. Government failure to take account of 
such environmental events that could devastate irrigation communities, threaten livestock 
and livelihoods, and ruin infrastructure and engineering works, generated a backlash 
from settlers, who called for a 'flood control authority' to be established. 
* * * 
Central Flood Control Authority 
During and after the 1956 floods, settlers expressed concern over the lack of 'flood 
control' along the Murray and its tributaries and many argued for a single control 
authority to be established for the Murray watershed. In May, the Murray Valley 
Development League (MVDL) invited Harrison (Executive Engineer of the RMC) to 
Mildura to hear its concerns. The League proposed that 'a single authority make a study 
162 
'The Flood Report' , Riverlander, November 1957, p.7. 
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of flood control for the Murray and its tributaries' .163 The League argued for 
'coordination' and 'uniform' flood control, rather than individual settlers having to take 
'their own precautions'. 164 A single flood control authority could also, it was argued, 
monitor the erection of levee banks, with one member of the League noting that levee 
banks could increase the damaging effects of floods by restricting floods to the river 
channel and causing 'aggravated flooding in other places because the river level was 
raised'. The League member mentioned Buronga as an example of where this could 
happen. 165 However, it was settlers in Nichols Point who later claimed that levees built in 
Mildura and Buronga had increased floods in the region, as these levees formed a 'bottle-
neck' and so increased the height of the floodwater by blocking its flow. 166 Building new 
levee banks along the Murray without government approval was illegal, as flood levels 
could be artificially raised. Levee building, however, was regulated under the imperative 
of interstate (rather than intrastate) relations. 
An interstate agreement between New South Wales and Victoria made in 1923 
aimed to regulate the building of new levees along the Murray. 167 The agreement decreed 
that new levees could only be built with government approval, as indiscriminate levees 
could push water across the river and raise flood heights. The agreement attempted to 
avoid liability and conflict between the states for intervening in or exacerbating floods; 
although existing levees could be reinforced and raised, as they had been in Mildura. 168 
The erection of new levees, the League member argued, was not well monitored. The 
League member stated that the lack of control over levee building was a symptom of a 
general lack of responsibility in governments regarding flooding: 'authoritative control of 
163 Sunraysia Daily, 5 May, 1956, p.3. The MVDL had also written to the RMC in 1955 requesting a 
centralised flood control authority be established for 'the Snowy River, the Murray River and all its 
tributaries, excluding perhaps the Darling and its tributaries'. Letter from G.V. Lawrence (Organising 
Secretary, MVDL) to W.S. Kent Hughes (President, RMC). 12 April, 1955. 'River Murray Flood Control'. 
Item 55/22730. VPRS 6008/P009/ 20. Public Records Office Victoria. 
164 Sunraysia Daily, 5 May, 1956, p.3. 
165 Sunraysia Daily, 5 May, 1956, p.3. 
166 Letter from claimants in Nichol's Point to Mildura Shire Council. 9 August, 1956. Flood Relief 1956 
General File. Inward Correspondence Files. Item 64/3703. VPRS 1163/P008/5 . Public Records Office 
Victoria. 
167 The 1923 agreement was made on the recommendations of an interstate report, submitted in 1921. See, 
Harrison, 'Report on the River Murray Flood Problem', Appendix 2; and, LR. East, '4. River Murray and 
Associated Works'. '(ii) River Murray Floods - Prevention, Prediction, Protection (Notes for Minister)', p.3. 
Memorandum for W.J. Mibus, Minister of Water Supply. 14 August, 1956. LR. East's Reports and Papers, 
1907-1966. MS 8847. Volume 11, 1955-1958. State Library of Victoria. 
168 LR. East, '4. River Murray and Associated Works', '(ii) River Murray Floods - Prevention, Prediction, 
Protection (Notes for Minister)', p.3. Memorandum for W.J. Mibus, Minister of Water Supply. 14 August 
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floods seems to be nobody's business' .169 A single flood control authority, it was argued, 
could provide a government mechanism for regulating levees. 
On the same day, an article on the front page of the local Mildura newspaper 
argued that floods could cause damage to the Snowy Mountains project if not addressed 
soon. The article concentrated on the opinions of the Federal Secretary of the Australian 
Primary Producers' Union, K. L. Waight, who criticised the governments for giving 
'insufficient thought' to floods in the establishment of dams and weirs on the Snowy 
River. Waight referred to the policy of the Federal Land Use Committee regarding the 
Snowy River, which was that dams had been erected and designed on the river without 
consideration of the wider catchment context, including floods, the effects of large levees 
and 'the conserving of this most important of all Australian Catchments'. She urged a 
federal responsibility for flood control and rivers generally (then under state authority in 
Australia), based on catchment areas as in America: 'The U.S.A. has a special committee 
appointed to advise the President on the general control of the resources of the land, and 
this committee advises on flood control... American experts from this advisory 
committee ... would surely be able to coordinate the various plans and schemes so that 
one overall scheme might be arrived at[,] applicable to any area' .17° Currently, she argued, 
'there are unfortunately too many differing authorities' .171 Complex state bureaucracy and 
a divided state and federal authority, she implied, obscured a catchment-wide perspective. 
She argued that interstate collaboration over rivers centred on engineering programs, like 
dams, which 'ignored the essential treatment of the catchment areas serving the river 
courses' and avoided wider environmental contexts. 172 
At the height of the floods , residents in Robinvale similarly argued for a single 
flood control authority. They urged, however, that a single authority be established to 
direct 'emergency' situations, rather than total catchment management. A single flood 
emergency organisation, residents argued, could provide a point of coordination, levee 
planning, and an identifiable institution from which they could request aid, equipment, 
and additional labour. 173 An opinion article in the Sunraysia Daily argued that the floods 
had revealed a 'fault in the system': 'As the flood position in huge areas of the Murray 
Valley grows more acute, the urgent n eed for some controlling authority becomes more 
169 Sunraysia Daily, 5 May, 1956, p.3. 
170 Sunraysia Daily, 5 May, 1956, p. l. 
171 Sunraysia Daily, 5 May, 1956, p. l. 
172 Sunraysia Daily, 5 May, 1956, p.l. 
173 Sunraysia Daily, 18 July, 1956, p.6; and, Sunraysia Daily, l August, 1956, p.5 . 
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and more obvious ... there is no authority to whom they [settlers and communities] can 
turn in their hour of desperate need ... there is no authority in a position to take overall 
control, organise maximum assistance and then channel it immediately to danger 
spots'. 174 
These arguments for an 'emergency' organisation, along with Waight's and those 
of the MVDL, were imbued with a sense that state and Federal governments had failed to 
address floods, provide adequate responses to the emergency or establish mitigation 
techniques. The arguments addressed engineering, either as a solution or problem in 
insuring settlers against floods. All looked to increased government regulation that 
addressed floods, to be clearly centralised to a state or Federal government. 
Current river authorities, focused on irrigation and drought mitigation, had failed 
to protect settlers from floods. There was 'a fault in the system'. Floods were, in a sense, 
outside the system, in terms of engineering and bureaucracy. The impacts of the 1956 
floods were not only under-provided for, in the view of many settlers, but they also 
represented an 'uncontrolled' danger currently outside physical or bureaucratic 
regulation. In the aftermath of the 1956 floods in the Murray and its tributaries, 
government engineers and parliamentary representatives argued about ways in which 
large floods could be brought into the system. The arguments centred on mitigation, 
administrative mechanisms (including emergency response and aid), and increased 
monitoring of the rivers. Each of these aspects became entangled with others, as 
politicians, lobby groups, and engineers attempted to negotiate flood mitigation and 
management within complex state and federal relationships. Federal involvement in the 
Murray watershed through engineering projects and the RMC saw the Commonwealth 
embroiled in arguments about flood mitigation through dams, regulation of floodplain 
use, and improved warning systems. River regulation had tied the Commonwealth to the 
Murray. 
* * * 
174 Sunraysia Daily, 1 August, 1956, p.4. 
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Bordering the National: Federal Responsibility for Rivers 
Politicians in the House of Representatives, like their constituents, argued for greater 
coordination of flood management. The possibilities for hydraulic engineering to mitigate 
floods loomed large in these debates. Many argued for federal takeover of 'flood 
control' .175 The Commonwealth was called on to finance flood mitigation dams or to use 
existing dams (and those under construction) for mitigation. The cost of building new 
large mitigation structures, as well as the extent of the floods (covering four states), 
suggested to some parliamentary representatives that it was necessary and logical for the 
Commonwealth to take control of mitigation and flood management generally and they 
argued that a watershed approach was needed. The RMC, Hume Dam, and Snowy 
Mountains Scheme also indicated to some the success of Commonwealth interventions in 
what were, constitutionally speaking, strictly state matters. It was argued that dams could 
lessen the heights of large floods and in this way limit the potential for extensive damage 
and bring floods into a management framework. Such proposals urged centralisation in 
order to man age floods holistically in the eastern states. Further, they indicated a faith in 
engineering and human ingenuity to control the rivers completely and to make them 
predictable enough to fit within bureaucratic management. large scale engineering 
projects that had aimed to increase agricultural production and secure settlers against 
drought and erratic rainfall, had failed to consider floods. Parliamentary representatives 
now argued to engineer 'manageable' floods. 
Winton George Turnbull, representing the Mallee district in Victoria, opened the 
debates over government action in response to the floods in the House of Representatives 
in August 1956. Turnbull was enthusiastic about the MVDL's proposals and referred to 
their arguments extensively. He supported 'to the hilt' their proposal for 'a co-ordinating 
authority for the protection and development of the Murray Valley'. Such an authority, 
he argued (in line with the League) should be preceded by an inquiry from a 'high-level 
technical committee ... such as that which investigated the Snowy Mountains project prior 
to the setting up of the Snowy Mountains Authority', appointed by the Commonwealth, 
Victoria, New South Wales, and South Australia. Turnbull further supported another 
major recommendation of the League, which aimed to limit the impact of grazing on 
flood velocity and erosion in the Snowy River catchment: the elimination of fire above 
175 Griffiths, Parliamentary Debates. (Hansard). Session 1956. Commonwealth of Australia. House of 
Representatives. V.12 and 13. New Series, p.39. 
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the 4,750 foot contour. Graziers regularly used fire to stimulate new vegetation growth for 
cattle grazing. Allowing vegetation to grow, by banning regular burns, could help prevent 
erosion and siltation and reduce run-off during floods. 176 This aspect of the League's 
proposal, and others, were also taken up by Victorian Premier, Henry Bolte. 
Turnbull further argued that 'a central controlling authoriry' be 'authorised to 
order the release of water from main structures in advance of expected intakes and so 
increase the capaciry of structures to delay flows'. Current dams as well as storages in the 
Snowy Mountains Scheme (which were under construction) could mitigate large floods 
through controlled releases of stored water in anticipation of flood flows. Turnbull did 
not propose to eradicate floods downstream, as '[o]ne cannot stop a river like the Murray 
from flooding'. However, he argued that using irrigation and hydro-electric dams could 
limit the impacts of large floods. This rype of mitigation, he reasoned, would reduce flood 
heights a 'few inches' - those few inches were important as they were the ones that broke 
levee banks. 177 
Others also advocated the use of current dams (and those under construction), 
designed for other purposes, for flood mitigation in this way. 178 However, Harrison 
(Executive Engineer of the RMC), was reported to have told the MVDL in June that 'no 
government would use irrigation storages to control floods' as they 'could not take the 
risk of emprying storages'. Further, this method did not substantially reduce flood 
heights. 179 Others argued that new engineering structures should be built, such as dams or 
pondages, to mitigate floods and store the water for use during drought. Charles Edward 
Griffiths, representing Shortland, New South Wales, thought that unmitigated floods 
were not only damaging but were also a 'waste of water'. 180 Hugh Stevenson Roberton 
(Minister for Social Services), representing the Riverina, urged that '[i]t is the prime dury 
of every self-respecting nation to undertake responsibiliry of controlling its own 
waterways'. Roberton argued that the topography of the Murray and Darling rivers was 
ideal for mitigation works, implying a scheme such as a system of storage pondages: 'the 
176 Turnbull, Parliamentary Debates. (Hansard). Session 1956. Commonwealth of Australia. House of 
Representatives. V.12 and 13. New Series, pp.27-28. See also, 'Many-sided Work Goes into Flood Control', 
RiveTlander, January 1957, p.25 and p.29; and, 'League General Council and Flood Inquiry' Riverlander, 
February 1957, p. 17 and p.26. 
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179 Sunraysia Daily, 2 June, 1956, p.3. 
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topography lends itself to treatment of the mitigation of such a disaster' .181 Sir Earle Page, 
representing Cowper, urged the building of dual-purpose dams - for flood mitigation and 
hydro-electricity, which could additionally be used for water supply. He stated that '[w]e, 
in Australia, cannot afford these terrible, uncontrolled floods ... [w]e cannot afford to lose 
millions and millions of acre feet of water in this, the driest continent in the world'. 182 
Page suggested that history had caught up with Australia: 'We have had 100 years of 
disastrous floods in this country, and it is time we did something about preventing 
them'. 183 Flood mitigation could be used for drought mitigation and power generation 
and put to service in the wider project of national development. Page advocated, along 
with many others, a national approach to engineering as, he argued, states had not 
provided adequate mitigation against floods and that a 'change in the Constitution is 
inevitable if the Commonwealth is to have power to deal with this problem' .184 Dams, 
initially established for irrigation, were now looked to for mitigation and the Federal 
government looked to take over mitigating engineering works. 
Arguments in favour of dams and other mitigation structures were made in 
conjunction with 'cross-broader' arguments for handing flood management along the 
Murray and its tributaries to the Federal government. The floods proved to some 
politicians that frequently inundated rivers, which crossed borders, needed a flood 
management authority that also crossed borders. Some politicians argued that Australia's 
Constitution, which placed rivers under state authority, was not adequate to manage the 
rivers and floods and called for it to be changed. 
Reginald Thomas Pollard, representing Lalor, took suggestions of Commonwealth 
coordination to this level: 'some alteration to the constitution [is necessary] so that such 
matters become a national responsibility'. 185 Griffiths also supported direct 
Commonwealth intervention and long-term responsibility for floods. Griffiths' argument, 
in a synopsis submitted to the Minister for National Development (William Henry 
Spooner), was described in the following terms: he '[p]ointed out that a national 
181 Roberton, Parliamentary Debates. (Hansard). Session 1956. Commonwealth of Australia. House of 
Representatives. V.12 and 13. New Series, p.40. 
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185 Pollard, Parliamentary Debates. (Hansard). Session 1956. Commonwealth of Australia. House of 
Representatives. V.12 and 13 . New Series, p.39. 
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approach to the problem is the logical one, because rivers flow through several states'. 186 
The environment, the rivers, by crossing borders promoted a national approach that 
wrested control of mitigation from states and could stretch along rivers unhindered by 
political boundaries. 
Under the constitution the states had primary responsibility and autonomy within 
their jurisdictions. Even Commonwealth relief was a possible threat to this. In the 
Synopsis of the Adjournment Motion on Floods in the Senate, submitted to the Minister 
of National Development, Victorian Senator Gordon's position was outlined as follows: 
In praising the Commonwealth's action in flood relief he referred to the constitutional 
difficulties. He pointed out, however, that as these floods transcend State boundaries, the 
Commonwealth's constitutional position is therefore different, and he proposed that the 
Commonwealth should consult with its legal advisers, to see if the constitutional 
limitations could be overcome. 187 
While all the states affected by the floods applied for Commonwealth funds to 
supplement their expenditure, there was a fine line between aid and interference that the 
Commonwealth was careful not to cross. Financial relief could threaten state auton omy 
and impinge on the constitution. Commonwealth involvement in building mitigation 
structures would be an even more direct intervention into state matters, as mitigation was 
part of infrastructure works as well as river management, both of which were firmly 
within the power of states. Section 100 of the Constitution explicitly placed rivers under 
state control. However, the states continued to argue for Commonwealth built m itigation 
and flood management with an unwilling Federal government. 
The Secretary to the Minister of National Development, H arold George Raggatt, 
summarised the August parliamentary debates for the Minister, outlining some 
suggestions for flood management. He brought attention to frequent calls for 
Commonwealth funds to establish flood mitigation structures, claiming to the Minister 
that these were 'essentially State responsibilities'. Raggatt also indicated that state regional 
representatives were arguing for direct Commonwealth intervention into local affairs, 
186 
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normally undertaken by state and local governments. However, he warned that 
'[i]ntervention of this sort is not welcomed by the States as a rule'. 188 Commonwealth 
flood relief, aid, and management were politically sensitive under a constitution that had 
only existed for half a century and had not yet been tested by an environmental, cross-
border event of this magnitude. 
The floods were seen as a failure of engineering to incorporate mitigation into 
dam design. Two years after the floods, and following further inundations along the 
Murray River, the Border Morning Mail (Albury, New South Wales) published an article 
written by an Albury resident outraged that the Hume Dam had only been constructed 
for irrigation with no capacity for flood mitigation. That the river could flood, in his 
opinion, was a failure of engineering to properly regulate the river: 
These water schemes have involved the nation in considerable expenditure, and in return 
the people are entitled to anticipate every possible benefit. But under the prevailing River 
Murray Commission policy one section of people [irrigators] receives benefits while other 
people who could be benefited [others on floodplains] are not even considered.189 
River regulation had not just seen the establishment of dams but also of expectations of 
the river as a carefully controlled stream, along which irrigation water releases were timed 
with precision. In the same article the Albury resident criticised the RMC's policy of only 
operating the Hume Dam for irrigation, where it was filled to capacity for the irrigation 
season and so could not catch any additional water for flood mitigation . With increased 
calls for flood mitigation from 1956, however, it seemed to many that although 
engineering was what had failed, the problem could be fixed by more engineering. 
While a strong argument in parliament for Commonwealth assumption of flood 
control was that the rivers crossed borders, it was also clear that there was another 
benefit; the cost of engineering works could be deferred from states by making mitigation 
a Commonwealth responsibility. Financial motives were not the sole reason, nor the most 
dominant in parliament for proposals of Commonwealth intervention, but they cannot 
188 
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be underestimated given the position of the states. Griffiths put it plainly, suggesting that 
a committee should be established to investigate flood control 'with Commonwealth 
funds to implement its findings', even if this meant introducing a special tax. 190 
Australia's drive toward national development had also led the states into more fragile 
economic territory. The financial demands of development projects, including dams and 
irrigation infrastructure, along with increased immigration, limited the capacity of states 
to address immediate consequences of the flood and to _commit to long-term projects to 
prevent future large floods. Pollard, in arguing for greater Commonwealth assistance to 
states for immediate repairs and federal assumption of flood management, invoked the 
financial position of the states: 'I make bold to say that because of immigration and of the 
very rapid capital development of this country, the States are much worse off financially 
than they have been on the occasion of any other national disaster, short of war' .191 States 
were struggling to meet the financial costs of immediate emergency and reparation work, 
let alone financing new mitigation constructions. William Edmonds (Member for 
Herbert) argued that the federal 'compensation of £1-for-£1 is completely inadequate. 
The states cannot raise their shares, and instead of Government aid, there are voluntary 
organisations appealing to the public for donations for flood relief. Some solution to the 
problem must be found'. 192 Pollard suggested the solution of three pounds of 
Commonwealth funds for every pound of state aid. 193 The financial implications of the 
floods infused politicians' debates in the House of Representatives, as unexpected 
expenditure threatened precariously balanced budgets. 
The Constitution did not fit the rivers, and further, engineering seemed to have 
failed constitutionally, or perhaps the Constitution had failed engineering. River 
engineering was a state responsibility unless a special agreement was reached, but the cost 
involved in erecting adequate structures for flood mitigation saw many parliamentary 
representatives demand extensive Commonwealth intervention and finances. States could 
not incur the expenditure of erecting dams. If they did nothing, however, their electorates 
190 
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would potentially lose confidence in them. Further, hydraulic engineering followed rivers 
rather than state boundaries and so, in considering mitigating works, politicians argued 
that the Commonwealth needed to handle this cross-border responsibility. Government 
engineers, however, took another view of the potential to mitigate large floods through 
hydraulic engineering. 
* * * 
Flood Mitigation: The Views of Engineers 
Both Harrison (Executive Engineer of the RMC) and East (Chairman of the SRWSC and 
Victorian representative to the RMC) considered that mitigating large floods through 
hydraulic engineering was unlikely to eventuate and, indeed, for several reasons, was 
impossible. They both argued that the financial outlay required to construct dams or 
pondages, and the large area needed to impound sizeable flood flows, meant that 
mitigation through hydraulic engineering was to a degree physically and financially 
impossible. 
In 1954 East had noted, in an address to the Old Collegians' Conference at 
Wesley College, Melbourne (later published in Aqua, the official journal of the SRWSC, 
and then re-printed as a pamphlet), that attempting to mitigate large floods on the 
Murray was illogical and in some ways impossible. He wrote that 'it would be 
impracticable to find storage basins large enough to hold them, even if it were financially 
possible to face the cost'. He gave the examples of the 1934 floods in the Latrobe, Bunyip, 
and Mitchell basins, arguing that the floods 'exceeded by far in volume the capacities of 
all the possible storage basins in their catchments. Similarly on the Murray'. Further, East 
argued, if large storages were built to trap floodwater for mitigation and use during dry 
periods, much of the water would be lost through evaporation and the impounded water 
would drown fertile, productive land, 'for practically all storage basins [large enough] are 
unfortunately on fertile flats'. 194 
The 1956 floods did not change his view. 'Great floods on the Murray cannot be 
prevented or, to any appreciable extent, controlled', he wrote in a letter to the Victorian 
Minister for Water Supply in August. East had been asked by the Minister (Wilfred John 
194 L.R. East, Development of Australia's Natural Resources: Water (Melbourne: State Rivers and Water Supply 
Commission, 1954), p.4. 
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Gibbs) to (in East's words) prepare notes 'dealing with the flood problem along the 
Murray River'. East argued that the topography of the river system and limitations of 
engineering meant that large floods could not be mitigated through dams. He argued that 
many tributaries fed the Murray floodwater simultaneously. The amount of water that 
accumulated was immense. He noted that in the first seven months of 1956 this was 12 
million acre feet and '[t]he provision of great flood detention storages to store such vast 
quantities of water is quite out of the question'. In similar terms to those in his 1954 
paper, East also pointed out that 'the cost would be fantastic and the damage done by the 
submergence of fertile valleys in the upper reaches of the river would be much greater 
than the damage done by uncontrolled floods'. East also advised against constructing 
continuous levees along the river. Such an attempt 'would lead inevitably to disaster'. He 
cited the 'disastrous breaches in the levees' along the Po, Yellow, and Mississippi Rivers. 
Nevertheless, he thought that these levees, although causing problems, were justified as 
they were built to protect productive lands that offset the cost. Along the Murray, he 
implied, construction and maintenance expenses would not be recouped. Further, he 
argued that in comparison with the areas that these rivers could inundate, the 'areas 
flooded by the Murray are insignificant'. 195 Instead East suggested that local levees, 
regulated through the 1923 interstate agreement, were the best method of flood 
mitigation for the Murray. 196 
Indeed, a number of years previously East had recommended that decentralised 
water boards be established state-wide for flood prevention and control as well as river 
improvement and drainage. The water boards would be regional organisations 
coordinated by the states, but focused on local problems. By July 19 56 the Rivers 
Improvement Bill was drafted. However, it was shelved following heavy criticism that it 
was an 'engineers' approach', treated 'Victoria's flood problem' purely as a matter of 
drainage, and merely passed costs to those living in rural areas. The Country Party refused 
195 LR. East, '4. River Murray and Associated Works'. '(ii) River Murray Floods - Prevention, Prediction, 
Protection (Notes for Minister)', pp. l-2. Memorandum for W.J. Mibus, Minister of Water Supply, Victoria. 
14 August, 1956. LR. East's Reports and Papers, 1907-1966. MS 8847. Volume 11, 1955-1958. State 
Library of Victoria. 
196 LR. East, '4. River Murray and Associated Works'. '(ii) River Murray Floods - Prevention, Prediction, 
Protection (Notes for Minister)', pp. l-2. Memorandum for W.J. Mi bus, Minister of Water Supply, Victoria. 
14 August, 1956. LR. East's Reports and Papers, 1907-1 966. MS 884 7. Volume 11, 1955-1958. State 
Library of Victoria. 
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to support the Bill and the Labor Party (reliant on Country Party votes) was forced to 
pressure a withdrawal of the Bill from a parliamentary vote. 197 
The official report on the 1956 flood by the RMC, written by Harrison and 
released in 1957, focused on techniques for mitigating large floods, particularly 'flood 
detention storages', which Harrison considered the 'most effective method of flood 
control, where applicable'. 198 Such structures, used in the Tennessee and Ohio Valleys in 
America, manipulated the topography of the river to trap water in existing flood ways. 
Like hydro-electric and water supply dams, detention storages were expensive. Harrison 
estimated that they would need to impound 15 million acre feet of water at a cost of £220 
million. Further, such expensive works would be no guarantee against floods as large 
floods would be reduced, but not prevented. In light of the cost, and 'the infrequency of 
high floods', Harrison argued that detention storages 'could not be justified on economic 
grounds' .199 
Harrison argued, much like East, that regional or local methods of mitigation, 
such as 'river improvement' (snagging and dredging) and levee banks would be more 
effective, if used in accordance with government regulation and with caution. 'Catchment 
improvement' was also considered by Harrison as a means of mitigating large floods, 
which (like the MVDL proposal) was a more holistic approach and included techniques 
for soil conservation and re-forestation to increase the possibilities for floodwater 
absorption into riparian land. However, he argued that during large floods such measures 
were useless and would not affect the high velocity and run-off rate generated by the 
swelling river. zoo Indeed, Harrison was (to a degree) pessimistic about all forms of 
mitigation when it came to large floods. His official RMC report presented no blanket 
solutions to flooding and hinted at the sense of impossibility he felt for any river or 
catchment-wide approach to mitigation. Localised mitigation, which Harrison seemed to 
advocate in the report, he criticised elsewhere. 
For example, he told the MVDL and Wentworth shire there was very little chance 
of state or Federal governments acting on the calls of the League for a single flood control 
authority or mitigation. The Sunraysia Daily reported Harrison's candid rebuttal of the 
MVDL's and Wentworth Shire Council's 'proposal that a single authority make a study of 
197 Sunraysia Daily, 19 July, 1956, p.l; and Age, 9 February, 1957, Age 14 February, 1957, Age, 5 June, 1957, 
in newspaper clippings, in 'Flood Control - investigation of flood control and mitigation in the Murray 
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198 Harrison, 'Report on the River Murray Flood Problem', p.6. 
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flood control for the Murray and its tributaries', in Mildura in June 1956.201 Harrison, 
however, was to later write this very report after the RMC was pressured to investigate the 
1956 flood and report on flood mitigation through the Murray river system.202 Addressing 
the Mildura meeting in June 1956, Harrison came very close to declaring that there was 
nothing anyone could do, stating that those who lived along a river that had flooded for 
'thousands of years ... [had to] expect trouble'. Harrison played down any chance of 
mitigating the then impending flood, or future large floods. He argued that mitigation 
through existing dams was unlikely because they were designed for irrigation and 
governments were unlikely to use them for anything else: 'The Government will never 
allow Hume Reservoir to be used for flood mitigation'. He told the meeting that there 
were three methods of effective flood mitigation: catchment improvement, storages, and 
levee banks. He then eliminated all three as impracticable on the Murray during large 
floods. Catchment improvements were unlikely to affect the floods, storages were too 
expensive, and levee banks (which many councils, companies, and individuals had set 
about building) held too much potential for raising river heights. 'We don't want levee 
banks. They only make the river level higher as they get higher', he said.203 In his later 
report, Harrison acknowledged that '[m]any vital areas such as pumping stations at Red 
Cliffs and Waikerie and towns such as Wentworth and Renmark were saved from 
inundation' by levees banks.204 Perhaps local efforts had changed his mind to a degree; or 
perhaps placing his view on official record tempered his arguments. 
During the meeting Harrison further made clear that the RMC was not the 
organisation to approach as the desired 'single authority' on floods - he asserted that 
'flood control' was constitutionally a state concern. Further, the RMC did not have 
enough power, he argued, to be such an authority - for example it had no authority for 
construction (the RMC's involvement in the construction of the cross-jurisdictional 
Hume Dam was an exception reached by special agreement).205 The RMC merely 
monitored state construction by reviewing designs. Complex bureaucracies that specified 
precise departmental and commission duties and expenses, as well as interactions 
201 Sunraysia Daily, 2 June 1956, p.3. Also reported in, 'If You Can't Avert Floods You Can Ease Floods', 
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205 Sunraysia Daily, 2 June 1956, p.3. 
254 
Chapter 5 - Mildura and the Murray River 1956 
between topography and floodwater, and the sheer amount of water, all worked against 
the mitigation of large floods. 
For both East and Harrison a catchment-wide approach to flood mitigation 
beyond government regulation of local activities seemed impossible. In terms of built 
structures, the engineers argued that local works were the best method. Hydraulic 
engineering, which was looked to by governments and settlers to provide environmental 
security and national development on a grand scale, could not stop the damaging effects 
of large floods. East and Harrison made it clear that local, smaller scale engineering and 
attention to catchment environments were the only means for limiting the damage caused 
by such occurrences. 
While mitigation through engineering was given significant attention by East and 
Harrison as well as by parliamentary representatives, it was but one aspect of potential 
government action. There were also the matters of flood warning and emergency 
response. For settlers and politicians the factors generally seemed to suggest a watershed 
approach - including warning networks, emergency response, and engineering (despite 
East's and Harrison's arguments). As the MVDL and Wentworth shire had looked to the 
RMC to take up 'flood control' generally, so too did Victorian Premier Henry Bolte. 
* * * 
The River Murray Commission 
The RMC seemed perfect as a potential interstate 'flood control body'. As an already 
operative body with unparalleled expertise on the Murray and its tributaries, covering a 
larger geographical scope than other interstate river management bodies (such as the 
SMA) and already implicated in dam construction (as states needed to submit designs for 
approval) and operation (being responsible for such structures as the Hume Dam), it 
already had much of the necessary expertise and bureaucratic mechanisms. The RMC 
further had state (New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia) and Commonwealth 
representatives, but was federally financed. The Commission was targeted by states, who 
urged that the RMC not only be used as an administrative channel for Commonwealth 
flood mitigation, but also as a body to monitor the rivers by improving stream gauge 
numbers and quality. 
255 
Parliamentary debates spilled into newspapers, as the address of the Assistant 
Minister for State Development in Victoria to the MVDL was made public. The Canberra 
Times headlined an article, 'Bolte Seeks Support For Murray Scheme', about the Assistant 
Minister's speech in which Victorian Premier Henry Bolte was revealed to have 
approached the Acting Prime Minister and Premiers of South Australia and New South 
Wales to support transferring 'full responsibility of flooding in the Murray Valley' to the 
RMC.206 It was reported that the scheme involved: the RMC establishing mitigation dams 
as well as ensuring the 'elimination of fire from the catchments; elimination of grazing 
above the 4, 750ft. contour; the discouragement of building within the inter-levee zones; 
diversion of water to natural pondages or lakes when a flood is in progress'. The last of 
these plans included a suggestion to channel floodwater into artesian basins in New 
South Wales for storage. 207 Under the proposal the Commonwealth would finance dam 
construction and would, presumably, also bear responsibility for any adverse effects of 
such regulation. 
Indeed, East was somewhat implicated in this manoeuvre. In his letter to the 
Minister for Water Supply, dated a few days before the meeting, he addressed the issue of 
flood warning. He wrote that a 'feature of the recent floods has been the lack of sufficient 
information to enable anything more than an approximate prediction to be made ... 
[regarding] flood peaks ... from Euston (near Robinvale) to Wentworth'. He argued that 
although the SRWSC had 'organised very effective flood warning systems for many 
Victorian Rivers' and was addressing the needs on the Murray, the Murray was outside 
Victoria's borders. East suggested that the RMC was the best organisation to recommend 
what action should be taken towards establishing a flood warning network on the Murray, 
as it could 'consult with all bodies concerned'. zos The RMC' s intermediary role between 
Victoria and New South Wales was called upon. 
The Minister for National Development, William Henry Spooner, responsible for 
Commonwealth representation on the RMC, asked his secretary for arguments against 
206 Canberra Times, 25 August, 1956, in newspaper clippings, in 'Flood Control - investigation of flood 
control and mitigation in the Murray Valley'. Item E1077 PART l. Series A987. National Archives of 
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208 LR. East, '4. River Murray and Associated Works'. '(ii) River Murray Floods - Prevention, Prediction, 
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of Victoria. 
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proposals by the states for the RMC to take on any increased role as a result of the 
floods.209 The strongest argument for the Minister was that the RMC could investigate 
river monitoring but '[s]ince flood prevention is a State responsibility, the initiative lies 
with the States' or is simply 'a State matter' .210 The RMC retained its position as an 
advisor to states, producing a report on the 'River Murray Flood Problem' but nothing 
more. 21 1 
In 1958 tension again surfaced over who was responsible for flood control. 
Harrison made another public declaration in the Border Morning Mail that the 'River 
Murray Commission is not a flood control authority and operates its structures for the 
benefit of irrigation, and, in a lesser degree, navigation'. 212 Floods were not within the 
sphere of power of, nor a priority for, the RMC, which continually rejected such 
responsibility (and liability). 
It was not just the Commonwealth that was pushing for states to take 
constitutional and practical responsibility for the 1956 flood and future floods. Though 
most in the House of Representatives in August 1956 called for increased 
Commonwealth assistance, one politician, Jeff Bate, representing Macarthur, argued that 
Commonwealth intervention of any sort was unnecessary, perhaps fulfilling Raggatt's 
opinion that federal aid would be unwelcome in states. His argument was summarised by 
the Secretary as: 
N.S.W. had established a natio nal emergency service, which operates in times of 
disastrous floods. T he State Government also controls the police and most other 
departments which are involved. It would be foolish for the Commonwealth to duplicate 
these services. Relief in past floods has been on generous terms and areas affected have 
been put on a proper footing again.213 
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Bate's comments also indicate that, in his view, New South Wales' bureaucracy had come 
to terms with periodic flooding. He saw the states as having developed successful avenues 
of relief, emergency aid, and reparation for mobilisation during floods. The firmness with 
which he rejected Commonwealth intervention, though phrased as 'foolish' duplication 
of state mechanisms, was also an assertion of state autonomy. The Commonwealth could 
help states financially with 'generous' donations, but otherwise could keep its distance 
from New South Wales' rivers. Many Commonwealth Ministers also argued that states 
should address floods as a constitutional necessity.214 
In light of the flood, many politicians and settlers were concerned that Australian 
officials did not know enough about the flood potentials of the inland rivers, especially 
the Murray River. Expectations of consistent, controlled river flows on the Murray, the 
feat of engineering, were disappointed; engineers were seen to have failed to know the 
river and control it. While arguments for increased physical and bureaucratic regulation 
to solve the immediate 'flood problem' were common, equally so were those for increased 
monitoring of the rivers. 
* * * 
Monitoring and Regulation: Knowing a River 
Scientific investigation into the hydrology of Australia's inland rivers began early. By the 
1850s meteorologists such as William Stanley Jevons were attempting to decipher 
patterns of floods and droughts and the relationship between river flow and adjacent 
alluvial land. In the 1880s New South Wales Government Meteorologist Henry 
Chamberlin Russell extended the meagre rainfall observing stations in that state to 50 in 
1882, with 210 'unofficial' observers. However, local rainfall was not the only factor that 
influenced floods in the Murray and Darling river systems, as run-off from tributaries also 
contributed to river heights. Recognising this factor, hydraulic engineer John Baillie 
Henderson began installing river gauges along western Queensland rivers in the late 
1890s with a view to creating flood warning networks. River observation and measuring 
had passed from meteorologists to engineers by the turn of the century. While both 
214 Parliamentary Debates. (Hansard). Session 1956. Commonwealth of Australia. House of 
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meteorologists and engineers before Federation had pursued knowledge of the rivers for 
the sake of scientific inquiry, both were allied early to the government. Their role as 
government employees set an agenda for research into rivers that invariably centred on 
land settlement through irrigation and navigation. Navigation became a secondary 
consideration by the early 1900s as frequent droughts stranded vessels and railway 
networks increased, providing a more reliable means of transporting stock, produce, and 
people. 
Settlement dominated engineers' investigations into rivers and by the 1950s it was 
tailored towards two main drought mitigation techniques: dams and irrigation networks. 
Stream gauges were established along major watercourses to monitor the effects of dams 
and to gather data for prospective regulation. To a lesser extent floods also motivated 
gauge reading. Drought, however, was seen as a bigger threat to pastoralists and 
agriculturalists than inundation and so irrigation, not flood mitigation, was the primary 
focus. 
In 1950, Senior Designing Engineer for Water Reserves, SRWSC, K.D. Green, 
wrote the prefacing article to a collection on 'The Utilization of River Flow', in the 
Australian journal of The Institution of Engineers. Green's article, 'River Gaugings' , and 
expertise provide an insight into the 1950s culture of engineering. The priority of river 
engineers was to maximise the use of river flow for settlement. Gauging results, '[a]s far as 
the State Rivers and Water Supply Commission is concerned', Green stated, 'will 
normally be used in the design of a dam or diversion weir which will utilise the waters of 
that stream'.215 Gauging was part of a repertoire of engineering technology that ultimately 
aimed for optimum use of river water. 
Green began his article with the poignant comment: 'The ultimate development 
of any community is usually limited by its water resources .... This is true of both country 
and urban development: for industry: for gardens: for irrigation: and for rural stock and 
domestic supplies'. Green's list of areas and industries dependent on water supply is a 
checklist of who and what would benefit from gauging. He continued that '[s]ystematic 
stream gauging is the only answer to the problem. Without reliable statistics of any kind ... 
any developmental project may be considerably in error'.216 Gauged data was a way of 
215 K.D. Green, 'The Utilization of River Flow: River Gaugings', The Institution of Engineers, Australia, Journal, 
31, April-May 1950, pp.77-85 , p.78. 
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knowing a river, where the quest for knowledge was pivoted towards 'developmental' 
projects. Failure of engineering and regulation was, then, a failure to know the river. 
Where did flood monitoring fit into Victorian engineers' research into rivers? 
Perhaps the most telling sign is the placement of technically advanced automatic gauging 
machines. Of the 35 instruments installed between 1934 and 1950, only four were placed 
on rivers in such a way as to monitor floods for mitigation works, compared to the 12 
placed on irrigation channels and 14 for gathering data to 'use in [connection with] 
existing or proposed storage schernes' .217 Only one was located on the Murray River. 
Green's opinion was that although some gauging was done for floods, there was 'not as 
much as desired'. 218 
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Information on river rises and flood peaks was made even scarcer because the 
older 'staff method, where a pole was placed into the river to record the height, proved 
impractical and other forms of gauges were unable to be reached by recorders (often local 
residents) during floods.219 Further, 'quick rises and falls' along with lack of warnings of 
flood peaks to gaugers, contributed to the rarity of accurate flood data, as measurements 
were not taken when the flood was at its highest. 220 To remedy this problem, engineers 
used logarithmic extrapolation, slope area or velocity-area methods to project what the 
data would have shown. These methods, Green wrote, were considered 'reasonably 
accurate'. 221 
The responsibility of engineers to build reliable regulatory structures was felt 
keenly in the profession. A.F. Ronalds, Principal Investigating Engineer for the Snowy 
Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority, wrote an article, 'Regulation of River Flow', in the 
same set as Green. He concluded with these warning words for engineers involved in 
regulation: 'With the rapid expansion of water supply works - provided to permit 
increased primary production - and the consequent, increasing dependence of various 
communities on those works, any complete failure of supplies during an irrigation season 
would prove a national calamity'. 222 The surge in irrigation settlements under closer and 
soldier settlement schemes, combined with pastoral reliance on irrigation, meant that 
dependence on regular river flows was greater than it had ever been. While engineers 
were guarding against drought, the magnitude of the 1956 flood was underprovided for; 
engineers were preparing for more severe dry periods than the 'phenomenal' 1902 and 
1914 droughts, though unprecedented flooding was not given the same attention. 223 
Following the 1956 floods, Green and Ronalds would perhaps have taken 
personally a politician's argument that, 'there is not available in this country at the 
present time sufficient technical information upon which to base plans for flood 
mitigation' .224 Engineers' careful quest for knowledge of the rivers, to secure settlers with 
219 Green, 'The Utilization of River Flow: River Gaugings', p. 79. 
220 Green, 'The Utilization of River Flow: River Gaugings', p.82. 
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assured regular flows, had failed, it could be argued, because governments privileged 
irrigation. 
In 1956 debates in the Senate turned to long-term plans for provision against 
floods, where m onitoring the rivers was a part of that process. State and regional 
representatives urged a Commonwealth or interstate commission to be 'appointed to 
make long-term plans for flood prevention in the Murray', for the collection of 'necessary 
technical data on flood control' and with 'a long-term plan for flood control' that 
included Commonwealth financed 'research into flood mitigation'.225 The MVDL also 
argued for further investigation of flood flows before mitigation structures were built, 
while the RMC considered extending existing gauge networks.226 Not all Ministers and 
state and regional representatives were convinced that long-term strategies were what 
parliament should be debating. The bluntest opinion was recorded from a Senator: 'the 
approach to the River Murray floods must be with a short-term outlook, because floods 
cannot be prevented entirely, and measures must be taken to deal with the immediate 
situation'. 227 For the Senator, while the water was still high the immediate, largely 
financial, effects of the floods overshadowed plans for long-term measures. Such an 
opinion was an exception, however, with most arguing for improved knowledge of floods. 
Improved data sets, it was believed, could become a basis of future flood mitigation to 
protect settlemen ts along the rivers and hold the water back from already h ighly 
engineered landscapes on the Murray. 
Although mitigation may have been a consideration in dam design, it was not a 
primary intention of the dam designers or governments. The dams were almost solely 
built to store water for irrigation and guard against drought, with the exception of the 
Snowy Mountains Scheme. The 1956 flood tested the new infrastructure, in a way 
perhaps not intended by the designers. Flood mitigation quickly became a priority for 
engineers working on dams. 
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In 1956, flood mitigation on a watershed scale was considered more seriously 
than in 1852 or 1890. The floods occurred at a time when the possibilities of engineering 
had been realised. John Blainey, in Red Cliffs during the floods, was Assistant District 
Engineer under the SR WSC. In 1962 he was transferred to the RMC and, he reflected, 
this gave him a 'new' relationship with the floods. Concerns remained about increasing 
flood mitigation on the Murray as the floods were 'still fresh in people's minds'. The 
Hume Dam's capacity had been increased since the flood and spillway gates built. In 
Blainey' s words, 
This had added a new dimension to the Commissioner's need to understand the Murray 
floods. With correct manipulation of the gates, part of the flood could be stored and 
lesser floods mitigated. But opening the Spillway gates too fast could in itself create a new 
flood peak ... We were determined that ... there should never again be a need for an 
emergency operation such as had been necessary at Red Cliffs in 1956.228 
The 1956 floods, in showing the faults of engineering, provided a chance to improve 
structures and to increase the security they could offer settlers along the Murray. 
However, as Blainey's statement indicates, while dams were established to secure irrigators 
against droughts, there were concerns that dams may increase floods. The Snowy 
Mountains Scheme, planned as a large system of dams, became a source of anxiety for 
settlers in 1956 who were concerned that once complete, the Scheme could increase both 
the size and frequency of floods. 
* * * 
Increased Floods? The Snowy Scheme and Hume Dam 
In the final month of 1956 William Henry Spooner, the Commonwealth Minister for 
National Development (and Chairman of the RMC), whose department oversaw the 
construction of the Snowy Mountains Scheme, issued a press statement assuring 
concerned residents in the Murray Valley that Snowy Scheme water releases would not 
228 Quoted in, Mary Chandler, '56 Memories Flood Red Cliffs, p.8. 
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increase the flood, nor would future storages of the Scheme aggravate 'severe' floods. 229 
Spooner's press statement, which called on the expertise of Sir William Hudson, 
Commissioner of the SMA, stated that the Commissioner had had 'this matter 
thoroughly investigated'. Hudson and the SMA further defended the Scheme, arguing 
that once completed it would in fact 'have a marked effect in reducing flooding in the 
Murray and Murrumbidgee' rivers via a system of reservoirs on the upper Tumut and 
upper Murrumbidgee Rivers. The SMA also revealed plans to enlarge the RMC-operated 
Hume Dam by a further 500,000 acre feet (half the cost being paid by the SMA), to 
supplement current works already increasing the dam to two million acre feet, which 
would also somewhat mitigate floods. 
In the following days, the Border Morning Mail (Albury, New South Wales), 
Advertiser (Adelaide, South Australia), Mercury (Hobart, Tasmania), Ballarat Courier 
(Ballarat, New South Wales) and Argus (Melbourne, Victoria) carried the story.230 'Snowy 
Surplus No Danger to Murray River', read the editorial of the Border Morning Mail on 31 
December 1956. 'With vivid memories of the all-time record flooding of the Murray in 
the year ending today', the article read, 
... and the tremendous damage to valuable properties that followed and continued for 
several weeks, it was only natural for those in that famous old stream's lower regions to 
ponder upon a greater menace when the waters of the Snowy were ultimately diverted to 
the Murray its Murrumbidgee tributary.231 
The effects of regulation in 1956 were imagined problems of the future; what would 
happen to the river on completion of the Snowy Scheme, rather than in any way 
229 
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connecting regulation directly to the floods of that year. The previous year the first of 
sixteen dams that were eventually built for the Snowy Scheme, was completed; the ball, so 
to speak, was rolling. Residents, claimed the article, while 'proud of the immense Snowy 
River project as they were when the giant Murray was harnessed in 1936' (when operation 
of the Hume Dam commenced), had some reservations about engineering and its impact 
o n the river and floods. They were concerned that flood heights could be increased as the 
Snowy Scheme would divert water from other rivers into the Murray.232 Spooner had put 
minds at rest, according to the Border Morning Mail: 'Fortunately for all concerned their 
qualms no longer exist'. 233 
Spooner's and Hudson's quick response to settlers' concerns must be seen in the 
context of the national and international status of the Snowy Mountains Scheme. The 
Scheme was a symbol of Australia's development within a global drive towards technical 
advancement rooted in national and progressionist projects. As the largest engineering 
project yet undertaken in Australia, it represented the engineering abilities of the nation 
and was receiving international attention. Environmental historian John Merritt, in his 
study of the changing political and environmental contexts of grazing in the Snowy 
Mountains in this period, has drawn attention to the efforts of Hudson to maintain 
popular support for the project - as it was only through sustained public enthusiasm that 
the Scheme could maintain its status, avoid controversy, and, indeed, continue. For 
example, Merritt noted that in response to lobbyists' claims that the construction of the 
Scheme could aggravate soil erosion (through building access roads, dams, and tunnels), a 
soil conservation section was included in the SMA's scientific division. The potential for 
political fallout had been significant as irrigators, who would benefit from the Scheme, 
could potentially join with the lobby groups and 'embarrass Hudson'. 'But', Merritt 
wrote, 'no experienced hydro-electricity engineer would willingly allow such a d isaster to 
happen'. 234 Perhaps this was also the case with settler concerns that the Scheme would 
increase floods. The SMA promised that it would do what Harrison had proclaimed as 
unthinkable - consider flood mitigation within the scope of darns designed for irrigation 
and hydro-electricity. The SMA made no pretences that the darns could mitigate large 
232 Letter from P. T. Byrnes to Prime Minister R.G. Menzies. 9 November, 1956. Folio 139. 'Flood Control 
- investigation of flood control and mitigation in the Murray Valley'. Item E1077 PART 2. Series A987. 
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floods (dismissed by Harrison and East as impossible), but they might mitigate future 
smaller floods . 
Figure 5.7 
The Snowy Mountains 
Hydro-Electric Project. 
[Laurie Failes (Laurence 
John), 1899-1976. 
Map of the Snowy 
Mountains Hydro-Electric 
Scheme area, covering 
approx. 3,000 square miles 
[picture] [between 1954 
and 1965]. nla.pic-
an20118662-l. National 
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Anxieties over the effects of the Snowy Mountains Scheme on flood heigh ts that 
had surfaced in 1956, which may never have been completely eased, resurfaced in 1957. 
The Victorian Premier, Bolte, raised the issue in a letter to the Acting Prime Minister in 
May 1957. Prompted by '[r]epeated representations ... by landowners along the Upper 
Murray', who feared increased flooding as a result of the Snowy Mountains Scheme, the 
Premier put forward concerns of a 'recent' deputation and added some of his own. Those 
at the deputation, Bolte wrote, 'even now' experienced damaging inundations in the 
snowmelt months of winter and spring which, he implied, were exacerbated by the year-
round increased flows in the river, in turn due to Snowy Mountains Scheme diversions as 
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more dams came under construction. The river, already carrying additional water because 
of the Scheme, flooded to a greater height. 
While 'present flooding had its problems', Bolte wrote, 'the prospect of additional 
water flows could be a matter of most serious concern, particularly to smaller land holders 
who envisaged the whole of their properties being rendered unproductive'. For Bolte, the 
SMA was clearly liable. However, in referring to the conditions of the Snowy Mountains 
Agreement of 1949, he was troubled that while the SMA was required to provide against 
soil erosion and siltation that occurred because of its regulation, it did not include any 
'specific reference to flooding'. Bolte was further concerned that settlers were not legally 
protected because the Agreement authorised the diversion which caused the flooding. In 
view of the legal situation, where the SMA was under no obligation to prevent flooding 
caused by engineering, Bolte requested the Acting Prime Minister to extract an 
'assurance' from the SMA that it would 'do all that it can to avoid damage being caused ... 
and that, where it is not possible for damage to be avoided, take action to compensate 
appropriately those persons who may suffer injury as a result of the Authority's actions'. 235 
Whether floods were increased by regulation was a continual source of anxiety for 
residents along the Murray River, particularly with the completion of the largest regulator 
on the Murray system and what was to be declared one of civil engineering's 
wonders of the world', the Snowy Mountains Scheme, on the horizon. 
' seven 
After further floods along the Murray in 1958 residents became more outspoken 
on the subject, bypassing government representatives and going straight to the press. This 
time, though, settlers criticised the Hume Dam as well as the Snowy Mountains Scheme. 
In September and October 1958 the Border Morning Mail published a series of articles 
written by Harrison, by settlers in its readership sphere of the upper Murray, and by 
newspaper staff. Following the newspaper's report on a 'flood protest meeting' held at 
Albury on 26 August, prompted by the Murray again breaking its banks, Harrison wrote a 
letter, published in early September, defending the Commission's operation of the Hume 
Dam. Harrison denied that water releases exacerbated the flood for those below the dam, 
declaring that, 'statements that the gates were raised, allowing large volumes of water to 
escape, or that it was a 'man-made' flood, are inaccurate as no stored water was released'. 
Harrison argued that floods had occurred 'from time immemorial' and that it was 
235 Letter from Victorian Premier Henry Bolte to the Acting Prime Minister. 28 May, 1956. Folio 267. 
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perfectly natural for the river to flood 'over its own floodplain'. He criticised negative 
press reports that 'abuse the river (or some convenient authority) for the destruction it 
has wrought'.236 The position of the RMC (Harrison, speaking in a public forum using his 
title, representing the Commission) was that: the river would flood with or without the 
Hume Dam, people should accept this, and the structure had no effect on increasing 
flood heights. Border Morning Mail reporters and settlers who had experienced the floods 
saw things differently. 
On the day following publication of extracts from Harrison's letter, a Border 
Morning Mail editorial rehashed opinions of 'primary producers' who had held the protest 
meeting. The report detailed their calls for an inquiry into the role of Hume Dam releases 
in causing or increasing the flood, because of concerns that too much water was released 
by 'mistake or miscalculation'. The editorial backed the protesters views, adding that 
when the Snowy Mountains Scheme was completed floods could be further 
' d' 237 aggravate . 
Accusations that RMC operation of the Hume Dam increased flood heights along 
the upper Murray kept coming. In early October an article written by an Albury resident, 
V. A. Krueger, appeared in the Border Morning Mail, which blamed the RMC's policies as 
the primary source of increased flood heights. Krueger argued that the RMC policy was to 
fill the dam to capacity well before the irrigation season in September, refusing to leave it 
empty to catch floodwater - and thereby possibly reduce flood heights - because of its 
commitment to irrigators. It was, Krueger described, a 'no risk' policy: the RMC would 
not risk having an empty dam at the start of the watering season. The Albury resident 
labelled the policy 'weak and defeatist' arguing that those who were not irrigators suffered 
as a result: 'filling the weir at the earliest no risk is taken with [water] conservation while 
every risk of flood devastation now falls on the downstream landholders - a full weir will 
not hold its flood waters'. By maintaining a full dam the RMC was responsible for the 
flood by neglecting mitigation. 
In Krueger's account the Snowy Mountains Scheme also made an appearance. 
The Scheme was a source of anxiety, having the potential of increasing future floods 
236 Border Morning Mail, 2 September, 1958, in newspaper clippings, in 'Flood Control - investigat ion of 
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when it was completed. The Scheme would be used to divert Snowy River water into the 
Hume Dam in dry years, to supply the Murray irrigation season. If a flood was to then 
occur, Krueger speculated, the additional water in the Hume weir would cause the peak 
to be higher than it would have been if the dam had remained without the diverted 
water. Krueger claimed that: 'Feeding these volumes of water into the [Hume] weir could, 
under this stringent conservation policy, later become the basis for intensified 
flooding' .238 River regulation, which privileged irrigation, stirred emotional responses 
from this non-irrigator, who blamed the structures and the RMC for being impartial to 
his situation and that of fellow floodplain dwellers to the point that engineers would 
(possibly) risk exacerbating flooding for the sake of irrigation. 
The perceived effects of dams on the floods brought forth feelings of injustice, 
where certain industries were privileged at the expense of others. The states' and 
Commonwealth government's bias towards irrigation created animosity from non-
irrigators, who expressed their sense of injustice at having to suffer floods for the sake of 
irrigation and fu ll dams. Another non-irrigator, A. Reuss, president of the Albury-
Wodonga Milk Producers Association, spoke out on behalf of dairy farmers. He blamed 
the Hume Dam for more frequent and larger floods. Since its construction 'he had been 
forced to move his entire herd three times'. Reuss had little faith in 'the authorities'. He 
was quoted as saying: 'They are completely destroying us and we don't know how long we 
can stand it from a financial point of view ... you can see what the weir has done'. The 
RMC was specifically targeted, as he claimed 'the RMC is not helping us at all. The man 
below the weir is not being considered' .239 Reuss' strong words reflect his sense of 
disappointment and betrayal by 'the authorities'. 
The dam, the RMC, engineering - all pivoted towards irrigation - failed to 
provide security against floods and were, in fact, blamed for them. The floods in 
Gundagai in 1852 saw the government criticised for putting settlers in the path of danger 
by surveying the town on flood prone land. Now it was dam designers endangering 
already occupied land. In an era dominated by faith in engineering, both the 1956 and 
1958 floods were seen as a failure of the profession and government to control the rivers 
and protect settlers. The RMC, Hume Dam and the near-complete Snowy Mountains 
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Scheme were blamed for destruction caused by floods. Through the blame, comes a 
strong sense that engineers should have done more to mitigate floods. 
In the aftermath of the 1956 floods on the Murray River, less blame was directed 
at the RMC, SMA, and Hume Dam than two years later. The main source of anxiety for 
settlers was the future effects of diversions and consequent increased flooding from the 
Snowy Mountains Scheme, rather than the influence of dams on the current flood, even 
though the Hume Dam was already built. However, the 1956 floods witnessed the 
beginnings of suspicion that the bias of engineers and governments towards irrigation 
meant that flood mitigation had been sidelined and that the large blockages in the rivers 
and water releases may increase the size of floods. Further, the consequences of not 
mitigating floods hit home to both settlers and the government in 1956, as both argued 
for structures to now be built that provided for both irrigation and mitigation. The 
debates that took place in the pages of the Border Morning Mail in 1958 show that those 
tensions had not disappeared but had, in fact, grown, with settlers connecting existing 
regulatory structures to the floods they were experiencing. Perhaps continued flooding 
had made a situation, that was pressing, urgent and settlers, with stretched finances, more 
demanding. Perhaps, too, the era of technological optimism was drawing to a close. 
Technically, the Hume Dam did not increase the 1956 or 1958 floods. The RMC 
was, as Krueger argued, only implicated in its failure to mitigate the floods, especially in 
1958. The Hume Dam became benign in large floods, such as 1956, and tended to 
slightly reduce the peaks of minor floods, as in 1958. The construction of the Hume 
Dam, designed as a remedy to droughts, had coincided with a series of wet years and this 
may explain the causation assigned to the dam by some settlers. Their sense of injustice 
towards the operation of this dam was felt rather than vindicated. Perhaps non-irrigators' 
accusations were influenced by a broader sense of injustice, as many grazing licences in 
the Snowy River area had been suspended in 1958 to stem catchment erosion as the 
Snowy Mountains Scheme continued construction and lobby groups reacted to the 
environmental impact of the work.240 The dams may have also become the focus of a 
sense of loss, symbols of changing government interests and a transforming landscape. 
People continued to blame governments. With dams governments became 
intertwined with river flow: they were, in a very real sense, embedded in the river. Floods 
were no longer natural disasters in the way they had been and were instead seen to come 
240 Merritt, Lasing Ground, pp.90-92. 
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from a river controlled by officials. With dams and other forms of regulation, what was 
natural or unnatural river flow became increasingly blurred. 
The effect of the Snowy Scheme on future floods remained a point of contention. 
The Snotv')' Mountains Hydro-electric Power Act was amended in 1958, following outcries by 
settlers and Premier Bolte that the Agreement did not cover flooding caused or increased 
by the works of the SMA. An added section stated that '[i]f the owners of land along the 
Upper Murray or along the Lower Tumut suffers loss by flooding from temporary works 
of the Authority in relation to that land, the Authority shall be liable to pay 
compensation to the owner'.241 The following sections clarified this first amendment, 
most importantly emphasising that the Authority was only liable for floods caused or 
increased by 'temporary works', not permanent structures.242 A further qualification 
reaffirmed Bolte's concerns that because the 1949 Agreement authorised d iversions the 
Authority was not liable for aggravating flooding. The clause stated that: 
(3D) For the purposes of rights to compensation under this section, where anything has 
been done by, or under the authority of, the Authority and the doing of that thing was 
authorized both by this Act and by a State Act, that thing shall be conclusively presumed, 
as against the Authority, to have been done in the pursuance of this Act.243 
A 'thing' could be a dam and the Authority remained without any real legal responsibility 
for having an ongoing effect on river heights, other than soil erosion and siltation, 
remaining largely exempt from compensating settlers affected by the erection of dams, 
which were designed to be permanent and lasting. 
In 1963 the SMA still maintained that floods would not be aggravated by the 
Scheme, adding an assurance that '[t]he agreement ... gives full protection to owners of 
land along the Upper Murray should any loss of flooding be experienced as a result of the 
works of the Scheme'. The amended Agreement, though, barely covered dam-exacerbated 
flooding. Yet the Authority claimed the Agreement was adequate and also reiterated that 
there would be 'some mitigation of natural floods' .244 However, in 1966, on completion 
of major sections of the Snowy Mountains Scheme, the Authority reported that although 
the storages would not affect very large floods, floods under 12,000 cusecs would probably 
241 Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Power Act 1949-1973, Part VI, 33 (3A). 
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be increased by the Khancoban Dam, flooding as much as 2,400 additional acres. 
Further, this effect would be ongoing. The report considered several options such as 
individual legal agreements with farmers or buying the endangered land; however, 
decided for financial reasons to do nothing and address compensation claims 'as they 
arise'. 245 Bolte' s concerns that the Snowy Mountains Agreement exempted, by omission, 
the Authority and Commission from responsibility for any flooding caused by its works, 
appears to have remained justified, as the legal mechanisms only covered the effects of 
' k, temporary wor s . 
Ironically, the nation focused on engineering and irrigation as remedies for 
drought, had not only forgotten flood mitigation, but possibly created a new 'flood 
problem', environmental, social, and political. Engineers, in conjunction with states 
(especially Victoria and New South Wales) and the Commonwealth, had created a new, 
regulated river with changed flows and fresh unpredictability. The 1956 floods set a new 
agenda for engineers. In the following decades the eastern states embarked on extensive 
programs of dam building: to feed irrigation networks, encourage new ones, supply 
enough water to growing populations and industries and in some areas to mitigate floods. 
Coastal regions in New South Wales had been devastated by floods in 1955 and 1956 
and flood mitigation dams were built to reduce future floods, made cost-effective as they 
protected highly productive regions. New dams in other areas, such as on Darling River 
tributaries, were also built with flood mitigation capacity. The concerns of residents in 
Albury over changed flood flows were felt across the nation as the environmental changes 
caused by dams, irrigation industries' privileged position and ·the challenges of limited 
water resources all helped to turn dams from revered national icons to controversial 
constructions responsible for social injustice and environmental degradation. Large-scale 
intervention in manipulating river flow made dam designers and operators responsible, 
and accountable, for rivers, as engineers took control of the water. 
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6 
Challenging National Development 
Dams and Irrigation, 1956 to 1990 
In 1958 dairy farmers near Albury protested that dams increased both the height and 
frequency of floods, one of many negative reactions to dams and river regulation from 
those who lived in riverine environments. While the dairy farmers were perhaps not 
vindicated in their particular dispute, they were protesting that government privileged 
irrigation by providing dams to support annual crop watering. The dairy farmers were not 
alone in being thrown into the shadows of government policies in an era of technocratic 
national development. 
The town of Tallangatta was moved eight kilometres west in 1952 when the 
Hume Dam was enlarged to provide greater water storage for hydro-electricity and 
irrigation . Neighbouring farms were compulsorily acquired. W .H. Ferguson, a resident of 
the town, expressed a strong sense of injustice at the narrowness of government 
development regimes and officials' decision-making, that took little account of local 
attachments to place, and valued natio nal benefits above local losses. In an open letter, 
just before the town was flooded, he wrote: 
Perhaps I should apologise to the public for broadcasting the small affairs of a place 
unknown to many thousands living in Victoria, but this 'history' is somewhat of an 
obituary notice, the poor little place is to be drowned, a very beautiful and fertile parish is 
to be drowned by the Hume Weir Waters [sic]. There are two ways of getting rid of 
people - fire and water. T he Governments in their mercy have adopted water, we are to 
be merely drowned out; we should be grateful. We are not. We are told for every one of 
us driven off the land, ten others will be placed upon it, and will live happily ever 
afterwards. We grudge no people their happiness, but we dread our removal. Ministers of 
the Crown put the matter with brutal candour. 'We won't pay for sentiment', saith one; 
another, 'You cannot make omelettes without breaking eggs'. We are the eggs, and 
though we are being forced off the earth we should not squeal. The boasted policy of 
governments is to settle the people on the land, they are unsettling us off the land ... The 
pioneers of our valleys fought nature; they carved smiling farms out of forests and 
swamps. They have left their sons a goodly heritage. We must go, but we go with 
L sorrow ... 
This sense of injustice towards the government was to pervade many of the experiences of 
those who lived in flood country over the following decades. 
In the years and decades following the 1955 and 1956 floods state governments 
embarked on extensive programs of dam building. More dams for the Snowy Mountains 
Scheme came under construction. In Western Australia, the Ord River Irrigation Scheme 
was initiated and completed. In the eastern states new dams were also built for irrigation, 
town supplies, and stock watering, and old ones were enlarged. The largest dams on the 
Murray and Darling systems were predominately built for, or became used for, irrigation. 
State and federal water management for inland regions consolidated around dams 
and irrigation. Government dam building and water management for irrigation was made 
possible by highly centralised water management. Such a restricted water management 
focus that privileged irrigation, together with governments' development ethos and 'top 
heavy' approach, was increasingly challenged by a variety of different people and groups 
in this period. Indeed, by the 1990s national perceptions of dams and irrigation had 
altered to include, importantly, environmental degradation along the Murray and Darling 
rivers caused by changed river and flood flows and toxic chemicals used by agricultural 
irrigators. The complex social, environmental, and economic milieux that emerged in 
many regions of the inland following the advent of dams, irrigation, and centralised flood 
mitigation proved significant issues in future water management; especially as 
governments attempted to simultaneously address local, national, and international social 
and environmental concerns. 
While government programs for dam building continued, the period from 1956 
to 1990 marked a change in government polices around irrigation; from public (or 
1 W .H. Ferguson (1952), quoted in, Catherine Allan, et al., 'Understanding the Social Impacts of Floods in 
Southeastern Australia', in Aldo Poiani (ed .), Floods in an Arid Continent, Advances in Ecological Research 
No. 39, (Elsevier: California, 2006), pp.159-174, pp.164-165. 
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government funded) irrigation to that of encouraging private irrigation. This chapter 
discusses this transition. At the same time as governments built dams for irrigation in this 
period, they also attempted to improve flood mitigation, which had been shown to be 
ineffective during the 1955 and 1956 floods . Floods in coastal and inland rivers in these 
years had caused significant damage to towns and crops. During this period governments 
began to systematically address flood mitigation for the first time by constructing levee 
banks. The New South Wales government also incorporated flood mitigation into some 
new dams along inland and coastal rivers. 
Floods changed views of dams and became entangled in bigger disputes about 
irrigation and its environmental, social, economic and political effects, particularly as they 
emerged between 1956 and 1990. In this period important changes occurred in settler, 
government, and industry understandings and management of floods, as well as 
alterations to flood flows and floodplains. Dams and irrigation caused widespread 
changes through many river systems and adjacent floodplains as they relied on harnessing 
flood flows for water supply and permanently alienated river flow from floodplains. 
Taken together, the changes constituted environmental degradations that reflected on 
problems and difficulties of the then traditional water management practices and 
ideologies. This saw the rise of major and divisive, national and international issues such 
as water security and environmental sustainability. Post-war personal insecurities gave way 
to broader anxieties over the environmental destruction of landscapes. 
Dam building and irrigation were challenged in three ways in this period. First, 
economist B.R. Davidson critiqued the economic feasibility of dams and irrigation. In the 
1960s Davidson and others argued that government expenditure on dam construction 
and irrigation subsidies rendered irrigation unprofitable. He further argued that irrigation 
wasted water in such a dry continent - dryland farming should instead be pursued and 
supported by governments. Secondly, non-irrigators raised concerns that dams, water 
extractions for irrigation, and flood mitigation dramatically changed river and flood flows 
in their regions, including along the Namoi and the Macquarie rivers and floodplains, 
where extensive cotton industries followed the construction of dams. Cotton depended 
on large amounts of water for 'surface irrigation' and a strict watering regime.2 Such water 
intensive techniques for growing crops, which also included rice, were developed 
z R.J. Whyte and M.L. Conlon, The New South Wales Cotton Industry and The Environment (Sydney: State 
Pollution Control Commission, August 1990), p.14; and, David Ingle Smith, W ater in Australia: Resources 
and Management (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.91. 
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extensively over large inland areas in this period. Thirdly, the emerging environmental 
movement altered national conceptions of dams and other 'development' and land 
settlement projects, seeking changes to government policies and regulations in order to 
make them accountable for the environmental impacts of development projects, and to 
value environmental conservation. Although environmentalists, by and large, did not 
focus on the Murray and Darling systems until the 1990s, in the period here under study 
they targeted 'development' projects elsewhere, importantly the flooding of Lake Pedder 
and the damming of the Franklin River (both in Tasmania). National campaigns against 
large-scale river works changed the national conception of dams in Australia - from 
projects of national development that were largely unopposed or unquestioned, to being 
problematic and undesirable. 
This chapter will finish with an analysis of the centralised systems that 
characterised government river and floodplain management in this period. 'Top heavy' 
water management drove more and more river flows to become directly manipulated by 
government works, departments, and officials. Emergency responses to floods also 
became more centralised. Centralised governments, focused on irrigation and dam-
building, found themselves incapable of addressing the increasingly complex problems 
they had helped to create. In the 1980s governments began to develop river management 
processes to include a broader range of river values and uses as well as to address 
environmental degradation, but the growing problems of salinity and poor water quality 
increased the urgency for these new processes of river and floodplain management. Many 
of the administrative problems from this period remained into the 1990s. 
* * * 
Dams and Irrigation: Economic Assessment 
Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia 
and Queensland expanded their water storage and distribution networks. State programs 
of dam building and storage enlargements rivalled the hydro-electric and irrigation 
projects undertaken in the post-war period. For example, the combined water storage 
capacity of government dams in Victoria nearly doubled between 1956 and 1980, from 
276 
Chapter 6 - Challenging National Development, 1956 to 1990 
around eight million megalitres to around fifteen and a half million megalitres.3 In New 
South Wales, the government surveyed over 30 sites for new dams and weirs and by the 
mid-1960s had a 50 year plan for dam constructions worth £700 million.4 The dams built 
in this period continued post-war philosophies of national and state development that 
focused on large-scale technocratic projects and increasing settlement and populations 
through agricultural irrigation. 
In 1963 the Victorian State River and Water Supply Commission (SRWSC) 
engineer A.L. Tisdall, speaking at a national conference on Australia's water resources, 
commented on the continued importance of irrigation in the process of national 
development: 'Water conservation is of vital importance in this driest of all inhabited 
continents ... Irrigation development is not simply an isolated business undertaking, and 
in advanced countries is not so regarded. It is nation-building in the real sense' .5 Tisdall's 
view was typical of many government engineers involved in water management in this 
period. Dams and irrigation development had become mainstays of government policy, 
closely linked to land settlement programs and national development. 
Established irrigators also supported continued government investment in the 
irrigation industry. Powell argued that in Victoria in the mid-1960s, '[i]rrigation was ... a 
well-ensconced institutional force ... ; it was the focus of powerful community interests, 
family loyalties, organisational strength, and professional identity'.6 In New South Wales 
irrigation was gathering a similar status along rivers such as the Namoi and Macquarie. 
Following the completion of large dams on these rivers in the 1960s, irrigation developed 
rapidly. In many regions irrigators quickly became dominant and formed powerful groups 
within local communities. Their interests also heavily influenced river management. 
However, the financial feasibility of large dams and irrigation began to be questioned by 
economists as well as some engineers in this period. The previously unquestioned role of 
irrigation as a national asset was challenged publicly and sustainedly for the first time.7 
Economist B.R. Davidson led attacks against irrigation and irrigation dams in the 
1960s and 1970s. His books, The Northern Myth and Australia Wet or Dry?, published in 
3 J.M. Powell, Watering the Garden State: Water, Land and Community in Victoria 1834-1988 (Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 1989), 'Figure 61. Simplified chronology and cumulative storage capacity, Victorian water supplies'. 
p.252. 
4 C.J. Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty: Water Development and Management in New South Wales (Parramatta: 
Department of Water Resources New South Wales, 1988), p.282. 
5 AL. Tisdall, quoted in Powell, Watering the Garden State, p.248. 
6 Powell, Watering the Garden State, p.254. 
7 Powell, Wa tering the Garden State, pp.248-255 
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1965 and 1969 respectively, criticised contemporary and past irritation schemes and their 
associated dams, as uneconomical in terms of cost-benefit ratios.8 In Australia Wet or Dry? 
Davidson wrote: 'If the aim of the nation is to use its resources as efficiently as possible 
and to give its people the highest possible standard of living, the establishment and 
continued expansion of irrigation is a mistake'.9 ln crude terms, Davidson's argument was 
that irrigation dams cost far more to the state, including capital and maintenance 
expenses, than was recouped from farmers' production. 1° Farmers were not taxed for the 
capital and maintenance costs of dams, nor did they pay interest on the capital invested 
in dam construction. Instead, water was sold cheaply to farmers who, Davidson argued, 
wasted the water through inefficient irrigation methods. Many irrigators were also 
financially supported by government subsidies. Davidson argued that a small area of 
irrigated land was sufficient for all the necessary vegetable production in Australia and, 
generally, there was too much land under irrigation. 11 He especially crit icised small-scale 
irrigated dairy farming, which was significantly subsidised by the government. He 
suggested that dairy farms be amalgamated and used for rice growing, beef grazing, and 
raising fat lambs. 12 
Davidson argued that irrigation in Australia had been founded on powerful ideas, 
such as that it was the best way to achieve land settlement, drought mitigation, economic 
growth, and increased production. The continued logic of these ideas, however, did not 
stand up under scrutiny and contemporary technology. 13 He argued that the effects of 
drought were felt more intensely in regions under irrigation as these areas depended on 
consistent water availability, and that the land settlement imperative of irrigation had also 
failed, pointing out that greater population densities had been achieved in wheat districts 
(albeit in townships rather than on small farms). 14 Dryland farming (and improved crop 
varieties) should instead be developed through government support, since technological 
8 B.R. Davidson, The Northern Myth: A Study of the Physical and Economic Limits co Agricultural and Pastoral 
Development in Tropical Australia (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965); and, B.R. Davidson, 
Australia Wet or Dry! The Physical and Economic Limits co the Expansion of Irrigation (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1969). 
9 Davidson, Australia Wet or Dry?, p.241. 
10 Davidson, Australia Wet or Dry!, p.240. 
11 Davidson, Australia W et or Dry?, pp.240-243. 
12 Davidson, Australia W et or Dry?, pp.139-142. 
13 Davidson, Australia Wet or Dry?, pp. l -5. 
14 Davidson, Australia Wet or Dry?, p.241 and pp. 155-160. 
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innovations made it a feasible alternative. Dryland farming was an economical and water 
efficient form of agriculture. 15 
Continued dam building by governments would also create new demands on 
limited amounts of water. Indeed, Davidson argued that with 90 percent of Australia's 
stored water going to irrigation, the industry had reduced the water available for other, 
more lucrative industries such as grazing, as well as for domestic supplies. 16 Further, 
traditional irrigation crops were becoming less profitable because European markets, 
which had taken a large proportion of exports, were contracting. 17 The only crops that 
could be grown lucratively were commercially expensive products such as fruit and 
vegetables, and even these could be grown in smaller areas and could in part be replaced 
by more water efficient dryland farming. 18 He concluded Australia Wet or Dry? with these 
words: 'It is the conservation of water for uneconomic irrigation schemes, rather than 
allowing the water to flow harmlessly into the sea, that has wasted the nation's 
resources' .19 Davidson explicitly omitted some forms and areas of irrigation from his 
general criticisms in Australia Wet or Dry?, including the then embryonic cotton industry 
on the Namoi. In fact, he stated that cotton growers on the Namoi made 'efficient' use of 
water.20 There, private irrigation farms were fed by the government built Keepit Dam. 
Like irrigators elsewhere, Namoi irrigators were not taxed to recover the capital cost of 
the dam. The cotton industry was also given a starting boost in the 1960s through a 
cotton bounty. Nevertheless, Davidson was generally more positive about the cotton 
industry than other types of irrigation because the national and international cotton 
market was good. He cautioned, h owever , that cotton irrigation would only prove 
economically viable in the future if cotton markets improved further and disease did not 
wipe out cotton monocultures , which were developing in places like the Namoi.21 
Davidson's work and arguments shaped a 'school' of economists who critiqued 
the economic basis of irrigation. 22 There was a reaction against them by engineers who 
presented alternative cost- benefit analyses, that showed the economic advantage of 
irrigation, and made counter arguments that irrigation did, in fact, achieve drought 
15 Davidson, AustTalia Wet or Dry?, pp.3-4. 
16 Davidson, Australia Wet or Dry?, p.2. 
17 For changing contexts and markets in this period see, Powell, Watering the Garden State, p.247. 
18 Davidson, Australia Wet or Dry?, pp.112-114. 
19 Davidson, Australia Wet or Dry?, p.245. 
20 Davidson, Australia Wet or Dry?, p.242. 
21 Davidson, Australia Wet or Dry?, pp. 191-198. 
22 See, C.H. Munro, Australian Water Resources and Their Development (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1974), 
p.208. 
279 
mitigation, increased land settlement density, and other positive outcomes. Engineer 
C.H. Munro countered Davidson's criticisms by pointing to the economic success of 
cotton irrigation in the Namoi valley.23 For Davidson, irrigation along the Namoi had 
been the exception, for Munro it was the example. Growers along the Namoi represented 
a new generation of irrigators who grew lucrative crops. Munro argued that the 
economics of the government dam at the headwaters of the Namoi had undergone 
rigorous assessment, and its operation as well as the irrigators' water use was closely 
regulated. Munro argued that the debate would only be settled if other dams were as 
thoroughly assessed as Keepit Dam and the methods of calculation made public (he 
criticised Davidson for not publishing his methods of calculation). Munro suggested that 
studies of other dams and irrigated farms would reveal them to be as economically viable 
as Keepit and the Namoi irrigators.24 
Davidson's arguments, and the debates they triggered, raised real and previously 
overlooked weaknesses of irrigation. In many ways the 'irrigation controversy' (as Munro 
called it) was a long overdue thrashing out of the value of irrigation, the benefi ts and 
necessity of which had previously been largely unquestioned.25 Davidson's arguments 
were those of an economic rationalist and their economic aspects were taken up in wider 
debate. U ltimately, the 'controversy' led to an economic reductionist critique and 
consideration of irrigation. The opportunity for a broader assessment that included the 
immediate and longer term social and environmental impacts of dams and irrigation, and 
issues around the social injustice of these works, was missed at this time. Further, 
Davidson's arguments, while condemning of irrigation programs that rested on outdated 
economics and technology, were in some ways rooted in the same narrow development 
focus that drove irrigation and dam-building programs. Davidson aimed to improve 
'efficiency' in using 'resources'.26 He worked from basic assumptions, such as the need for 
greater population and land settlement density. As such he worked within traditional 
development ideologies of his era. 
23 Munro, Australian Water Resources and Their Development, pp.208-2 18. 
24 Munro, Australian Water Resources and Their Development, pp.208-218. For more information on Munro's 
and Davidson's arguments see, J.J. Pigram, Issues in the Management of Australia's Water Resources (Melbourne: 
Longman Cheschire, 1986), p.205-209. 
25 Munro used this term, drawing on a general terminology. See, Munro, Australian Water Resources and Their 
Development, pp.208-209. Later, J.J. Pigram called it 'the irrigation question'. See, Pigram, Issues in the 
Management of Australia's Water Resources, p.205. For the lack of debate about irrigation see, Pigram, Issues in 
the Management of Australia's Water Resources, p.209. 
26 See especially, Davidson, Australia Wet or Dry7, pp. l 09-117. 
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From the late 1970s academic writings, government reports, and international 
inquiries (for example, by the United Nations (UN)) were to take up issues of the social 
injustices and environmental degradation caused by dams and irrigation. These critiques 
began slowly and it was not until the 1990s that a true groundswell of study around these 
issues began in any sustained way. This growing body of literature revealed, and continues 
to reveal, long histories of injustice and environmental degradation exacerbated or caused 
by government dams and public and private irrigation, in Australia and around the 
world.27 
While the problems raised by Davidson caused substantial debate within 
engineering and economic circles, programs of dam building and irrigation expansion 
continued.28 Irrigation and associated dams had become mainstays of government 
policies, linked closely to land settlement projects. Such works gained continued currency 
with politicians and many of their constituents as integral to the 'national development' 
ideals of making a dry land productive. The ideologies that underpinned dams and 
irrigation were more powerful than Davidson anticipated.29 However, the irrigation scene 
was changing as Davidson was writing. Earlier criticism over public (or government) 
irrigation saw governments instead turn to supporting private irrigation through 
government dams, such as on the Namoi. 
* * * 
27 See, for example: Tina Loo, 'Disturbing the Peace: Environmental Change and the Scales of Social Juctice 
on a Northern River', Environmental History, 12, 4, October 2007, pp.895-919; John Donahue and Barbara 
Rose Johnston (eds.), Water, Culture and Power (Washington DC: Island Press, 1998); Barbara Rose 
Johnston (ed.), Who Pays the Price? The Sociocultural Context of Environmental Crisis, (Washington DC: Island 
Press, 1994); Barbara Rose Johnston, 'Reparations and the Right to Remedy', World Commission on Dams 
briefing paper. Contributing Report, Thematic Review 1.3: Displacement, resettlement, reparations, and 
development. July 2000; Jaques Leslie, Deep Water: The Epic Struggle Over Dams, Displaced People, and the 
Environment (New York: Picador, 2005); Timothy Mitchell, The Rule of Ex.perts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, 
Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Benjamin Weil, 'The Rivers Come: Knowledge 
Systems in the Indus Basin, 1840s-1930s', Environment and History, 12, 1, February 2006, pp.3-29; Heather 
Goodall, 'The River Runs Backwards', in Tim Bonyhady and Tom Griffiths (eds.), Words for Country: 
Landscape and Language in Australia (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2002), pp.30-51; Arnita 
Baviskar (ed.), Warerscapes: The Cultural Politics of a Natural Resource (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2007); 
Vandana Shiva, Water Wars: Privatization, Pollution, and Profit (Cambridge: South End Press, 2002). 
28 Powell, Watering the Garden State, p.254. 
29 C hanging global markets further promoted economic and industrial expansion and diversification. 
Powell, Watering the Garden State, pp.247-249; and for criticism of public irrigation schemes in New South 
Wales see, Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.286. 
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Dams: Public Schemes, Private Irrigation, and Flood Mitigation 
J.M. Powell has observed that there were two types of water projects built in this period: 
'primary development' works, which created a demand for water by providing reliable water 
sources, most notably for irrigation and hydro-electric projects; and 'secondary 
development' works, which aimed to meet existing or projected demands, such as water 
supplies to towns and established industries. While Powell makes this observation for 
Victoria, it can be extended to all Australian states. Dams were built to meet the needs of 
growing populations, but also to settle people on the land (as W.H. Ferguson bitterly 
observed).30 
In Victoria, irrigation dominated rationales behind further dam constructions 
and enlargements in rural areas. These included, for example, Buffalo and Mokoan 
Dams.31 Powell has noted that the area under irrigation increased six percent between the 
early 1970s and early 1980s. 32 Most irrigation in Victoria occurred within defined 
'irrigation districts'. The districts were fed by government dams and infrastructure. Water 
diversions to the districts were highly regulated and coordinated with other irrigators in 
the district. lrrigators, however, farmed individually or through joint cooperatives. In this 
period there was an increase in the number of private irrigators. 'Private irrigators' were 
farmers who were licensed for water diversions and irrigation but were outside the 
irrigation districts. Powell estimated that half of these irrigators drew diversions from 
rivers that were regulated by government dams. The other half either relied on 
unregulated river flow or constructed large private storages, a trend that escalated in 
subsequent years, especially in parts of New South Wales and Queensland.33 
30 Powell, Watering the Garden State, pp.246-247. Some dams built in this period, including Dartmouth Dam 
(commenced in 1973 and completed in 1979), were cofinanced between the state members of the RMC 
and the Federal government. Dartmouth Dam fed the Hume Dam and far exceeded the older dam's storage 
capacity. The Hume was also enlarged in the late 1970s with a new capacity of over three million megalitres. 
Dartmouth and Hume were part of the Snowy Mountains Scheme, providing extra water for irrigation and 
electricity generation. 
3 1 See, Powell, Watering the Garden State, p.301, 'Major water storages' . Powell's table gives a list of major 
water storages that were completed by the Victorian government up to 1988, and their main uses. 
32 Powell, Watering the Garden State, pp.254. The largest irrigator in the state was the dairy industry, with 
79.4 percent of the total area under irrigation in the state being used for pasture between 1979 and 1982. 
The next biggest irrigator was the fruit and vegetable (including vineyard) industries, which accounted for 
9.9 percent of the total land under irrigation. Powell, Watering the Garden State, p .255. 
33 Powell, Watering the Garden State, pp.254-255 ; Munro, Australian Water Resources and Their Development, 
pp.150-151; and, P.J. Hallows and D.G. Tho mpson, The History of Irrigation in Australia (Mildura: Australian 
National Committee on Irrigation and Drainage, 1995), pp.41-57 . 
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In New South Wales there was a greater movement towards private irrigation 
outside the government irrigation areas. As Clem Lloyd noted, public irrigation schemes 
fell from favour in the New South Wales government following the floundering 
beginnings of the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area and Murray Irrigation Districts.34 Lloyd 
described the Coleambally irrigation district, established in 1960, as '[t]he last major 
venture into public irrigation in New South Wales'.35 In the 1960s the government 
embarked on an extensive program of dam building in coastal and inland regions to 
promote private irrigated agriculture. The dams were intended to create a demand for 
water and irrigators to follow their construction. Many of these dams were built in the 
northern half of the state, above the Lachlan River (although additional dams and weirs 
were constructed on the Lachlan, Murrumbidgee, and Murray rivers).36 
Inland dams were also development projects in another sense. New South Wales 
aimed to capture water along the Darling tributaries within that state, so that it was not 
'wasted' by flowing out to sea and to ensure that claims were not made on the water by 
Victoria and South Australia once it reached the Murray.37 The dams could provide state 
water security as well as development. Dams were built, for example, on the Macquarie, 
Namoi, Dumaresq, Macintyre, and Castlereagh rivers, and smaller weirs along those and 
other inland watercourses. Similarly, Queensland built dams to encourage irrigation by 
private licence, notably at two sites, near the towns of St George on the Balonne River 
and near Goondiwindi (and Inglewood) on the Macintyre River, completed in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Smaller weirs were also built along these rivers. These irrigation 
schemes were in the upper portions of the Darling river system, which were not subject to 
interstate agreements or monitoring by the River Murray Commission. Ir could be argued 
that this was one reason that problems such as the overallocation of water licences 
occurred. However, given the history of engineering on the Murray, this may have 
happened even under interstate management. 
Another area in which state governments centralised control in an era of 'top 
heavy' government was flood mitigation through levee construction, improved flood 
H Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.282. 
35 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.286. 
36 See, Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.285. In 1968 in New South Wales the crops that accounted for the 
greatest area under crop irrigation were fodder crops, such as lucerne. Rice was second, and then cotton. 
However, both rice and cotton were expanding industries in the 1960s and both were to overtake fodder 
crops in the following decades. In terms of area, irrigated pasture was roughly equal to that used for growing 
irrigated crops. This was in contrast to the dominance of pasture irrigation in Victoria. Munro, Australian 
WateT Resources and Their Development, p.146 and p.151. 
37 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.281. 
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warning systems, and dams. A program of flood surveys and strategic levee building began 
in New South Wales following the 1955 and 1956 floods. Flood mitigation had long 
been considered too expensive in comparison with the damage that could be prevented. 
The damage caused by the 1955 and 1956 floods, however, was so substantial that the 
expense of flood mitigation works was now justifiable in economic and social terms in 
some areas.38 Flood mitigation works mostly took the form of systems of levee banks, 
improved warning systems, and diversion channels. For example, the New South Wales 
government sent officials into many inland areas, such as the Namoi River valley, to assess 
flood flows and to establish flood mitigation levees to protect towns and, to a lesser 
extent, residents living beyond town boundaries. State and Federal governments also 
began programs to improve flood warning systems through increased river gauging 
stations - both through the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) and the State Emergency 
Services (SES, in the mid-1970s re-named the State Emergency Service), which had 
independent warning systems in some places, such as along the Namoi.39 This was the 
first time flood mitigation was systematically addressed by government. The size of the 
1955 and 1956 floods, as well as large floods in the 1970s along tributaries of the Darling 
River, was in many places unprecedented since settlement. Action to mitigate was in some 
ways a direct response to a new sense of the threat that floods posed. 
Flood mitigation dams were also built, and used to supply water to industry 
simultaneously. For example, Glenbawn Dam on the Hunter River was built to mitigate 
floods as well as to supply water for irrigation and mining development. In the inland, 
Burrendong Dam was built on the upper Macquarie as a flood mitigation and irrigation 
structure that would also, it was argued, ensure water to the Macquarie Marshes, an 
important wetland for cattle grazing and bird breeding.40 Flood mitigation through dams 
was linked to a development ethos and centralised water management. Responses to 
'natural disasters' were also centralised to states in the 1970s. All states passed Acts, 
following a series of damaging environmental events in the 1970s, which codified 
centralised responses and financial assistance (to individuals and local governments) 
during and after natural disasters. This will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
* * * 
38 Lloyd, Eicher Drought or Plenty, p.289. 
39 Laurie Monrgomerie and Pettit Consulting Engineers, Namoi Valley Flood Mitigation Study: Volume 1 
(Sydney: W ater Resources Commission, June 1980), pp.123-128. 
40 Lloyd, Eicher Drought or Plenry, p.283. 
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Regional Impacts 
The Namoi and Macquarie rivers are tributaries of the Darling River. The regulation of 
these two rivers through dams and intensive irrigation occurred between 1960 and 1980, 
as part of the New South Wales government's program of river development to secure the 
waters of the Darling river system. An exploration of these two specific rivers aims to 
provide some insight into the complexity of the issues around dams, irrigation, and flood 
mitigation in this period. While these two rivers share a number of issues related to river 
regulation, they also have local particularities. The studies of these two rivers, therefore, 
also explore the ways that larger political processes and issues common to many different 
places, such as reduced flooding, were articulated in local contexts. This is important to 
recognise as it was the complexity of local issues and environmental changes that 
presented the greatest challenges to traditional river management. Centralised 
governments that focused on dam building and irrigation were unable to address many of 
the complex local (as well as river and basin wide) issues which they had helped to create. 
Further, these studies demonstrate the entanglement of issues - environmental, social, 
and political - that were to dominate management of the inland rivers from the 1990s 
and shape the futures of residents of flood country and the rivers. 
Different issues will be emphasised and explored in the Namoi and Macquarie 
studies. The issues have been selected because of their dominance in the regions and in 
order to more fully explore particular challenges to dams and irrigation. The N amoi study 
concentrates on two issues. First, the social and industrial tensions that resulted from 
river regulation and irrigation, especially the concerns of graziers as river flow was reduced 
by irrigators' water extractions. Secondly, the way large floods were exacerbated by the 
operation of the darns and the erection of private levee banks by irrigators. The 
Macquarie study focuses on the environmental impacts of dams and irrigation, 
particularly in relation to the Macquarie Marshes. The marshes, an important wetland 
located along the lower reaches of the river, were to be significantly degraded by dam 
releases and irrigation. Local residents challenged irrigation development in order to 
protect the wetland. 
In both these regions extensive cotton irrigation developed after the completion 
of large dams. The most common method of cotton irrigation was 'surface irrigation' 
(also called 'flood irrigation') from river water. Flood-irrigated cotton was dependent on 
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large amounts of water and strict watering regimes. Water intensive crops, such as cotton 
and rice, began to be grown extensively for the first time in the inland in this period. 
Each had been grown from early in the process of land settlement, but the area under 
cultivation increased rapidly as more dams came under construction.41 Prior to 1980, 
water licences were tied to properties so that if the government authorised land for 
irrigation, irrigators could pump as much water as was required to irrigate that land.42 
Some irrigators used artesian water as an alternative or supplementary source of water, 
which was pumped from underground aquifers.43 
Flood irrigation essentially used artificial channels to funnel water from large on-
farm reservoirs to crops, flooding fields during key growth times. The crops needed to be 
watered in this way relatively frequently, sometimes as often as every 10 days.44 However, 
irrigators had to be careful not to supply the fields with too much water, as cotton crops 
are sensitive to water-logging. Control of water availability, both along the river and to 
irrigation farms, as well as flood mitigation were, therefore, important to irrigators. 
Further, the dry climate of northern inland New South Wales was favourable for cotton 
growing. The rivers were regulated largely according to irrigators' needs. The water needs 
of cotton growers were, however, at odds with the unregulated flows of the Darling 
tributaries on which many native species of plants and fauna relied. Ecologies along these 
rivers had evolved in response to the variable flows of the rivers, including large floods 
that extended wetlands and cued reproduction for many species of birds, animals, and 
plants.45 Many non-irrigators also valued and relied on floods. For example, graziers relied 
on small floods to rejuvenate grazing pastures. 
41 See, Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, pp.285-288. 
42 Pigram, Issues in the Management of Australia's Water Resources, pp.191-192. 
43 Pigram, Issues in the Management of Australia's Water Resources, p.190. 
44 Whyte and Conlon, The New South Wales Cotton Industry and the Environment, p.14. 
45 R.T. Kingsford, 'Review: Ecological Impacts of Dams, Water Diversions and River Management on 
Floodplain Wetlands in Australia', Austral Ecology, 25, 2000, pp.109-127. 
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The Namoi and Macquarie rivers, showing the location of major dams and weirs and the 
Northern Bypass Channel in the Macquarie Marshes. 
[By: Jennifer Sheehan, Cartographic Services, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 
the Australian National University.] 
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* * * 
Namoi River: Industry Tensions, Social Conflicts, and a New Flood Threat 
Keepit Dam, built in n orth-central New South Wales at the headwaters of the Namoi 
River, was originally intended to supply water for stock raising. Construction of the dam 
began in the 1940s and, after lengthy delays for a variety of reasons, was completed in 
1960. By the time the dam was completed graziers' water needs had mostly been met 
through more efficient techniques of using artesian water. The government turned to 
private irrigators to make use of the dam water. Cotton irrigation soon began near Wee 
Waa, spearheaded by immigrant Californian irrigators.46 
Oral historian Siobhan McHugh has noted that Californian irrigators were 
attracted to Australia because of the lack of government controls over irrigation and 
government subsidies to irrigators; and to the Namoi because of the favourable climate 
for cotton growing and ready source of dam water.47 The Namoi River's headwaters are in 
the Great Dividing Range. The Namoi has many tributaries that also flow from the 
mountains. All have shallow channels. Floods, fed by rain over the rivers' headwaters in 
the mountains, tend to spill out of the shallow channels onto the flat floodplains below. 
Floods bring fertile black silt from the mountains which accumulates on the floodplains 
and retains water well. lrrigators were planting highly water sensitive crops, but they were 
establishing infrastructure on land that could flood.48 
Cotton irrigation expanded rapidly on the Namoi. By 1965 there were 63 cotton 
irrigators in the region, 25 of them American.49 Between 1961 and 1969 the area of land 
under cotton irrigation grew from 38 hectares to 20,000 hectares, and between 1965 and 
46 Siobhan McHugh, Cottoning On: Stories of Australian Cotton-growing (Sydney: Hale & lremonger, 1996), 
pp.2-11; Pigram, Issues in the Management of Australia's Water Resources, p. 176; and, Hallows and Thompson, 
The History oflrrigation in Australia, p. 77. 
47 McHugh, Cottoning On, pp.5-8. 
48 Laurie Montgomerie and Pettit Consulting Engineers, Namoi Valley Flood Mitigation Study: Volume 1, pp.3-
4; and, Water Resources Commission, Restoration of Namoi River Floodplain Waterways (Sydney: Water 
Resources Commission, 1976), preliminary report, p.2. The Restoration of Namoi River Floodplain Waterways 
report was published as two sections in one volume - the preliminary report and the final report. The final 
report was located at the back of this volume and indicated that the final report was to be read in 
conjunction with the preliminary report. The final report made only minor changes to the preliminary 
report after consultation with landowners. 
49 McHugh, Cottoning On, pp.5-8 and pp.19-20. 
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1979 the region was the major cotton producing area in Australia.50 Indeed, the success 
of the Namoi cotton growers boosted the profile of cotton in New South Wales and 
cotton irrigation quickly developed on other upper Darling tributaries, such as the 
Macquarie and Gwydir rivers, and later on the Darling itself. Cotton had the advantage of 
being a 'high-input, high-output' crop.51 It was lucrative, under the right government 
policies, and the crops produced on the Namoi, and later along other Darling tributaries, 
were of high quality, which meant even higher profits.52 
The New South Wales W ater Conservation and Irrigation Commission (WCIC) 
was, however, unprepared for the speed at which cotton irrigation developed on the 
Namoi and the large amounts of river water pumped by the irrigators.53 Officials had 
envisioned that farmers would only irrigate a proportion of their licensed land, as had 
historically been the case in Australia. The type of pumps used by farmers in Australia 
meant that they traditionally had not irrigated all of the authorised land. However, 
Californian farmers introduced larger and more powerful pumps. These pumps meant 
they could, and did, irrigate the maximum area of land allowed by their licences. The n ew 
pumps meant that government projections of water use were, in fact, underestimates. 
Government assumptions about pumping technology and past irrigation methods meant 
more irrigation was authorised than the river could support. River flows were soon 
overcommitted.54 
A drought in 1965 first revealed the overcommitment of water to irrigators. By 
1965 irrigation on the Namoi was booming and a large area of land (6,000 hectares -
approximately 15,000 acres) had been authorised for irrigation the previous year.55 The 
drought revealed that all the authorised land could not be irrigated under dry conditions, 
which were relatively common in the region. The river and dam threatened to run dry. 
Downstream graziers were outraged at the effects on the river. lrrigators had exacerbated 
the effect of the drought by reducing river flow to their downstream pastures. To 
supplement meagre surface water supplies, irrigators began to pump artesian water for 
their crops. The interconnectedness of artesian water under the Namoi floodplains meant 
50 Whyte and Conlon, The New South Wales Cotton Industry and the Environment, p.3; and, Angela H. 
Arrhington, 'The Effects of Agricultural Land Use and Cotton Production on the Tributaries of the Darling 
River, Australia', Geo]ournal, October 1996, 40, 1-2, pp. 115-125, p.117. 
51 Whyte and Conlon, The New South Wales Cotton Industry and the Environment, p.3. 
52 McHugh, Cottoning On, pp.9-11. 
53 McHugh, Cottoning On, p.25. 
54 For further discussion of American irrigation methods, the effects on river flow, and graziers reactions 
see, McHugh, Cottoning On, pp.26-28. 
55 Pigram, Issues in the Management of Australia's Water Resources, p.178. 
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that when irrigators began to pump out large amounts the water table, which fed other 
bores used for stock watering, dropped and graziers' bores lost the pressure needed to 
pump the water to the surface.56 Indeed, irrigators were to expand their artesian water 
extractions to such an extent that by 1981 as much as 50 percent of irrigation in the 
region was from this source.57 The reduction in river flow combined with the falling water 
table led to increasingly bitter sentiments from graziers as the drought continued.58 
Further, during the drought dam operators continued to favour the interests of cotton 
irrigators. Government officials saved, released, and allocated water for cotton crops 
above the needs of others who relied on the river.59 
The social and industrial tensions on the Namoi in 1965 were somewhat eased by 
the establishment of 'water user associations', formed by local industry groups to 
represent disparate interests to government and each other. One of the key issues 
identified by the associations was the overcommitment of water from Keepit Dam. 
Indeed, water management expert John Pigram later estimated that water had been 
overcommitted by as much as 50 percent.60 
The fact that water had been overcommitted to irrigators was acknowledged by 
the government. The WCIC introduced new limits on irrigators' extractions. An official 
was appointed to the Namoi region to coordinate and enforce the new limits . However, 
irrigators began to pump and divert water illegally to irrigate established cotton fields. 
The government official was reduced to being a kind of irrigation policeman, hunting 
down law breakers to stop illegal pumping and river diversions. In the 1970s the land 
authorised for irrigation was again significantly reduced and in 1976 an embargo was 
placed on issuing additional licences. 61 Ultimately, the government introduced volumetric 
allocations of surface and artesian water, after continued agitation for its introduction by 
water user associations, and to more effectively roll back overallocations of surface water.62 
Another source of concern from graziers and other residents (including dryland 
farmers) was the way in which irrigation and the operation of Keepit Dam changed flood 
% McHugh, Cottoning On, p.28; and, Pigram, Issues in the Management of Australia's Water Resources, p. 190. 
57 Pigram, Issues in the Management of Australia's Water Resources, p.190. 
58 McHugh, Cottoning On, p.28. 
59 McHugh, Cottoning On, p.27. 
60 Pigram, Issues in the Management of Australia's Water Resources, p.193. 
61 McHugh, Cottoning On, pp.29-35 and pp.39-40; and, Pigram, Issues in the Management of Australia's Water 
Resources, p. 188. 
62 Pigram, Issues in the Management of Australia's Water Resources, p.188 and pp. 191-192; and, Australian 
Government, 'Water Resources - Allocation and Use - New South Wales', Australian Natural Resource 
Atlas, http://www.anra.gov.au/ topics/water/allocation/nsw/gmu-upper-namoi-alluvium.html, accessed 9 
June 2009. Volumetric allocations were introduced on all regulated rivers by 1983. 
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flows through the Namoi Valley. Throughout the 1970s tension remained as 
governments continued to disproportionately favour the interests of irrigators in the 
regulation of river flows.63 The operation of Keepit Dam for irrigation water storage and 
releases, along with irrigators' extractions, reduced small floods and 'freshes' downstream, 
valued by pastoralists for stimulating vegetation growth and depositing silt.64 Pastoralists 
and other residents also argued that the dam's water levels should be kept low to reduce 
the height of large floods, while irritators argued it should be kept full for seasonal crop 
watering. 65 
In the 1970s a number of large floods swept through the Namoi river system and 
cumulatively revealed another, more acute issue with cotton irrigation on the floodplain. 
These floods occurred in 1971, 1974, 1976, and 1977.66 During each of these floods 
irrigators' private embankments, built to divert water to crops and protect their cotton 
fields from floods, pushed floodwater in unpredictable directions and in many cases 
increased the velocity and depth of floodwaters by confining the water to narrow 
channels.67 
The private embankments changed the behaviour and direction of the 
floodwaters, increasing crop damage on irrigation and dryland farming properties and the 
stock losses of graziers, as well as endangering residents. For example, the 1971 floods 
caused five deaths in the towns of Gunnedah, Narrabri, Wee Waa, and Moree and more 
than $25 million worth of damages. This included the destruction of over 60 percent of 
sown cotton crops on irrigation properties around Wee Waa.68 Similar damage was 
repeated in the succeeding floods in the 1970s. 69 Most graziers and dryland farmers did 
not erect levees in order to receive the beneficial effects of floods, and many planned their 
farming around past flood experiences. However, the effect of levee banks made floods 
more unpredictable. Some levee banks that had been quickly erected by irrigators also 
63 McHugh, Cottoning On, pp.29-35 and pp.39-40; and, Pigram, Issues in rhe Managemenc of Australia's Warer 
Resources, p.188. 
64 McHugh, Cotroning On, p.37. 
65 McHugh, Cottoning On, pp.27-28. 
66 Laurie Montgomerie and Pettit Consulting Engineers, Namoi Valley Flood Mitigation Srudy: Volume I, 
pp.21-24. 
67 McHugh, Cotroning On, p.37; and, Water Resources Commission, Resroration of Namoi River Floodplain 
Waterways, p.3. 
68 Pigram, Issues in the Management of Australia's Water Resources, p.45. During the 1971 flood Keepit Dam 
was full and provided no mitigating capacity. Indeed, the dam released 2.4 megalitres of water per second as 
the flood peaked, contributing to peak flood heights of over two metres downstream. Pigram, Issues in the 
Management of Australia's Water Resources, p.46. 
69 Pigram, Issues in the Management of Australia's Water Resources, p.46. 
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gave way. The floodwater that had been held back by these banks was released with force 
across the floodplains, isolating and drowning stock. 70 The rapid development of 
irrigation in the valley (as well as in neighbouring valleys such as the Gwydir valley) and 
the subsequent expansion of towns such as W ee Waa meant that the potential for 
damage by floods had also increased. 
In 1976 the New South Wales W ater Resources Commission (WRC, formerly the 
WCIC) published a report on the effect of irrigators' private earthworks on flood flows in 
the 1971 and 1974 floods in the Narrabri-Wee Waa region.71 The report, titled 
Restoration of Namoi River Floodplain Waterways, confirmed the already widely 
acknowledged impact of irrigators' earthworks on increased flood heigh ts and other 
changes to flood flows. The detrimental effect on Namoi valley residents and farmers 
(irrigators and non-irrigators) from the private embankments was significant. Greater 
velocity meant floods had become not only more damaging but also faster rising - there 
was less time for residents to prepare for floods as the time between warnings and flood 
peaks had been reduced.72 Further, as landowners built levees that blocked flood flows to 
floodplains, neighbours in turn built levees to protect their properties from the increased 
floodwater in the river channel, which in turn meant other neighbours raised existing 
levees or built new ones, and so on, 'creating an intensifying cycle of bank construction' 
and higher and faster floods.73 T he report recommended, as the title suggests, that key 
natural flood ways be restored to reduce flood heights created by earth works. The report 
based its recommendations on research and field surveys, including a comparison of the 
1955 and 1956 floods on the Namoi, which occurred prior to extensive irrigation along 
the river (and which were documented through aerial photography), with the 1971 and 
1974 floods.74 The investigating officials compiled map guides, with marks to show where 
levees needed to remain or be built in order to maximise protection to fields, towns, and 
properties, and to indicate to landholders which levees needed to be demolished. 75 The 
70 McHugh, Cottoning On, pp.36-40; and, Water Resources Commission, Restoration of Namoi River 
Floodplain Waterways, p.3. 
71 Water Resources Commission, Restoration of Namoi River Floodplain Waterways, preliminary report, pp. l-2. 
The final report included some adjustments in response to the 1976 flood which occurred after the 
preliminary report was submitted to the WRC. 
72 Water Resources Commission, Restoration of Namoi River Floodplain Waterways, preliminary report, p.3. 
73 Water Resources Commission, Restoration of Namoi River Floodplain Waterways, preliminary report, p.3. 
74 Water Resources Commission, Restoration of Namoi River Floodplain Waterways, preliminary report, pp. l-6. 
75 Water Resources Commission, Restoration of Namoi River Floodplain Waterways, Figures 1-16 and 
preliminary report, p.5. 
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preliminary version of the report was commented on by landowners, who suggested some 
minor adjustments, which were approved by the WRC.76 
Although the potential impact of irrigators' embankments on floods had been 
recognised by government officials engaged in flood mitigation assessments in the Namoi 
valley in the 1960s, they were prevented from intervening as the government held no 
power over private levees built on floodplains, only those on riverbanks.77 The Water 
Resource Commission Act 1976 increased water managers' responsibility to include 
regulation of floodplain development, including 'off-river' levee banks.78 However, the 
expense and labour of demolishing levees and removing excess earth meant that when the 
1977 flood occurred many private levees that had been recommended for demolition still 
remained. 79 
Another report into flood mitigation on the Namoi, published in 1980 and 
written by consultants who had conducted similar flood mitigation studies for other river 
systems in New South Wales, argued that the Namoi had reached a new level of crisis: 'If 
a hierarchy of river valleys with flooding problems was to be established fo r the state's 
inland and coastal rivers, the Namoi Valley would either head the list or be very close to 
the head'.80 The report's authors d id not conduct detailed fie ld surveys, instead arguing 
that the vast area they were briefed to investigate (the entire Namoi valley) limited their 
report to policy issues, which were nevertheless considerable. Further, the authors argued 
that the recommendations made by past WRC investigations (such as by the 1976 report) 
for local areas and individual properties were still current and relevant, and needed to be 
fully implemented. The authors also consulted with many relevant groups including the 
SES, BoM, local councils, and landholders.81 
The policy issues identified in the report included wider water management and 
flood policy, including floodplain farming and the need for financial assistance and 
incentives for landholders to carry out flood mitigation works and levee demolition as 
directed by the WRC. The authors argued that the recommendations made by the 
Commission in 1976 remained 'possibly the only practicable way in which the situation 
76 Water Resources Commission, Restoration of Namoi River Floodplain Waterways, preliminary report, p.5 
and Final Report, p. l. 
77 McHugh, Cottoning On, pp.36-39. 
78 Laurie Montgomerie and Pettit Consulting Engineers, Namoi Valley Flood Mitigation Study: Volume 1, p. l. 
79 See, Laurie Montgomerie and Pettit Consulting Engineers, Namoi Valley Flood Mitigation Study: Volume l, 
97-99. 
80 Laurie Montgomerie and Pettit Consulting Engineers, Namoi Valley Flood Mitigation Study: Volume l, p.2. 
81 Laurie Montgomerie and Pettit Consulting Engineers, Namoi Valley Flood Mitigation Study: Volume 1, pp. l-
2, p.9, and pp.123-128. 
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in that area [the Wee Waa-Merah North areas] could be handled'.82 However, they also 
suggested financial assistance and/ or incentives for landholders to participate in joint 
projects, in order to discourage 'unilateral action'. The authors implied that self-interest, 
along with expense, had contributed to the failure of landholders to carry out the 1976 
recommendations.83 
While recommending some courses of direct action, the report mainly identified 
short- and long-term policy issues with flooding in the region. Despite past investigations 
and recommendations by the WRC, the 1980 brief was for the consultants to make 
preliminary outlines that could direct the Commission's approach to flood mitigation, 
which was a relatively new responsibility for the WRC (from 1976). The authors wrote 
that, '[t]his report ... represents part of the response by the [Water Resources] Commission 
to cope with these responsibilities' .84 The need for a broader policy perspective at this 
time was perhaps also necessary for greater coordination with other government 
departments, such as the New South Wales Counter-Disaster Organisation (CDO), 
established in 1972, and the SES (which was now administratively within the CD0).85 
The government sought broader policy changes. 
One such change came in the mid 1980s when the Water Act was amended to give 
officials the power to nominate 'floodplains'. Areas declared as 'floodplains' could now be 
better coordinated and controlled. Landholders in officially proclaimed floodplains were 
required to gain government approval to build levees. However, many floodplains have 
not gained official recognition, due to incomplete surveys and lack of funds for detailed 
studies, and so socially, economically, and environmentally problematic levees continued 
(and continue) to be built, along with illegal embankments.86 
The period from the completion of Keepit Dam in 1960 to the regulation of 
floodplain development that aimed to re-establish important flood ways in the 1970s and 
1980s, marked significant changes to flood flows in the Namoi valley. Developments 
shaped new understandings of floods for both residents and governments. In this period 
82 Laurie Montgomerie and Pettit Consulting Engineers, Namoi Valley Flood Mitigation Study: Volume 1, p.9. 
State and federal government subsidies had been granted to local councils and individual farmers during a 
coordinated effort towards flood mitigation on northern New South Wales coastal rivers in the 1960s. 
83 Laurie Montgomerie and Pettit Consulting Engineers, Namoi Valley Flood Mitigation Study: Volume 1, p.99. 
84 Laurie Montgomerie and Pettit Consulting Engineers, Namoi Valley Flood Mitigation Study: Volume 1, p. 1. 
85 K.D. Whiting, 'The Role of the State Counter-Disaster Organization and State Emergency Setvice in 
Disaster Management', n.d. p.2. 
http://desastres.unanleon.edu.ni/pdf/2003/agosto/pdf/eng/doc544/doc544-contenido.pdf, accessed 8 
June 2009. 
86 McHugh, Cottoning On, pp.36-39. 
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the position of the government also changed, from supporting unfettered irrigation 
development (which was privileged over, for example, the water needs of graziers and 
dryland farmers) to that of mediating disparate interests. The 1970s and 1980s saw 
greater centralisation in government flood response and management, which potentially 
disempowered local knowledge but also provided coordinated management to a region 
undergoing rapid change and that was home to residents with disparate views over river 
management. 
The issues in the Namoi valley that have been outlined here have focused on 
social and political concerns, as well as flood events as they related to the expansion of 
irrigation and changed river and flood flows. However, the environmental and ecological 
ramifications of irrigation development and dams on undomesticated fauna and flora 
were also mounting in many river systems. These consequences were gathering 
prominence among some residents of flood country, the Macquarie Marshes being an 
area of central concern. 
* * * 
Macquarie River and Marshes: Environmental Impacts 
The Macquarie Marshes, a semi-permanent wetland located along the lower reaches of the 
Macquarie River, had long been recognised by settlers as an important water source and 
breeding site for migratory birds. In 1882 part of the lower marshes was declared a water 
reserve. A portion of the wetlands (40,000 acres) was declared a 'game reserve' in 1900.87 
In 1919 the marshes were declared a Bird and Animal Sanctuary.88 Later, the birds also 
had a distant industry role - sugar cane farmers in Queensland came to rely on ibis to eat 
grass hoppers, which could destroy their plantations. Queensland sugar cane farmers 
protested against plans to build a dam on the Macquarie River in 1946-8.89 
The hydrological underpinnings of extensive tracts of the marshes were also 
implicitly acknowledged in the limits imposed on the way pastoralists farmed in the 
marshes. From 1900 to 1943 the land within the fauna sanctuary was divided into five 
87 Kay Mas man and Margaret Johnstone, Reedbed Country: The Story of the Macquarie Marshes (Tamworth: 
Macquarie Marshes Management Committee, 2000), p. 155. 
88 Masman and Johnstone, Reedbed Country, p.178. 
89 McHugh, Cottoning On, p. 75; and, Masman and Johnstone, Reedbed Country, p.178. 
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grazing blocks.90 In 194 3 these 'marsh blocks' were re-surveyed and divided into 21 
grazing blocks (having become Crown Land in 1913). There were special lease 
arrangements for the new blocks that stipulated certain conditions of use.91 For example, 
one condition was that the lessees 'take reasonable steps to protect wild birds and animals 
upon the area' .92 Other conditions were, for example, the protection of 'non-noxious 
birds nesting upon the Lease' and of reeds used for nesting.93 Floods were important in 
the marshes. Plants, animals, birds, and fish had adapted to flood flows, which cued some 
species to reproduce in a pattern common to many parts of Australia.94 Graziers in the 
marshes also valued floods for stimulating the growth of native grasses for stock grazing.95 
These early recognitions of the environmental and industrial importance of the 
marshes were to be overcome by the government's post-war development ethos. In 1896 a 
weir was built at Warren on the Macquarie River and although larger dams were 
proposed for the Macquarie River from the early twentieth century, they were extensively 
debated by government, industry, and residents, and mostly dismissed as injurious to the 
marshes or too expensive to both supply water and cater for the marshlands. However, 
small areas along the Macquarie River were authorised for irrigation between 1920 and 
1940.96 
In 1946 the construction of Burrendong Dam was approved. The site of the dam 
was located near the headwaters of the river and had been mooted as a suitable place for a 
dam since 1909.97 The dam was intended to stimulate irrigation development, but after 
floods in the early 1950s delayed construction, a flood mitigation pondage was added to 
the dam, capable of storing 470,000 megalitres of water. The dam was completed in 1967 
with a total storage capacity of approximately 1,660,000 megalitres.98 
Anticipating the completion of the dam, cotton growers began acquiring 
properties along the Macquarie, which were to be authorised for irrigation. In 
90 Masman and Johnstone, Reedbed Country, p.155. 
91 Masman and Johnstone, Reedbed Country, pp.161-163 and p.178; and, McHugh, Cottoning On, p. 74. 
92 Masman and Johnstone, Reedbed Country, p.161. 
93 Masman and Johnstone, Reedbed Country, p.161 and p.162. 
94 Richard T. Kingsford and Rachel F. Thomas, 'The Macquarie Marshes in Arid Australia and Their 
Waterbirds: A 50-Year History of Decline', Environmental Management, 19, 6, pp.867-878; and, Libby Robin, 
Robert Heinsohn, and Leo Joseph (eds.), Boom and Bust: Bird Stories for a Dry Country (Canberra: CSIRO 
Publishing, 2009). 
95 McHugh, Cottoning On, p.74. 
96 Masman and Johnstone, Reedbed Country, pp.177-178; and, Hallows and Thompson, The History of 
Irrigation in Australia, p. 76. 
97 Hallows and Thompson, The History of Irrigation in Australia, p. 76. 
98 Hallows and Thompson, The History of Irrigation in Australia, p. 76. 
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acknowledgement of the environmental importance of the marshes, the government 
made provision to release a certain amount of water into the marshes from the new dam 
for the conservation of fauna and flora.99 Graziers, however, opposed the dam from the 
beginning, arguing it would reduce the small floods and freshes that rejuvenated grasses 
grazed by cattle even with water releases to the marshes. 100 
As the dam was being built some residents expressed their concerns that the dam 
would endanger the marshes and birds that bred there by reducing the number of small 
floods and freshes. One resident stated that, 'small freshets [or 'freshes'] and minor floods 
which for untold years have maintained or augmented the Marshes water supplies will 
then be retained in Burrendong Dam'. 101 The Macquarie Marshes Investigation 
Committee, formed in 1951 by local residents to lobby the government to protect the 
marshes after the completion of the dam, stated, '[i]f our plans are not put into effect, the 
Macquarie Marshes will just cease to exist as a breeding ground for birds after 
Burrendong Dam is built' .102 The dam had been widely publicised as securing a reliable 
water supply to the marshes, yet local residents remained sceptical about the effect of the 
dam on the wetlands. The year the dam was completed, the National Parks and Wildlife 
Service (NPWS) was created and management of the marshes was transferred from the 
Department of Lands to this authority. 103 The dam began operation and cotton irrigation 
expanded during a severe drought. Water releases promised for the marshes were put on 
hold to supply irrigators with water. The already limited water supply to the marshes was 
reduced by irrigation extractions, irrigators' 'off-river' storages, and water stored in the 
dam. The wetland began to dry out. 104 Water releases to the marshes, to ensure bird 
breeding, were reintroduced in 1969, and in 1971 part of the marshes was declared a 
Nature Reserve. 105 
However, farming and the needs of the marshes remained in tension. A bypass 
channel was completed in 1972, built to speed water supply to downstream farmers 
whose water supply had been reduced by irrigation extractions (see Map 6.1). The bypass 
channel meant that water used for farming bypassed the slow network of marshlands, 
99 McHugh, Cottoning On, pp.74-75. 
100 Cameron Muir, 'The Opera House of the West', unpublished conference paper presented at the 
National Creative Non-Fiction Conference, 'The Art of the Real', 16-18 May, 2008. 
101 Quoted in, Masman and Johnstone, Reedbed Country, p.201. 
102 Quoted in, Masman and Johnstone, Reedbed Country, p.201. 
103 Masman and Johnstone, Reedbed Country, p.182. 
104 McH ugh, Cottoning On, pp. 7 4-7 5; and, Mas man and Johnstone, Reed bed Country, p.202. 
105 Masman and Johnstone, Reedbed Country, p.182. 
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further reducing the amount of water flowing through the marshes. Irrigation water was 
also released at different times from traditional flooding. Further, releases caused 
canalisation and erosion along watercourses. Another effect of the way the river was 
regulated was that some parts of the marshes were permanently flooded, which injured 
red gums (reliant on a combination of floods and periods of drying), while other parts of 
the marshes were often too dry. The canalisation of the marshes meant vegetation no 
longer purified the water and water quality below the marshes deteriorated. A reduction 
in the frequency and size of floods also limited bird breeding, as some birds, such as ibis, 
would only breed in large numbers when the marshes flooded extensively. Reduced 
flooding also caused a reduction in the quantity and area of reed growth, needed for 
nesting material by birds. These changes to the marshlands were recognised by local 
residents from the time the darn began operation. 106 
Government researchers from the CSIRO studied the effect of dams and 
irrigation on the wetlands from the 1960s, confirming local residents' observations. 107 In 
the 1980s and 1990s scientists such as Richard Kingsford from the NPWS were to 
conduct studies on the ongoing effects of reduced and altered water flow on bird 
breeding and bird populations at the rnarshes. 108 Water birds' habitats and breeding 
continue to be threatened by reduced flooding. Floods are integral to the ecology of the 
marshes. Indeed, Kingsford and fellow researcher Rachel F. Thomas used the large 1990 
flood to measure the wetlands - the very shape and extent of the marshes is due to 
floods. 109 As Kingsford has argued, the 'alienation' of floods from floodplains and 
wetlands through river regulation for irrigation has widespread ecological ramifications, 
including reduced biodiversity and the transformation of wetlands and floodplains to 
. l l . 110 terrestr1a eco og1es. 
Irrigators have recently argued that although the marshes have become degraded, 
their on-farm water storages and government dams act as surrogate wetlands. The dams 
106 McHugh, Cottoning On, pp.75-76; and, Hallows and Thompson, The History of Irrigation in Australia, p.77. 
See also, Kingsford, 'Review: Ecological Impacts of Dams, Water Diversions and River Management on 
Floodplain Wetlands in Australia', p.117. 
107 R. Carrick, 'Breeding Movement and Conservation of Ibises (Threskiornithidae) in Australia', CSIRO 
Wildlife Research, 7, pp. 71-90. 
108 Kingsford and Thomas, 'The Macquarie Marshes in Arid Australia and Their W aterb irds: A 50-Year 
History of Decline', pp.867-878; and, Kingsford, 'Review: Ecological Impacts of Dams, Water Diversions 
and River Management on Floodplain Wetlands in Australia', p.1 17. 
109 Kingsford and Thomas, 'The Macquarie Marshes in Arid Australia and Their Waterbirds: A 50-Year 
History of Decline', pp.867-878. 
11° Kingsford, 'Review: Ecological Impacts of Dams, Water Diversions and River Management on 
Floodplain Wetlands in Australia', pp.1 10-111. 
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are used by birds for breeding and sustain a diversity of wildlife. 111 Indeed, there is a 
movement amongst farmers, irrigators included, to encourage wildlife diversity in and 
around some dams through measures such as native vegetation planting. Government 
and non-government publications encourage farmers to create dams that are 'wildlife 
friendly' - for the conservation of native species of birds and plants, but also for the role 
certain species can play in industry; for example, the pest control that birds can provide 
and the water purification qualities of wetland plants. 112 However, the biological diversity 
of private and government dams is subject to private interests, and comes second to 
private and industry needs. In addition, irrigators cannot replace the complex ecologies 
and biodiversity of wetlands that have evolved over thousands of years. 113 
Many graziers and others who lived near the Macquarie Marshes were outraged at 
the denudation of the wetlands due to the combined effects of irrigation, the bypass 
channel, and the dam. They were not only outraged at the effects on their livelihoods but 
also, significantly, at the effects on wildlife and vegetation which they had taken care to 
protect, often for generations. In 1983 a draft management plan was developed for the 
marshes by the NPWS in conjunction with the New South Wales WRC. 114 The same year 
the WRC announced it would issue a 50,000 megalitre allocation of water to the marshes 
annually. 115 The management plan was finalised in 1986 after consultation with interest 
groups, including the Australian Conservation Foundation. 116 The management plan was, 
and continues to be, periodically updated in consultation with the Macquarie Marshes 
Management Committee, formed in 1989 by local residents. 117 In 1986 the marshes were 
also included in the Ramsar List of Wetlands of International Importance and became, in 
111 Masman and Johnstone, Reedbed Country, p.205. 
112 See, Stephen Platt, 'Wildlife on Farm Dams', Department of Primary Industries, State Government of 
Victoria, http:Uwww.dpi.vic.gov.au/ DPI/nreninf.nsf/childdocs/-
9599F8E44B161 F63CA256BC800079622-738D5F5AA8EE28A2CA256 BC800090A63-
6 Fl B33 D2E88612BE4A256DEA002933 B4-89D37BDD10F23033CA256BCF00088818?open, accessed 19 
June 2009; Coaral Rawton, 'Making Your Dam 'Wildlife Friendly", Land For Wildlife Note No. 2, Land 
For Wildlife: Voluntary Wildlife Conservation, April 1999; Carl Gosper, 'Creating Habitat for Birds', 
Biodiversity: Darling Riverine Plains, Fact Sheet No.10, n.d.; G. Barrett, 'Birds on Farms: Ecological 
Management for Agricultural Sustainability', supplement, Wingspan, 10, 4, December 2000; and, Barry 
Lewis, Farm Dams: Planning, Construction and Maintenance (Canberra: Land links Press, 2002). 
113 See also, Masman and Johnstone, Reedbed Country, p.205. 
114 Water Resources Commission and National Parks and Wildlife Service, Draft Plan of Management for 
Works in the Macquarie Marshes (Sydney: Water Resources Commission and National Parks and Wildlife 
Service, January 1983). 
115 Pigram, Issues in the Management of Australia's Water Resources, p.81. 
116 Department of Water Resources and National Parks and Wildlife Service, Water Management Plan for the 
Macquarie Marshes (Sydney: Department of Water Resources and National Parks and Wildlife Service, 
1986). 
117 Macquarie Marshes Management Committee, http://www.macquariemarshes.com/bwWebsite/. 
accessed 3 September 2008. 
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principle, subject to the management regulations of the Ramsar Convention. 118 However, 
the wetlands continued to decline and additional concerns emerged, such as the use of 
toxic chemicals by cotton growers near the marshes. 119 Conflicts over the marshes were to 
come to a head in the 1990s, as irrigation encroached further and the research of 
ecologists revealed increasing environmental degradation. Environmental activists from 
around the nation became involved in the dispute. 120 
The Namoi and Macquarie rivers were particular cases, but dams and irrigation 
created similar, although place-specific, issues throughout the Murray and Darling river 
systems, as well as elsewhere in Australia. 121 The reproduction and migration of native 
fish, such as the iconic Murray Cod, was affected. Dams and weirs created barriers for fish 
and water holes used for breeding silted up from changed floods and river flows. Rivers, 
such as the Balonne in Queensland, contained more suspended silt as irrigation pumps, 
dams, and weirs increased the turbidity of the water. Recreational fishers monitored such 
changes in rivers and the decline in native fish numbers (and the consequent spread of 
introduced European Carp through the rivers). m 
Government engineering projects to increase irrigation water supplies and hydro-
electricity along the Murray and its headwaters were also completed in this period, 
bringing controversial changes to those who lived along the rivers and watercourses that 
became diverted into the Murray system. For example, dams built for the Snowy 
Mountains Scheme turned more of the waters of the eastward-flowing Snowy and Mitta 
Mitta rivers westward, into the Murray system. While established dairy farmers, crop 
118 Masman and Johnstone, Reedbed Country, p.186; The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, 
http://www.ramsar.org/, accessed 10 June 2008; and, 'Ramsar Convention on Wetlands', Department of 
the Environment, Water, Heritage, and the Arts, Australian Government, 
http://www.environment.gov.au/water/environmental/wetlands/ ramsar/ index.html, accessed 2 June 
2009. 
119 See, Masman and Johnstone, Reedbed Country, pp.206-219. 
120 McHugh, Cottoning On, pp.75-90; Eric Rolls, 'A Place for Bird and Song', The Sun-Herald, 21 November, 
1993, p.40; and Eric Rolls, 'Marshes Endure Misplaced Stress', The Sun-Herald, 28 November, 1993, p.43. 
121 See, for example, Jane Carruthers, 'From "land" to "Place": landscape Conservation and Environmental 
Activism in the Magaliesberg, South Africa and Cooper's Creek, Australia', in ChristofMauch, Nathan 
Stoltzfus, and Douglas R. Wiener (eds,), Shades of Green: Environmental Activism Around the Globe 
(Washington: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), pp.69-99, pp.88-93; Damian Lucas, 'Shifting Currents: a 
History of Rivers, Control and Change', PhD thesis, University of Technology, Sydney, 2004; Paul Sinclair, 
The Murray: A River and lcs People (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2001); Heather Goodall, 'The 
River Runs Backwards', in Tim Bonyhady and Tom Griffiths (eds.), Words for Country: Landscape and 
Language in Australia (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2002), pp.30-51; and, Jaques Leslie, 
Deep Water: The Epic Struggle over Dams, Displaced People, and the Environment (New York: Picador, 2005), 
pp.223-341. 
122 Lucas, 'Shifting Currents: a History of Rivers, Control and Change', especially pp. 116-123; and, Sinclair, 
The Murray, pp. 120-172. 
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growers, and graziers along the rivers had been assured by the Snowy Mountains Hydro-
Electric Authority (SMA) that they would benefit from the flood mitigation capacities of 
the dams, so much water was stored that not only were beneficial floods reduced but river 
flow was limited to a fraction of what it had been. The SMA rejected the protests of 
residents over the effects of the dams in favour of irrigators' claims. 123 
The effects of changed rivers and flood flows along the Murray, such as the death 
of red gums from prolonged flooding or extended drying, as well as increased soil salinity, 
had been recognised early in the process of river regulation for irrigation. 124 However, 
these problems increased and gained wider public recognition in the 1970s and 1980s as 
irrigation was pursued more intensively. 125 
Settler land use practices contributed to increased soil salinisation throughout the 
Murray and Darling river systems in multiple ways. Irrigation raised water tables in some 
areas, such as the lower Murray, intensifying salt concentrations in the already salty soil. 
Water diversions also meant dryland areas that comprised 98 percent of the Basin, 
including many floodplains, were not regularly flushed of accumulated salt. Land clearing 
also affected salt levels, allowing the water table to rise and the soil mineralise through 
capillary action. 126 
In some areas ideas of irrigation and dams as projects of national development 
and technological progress endured. Such notions prevented residents of flood country 
voicing their opposition to irrigation schemes, even if they were disadvantaged by reduced 
river flow. For example, historian Heather Goodall has noted that graziers on the Darling 
River, who were disadvantaged by reduced river flow from cotton irrigation in the Bourke 
area, were reluctant to oppose irrigation publicly. Goodall wrote that graziers were 
'uncomfortable about positioning themselves as opponents of 'progress' and profit-
making development'. 127 The power of more than a century of river development and 
land settlement rhetoric endured. 
While social, political, economic, and environmental problems that stemmed 
from dams, irrigation, and narrow government development policies and management 
m Catherine Allan, et al., 'Understanding the Social Impacts of Floods in Southeastern Australia', in Aldo 
Poiani (ed.), Floods in an Arid Continent, Advances in Ecological Research No. 39, (Elsevier: California, 
2006), pp.159-174; Claire Miller, Snowy River Story: The Grassroots Campaign to Save a Na tiona l Icon (Sydney: 
ABC Books, 2005); and, Leslie, Deep Water, especially pp.268-270 and pp.275-284. 
124 Powell, Watering the Garden State, pp.255-258. 
125 Powell, Watering the Garden Sta te, pp.258-262. 
126 Daniel Connell, Water Politics in the Murray-Darling Basin (Sydney: Federation Press , 2007), pp.17-19. 
127 Goodall, 'The River Runs Backwards', p.48. 
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focus mounted in regional communities throughout the Murray and Darling river 
systems, a national environmental movement was gaining momentum. Environmental 
(and humanitarian) activists and organisations, often based in urban centres, lobbied 
against projects by governments and private companies that would destroy 'wilderness' 
areas. The activism of the 1970s and 1980s was generally (although not exclusively) 
focused on specific causes that related to places frequented by urban tourists, such as the 
Great Barrier Reef in northern Queensland, or was linked to particular and well-
publicised struggles to limit or prevent development, such as the Little Desert in western 
Victoria. Environmental activists did not often connect with the problems being 
experienced in the Murray and Darling river systems until the 1990s. 128 However, it is 
important to briefly explore the issues raised by environmental campaigners in the 1970s 
and 1980s, and the types of concerns they brought to government and popular attention, 
as they were to impact on changing popular conceptions of dams and other projects of 
national and private enterprise development. They also forced changes in government 
policies and legislation, particularly around land and marine conservation. 129 Urban and 
rural environmentalists and human rights campaigners were also to constitute another 
sector of Australia's population that challenged government's traditional 
environmental/natural resource management frameworks. 
* * * 
Environmental Movement: Going National 
A number of factors converged that lent a particular urgency and 'national' flavour to the 
1960s and 1970s environmental and human rights movements. The publication of 
Rachel Carson's Silent Spring in America in 1962 stimulated the formation of campaign 
and lobby groups against certain chemicals and pollutants, such as DDT, in Australia. By 
the late 1960s, however, wilderness causes came to the fore in Australia, in part 
invigorated by the publication of A.J. Marshall's The Great Extermination (1966), on the 
128 The Australian Conservation Foundation did comment on the 1983 Macquarie Marshes Draft 
Management Plan. See, Department of Water Resources and National Parks and W ildlife Service, W ater 
Management Plan for the Macquarie Marshes, Figure 1, 'List of People and Organisations Making 
Submissions', p.19. 
129 For a list of land conservatio n legislation passed in this period in Victoria see, Powell, Watering the 
Garden State, p.268 . See also, Libby Robin, Defending the Little Desert: The Rise of Ecological Consciousness in 
A ustralia (Melbourne: Melbo urne University Press, 1998). 
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destruction of Australian fauna and habitats. In 1965 the Australian Conservation 
Foundation was established to bring together environmental campaigners from around 
the country. It was the first national organisation of its kind anywhere in the world. The 
unpopular Vietnam War politicised student bodies in America and Australia in the 
1970s, who sought national political change. In addition, human rights campaigns for 
oppressed populations gained momentum, particularly in America. The image of earth 
from the moon, widely published and circulated in the late 1960s and 1970s, also 
brought a realisation to many that the planet's resources were finite. 130 
The 1960s and 1970s environmental activists faced new challenges. In the past, 
those with concerns about the threat of developments to particular areas had been able to 
approach politicians and negotiate, in what Dew Hutton, Libby Connors, and others 
described as, a 'gentlemanly' manner - one of caution, trust, and honourable 
negotiation. 131 The new political clout of private companies, as government became more 
reliant on private industry after expensive post-war projects, created a new kind of 'dirty 
politics'. For example, the 1960s campaigns to prevent exploratory oil drilling on the 
Great Barrier Reef and to stop sand mining on Fraser Island, were thwarted by 
politicians' broken promises. Environmental activists formulated new tactics, including, 
significantly, highly successful public awareness campaigns using posters, bumper stickers, 
public seminars, and so on. Further, trade unionists who led the urban 'green ban' 
invigorated the environmental movement to challenge 'boys club' politics and decision-
making.132 
A rift emerged in many campaigns in the 1960s, between environmental activists 
and scientists. Although scientists had been important advocates for environmental 
protection before World War II, industry and government demands for science expertise 
meant that many scientists left environmental groups. The increased radicalisation of the 
environmental movement in the 1970s further drove more conservative scientists from 
the new brand of environmentalism. Val and Richard Routley's critique of the forestry 
industry in Fight for the Forests, published in 197 3, alienated many foresters and forest 
130 Drew Hutton and Libby Connors, A History of the Australian Environment Movement (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.91-99, p.107, and p.125; Robin, Defending the Little Desert, pp.134-
138; Powell, Watering the Garden State, p.24 7; Sinclair, The Murray, pp.175-185, and pp.223-226; and, 
Timothy Doyle, Green Power: the Environment Movement in Australia (Sydney: University of New South Wales 
Press, 2000), pp.114-115. 
131 Hutton and Connors, A History of the Australian Environment Movement, p.108, p.114, and p.124. 
m Hutton and Connors, A History of the Australian Environment Movement, pp.99-124; and, Robin, Defending 
the Little Desert, pp.140-150. 
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scientists. On the other hand, government scientists sometimes helped campaigns, such 
as the 1969 campaign to protect the Little Desert from being opened up for land 
settlement and dry-farming. In the 1970s a number of scientists also became involved in 
environmental organisations and campaigns, providing important data to support causes, 
for example, forest ecologist Len Webb in the Wildlife Preservation Society of 
Queensland. 133 
Indeed, the work of ecologists was increasingly used by environmental movement 
campaigners to challenge development projects and ideologies in this period. Although 
ecology had a long history in science, with its roots in the nineteenth century, it only 
emerged as a professional discipline in the post-war period. Ecology takes an ecosystem as 
a starting point and seeks to study and account for the relationships between various 
organisms and also between organisms and their physical environments. By studying the 
ways in which organisms and environments affected each other, ecology gave 
environmentalists a tool that both lent itself to their cause and was rooted in 'hard 
science'. 134 
Two campaigns were to significantly alter national conceptions of dams (and 
greatly bolster the environmental movement generally) in this period, both in Tasmania. 
These campaigns were the flooding of Lake Pedder and the damming of the Franklin 
River for hydro-electric schemes. The campaign to save Lake Pedder began in the late 
1960s as a local movement by bush walkers and other visitors to the lake. The 
unresponsiveness of the state government led campaigners to take the cause state-, and 
then, nation-wide. Despite the substantial support generated by the campaign, in 
Tasmania and around Australia, the flooding of the lake went ahead, beginning in 1973. 
Although the campaign failed in preventing the flooding of the lake it created sign ificant 
changes, including a more environmentally attuned national population The campaign 
also achieved national political recognition and debate as the controversy of flooding 
133 Hutton and Connors, A History of the Australian Environment Movement, pp.97-100; and, Robin, Defending 
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Lake Pedder became an election issue at the 1972 national elections, and led to the 
creation of the United Tasmania Group (later Greens) political party. 135 
The Franklin River campaign in the late 1970s and early 1980s created even more 
political friction. The campaign again went national and generated so much support that 
it swung the 1983 federal election to the Labor Party. The Labor coalition had aligned 
with the campaigners to stop the Franklin River dam when the election was called, and 
the river had become a major election issue. Part of the reason campaigners took the 
cause to federal politicians was the unwillingness of the state (also Labor) government to 
engage in a 'no dam' option when the issue came to a state referendum. The government 
instead gave voters the choice of two alternative dam sites. The campaigners had sought 
federal intervention and national support to stop the dam, a tactic other campaigners had 
successfully employed for other causes. The Federal government also broke new ground 
by intervening in state development works, preventing the dam from being built by 
invoking its responsibility as a signatory to international World Heritage agreements. 136 
Environmental campaigners for Lake Pedder and the Franklin River recognised, 
and experienced, some similar problems in government environmental management and 
development to those experienced by residents within the Murray and Darling river 
systems - most clearly, some of the problems of the narrow government focus on land 
settlement and development works. Libby Robin has argued that participation in 
environmental campaigns was 'about introducing a moral sense of 'limits to 
development" .137 While the Lake Pedder and Franklin River cases revolved around 
government works, other environmental campaigns in this period lobbied against 
government permissions for private companies to develop or mine areas, such as the 
Great Barrier Reef and Fraser Island. 138 Both environmental campaigners and those in 
flood country reacted to the strong alliance between certain private enterprises and 
governments that overlooked other sectors of the population, their reliance on 
environments and environmental destruction. 
135 Hutton and Connors, A History of the Australian Environment Movement, pp.118-124; Robin, Defending the 
Little Desert, p.41; Pigram, Issues in the Management of Australia's Water Resources, pp.82-83; Colin Michael 
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There were, of course, obvious differences between environmental activists and 
residents of flood country. Environmentalists concentrated their campaigns on saving 
places from people (specifically, government and industry projects of land settlement and 
exploitation) - they wanted to prevent development and the march of land settlement 
from destroying environmentally unique or beautiful places, 'wildernesses'. The 
environmental movement in this period began to link with Aboriginal rights movements, 
which increasingly problematised notions of 'wilderness' for settler environmentalists. 139 
Residents of Murray and Darling flood country lived in places that had been deeply 
changed by settler land use for a century and a half. Further, the region had long been a 
'working' landscape in Australian settler culture. In the 1990s, with the r ise of the 
ecological sciences and changing understandings of environments, urban 
environmentalists were to become more involved in disputes over the effects of dams and 
irrigation in the Murray and Darling river systems. 
* * * 
The Beginnings of Reform 
By the 1980s Australian state governments' water management bureaucracies were 
disconnected from changing community concerns and needs. The authority to manage 
water in Australia had been vested in governments since settlement, being governed as a 
public utility. 'Top heavy' management structures, which had developed expertise in the 
planning and construction of large-scale engineering projects, were in many ways unable 
to cope with the various complexities, local specificities (as on the Namoi) and concerns 
that had emerged, in both inland river regions and urban environmental movements. 
Reflecting in 2008, historian Daniel Connell described the water management 
institutions of this period as, ' large, hierarchical, technocratic and culturally monolithic 
but performed efficiently as measured by the criteria of their time'. However, 'their time' 
was perhaps the 1930s and 1940s. By the 1980s they were disconnected from changing 
community concerns and were unable to cope with the complex social and environmental 
problems they had helped to create. 
139 Hutton and Connors, A History of the Australian Environment Movement, p.145-146; Robin, Defending the 
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Powell noted that some engineers in the 1940s had foreseen the potential pitfalls 
of narrow government water administrations geared towards development works, that: 
'The tunnel vision of narrowed specialisation could lead to a cul-de-sac of social 
irrelevance'. 140 In the 1980s government water bureaucracies had become outdated. In 
New South Wales, as Lloyd wrote, water administrations had changed in structure and 
name but rested on legislation that was 'virtually 7 5 years old': the 1912 Water Act. 141 New 
problems and challenges had emerged, including greater demands for water supply from 
an increasing population, and the just as pressing issues of water quality and soil salinity 
in many regions of the Murray and Darling river systems. Further, there were 
international changes in attitudes to water and the environment that filtered into 
Australia as new political issues arose, especially over future competition for water within 
nations and internationally, which were already problems in the USA and Europe. 
In 1987, a UN commission headed by Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem 
Brundtland published a report, Our Common Future. The report developed concerns, 
raised in UN conferences since 1977, that 'water security and accessibility increasingly 
threaten four fundamental aspects of human security - food production, human health, 
the health of the aquatic environment and social, economic and political stability' . 142 Our 
Common Future (or 'The Brundtland Report') argued that unsustainable development had 
impacted international and national security and would continue to do so. 143 The report 
put forward an argument for sustainability on environmental, social, economic, and 
political grounds, each contributing to total human welfare: the 'needs of the present' 
must be met, the report stated, 'without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs'. 144 
The New South Wales government had restructured its water bureaucracy in the 
1970s, bringing disparate departments under a single water authority, the WRC. 
However, the WRC was haunted by old philosophies and programs. Lloyd argued that in 
the 1980s water management remained unconnected to changing circumstances: 'the 
[water management] industry was perceived as patronising and centralised, offering little 
participation to significant client groups, remote from many of its users and preoccupied 
140 Powell, Watering the Garden State, p.245. 
141 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.291. 
142 See, Connell, Water Politics in the Murray-Darling Basin, p.2. 
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with concerns of central administrations in Sydney' .145 In the mid 1980s the WRC was 
revamped by a Water Management Audit, which was briefed to reposition the 
Commission and formulate new 'strategic directions' that addressed contemporary 
issues. 146 Out of the Audit the WRC was reformulated as the Department of Water 
Resources, with policies that emphasised commercialisation of water-related industries 
and indeed, of water itself as a tradeable commodity. However, as Lloyd argued, its new 
underlying creed also changed from development to environmental management. 147 The 
state also planned for the establishment of catchment management bodies which could 
facilitate community consultation in order to formulate management policies for 
particular river catchments, essential for addressing the pressing issues of salinity, water 
quality, and water security, as well as broader management challenges such as negotiating 
the needs and concerns of various 'stakeholders'. Water bureaucracies in the other 
eastern states were similarly restructured in the 1980s and early 1990s. The restructures 
reflected national shifts in thought, understandings, and sense of the purpose of water 
management. 
The attempts of state water departments to address these changes were self-
conscious. The reflexivity provoked by a changing sense of purpose and bureaucratic 
structure can be seen, for example, in the water management histories they commissioned 
in this period. These include Lloyd's history of New South Wales water management, 
Either Drought or Plenty, and Powell's Victorian history, Watering the Garden State, which 
are referred to extensively in this thesis. Both books, whilst commissioned histories, are 
critical of water management and the international networks and ideologies, as well as 
local environments that shaped them. Both books were heavily influenced by ideas in the 
social sciences and physical geography at the time, and focused on land settlement. 
Although state water bureaucracies restructured in an attempt to address more 
complex issues, such fundamental changes were slow to be implemented and to take root 
in practice. Connell has argued that when Australian water management bureaucracies 
instituted further reforms in the mid 1990s they did so because of continued centralised 
management and narrow focuses that limited their ability to address community concerns 
and environmental degradation. He argued that '[f)or a variety of reasons' water managers 
'were unable to cope with the expansion of their brief from storing and distributing water 
145 Lloyd, Either Droiight or Plenty, p.293 . 
146 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.293 . 
147 Lloyd, Either Drought or Plenty, p.297. 
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to also include protecting its quality' .148 Chief among the reasons for institutions' 
inadequacy to deal with water quality (and adopt ecological conservation), Connell 
argued, was that it required intensive consultation with communities and research 
scientists outside of government employees. Governments needed to look outside old 
institutional models to take more comprehensive account of the growing environmental 
concerns of communities and political activists, Indigenous knowledge and rights to 
water, and to expand the breadth of water management. Integrated Catchment 
Management (ICM) was to be adopted by each Australian state in the 1990s and 2000s, 
and in 2001 by the Murray-Darling Basin Commission (formed in 1993, replaced by the 
Murray-Darling Basin Authority in 2008). ICM aimed to institute methods of community 
consultation and co-management of watersheds, especially to address water quality and 
soil salinity. By 1990, however, Australian state water management bureaucracies, and 
other administrative branches, remained largely centralised while plans for more 
decentralised, consultative models of management were being developed. In this period 
of transition, state governments were caught between lingering centralisation, 'top heavy' 
management, established irrigation practices and water extractions for industry, and ways 
of incorporating local, and other 'extra governmental', knowledge, needs, and values, into 
bureaucratic decision-making. 
148 Connell, Water Politics in the Murray-Darling Basin, p. 16. 
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Cunnamulla 1990 
The Town That Did Not Flood 
From the aeroplane the earth looked vast, red, flat, and dry. I was flying west, from 
Brisbane to Cunnamulla, located on the banks of the Warrego River, to the final place of 
my flood research. The plane landed in St George to let passengers off. It was the last stop 
before Cunnamulla and the plane was nearly empty. We took off again. From when we 
left St George I sought grey-green tree lines from the air and traced them with my eyes, 
looking for brown stretches of water. I searched for water not only because I was going to 
Cunnamulla to research floods, but also because some instinct kicked in. I was trying to 
locate myself through the most dominant landmarks I could find - rivers and water. They 
were dominant because they were so scarce. Craters of dry dams testified to the 
elusiveness of surface water in these parts. The red dryness of the land boosted another 
reflex that went deeper, prompting me to scan the land for water. The tree lines, rivers, 
and creeks were far apart, and water is the stuff of life. It was my second visit to 
Cunnamulla and I felt overwhelmed. The first time I travelled there, the previous year, I 
had driven north-west from Canberra. The changes in the landscape had been gradual; 
leaving the mountains behind, crossing the inky Darling River floodplains, and then 
coming upon the flat, open plains that border the Warrego River. I was returning to 
follow up research on a flood on the Warrego in 1990. These were the river's floodplains, 
stretching off into the dusty horizon. 
The Warrego's headwaters are in the Carnarvon Ranges in Queensland, an 
outcrop of the most north-westerly point of the Great Dividing Range. From there, the 
river winds south, joining with the Darling River in New South Wales. The Warrego is 
located between four rain-led ecologies: the monsoon to the north; the plush Darling 
Chapter 7 - Cunnamulla 1990 
Downs, petering into aridity, to the east; semi-arid western New South Wales to the 
south; and desert to the west. It is fringe country. In managerial terms, it is marginal 
farmland. The river and land have even more dramatic booms and busts than the Darling 
River. The Warrego catchment comprises seven percent of the area of the Murray-Darling 
Basin, but on average contributes only one percent of the Basin's total annual flow. The 
river and tributaries have a wide range of hydrologies, from the headwaters to the 
junction with the Darling. The headwaters' faster flows move over and through shale rock 
formations, feeding subterranean aquifers. The rivers and tributaries also have highly 
variable flows and experience periods of intense drying, freshes, and flooding. Along the 
mid and lower reaches the land has only a slight gradient and the watercourses are 
shallow. Floods can be kilometres of submerged land and can last for months. When 
enough rain falls the water spreads across the braided channels, in a shallow and wide 
expanse over flat red earth. The floods do not bring the inky sediment seen on Darling 
River floodplains. This is a country dominated by sand hills and red dusty soils. 
To the Warrego's west lies the Paroo River, shadowing the course of the Warrego. 
The Paroo is so shallow and intermittent that cartographers do not join this river to the 
Darling on maps: it is merely a floating line across the Queensland and New South Wales 
border. The Paroo only joins the Darling when in flood, when it also often joins the 
Warrego across the floodplains. Its floodwater drains south slowly and transforms the 
country: birds, frogs and fish breed, plants sprout and seeds and animals perish and 
flourish; and people seek higher elevations. 
In April 1990, an Army helicopter flew over the soaking Warrego floodplains. 
The flood was the largest since records began to be kept by settlers in the area in 1910. In 
the helicopter were two people, watching the water. They were both there to protect 
Cunnamulla; but they had been in disagreement. Allan Tannock had asked Police 
Superintendent Harry Edwards to join him in the flight from Cunnamulla. Tannock 
hoped to convince the Superintendent that Cunnamulla would not flood. In Tannock's 
mind there was no doubt the town was safe. Before the flight the Police Superintendent 
had thought that the town would be severely flooded, that the levees would not hold or 
that the water would rise beyond their height. The Superintendent was so sure that he 
had ordered the evacuation of the town and people were gathering at the airport to be 
flown out by more Army aircraft. 
That day the flood would peak in Cunnamulla. This was Tannock's last chance to 
prevent a full evacuation. Tannock wanted the Superintendent to see the river from the 
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air, so that he could see the channels and how the water was flowing; to see that the 
western floodplains were taking water from the Warrego, reducing the height of the flood 
peak in Cunnamulla. Tannock needed to convince the Superintendent because it was the 
Superintendent who would make the final decision about Cunnamulla's evacuation. 1 
The Superintendent was an agent of the state, sent from Brisbane to coordinate 
the effort to prevent the town from flooding. Tannock's disagreement with him over the 
potential of the flood and the appropriate course of action to save Cunnamulla, stemmed 
from Tannock's experience with the river, its changeability, and his view of the 'unique' 
way this flood was behaving. Tannock had lived with the Warrego for 60 years and issued 
flood warnings for the river for 40 years. 
The difference in their understandings (of the way the flood was moving down the 
Warrego and the level of threat to the people of Cunnamulla) hints at the ways each was 
acting within a different knowledge system. Tannock and the Superintendent came from 
different backgrounds: one came from a government department located in distant 
Brisbane and one from the community and the place now threatened by flood. The 
Superintendent was acting within a government knowledge system that was codified in 
the State Counter-Disaster Organisation Act 197 5. This Act had formalised government 
responses to 'natural disasters' in Queensland for the first time, codifying government aid 
through legislation and a bureaucratic body, the Counter Disaster Organisation. The Act 
centralised aid and financial relief to the state government and gave the government 
power to take charge in a natural disaster event. It also established a system of response, 
through its clauses, that was dominated by methods of risk assessment (to human life and 
property) and an ideology of humanitarian aid. In this framework, evacuation of 
threatened communities was supported, indeed privileged - if there was any risk to the 
people of Cunnamulla (in the context of the Act), they should be evacuated. The Act 
represented a government knowledge system that promoted 'knowing' floods as (arguably) 
abstract events, where humanitarian approaches were valued above place-informed 
understandings.2 
1 Allan Tannock, pers. comm., 18 January, 2006; and, Allan Tannock, The Warrego Watershed: Forty Years of 
Flood Records and Research (Toowoomba: Harrison Printing Co., 1990), pp.39-41. 
2 Seate Counter-Disaster Organization Act 197 5. The Seate Counter-Disaster Organization Act 197 5 was amended 
in 1978 by the State Counter-Disaster Organization Act 1978. The 1978 amendment mostly changed some 
terminology and is not relevant in the following discussion. Scace Counter-Disaster Organization Act 1975 was 
also amended in 1995 by the Emergency Services Legislation Amendment Act 1995. Importantly for this chapter, 
the 1995 Act amended the spelling of 'organization' to 'organisation' [s45]. In citing the 1975 Act in the 
text of this thesis the spelling 'organisation' is used. 
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In contrast, Tannock's knowledge was one of community-in-place. In the 1950s 
Tannock had established a free, independent flood warning service for the Warrego, 
when such a service had not previously existed. Summaries of rainfall and his predictions 
were broadcast over Charleville radio station 4VL, and later through 2UE in Bourke. 
T annock' s knowledge of the river was through lived experience and through networks 
with others who lived in upstream towns and properties; what he termed 'local 
knowledge'.3 His understanding of the river and floods was formed over a lifetime of 
living with the river and talking with others who lived along its banks. T annock' s 
knowledge and flood warning service was valued and respected along the river. 
The strength of Tannock's argument, that Cunnamulla did not need to be 
evacuated, must be seen within broader social and economic circumstances, along with its 
environmental context. In 1990 rural Queensland was in economic decline. The 
southwest of the state (including Charleville and Cunnamulla) had been dubbed 'the 
heartbreak corner'. An evacuation now could mean that many who lived in the town 
would not return: the negative economic impact on businesses, which would remain 
closed during the period of evacuation, could potentially be too great. In this context, 
such disruption to the human ecology could radically change the town. Tannock and the 
Superintendent had different ideas about the threat the flood posed to the town and 
significance of an evacuation: one with concerns about the community-in-place, the other 
with concerns about how to manage the flood risk. 
This chapter explores the 1990 flood in Cunnamulla in the context of rural 
decline in south-western Queensland and highly bureaucratised state involvement in 
'flood response'. It draws out the competing knowledge systems of Tannock and Edwards 
and discusses other knowledge systems, such as those embedded in scientific approaches 
to the floods. The floods in the Warrego threw into relief interplay of power and 
knowledge under particular legal and environmental contexts that enveloped the two 
men. These wider contexts took a particular form in Cunnamulla, directly influenced and 
heightened by the flood itself, which behaved in unexpected ways, and involved unique 
individuals such as T annock whose local knowledge offered a different kind of model. 
The Cunnamulla story will be contrasted with the evacuation of Charleville, a 
town located upstream on the Warrego. While Tannock and the Superintendent flew 
over the floodwater, Charleville was experiencing severe flooding and a mass evacuation 
3 Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, p.39. 
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of residents. The flood in Charleville situates my discussion of Cunnamulla in two ways. 
The severe flooding of Charleville created expectations that downstream Cunnamulla 
would experience similar inundation, that it would become 'another Charleville'. The 
government's reaction to the flooding of Charleville and the evacuation of the town also 
highlight some of the tensions between the government's risk management approach and 
that of communities-in-place. Which knowledge is considered valid within centralised 
networks of emergency planning? How can local knowledge such as Tannock's influence 
the chain of command? 
* * * 
Allan 'A.D.' Tannock and The Warrego Watershed 
I first met Allan Tannock in September 2005. I arrived on his doorstep in Cunnamulla 
after a number of conversations with people about the 1990 flood on the Warrego; each 
conversation confirming that he was someone I needed to meet. According to those I 
spoke with, T annock knew the most about floods in the area and they suggested that I try 
to contact him. The owners of the cattle grazing station ('Coonberry') where I was staying, 
were the first to suggest that I try to talk with 'A.D.' (as he is known in Cunnamulla) 
Tannock about his predictions of floods, especially the 1990 flood. They also told me that 
he had written a book on the history of floods on the Warrego. Unsure of how to find 
Tannock, I decided find his book first. 
I looked for the book at Cunnamulla's Visitor Information Centre. After 
searching the shelves and not finding it, I asked at the desk. They had sold out. I spoke to 
the person at the desk about my research and he too suggested I try to speak with 
Tannock. He gave me directions to where he lived, assuring me it would be fine to drop 
in. If Tannock was not there, he said he would be at the newsagency. Embarrassed, I 
thought of (but did not voice) an obstacle. I would not know what Tannock looked like if 
it came to finding him in the newsagency since I had not met him before. I felt that 
T annock was so well known that I should know who he was. I thanked the person at the 
desk and left, hoping that Tannock would be at home. He was. 
W e made a time to meet later that day. When I arrived back at his house for our 
meeting he graciously had a copy of his book, The Warrego Watershed, ready to give me. I 
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spoke with Tannock twice; at that initial meeting and again when I returned to 
Cunnamulla the following year. This section draws on those conversations in places, but 
more substantially on his book as well as newspaper, government, and scientific reports. 
The Warrego Watershed was the culmination of Tannock's flood recording and 
flood warning experience. He published this book soon after the 1990 flood to record 
what he knew of floods in the Warrego area, having retired from flood warning that year. 
In The Warrego Watershed Tannock describes eight floods (including the 1990 flood) that 
he witnessed between 1949 and 1990. He selected these floods for their significance in 
demonstrating changes in settlement in the watershed (and therefore in the effect of the 
floods on towns and rural properties) and also to show the differences in flood behaviour, 
as each occurred under distinct environmental conditions. Besides these, there were 
many other floods on the Warrego during that period. 
Throughout The Warrego Watershed there are glimpses of how Tannock gained his 
knowledge of the Warrego. First, he lives there. Tannock has lived with the Warrego for 
more than 60 years. Secondly, his professions have demanded attention to river flows. In 
his youth he was a jackaroo (or drover), moving stock between Charleville and 
Cunnamulla. The flows of the rivers and creeks are pivotal in droving; determining 
watering places for stock and crossing places on the watercourses. T annock draws on his 
early work experiences in the book, noting that extensive flood mitigation had been 
suggested for Charleville in 1933-34 after a large flood: 'I was Jackarooing on Oakwood 
Station in 1933 at which time Charleville experienced a Major Flood similar to but not as 
high as the 1990 flood'. The mitigation works, which included diversion channels for a 
flood overflow and levee banks, did not eventuate. T annock postulated that this was 
because of the financial costs of the works and the imminence of World War II.4 
Later Tannock established a business, A.D. Tannock and Co. Stock and Station 
Agents. In this work also, knowledge of river flows and rainfall was of substantial benefit, 
as river flows affect droving routes, the health of livestock, and stock numbers. It was 
through this business that Tannock established a free flood warning service along the 
Warrego that provided summaries of rainfall, and forecast (and tracked the progress of) 
floods from Charleville through to Bourke in New South Wales over radio stations 4VL 
4 Original capital letters. Tannock, The W arrego W atershed, p.27 ; and, Allan Tannock, pers. comm., 7 
September, 2005. 
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in Charleville and 2UE in Bourke.5 When I asked Tannock how he became interested in 
flood warning, he replied that a formal flood warning system on the Warrego had simply 
not existed before this (1950s). He saw himself as filling a need for Cunnamulla and 
surrounding stations. 6 
Tannock's flood warning service was made possible through personal networks 
along the river. T annock especially acknowledges the river level readings and 
communications of Joan Leeds, to whom he dedicated his book. Leeds lived in upstream 
Murweh, near Wyandra, and communicated river heights to Tannock from 1954 to 
1979.7 Tannock and Leeds together studied the relationship between flood heights at 
Murweh and Cunnamulla. Tannock used Leeds' upstream river readings to judge how 
high a flood would be in Cunnamulla, including the speed of the flood and how much 
water was flowing onto the floodplains from the river channel. 
Leeds' personal contacts with people upstream from Murweh enabled her to 
evaluate the flood flows within a wider environmental context. Tannock paid tribute to 
these personal networks in his book, writing: 'Joan not only dedicated herself to keeping 
me posted with daily Flood Reports from Murweh, but she also had personal contacts on 
The Upper Warrego and its Tributaries, The N ive, The Ward and Langlo Rivers and 
Augathella Creek'. Through this network, 'she could estimate with a great deal of 
accuracy ... the flood level expected at Murweh in each individual flood. This in turn 
enabled me to make early and accurate forecasts of flood levels at Cunnamulla' .8 After 
Leeds left Muweh in 1979, Tannock received river heights from the area from 'Mrs. 
Hurse' between 1984 and 1990. However, the personal networks Leeds had established 
dissolved. Tannock attempted to maintain the associations in the Upper Warrego and its 
tributaries but, he wrote, 'I found it impossible to achieve anything similar over the years 
after John [Leeds' husband] and Joan Leeds left Murweh ... I had to give it "best" [give it 
up] as, apart from Mrs. Warner at Mt. Morris on The Langlo River, nobody appeared to 
be taking Flood Readings or appeared to be interested in keeping them'. Tannock 'could 
5 Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, p.9; Geoff Heatherwick, 'Foreword', in Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, 
p.5; and, Tannock, pers. comm., 18 January, 2006. 
6 Tannock, pers. comm., 7 September, 2005 . 
7 Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, p.9. 
8 Original capital letters. Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, p.9. 
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[From: Allan Tannock, The Warrego Watershed: Forty Years of Flood Records and 
Research (Toowoomba: Harrison Printing Co., 1990), p.48.] 
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not obtain Flood Readings from Charleville during the crucial period' in 1990, and had 
to wait until he received the Murweh readings before making a prediction for 
Cunnamulla.9 This reduced the amount of time between his warning and the flood's 
peak. 
Networks along the river and tributaries are critical in forecasting for each flood. 
Each flood is different and can behave in unexpected ways. Personal networks were 
crucial to Tannock in judging the unique behaviour of each flood. It was a matter of 
'reading' each flood, with the aid of Leeds' and others' observations and knowledge. In 
The Warrego Watershed Tannock describes floods he has experienced and the differences 
between them. Tannock notes that, 'no "Rule of Thumb" method can be employed by 
which all Floods can be read the same. The circumstances preceding each Flood must be 
d. d . d "l' JO stu ie m great eta1 . 
From his experiences with floods on the Warrego, Tannock developed a 'formula' 
or guide to judge the heights of floods in Cunnamulla in relation to flood heights and 
flows in Murweh. Tannock estimated that it takes between 60 and 90 hours for a flood 
peak in Murweh to reach Cunnamulla. According to his calculations, the eventual height 
of the peak in Cunnamulla varies according to an 8 metre threshold at Murweh: for 
floods under 8 metres at Murweh, 'Cunnamulla reads higher by 1.46 metres' and over 8 
metres Cunnamulla's peak will reduce by '0.3 metres for every metre the reading at 
Murweh is higher than 8 metres' .11 Tannock adjusted these calculations in response to 
the particular contexts and circumstances of each flood, such as the speed of the 
floodwater, the amount that flowed into various break outs, and changes in the 
landscape: fast and high floods meant more water flowed into break outs, but particular 
speeds and heights determined how much water flowed into which break outs. Tannock 
published his formula in The Warrego Watershed as a guide for others, so that this flood 
work (including recording the behaviour of floods, their heights, speeds, other influences 
on their flow, and so on) could be continued. 
T annock worked closely with the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) during the years 
that he operated his flood warning service, sharing knowledge in an informal way. 
However, he remained outside the institutional hierarchy throughout his flood warning 
career. Tannock particularly shared information with two BoM staff, Geoff Heatherwick 
9 Original capital letters. Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, p.20-21. 
10 Original capital letters. Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, p.13. 
11 Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, p.14. 
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and Brian Tippler. Heatherwick wrote a foreword to The Warrego Watershed, commenting 
that '[o]ver the years, staff of the Hydrology Section [of the BoM (in which Heatherwick 
and Tippler worked)] have compared notes with Allan, both during flood periods and 
post event, when we have come to appreciate the depth of local knowledge and 
understanding that he had about the behaviour of the Warrego River'. Heatherwick and 
Tannock' s relationship stretches back to 1972. Then on a field inspection of river level 
reporting stations, Heatherwick heard of T annock' s radio broadcasts and flood 
predictions from BoM river gauge readers and realised the value of Tannock's flood work. 
'It became obvious', he wrote, 'that the flood reporting service operated by A.O. Tannock 
and Co. Stock and Station agents [sic], was a highly regarded service which had a large 
listening audience'. The BoM also forwarded river height and rainfall information to 4VL 
(the same radio station that broadcast Tannock's reports). The benefit of Tannock's 
reports were, in Heatherwick's opinion, that they 'provided a consolidation of 
information and details of rainfalls in the area', as opposed to the BoM's frequent 
numerical bulletins. 12 Tannock's contributions to Cunnamulla were recognised when he 
received the Citizen of the Year award in 1983. 13 
For Tannock, the 1990 flood was 'unique' among all the floods he experienced; 
he wrote tha~ it 'was the most contentious and unpredictable'. 14 
* * * 
1990: The Floods Begin 
A monsoonal low moved inland in early March 1990, bringing heavy rainfalls across the 
Warrego. The empty, shallow channels filled quickly and the river and tributaries 
flooded, isolating stock on pastoral stations between Charleville and Cunnamulla. 15 
These initial floods were followed closely by a second wave of flooding. In early April a 
low pressure system again moved across south-west Queensland, converging with another 
trough to cause heavy rainfalls and thunderstorms across the Warrego. 16 Three 
concentrated rainfall events from 2 to 20 April further swelled the already full river. The 
12 Geoff Heatherwick, 'Foreword', in Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, p.5. 
13 M.C. Capp, in Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, p.7. 
14 Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, p.18. 
15 Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, p.18. 
16 
'April 1990 Floods in Inland Queensland' (Melbourne: Bureau of Meteorology, June 1990), p.11. 
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third rainfall event was the heaviest downpour. It centred on the Carnarvon Ranges. The 
surge of water flowed quickly to Charleville, located at the foot of the Ranges, and into a 
Warrego flood overflow, Bradleys Gully, which ran through the town. The town lies at a 
convergence of major Warrego tributaries, including the N ive, Ward and Langlo Rivers, 
which were also in flood and funnelled water towards the town. Following the heavy 
rain, the water rose almost 3 metres in 3 days in Charleville (from 5.5 metres on 18 April 
to a peak of between 8.2 and 8.54 metres on 21 April). 17 The town was severely flooded. 
Many who lived there found themselves homeless. All commercial buildings flooded, 80 
percent of residences were inundated, and many other homes were damaged and 
uninhabitable. The Sunday Sun reported that residents were ' in shock ... as they take in the 
full extent of the worst flood in the town's history'. 18 Many did this from helicopters and 
Army aircraft as they were rescued from rooftops by Army personnel and State Emergency 
Service (SES) volunteers. 
The entire population of the town was evacuated to Charleville airport or to 
Brisbane. People searched for family members in the crowds of evacuees. A woman 
sought her granddaughter and three-month-old great-grandchild amongst hundreds of 
people now housed in an aircraft hanger on the outskirts of Charleville. She last saw 
them waiting for rescue on their rooftop. 'I keep hoping the lot of them will turn up 
here'.19 
Other towns suffered similar (although not as total) damage. The towns of Alpha, 
Blackall, and Jericho on the north-western side of the Range, and Augathella in the 
Warrego catchment were inundated that month. At the time, the total cost of flood 
damage both to built structures and from the loss of livestock in the Warrego catchment 
was thought to exceed $100 million and possibly reached $200 million.20 Of this, an 
estimated $30 million accounted for damage to rural property outside towns. The floods 
spread from Queensland into New South Wales, reaching as far south as Nyngan, located 
on the Bogan River. The Warrego floods carried more water and reached greater heights 
than the 1956 floods, which had previously been the highest since records began to be 
17 Scott & Furphy Pty Ltd, 'Western Queensland Towns Flood Study, Volume 1 Report', January 1991, 
commissioned by the State Government of Queensland, p.42. 
18 Sunday Sun, Apri l 22, 1990, p.3. 
19 Sunday Sun, April 22, 1990, p.3. 
20 Queensland Times, 27 April, 1990, p.l; and, Sun, 27 April, 1990, p.2. 
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Map 7 .2 (left) 
The Warrego and 
adjoining catchments to 
the north-west. The towns 
of Alpha, Blackall, and 
Jericho, situated in these 
adjoining catchments, were 
flooded in April 1990. 
[From: Scott Furfy Pty Ltd, 
'Western Queensland 
Towns Flood Study, 
Volume 1- Report', Water 
Resources Commission, 
January 1991, Figure 1.2.) 
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kept in the area in 1910. Emergency Management Australia later estimated the total 
damage from the 1990 floods in both states to be $417 million ( 1997 values). 21 
* * * 
'Another Charleville': Cunnamulla Prepares 
Cunnamulla is the last major Queensland town on the Warrego before the river flows 
into New South Wales. Residents of the town knew of the destruction the floods had 
caused in Charleville and the upper Warrego before the water reached Cunnamulla. This 
meant that they, and the shire council, had t ime to prepare; but also that there was 
intense anticipation and anxiety surrounding the potential severity of the floods. 
Residents heard of the devastation in Charleville through the town's newspaper, the 
Western Sun. The Western Sun reported the speed with which the water rose in Charleville, 
the record height, the displacement of the population, and the extensive damage to 
buildings and other property. Now the water was moving downriver, towards 
Cunnamulla. 
Cunnamulla was already isolated by floodwater when C harleville and the upper 
W arrego flooded.22 There was a possibility that the water flowing towards the town could 
combine with local flooding to cause levels of inundation and destruction similar to those 
experienced in Charleville. In the view of SES senior operations officer John 
O'Callaghan, Cunnamulla's fate looked grim. 'We are expecting real problems ... it could 
be another Charleville' .23 There were two floods coming down the river; initial floods 
from March and the heavy April rains that had razed Charleville. It was feared that the 
faster April flood would catch the March water and combine to cause one very large flood 
surge. 
Cunnamulla was widely predicted to have four days to prepare for the arrival of 
the water. Army personnel, SES workers, and a number of Black Hawk, Iroquois, and 
Kiowa helicopters from the Army and Royal Australian Air Force bases in T ownsville and 
Oakey were stationed at the town from 21 April to aid the Paroo Shire Council's 
preparations for the flood's peak. While these officials put in motion procedures for 
21 Western Sun, 9 May, 1990, p. l; and, 'April l 990 Floods in Inland Queensland', p. l. 
22 Western Sun, 4 April, 1990, p. l ; Western Sun, 18 April, 1990, p. l ; Queensland Times, 24 April, 1990, p. l 
23 Sun, 23 April, 1990, p.2. 
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protecting the town and organised supplies to be flown in, residents began to fill sandbags 
to reinforce levees and create new protective walls around their properties. 24 
Relying on residents' and local Councillors' advice, between 16 and 22 April the 
Paroo Shire Council directed the erection of Army tents, pit toilets, water tanks, and a 
helicopter landing pad on sand hills which lay south-east of the town.25 The sand hills, 
residents claimed, were above the reach of any flood. A car park was also organised near 
the caravan park so that vehicles would be above flood level. In addition, the Council 
organised for the levee banks, initially built in the summer of 1971-72 at a height of 
about 9.5 metres, to be raised by a metre and a half which, it was believed, would be 
adequate to protect the town.26 
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On 22 April Councillor Darby Land called a town meeting. Residents were 
advised of the evacuation plan: to move to the sand hills and to move their cars to the car 
park in case water rose above the levees or they were breached. If the levee broke, a siren 
24 Western Sun, 27 April, 1990, p.l and p.7. 
25 Sun, 23 April, 1990, p.2. 
26 Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, pp.17-21 and pp.39-41. 
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would sound and, in this event, households identified as low-lying were advised to raise 
furniture and other belongings above a two-foot inundation level. 27 
That afternoon, Allan Tannock was in contact with officials in Charleville and 
Murweh, receiving information on river heights upstream (Murweh 11.2 metres) and 
progress of the flood. He realised that the lowering in gradient of the land, reaching one 
foot to a mile 40 miles from Cunnamulla, was slowing the leading flood. Using the 
formula he had devised over 40 years of predicting floods, Tannock calculated a flood 
peak of 10.4 to 10.6 metres for Cunnamulla. This calculation allowed for water flowing 
into 'by-washes' (or floodplains) and for the effect of the river and floodplains already 
being in flood. The buildup of water was pushing large volumes onto the floodplains, 
reducing the overall height of the flood. Tannock's prediction meant that Cunnamulla 
might escape the destruction Charleville had experienced. 28 
•. . "~· -z;l~ 
TO sa\•e a repeat of what happened in Charleville. the Telecom Exchange at 
Cunnamulla was sand hagged hy i;olunteers. 
Figure 7.2 
Cunnamulla prepares for record flooding, 1990. 
[From: Western Sun, 27 April, 1990, p.7.] 
27 Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, pp.39-41. 
28 Tannock, The Warrego W atershed, pp.39-4 1. 
324 
Chapter 7 - Cunnamulla 1990 
* * * 
Predicting Floods in a Changing Landscape 
The morning after he received the river heights from Murweh and Charleville Tannock 
flew over the river as far as Wyandra, in an Army helicopter, to observe the flood. This 
flight made him again re-evaluate the eventual peak in Cunnamulla. After the flight he 
reduced his predicted peak to 10.2 metres. The flight confirmed for him that the second 
flood was moving faster than the first, gaining on its lead. The saturation of the ground, 
combined with the amount of water carried in the second flood, meant that the second 
flood did not soak into the earth and moved quickly across the now very wide body of 
water over the floodplains. The first flood was moving more slowly than he had thought 
initially, and the second flood much faster; they were becoming one large flood as feared, 
but farther upstream from Cunnamulla than anticipated. The huge amount of water 
sought open floodplains and was spreading east from the river just below Wyandra, 
between Claverton and Cunnamulla, reducing the amount of water carried in the 
Warrego.29 
A railway embankment was also altering the course of the flood. Built between 
Claverton and Cunnamulla in 1898, it parallelled the river and severed a floodplain. 
While it had survived the 1910 flood, it washed away in 1990. Thirty-eight miles of 
embankment were 'excavated' by the water, leaving the steel railway lines suspended. If 
this stretch of embankment had not 'washed away and let the water go', in T annock' s 
words, 'then a large percentage of the water would have eventually converged back on 
Cunnamulla', testing the strength of the levees on the north-eastern side of the town. 30 
T annock also noticed that other elements of the river and floodwater were 
combining to shape the flood's course, which would reduce the surge of water heading 
towards Cunnamulla. The speed of the water and the gradient of the land, combined 
with long, gradual shifts in the streams' flows and beds, was causing more water than he 
expected to flow onto floodplains. Large volumes of water were being pushed onto the 
western floodplains and creeks as the floods neared Cunnamulla. 
Cunnamulla, built on the eastern riverbank, was, in Tannock's opinion, going to 
be safe. The water was being taken away from the Warrego, along creeks and onto 
29 Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, pp.39-41. 
30 Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, p.20. 
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floodplains west of the town. Tannock later speculated that had the 'by-washes' not taken 
so much water, the floods heading towards Cunnamulla would have been a metre higher. 
He later wrote that this flood was 'unique': 'The volume of water taken out by The Bye-
wash [sic] Watercourses was far greater than anything known by the older Locals who can 
go back at least 70 years'. Further, the western creeks were taking more water than floods 
he had previously forecast. For Tannock, 'lo]f all the Major Floods I have experienced on 
The Warrego this was the most contentious and unpredictable'.31 
With adjusted calculations Tannock predicted the flood would peak on 25 April 
and rise one metre in the preceding twenty-four hours. His predicted flood peak of 10.2 
metres broke Cunnamulla's previous flood reco rd of 9.8 metres. However, the oncoming 
flood did not represent the full volume of water from Charleville and Tannock believed 
that it presented very little danger to the residents of Cunnamulla.32 If the levees were 
raised by one metre, the town would not flood. Ironically, the double flood (which caused 
anxiety in Cunnamulla and for the SES and was reported in the Queensland media) 
would help to reduce the height of the peak in Cunnamulla by pushing large amounts of 
water from the Warrego onto floodplains. 
* * * 
'Flood of the Century'33 
The 1990 flood was forecast (by T annock and others) to reach heights greater than past 
flood peaks in C unnamulla. Even with large amounts of water spilling on to the 
floodplains, this flood was being labelled as the 'worst on record this century'. 34 Indeed, 
there were only records, that were scientifically acceptable, for the twentieth century on 
the Warrego. Because of the damage sustained in C harleville, due to unprecedented flood 
heights upstream, residents in Cunnamulla were anxious and expected the worst. A 
Cunnamulla resident, Police Constable M aloney, gave a sense of the feeling of 
inevitability that Cunnamulla's 1,700 residents faced an unstoppable surge of water that 
would test the levees and possibly destroy the town: 'The big water is 12km north of 
31 Original capital letters. Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, pp. 18-20. 
32 Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, pp.40-41. 
33 Townsville Bulletin, 23 April, 1990, p.1. 
34 Sun, 23 April, 1990, p.2. 
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Wyandra at the moment and the head water should hit us today. Nothing can stop it'. 35 
On 23 April the Sun reported that 'A wall of water raced towards Cunnamulla today in a 
massive flood surge police fear will devastate the outback sheep town'.36 
There are records that show Cunnamulla had experienced large floods since 
settlement. The town was established in 1868 as a pastoral centre on the Warrego River, 
during the height of a cattle boom. The town was sited at the junction of east-west and 
north-south stock routes, at a drovers' resting area, on the east bank of the Warrego. 
Small floods were a key source of water for pastoralists and the town, but large floods 
presented danger. 
A flood in 1890 inundated parts of the town and flooded pastoral stations, with 
the manager of Thurulgoonia estimating losses of 10,000 sheep.37 More floods followed. 
Floods in 1956 reached 10.13 metres in the town and stayed at this level for three days. 
After further floods in 1963 and in the summer of 1971-72 levees were built in key areas 
of the town to the height of the 1956 flood. In May 1983 the river peaked at 10.09 
metres, below the levee heights; however, gaps between the levees and the damming effect 
of a recently constructed road pushed water into the eastern part of the town.38 
Besieged by record floods and damage bills in 1990, for many in Cunnamulla it 
seemed inevitable that the town would experience unprecedented flood damage. A senior 
engineer at the Brisbane Weather Bureau said simply that, '[t]he heartbreak is set to 
continue' .39 As residents waited and prepared for the water to reach their town, other 
towns and pastoral stations that were already inundated faced the aftermath. 
* * * 
Aid on the Warrego: The State Government Response 
Cunnamulla was surrounded by devastation, political turmoil, and insurance chaos. 
Upstream, Charleville was a particular focus for state bureaucrats, insurance companies, 
and relief workers. The town had experienced 'record flooding' which broke the previous 
35 Sun, 24 April, 1990, p,l. 
36 Sun, 23 April, 1990, p.2. 
37 T.W. Blake, Cunnamullal 879-1979: A Centenary of Local Government (Cunnamulla: Paroo Shire Council, 
1979), p.27. 
38 Blake, Cunnamulla 1879-1979; and, Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, pp.1 6-18. 
39 Sun, 23 April, 1990, p. l. 
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record (set in 1956, of 6.96 metres) by 1.6 metres. The torrent of water swirled through 
the streets of the town, eroding bitumen roads and undermining pavement foundations. 
Cars were waterlogged and swept along by the current. AU business and commercial 
buildings flooded and 1,1 80 out of 1,470 homes were inundated.40 The flood 
overwhelmed residents, who had little time or warning to prepare. The aftermath of the 
flood in Charleville is important in understanding Cunnamulla's regional context. The 
flood in Charleville, including the mass evacuation of residents and the financial 
difficulties they faced, highlights (and added to) the fragility of settlement in south-west 
Queensland. Businesses in Charleville were often uninsured and many now faced closure. 
Further, government responses to the flood in Charleville draw attention to the state's 
approach to the flood as one of humanitarian aid and risk assessment, as opposed to 
communities-in-place. The effects of the flood in C harleville, and the government 
response, coloured the anticipation of large floods in Cunnamulla. 
The SES coordinated the evacuation of Charleville's population of 3,500 on 21 
April 1990, as the river peaked.41 Residents were flown by Army helicopters to temporary 
accommodation at the airport. There, tents and other amenities had been organised as a 
precautionary measure since the minor floods in mid April.42 Conflict arose between state 
workers who organised the evacuation, including SES officials and police from Brisbane, 
and local residents and councils. The Mayor of Roma, a town that lies 280 kilometres east 
of C harleville, criticised the evacuation as 'text-book army style' : efficient but without 
concern for the comfort, or sensitivity to the distress, of residents.43 Newspapers reported 
that conditions in the C harleville evacuation camp were undesirable: makeshift tents with 
bedding laid directly on floors . There had also been an outbreak of gastroenteritis.44 
Evacuees would have to camp there for up to two weeks. Indeed the Mayor of Roma, Bob 
Coomber, was reported to have described the camps as 'primitive' .45 
Coomber argued that those in the camp could have (and should have) been 
evacuated to Roma where many had family and friends and the town had been willing to 
house the victims. Roma residents had urged police to allow at least a portion of the 
victims to travel to Roma, which had not been cut-off from C harleville by the floods and 
40 
'April 1990 Floods in Inland Queensland', p. 12. 
41 Scott & Furphy Pty Ltd , 'Western Queensland Towns Flood Study, Volume l '. 
42 
'April 1990 Floods in Inland Queensland', p.21; and, Sunday Sun, 22 April, 1990, p. l and p.3. 
43 Sun, 24 April, 1990, p.2. 
44 Sun, 23 April, 1990, p.2; The Courier Mail, 23 April, 1990, p. l; and, The Courier Mail, 24 April, 1990, p. l. 
45 Sun, 24 April, 1990, p.2. 
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was only two-and-a-half hours drive away. 'It would have been easy to transport the people 
over that distance', Coomber argued, 'but it seemed more of a military-style operation had 
taken over'.46 Evacuees were instead, 'herded into the camp and not allowed to escape' .47 
The police and SES defended their decision to evacuate the population to the camps as 
' logical and correct'.48 Coomber's outrage at the lack of sensitivity towards the evacuees 
draws attention to the conflicting desires for a successful response to the flood. Coomber 
argued for an approach that included government consideration of the regional and 
personal circumstances of C harleville residents. Instead, in Coomber's portrayal, state 
agents organised temporary accommodation along standardised lines that may have been 
bureaucratically 'logical and correct', but lacked the perspective of the community-in-
place. 
Within a week of evacuation the townspeople returned to Charleville to survey 
the damage. Most found their homes uninhabitable; 2,800 out of the population of 3,500 
(over two-thirds of the townspeople) were displaced, their homes overcome by 
floodwater.49 Many remrned to find their homes had been looted. The Courier Mail 
reported that a Charleville resident, ' had seen business people yesterday look at their 
businesses then drive out of town'. T he interviewee observed that, 'This town could fold 
forever unless these people get some incentive, big incentives within 24 hours' .50 The 
financial cost of the flood damage in Charleville was estimated in June of that year by the 
BoM to be $45 million (1990 values). 51 
A report by the BoM in June 1990 examined why residents of Charleville had 
received so little warning of such a ferocious flood. Was it the Bureau's fault? The Bureau 
offered three reasons: some recording stations had been established too recently to give 
useful historical data; at other stations observers had been evacuated; and there was no 
-
warning network on Bradleys Gully to predict the 'flash flood' that had suddenly and 
immensely increased the flood in the town.52 Another factor may have contributed to the 
unexpectedness of the flood: this was not a La Nina year. Australia was supposed to be in 
drought. 
46 Sun, 24 April, 1990, p.2. 
47 Sun, 24 April, 1990, p.2. 
48 Sun, 24 April, 1990, p.2. See also, The Courier Mail, 23 April, 1990, p.l; and, The Courier Mail, 24 April, 
1990, p. l. 
49 Western Sun, 2 May, 1990, p. 1 and p.3. 
50 The Courier Mail, 24 April, 1990, p. l. 
51 
'April 1990 Floods in Inland Queensland', p.2. 
52 The Chronicle (Toowoomba}, 2 July, 1990, p.2. 
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Figure 7.3 
Flood damage in Charleville, 1990. 
[From: The Courier Mail, 24 April, 1990, p. l.J 
Likewise, those outside town centres received little warning. There, the floodwater 
moved quickly across - and lingered on - already flooded pastoral stations. According to 
the BoM's June 1990 report 'initial rural damage estimates', gained from the Queensland 
Department of Primary Industries, were extensive: 30,000 sheep and 11,000 cattle had 
died; 9,200 kilometres of fencing needed replacing; and, buildings and equipment were 
damaged. 'Total rural hardship' reached $30 million.53 In New South Wales, sheep 
remained isolated for more than a month. Emergency fodder drops kept up to 115,000 
sheep alive.54 Such successes were overshadowed by heavy losses. Reports of sheep 
drowning and starving filled the pages of Queensland Country Life. The newspaper 
estimated, from early reports by pastoralists, that more than 100,000 sheep died 
throughout western Queensland due to the floods (well beyond the 30,000 recorded by 
the Department of Primary Industries). Further, the Country Life journalists suspected that 
once the total effects had been felt, the number could rise to 250,000. Such losses 'would 
rival the January 1974 floods as the State's worst on record'.55 Shearing in the flooded 
regions was cancelled and, with up to 13 months wool on their backs, sheep bogged in 
the mud, increasing both stock losses and losses from unshorn wool clips. In addition, a 
53 
'April 1990 Floods in Inland Queensland', pp. l-2. 
54 Queensland Country Life, 3 May, 1990, p.3; Queensland Country Life, 26 April, 1990, p.6; and, 'April 1990 
Floods in Inland Queensland', pp. l-2. 
55 Queensland Country Life, 26 April, 1990, p.3. 
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fly epidemic was expected after the floods receded, and lambing was due to begin in a few 
months, contributing to pastoralists' concerns.56 
Many in Charleville, Alpha, Augathella, Jericho, Blackall, and outlying stations 
were uninsured. The risk of inundation in the region was high and flood insurance was 
either unavailable or very expensive for those in towns and stations along the Warrego.57 
Less than 10 percent of damaged or lost property was insured against floods. Further, 
flood insurance was not included in most insurance policies but was an elective. The 
Queensland regional manager for the Insurance Council of Australia suggested that as it 
had been a long time since the last flood 'it may well be that a number of business people 
perceived it as a low-risk elective and decided not to take it'. 'They believed it could not 
happen to them' .58 A United Graziers Association (UGA) spokesperson took another 
view, noting with some irony that the cost of insurance was so high that it possibly 
equalled the cost of the flood damage; so, 'if you can afford the insurance you probably 
don't need it'.59 The consequence for business owners who had little or no insurance or 
remaining capital was financial crisis. A Charleville police officer reflected that: 'Ninety-
nine percent of the businesses in the main street have been flooded out - they have lost 
everything and will never get it back'.60 The cost of recovery for businesses was estimated 
in the millions of dollars. 
After visiting the flooded region, then Queensland Premier Wayne Goss 
acknowledged the effect business closures may have on communities, as many proprietors 
could potentially leave the district. The Sunshine Coast Daily reported the Premier as 
saying, ' [e]ntire townships may be wiped off the map and never resettled after the western 
Queensland floods'. 61 Another newspaper conveyed the threat made by Charleville 
business owners to leave the area if the government did not intervene: 'The town's 
[Charleville 's] business people said yesterday they would leave town forever unless the 
Federal and State Governments promised a multimillion-dollar relief program today'.62 
Brisbane's Sunday Mail criticised the Federal government's delay in issuing financial relief 
56 Queensland Country Life, 26 April, 1990, p.3 and p.7; and, Sunday Sun, 29 April, 1990, p.2. See also, 
Western Sun, 9 May 1990, p.4. 
57 
'Current Issues', 'Residential Flood Insurance', Insurance Council of Australia, 
http://www.insurancecouncil.corn.au/Default.aspx?tabid= 1297, accessed 24 April 2008; and, Queensland 
Country Life, 26 April, 1990, p.5. 
58 Sun, 24 April, 1990, p.2; Sun, 25 April, 1990, p.3; and, The Courier Mail, 24 April, 1990, p. l 
59 Queensland Times, 2 7 April, 1990, p. l. 
60 Sun, 24 April, 1990, p.2 
6 1 Sunshine Coast Daily, 24 April, 1990, p.7. 
62 The Courier Mail, 24 April, 1990, p. l. 
331 
to businesses and homeowners. The newspaper suggested it was Deputy (and Acting) 
Prime Minister Paul Keating's preoccupation with coastal urban centres that laced the 
political and financial abandonment of western-Queensland at a critical time. The 
newspaper wrote that Federal government bureaucrats, 'either do not know or do not 
care that the inland has been in decline since the '50s. They seem not to recognise that 
the family properties have all but gone, the victims of alternate flood and drought and 
taxing Governments. It's not clear to them that towns beyond the Great Divide have been 
clinging on for 30 years. Charleville is what it is - was, rather, - because it is a classic 
example of forced survival'. 63 In a period of rural decline, Charleville faced extinction. 
Charleville's situation echoed in 'other small and economically fragile towns'.64 
The state government implemented its Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements in 
south-western Queensland (supplemented by the Federal government) in late April 
1990.65 The response was designed to provide financial and physical aid (through the 
SES) following 'natural disasters'.66 The scheme, which was developed in the 1970s, was 
still 'green' in 1990, untested in Queensland by an environmental event of this 
magnitude. Once implemented, it quickly became clear that people were not receiving 
enough aid under the program. Premier Wayne Goss and Deputy Premier and Minister 
for Police and Emergency Services Terry Mackenroth revised the scheme, stating to 
newspapers that it was 'inadequate for the scale of the flood in Western Queensland'.67 
Initially the scheme made up to $3,000 available for each household for damage 
to household items. A further $8,000 per household was available for 'emergency repairs'. 
These relief measures were regulated by a means test, and many were ineligible to receive 
the full amount. The test was adjusted in early May, being relaxed to a higher per annum 
income before relief was reduced.68 A new scheme was also implemented for those who 
did not qualify under the means test, of a concessional loan of up to $8,000. The 
conditions put on financial relief were proving to be unrealistic. The flood had destroyed 
homes and many were unable to work because they were either repairing their properties 
63 Sunday Sun, quoted in, Wesrern Sun, 2 May, 1990, p.16. 
64 John Ryan, Charleville: The Flood (Rockhampton: QNTV News, 1990), p.7. 
65 Sunday Sun, 29 June, 1990, p. l l ; and, Queensland Times, 24 April, 1990, p.3. 
66 
'About Us', State Disaster Management Group. State Government of Queensland. 
htn:i:!/www.disaster.gld.guv.au/abour/, accessed 17 April 2008. Some charitable donations were also 
established, such as that chaired by Brisbane Lord Mayor Clem Jones which raised $5 million and those 
formed by the QCWA, 'Life Line' and 'The Salvation Army'. Western Sun, 9 May, 1990, p.14; Queensland 
Times, 25 April , 1990, p.3; The Chronicle (Toowoomba), 2 May, 1990, p.12 [QCWA]; and, The Chronicle 
(Toowoomba), 24 May, 1990, p.12. 
67 Wesrem Sun, 2 May, 1990, p. l. 
68 Western Sun, 2 May, 1990, p. l. 
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or their place of employment had been flooded. Adjustments to the scheme continued 
and in May the means test was removed entirely.69 
Teething problems continued. Farmers had been left out of the relief 
arrangements. The UGA lobbied the state government for the inclusion of grazing 
homesteads and primary producers in financial relief. The UGA submitted a plan for aid 
to the state government, which included grants of $80,000 as well as loans for restocking 
and increased loan amounts to cover the costs of freighting fodder, fencing, and stock. 
Graziers had suffered heavy stock losses and property damage, losing capital already 
reduced by a previous drought. The UGA's aid plan was packaged by UGA President, Bill 
Bonthrone, as a long-term recovery strategy for primary producers in western Queensland. 
He proposed $300,000 be made available to farmers over a 15 year period. 70 Primary 
producers were hurriedly incorporated into the state government aid arrangements. 
* * * 
State Officials and Flood Expectations in Cunnamulla 
Because of the devastation at Charleville, Police Superintendent Harry Edwards and a 
number of officers from Brisbane were flown to Cunnamulla on 24 April 1990, to take 
over the flood response from the Paroo Shire Council and district police. The 
Superintendent was a late entrant to the floods in Cunnamulla, arriving from Brisbane 
the day before the peak. His role was to take command of the state-led (and federally 
supported) flood response in C unnamulla. The Superintendent had been involved in one 
other flood response, for a flood at Gatton, just 90 kilometres from Brisbane in 1974. In 
the Gatton flood he was involved in the operation to move people to safety, part of a 
broader police effort during the flood. The Cunnamulla flood was the first flood for 
which he managed the police response and it was 700 kilometres from Brisbane. It was 
also his last as the Superintendent was due to retire in six months. In a recent 
conversation with Superintendent Edwards he told me that at the time of the 1990 flood 
he had finished working on an internal police inquiry and was 'in between' assignments. 
69 Wescem Sun, 9 May, 1990, p.4 and p. 5. 
70 Queensland Country Life, 3 May, 1990, p.3. 
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He was available to take up the position of leading the Cunnamulla flood response, to 
which he was assigned. 71 
The Superintendent first met Tannock the day he arrived in Cunnamulla.72 At 
this time Tannock remained uncertain about the peak flood height but was sure the town 
would not flood and conveyed the information to the Superintendent. T annock 
hypothesised that although Cunnamulla was isolated by floodwater, the town would not 
need to be evacuated. The Superintendent, however, was concerned about the flood risk 
for Cunnamulla and in some ways needed to prepare for the worst possible scenario: a 
repeat of the flooding in Charleville. The amount of water, for him, indicated that 
Cunnamulla could be in serious danger.73 The Superintendent consulted with Tannock 
throughout the lead-up to the flood peak about the way the flood was moving, its threat 
to Cunnamulla and how high the flood would peak around the town.74 However, the 
final decisions were his prerogative and responsibility. 
The view that Cunnamulla could be severely flooded was shared by many others. 
Some SES workers thought that the floodwater would overflow the levee and that the 
flood would peak a metre higher than they had initially expected. Others were concerned 
that the levee would break under a 'wall of water' .75 The Paroo Shire Council expected 
the levee would not hold the water and was unsure how to act. One member of the shire 
council, Suzette Beresford, said: 'It's a big surge of water. .. we're facing something that 
nobody has knowledge of .76 Cunnamulla Police Sergeant Jim Egan thought that in such a 
situation residents were the best judges of the flood: 'The locals are the best people to 
know where it will come from' .77 The town waited: according to one resident it was 'like 
. . . b b' 78 s1ttmg on a ttme om . 
* 
71 Harry Edwards, pers. comm., 19 December 2008. 
72 Edwards, pers. comm., 19 December 2008. 
* * 
73 Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, pp.40-41; and, Edwards, pers. comm., 19 December 2008. 
74 Edwards, pers. comm., 19 December 2008. 
75 The Courier Mail, 24 April 1990, p. l; and, Sun, 26 April, 1990, p.3. 
76 The Courier Mail, 24 April 1990, p. l. 
77 Sun, 24 April, 1990, p. l. 
78 The Courier Mail, 24 April 1990, p.l; Sunshine Coast Daily, 24 April, 1990, p.7; Sun, 23 April, 1990, p.2; 
Australian, 23 April, 1990, p. l; Queensland Times, 24 April, 1990, p. l; and, Queensland Times, 25 April, 
1990, p. l. 
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Centralisation of Flood Aid: The Superintendent as State Agent 
Under Queensland state legislation the Superintendent was responsible for the 
coordination of equipment, personnel, and volunteers from the Australian Army and 
SES, now congregating in Cunnamulla. Empowered by the State Counter-Disaster 
Organisation Act 197 5 he could also order and enforce an evacuation of the town.79 
The 1990 flood occurred at a time when state involvement in community 
preparations and responses to floods had been formally centralised by policy and 
legislation. In the 1970s all states and territories passed Acts similar to the State Counter-
Disaster Organisation Act 197 5, prompted by a series of environmental events, including 
Cyclone Tracy and costly floods in Brisbane in 1974. The chaos of aid and mass 
evacuations that followed these events relied on charity and last minute government aid, 
and proved incentive for states and territories to seek order in emergencies. In many of 
the resulting state Acts, governments reserved the right to procure equipment that was 
privately owned.80 Through the Acts, responses to floods were in many ways standardised. 
They established channels of action, and financial aid to individuals and local 
governments, that corresponded to the level of crisis a community faced. 81 
In Queensland, the State Counter-Disaster Organisation Act 197 5 aimed to 
coordinate responses to 'natural disasters' through the state government. The legislation 
centralised responses, including physical aid and financial relief under the umbrella body 
of the State Counter-Disaster Organisation (SCDO). Within the SCDO, the SES was 
positioned as the primary response group on a local level, comprised of local volunteers. 
The SES was originally created in 1955 as State Emergency Services, a state funded 'grass-
roots volunteer organization' with dual functions: to aid communities in preparing for 
floods and coordinate reparation work and, during the Cold War, to mobilise civil 
79 
'About Us', State Disaster Management Group. State Government of Queensland. 
http://www.disaster.gld.gov.au/about/. accessed 17 April 2008; and, Stare Counter-Disaster Organization Act 
1975, s22(1) and s25(2)(a)(ii). The State Counter-Disaster Organisation Act 1975 was reviewed in 2002-03. The 
review resulted in a new Act, which replaced the 1975 legislation - the Disaster Management Act 2003. This 
Act remains the current legislation in Queensland. The new Act retained many of the previous Act's 
measures and in addition expanded state response to disasters to be more holistic. It now includes, for 
example, mitigation and prevention. 
8° For Queensland see: State Counter-Disaster Organization Act 197 5, s25(2)(a)(i). 
81 
'About Us', State Disaster Management Group. State Government of Queensland. 
http://www.disaster.gld.gov.au/about/, accessed 17 April 2008. Some charitable donations were also 
established, such as that chaired by Brisbane Lord Mayor Clem Jones which raised $5 million and those 
formed by the QCWA, 'Life Line' and 'The Salvation Army'. Western Sun, 9 May, 1990, p.14; The 
Queensland Times, 25 April, 1990, p.3; and, The Chronicle (Toowoomba), 2 May, 1990, p.12 [QCWA) and 24 
May, 1990, p. 12. 
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defence.82 Under the new Act the SES became a government-operated branch and, also, 
the predominant labour and coordination organisation in natural disaster response. 
However, the power of the SES to respond to, and aid preparations for, floods remained 
limited. The police force was included under the SCDO as a second tier of response, to 
be summoned as a coordinating, as well as a law enforcement body, if the 'natural 
disaster' proved severe.83 Such 'top heavy' decision-making in 'natural disasters' and their 
aftermath was codified in law but was deeply resented by local residents. Since Cyclone 
Tracy, locals had urged place-sensitive responses to disaster management.84 
The government legislation created an overarching context for both T annock and 
the Superintendent. The Act privileged state agents as decision-makers in 'natural 
disaster' areas by centralising responses to the environmental events to a state level. The 
Act also privileged the environmental knowledge of government agents by giving them 
positional power over those in the effected and threatened areas. It allowed government 
workers to make decisions as to the communities' best interests in situations declared as 
emergencies. In this way the Act set parameters on which knowledge was considered valid 
in such a situation, clearly privileging that of the government. In addition, standardised 
responses and the summoning of remote officials, who potentially had little knowledge of 
the areas, created a high potential for government agents to respond to and understand 
environmental events in abstracted forms. 
Further, the power of state agents to enforce an evacuation (which the Act 
enabled) reflected an ideology of humanitarian aid that privileged the removal of people 
from threatened areas and valued human life separately from people's connections with 
place. The benefit of such an approach is human survival. The drawback is that it 
82 Chas Keys, 'Towards Better Practice: the evolution of flood management in New South Wales', 
unpublished conference paper presented at the Australian Disaster Conference, Canberra, 1999, pp. 111-
116, p. 113. The Deputy Director General of the New South Wales State Emergency Service, Chas Keys, 
argued in a 1999 paper to the Australian Disaste r Conference in Canberra, that under similar 
circumstances in New South Wales the enabling Act failed to give the SES sufficient power to effectively 
manage floods. The SES remained focused on emergency response during flood events rather than long-
term preparations in communities that repeatedly experienced floods. Further, Keys argued that, ' [t]he Act 
gave the SES few clear responsibilities and no power to co-ordinate the activities of other agencies in 
relation to flood management' (p.3). Flood warning, flood plain d evelopment planning, community 
awareness, and SES emergency response remained isolated management processes. In 1989 a review of the 
SES resulted in the restructuring of the organisation through a new state Act (State Emergency Services Act 
1989). The SES was made responsible for flood management and coordinating other agencies to protect 
flood threatened communities in New South Wales, both in emergencies and long-term preparedness. 
83 State Counter-Disaster Organization Act 1975; and, 'About Us', State Disaster Management G roup. State 
Government of Queensland. http://www.disaster.qld.gov.au/about/ , accessed 17 April 2008. 
84 Peter Read, Returning to Nothing: The M eaning of Lost Places (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), pp.148-17 1. 
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undermines a consideration of communities-in-place. Humanitarian evacuations, as in the 
case of Cunnamulla and other places in south-west Queensland, can have personal and 
psychological effects that result in severing connections between people and place and 
jeopardise future economic survival of communities. Further, the approaches the Act 
codified meant important environmental and social knowledges held by those who live in 
the areas were potentially sidelined. 
* * * 
Tannock and the Superintendent: The Last Flight 
On Tuesday 24 April 1990 the Superintendent decided to bypass the community 
organised evacuation plan, which was to move to the sand hills. This was because, in his 
view, the facilities were inadequate.85 He put in motion alternative measures and 
recommended that the evacuation of the townspeople to the Charleville camp and to 
Brisbane should begin. This plan had been developed as an avenue to cope with extreme 
flooding in the town that could not be handled locally. It required greater state 
government involvement and coordination. That day, 90 people including the elderly and 
sick, pregnant and nursing women and young families were flown to Brisbane.86 It would 
be the largest air evacuation since Cyclone Tracy in 1974. As many as 1,100 residents 
were to be flown to Brisbane and 600 to the evacuee 'tent city' in aircraft hangars near 
Charleville. Some residents did not want to leave if the planned evacuation eventuated 
and the sand hill camp was stocked with provisions for them.B7 
SES deputy director Bob Barchard told newspapers that the decision to evacuate 
had been made after 'shire officials and engineers forecast floodwaters would exceed the 
levees by a metre'. It was a close call to make. However, Barchard supported the decision, 
saying: 'Once the water goes over the levee banks it is too late to make a decision'. The 
risks to human life were too great. The evacuation would mean displacing the entire 
population of Cunnamulla. 'I shudder at the thought of displacing them from their 
homes', Barchard said.BB As well as the emotional fissures and dispersals of family 
85 Edwards, pers. comm. 19 December 2008. 
86 Brisbane Times, 25 April, 1990, p. l. 
87 Queensland Times, 24 April, 1990, p.l; and, Sunshine Coast DaiLy, 24 April, 1990, p.7. 
88 The Courier Mail, 24 April, 1990, p. l. 
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members created by an evacuation, Cunnamulla's small economy would suffer, and 
possibly not recover. 
Airlift for 17tlO 
Town 
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Figure 7.4 (above) 
Newspaper headline as Cunnamulla prepared to evacuate. 
[From: The Courier Mail, 24 April, 1990, p.1.J 
Figure 7.5 (below) 
'The evacuation commences ... ' 
[From: Western Sun, 27 April, 1990, p.7.J 
The Superintendent consulted with Tannock and formulated a plan that would 
provide a small window of opportunity to either evacuate the town or to allow residents 
to stay. Just before a full evacuation they would take a second flight together over the 
Warrego floodplains and make a final decision as to whether to continue the 
evacuation.89 It was to be a critical moment of judgement for both men. 
At 6am on Wednesday 25 April the Superintendent ordered the sirens to be 
sounded for residents to gather on the sports oval for evacuation by helicopter to the 
town airport and from there to Charleville or Brisbane. Residents gathered at the airport, 
but the final leg was put on hold. Tannock and the Superintendent flew over the 
floodwaters. In the helicopter Tannock pointed to the rivers and creeks near Cunnamulla 
and asked the Superintendent, 'which do you think the main channel is?' The 
89 Edwards, pers. comm., 19 December 2008. 
338 
Chapter 7 - Cunnamulla 1990 
Superintendent said 'that one', and Tannock responded, 'that's the creek'.90 Near 
Cunnamulla the creeks were taking a large amount of the water west and had appeared 
from the air as the main channel. The Warrego and creeks were funnelling water away 
from Cunnamulla. 
After the flight, having seen the river and tributaries from the air, the 
Superintendent called the evacuation off, radioing in the decision from the helicopter. 
The flood peaked that day at 3p.m. at 10.15 metres, five centimetres lower than 
Tannock's prediction. The evening that the flood peaked, a portion of a levee gave way, 
flooding the showgrounds and Oxford Hotel in the southern part of the town in ankle-
deep water. Floodwater threatened to seep through other soil and sand bag levees in the 
following days, but they held. Outlying properties sustained damage and substantial stock 
losses. However, Cunnamulla's township escaped significant inundation.91 
After the flood had peaked and Cunnamulla was declared 'safe', journalists from 
the Western Sun expressed the town's gratitude for Tannock's involvement in preventing 
an evacuation: 
'AD.' (Tannock) as he is known to us all has spent a lifetime playing with the figures of 
floods in the south-west and had in the past been able to predict the flood heights to the 
mm. This information has proved invaluable. 
It must be remembered that a full scale evacuation of the town where the 
population ended up in Charleville, with problems of their own or in Brisbane unable to 
return for some days would have been just as devastating to Cunnamulla's economy as a 
raging torrent through the town. It would have been a disaster in it's [sic] own form from 
which many business houses would not have recovered. 
To this end thanks to those on properties above the town who had to swim to get 
flood levels for us.92 
The helicopter flight saved Cunnamulla. No reports of the flood were made by or 
required of Harry Edwards. Instead, there were joint debriefings in Roma and Brisbane 
for all those involved in flood response, including residents in the flooded and flood-
threatened areas. 93 
90 Tannock, pers comm., 7 September, 2005. 
91 Western Sun, 27 April, 1990, p.7 and p.5 ; Sun, 26 April, 1990, p.3; Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, 
pp.18-21 and pp.40-4 1; and, Edwards, pers. comm. 19 December 2008. 
92 Western Sun, 27 April, 1990, p.7. 
93 Edwards, pers. comm., 19 December 2008. 
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Figure 7.5 
Floodwater April 1990 - Wyandra-Cunnamulla reach 
Aerial landstat image. 
[From: Scott & Furphy Pty Ltd, 'Western Queensland Towns Flood Study, Volume 1 
Report', commissioned by the State Government of Queensland. January 1991.J 
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* * * 
'The Rivers Are Moving West': The Warrego' s Shifting Course 
T annock has explained that these western creeks were generally taking more water from 
the Warrego. 'The rivers are moving west', Tannock told me. The water is no longer 
flowing down the Warrego as it used to: one of its western tributaries, Cuttaburra Creek, 
is becoming the main channel. In 1990 this channel was where a large portion of the 
floodwater flowed below Cunnamulla. This channel shift may also explain why 
floodwater flowed west across floodplains as it neared Cunnamulla. Tannock writes that 
this process is in response to the westward drop in the gradient of the floodplains: 'What 
is happening to The Warrego and the Cuttaburra [the largest western creek] is normal 
procedure ... [for] our western rivers. One only has to fly over them to see the pattern 
outlined. Because of the reduction in height above sea-level the further one goes west 
toward the inland then our streams have a tendency to keep breaking west' .94 
Tannock's notion that rivers are moving west was influenced by information 
communicated to him by an Aboriginal friend. Tannock explains that, '[a]ccording to an 
old Aboriginal Friend of mine (long since deceased) The Widgeegoara Creek [now an 
eastern tributary of the Warrego] was at one time the main stream of The Warrego in the 
southern portion of The Basin ... I feel that he could have been right. According to him 
The Aboriginal word "Widgeegoara" means "Where's The Water Gone"'.95 It had, the 
story follows, gone to the Warrego. Widgeegoara, once the main channel, is now a creek, 
feeding its former tributary, the Warrego River, which lies to its west. Other creeks above 
Cunnamulla are also 'breaking west', creating serpentine new channels. The changes in 
water flow have been going on for hundreds, perhaps thousands, of years, Tannock 
hypothesises. He implies that there are larger geological timescales that we need to take 
into account in our environmental and flood knowledge, which, in turn, needs to be 
continually adjusted. It is easier for those living on the floodplains to see this, as they 
experience it. For those in the state government it is a little harder. 
T annock' s recognition of the changing course of the rivers brings 
acknowledgement of the rivers' agency in the world. People like Tannock are 
experiencing and understanding that the environment is constantly changing and that 
94 Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, p.37. 
95 Original capital letters. Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, p.37. 
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this needs to be recognised if its dynamic is going to be understood. Because the rivers 
move, and floodplains change, no two floods are the same. Where the water flows and 
how it flows, is different every time. Each flood is unique in this sense. Tannock 
perceived the 1990 flood as a particular dynamic of water, river channel, land, and 
weather. He also saw humans within this dynamic, as constructions on the floodplain 
influenced the course of the flood. The railway embankment, albeit in its absence, played 
a part in the flood; and the levee bank moved the water away from Cunnamulla. Further 
afield than Cunnamulla there is growing concern by hydrologists that levee banks speed 
the flow of floodwater by confining it to river channels and pushing it back across the 
land in a way it would not otherwise flow. Increased flood speed causes erosion and 
vegetation loss. 
Human actions are changing floods and, in consequence, ecological processes; 
each change creates a new influence on floods. The state government's commissioned 
report on the 1990 flood noted that residents in Charleville and Blackall had observed 
that the amount of vegetation growing in the riverbed had increased since stock grazing 
ceased on the riverbanks in the 1960s. Plants in the bed of the river sprouted when the 
river was dry and, with no grazing animals to eat it, flourished. Cattle and sheep have 
displaced native animals that may have grazed on the vegetation and land clearing along 
the riverbanks has reduced this vegetation's competition for growth. In both areas soil 
had accumulated around the riverbed vegetation, making the river shallower. 'Both the 
above factors' (riverbed vegetation and soil accumulation), the report stated, 'would raise 
water levels for a given flood flow' .96 With recognition of the interplay between various 
actors in floods (human and non-human) the divisions between rivers, humans, rain, 
animals, aquifers, vegetation, and soil, d isappear. Each is an actor, but their combined 
dynamic creates the particular ecological conditions of each flood. 
Tannock's predictions of the flood were based on his experience of the river as he 
observed these changing relationships over many years. The knowledge gained from living 
with the river in its different forms and studying its changes is what he terms 'local 
knowledge' .97 
* * * 
96 Scott & Furphy, 'Western Queensland Towns Flood Study, Volume l Report', p.xiii. 
97 Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, p.39. 
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Local Knowledge and State Bureaucracy 
In The Warrego Watershed, published shortly after the 1990 floods, Tannock empathises 
with the Superintendent from Brisbane on the grounds that whilst he did not know the 
river, he was nevertheless faced with the task of making decisions about responding to the 
flood: 
I for one had a happy association with Surperintendent [sic] Edwards by the time we had 
completed The Flood Operations, but I could see at this time, that he was working under 
a great handicap: (a) The Warrego Watershed was strange to him. He was aware of what 
happened to Charleville and there was no reason for him to believe that the same could 
not happen to Cunnamulla. (b) He could not, at that stage, accept the fact that The 
Cunnamulla Evacuation Camp on the Sandhill was completely safe from Flood 
Inundation ... His was an unenviable situation in that either way he could be liable to 
censorship, if he failed to evacuate and we had a repetition of Charleville or Nyngan or 
on the other hand if he evacuated and it was subsequently proved not to be necessary.98 
Tannock's relationship with the Brisbane Superintendent, while in the end a 'happy' 
one, needed to work accross differing environmental knowledges and expectations of the 
Warrego during the flood and planned evacuation. The Superintendent did not know the 
river the way Tannock did, and yet was responsible for the town's safety. The strucrures of 
power and knowledge played out in this flood draw attention to tensions between 
centralised state government and the knowledges of those who live with the river, far 
from the centres of political and managerial power. Personalities, and the moment of 
crisis, perhaps closed this gap between two understandings of the flood's potential and 
response to it. Indeed, the Superintendent visited Tannock in Cunnamulla after he 
retired, when Tannock gave him a copy of The Warrego Watershed.99 However, until the 
evacuation was called off there existed different and conflicting visions of the river's 
floods. The Superintendent had the power to act on his while Tannock, and the Paroo 
Shire Councillors, d id not. 
Settler responses to the flood were governed by an order of bureaucratic rank and 
power that did not take account of those who had experiential knowledge from living 
98 Original capital letters. Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, p.40. 
99 Edwards, pers. comm., 19 December 2008. 
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with the rivers. The differences between Tannock and the Superintendent over 
knowledge and expectations of the river were played out within larger frameworks of 
power and codified responses, where power lay with the agents of a centralised state 
bureaucracy. Through these governing channels, the Superintendent's knowledge was 
valued above Tannock's. Tannock's local knowledge had little status or power in critical 
decision-making, but ultimately relied on the willingness of the Superintendent to engage 
with other ways of understanding the river's flows. 
Tannock envisions an important role for local knowledge in state-led preparations 
for floods, mitigation planning, and flood warning systems in the future. In his book he 
included suggestions for additional levee banks in Cunnamulla, and plans for them in 
Charleville and Augathella. He rationalised each levee bank in terms of past floods and 
water flows, acknowledging that current flood peak 'records were made to be broken' and 
factoring the possibility of larger floods in to his designs. Implicit in his suggestions is an 
argument for more equitable collaboration between those living with the river and 
governments, for a sharing of knowledges. In the introduction to his book, he explained 
the value of recording local knowledge of rivers: 
In concentrating on the problems of the Warrego Watershed, I am hopeful that other 
persons with an intimate knowledge of other Watersheds which were similarly affected by 
the April 1990 floods, will be prompted to write something similar as the problems in the 
Warrego Watershed, are, I feel common to so many of our other Watersheds ... I feel that 
if these problems can be documented now, then our Local, State and Federal 
Governments can be made aware of the problems and the necessity for planned flood 
mitigation in the futu re to avoid the tragic losses, the resultant loss of production and the 
colossal Post Flood Expenditure necessary to repair the damage.100 
Sharing his knowledge of the river and floods through his book created a record of 
Tannock's observations and made it accessible to different levels of government, as well as 
to others living with the Warrego. If others did the same, Tannock suggested, important 
avenues of communication with governments could be opened. Residents have important 
knowledge to offer in planning for subsequent floods and to pass on to future 
generations. 
100 Original capital letters. Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, p.9. 
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Indeed, others with local knowledge of floods have done something similar. In the 
Burdekin shire, on the north Queensland coast, Doug Haig had developed a system of 
flood warning for the region that proved accurate and successful. Like Tannock, Haig's 
warning system was reliant on informal networks. He was a shire engineer and received 
telephone calls from people with river heights throughout the Burdekin River watershed. 
Over a number of years he developed a formula for predicting flood peaks. Haig, together 
with Burdekin Shire Council employees, developed a computer program based on his 
knowledge and formula, for predicting flood heights. The program could then issue 
warnings automatically to the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) radio to 
broadcast flood warnings to the community - a continuing legacy well after Haig's 
death. 10 1 
Cunnamulla did not flood, but the threat that the flood posed to the town, 
combined with rural losses, damage to other towns, changes to the floodplains, his 
retirement, and the almost-evacuation, prompted Tannock to write down his 40 years of 
observations and pass on what he ~ad learnt. His book is a testimony to rivers' 
continuing changeability, the variability of drought and flood, and the differences 
between each flood, as influenced not just by rainfall but also by their changing 
biophysical contexts. This is information T annock believes current and future 
generations, both inside and outside government, need to know. He wrote the book as a 
gesture to the future. 
101 Mark Stoneman, Parliamentary Debates. (Hansard). Session 1991. Queensland Legislative Assembly. 
Vol.319 and Vol.320, 10October1991, p.1614. 
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Local Knowledge in the Context of 
Climate Change 
There is a sense of urgency to Tannock's suggestion that those living on floodplains need 
to be proactive in their communication with governments and in forming partnerships 
with government agents. Further, both governments and those living on the floodplains, 
he argues, need to take a new approach to floods, giving flood warnings higher priority. 
Tannock expressed a sense of urgency for immediate action and communication because 
of the potential impact of ' the greenhouse effect ' or climate change: 
I sincerely hope that the tragic losses incurred in the April 1990 Flood in Charleville and 
elsewhere, will be instrumental in seeing the establishment of a comprehensive and 
efficient "Flood Warning Service" th roughout the whole Watershed with the distinct 
possibility of more frequent major floods in the future as a result of the possible 
"Greenhouse Effect", this now becomes a matter of paramount importance.1 
For him the 1990 flood was a call to action for floodplain communities, state, and nation, 
in preparing for more severe, and possibly more frequent, floods. 
Tannock's role in preventing the evacuation of Cunnamulla and his knowledge of 
the Warrego watershed makes a strong case for incorporating local and experiential 
knowledge in flood warnings during flood events, and for ongoing commu nication and 
equitable collaboration between community m embers, governments, and councils, in 
1 Original capital letters. Tannock, The Warrego Watershed, p.21. 
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future planning. The development of channels within government bureaucracy for types 
of knowledge that are personal (in the sense that they are acquired through living with 
the river) and ' informal' (in the sense that they are accumulated outside either 
government or acceptable scientific or academic frameworks) needs to occur for 
Tannock's vision to be realised and for the full benefit of local knowledge to be felt.2 
Libby Robin has recently argued that science in Australia dominates national and 
regional comprehensions of environments, and has increasingly done so since Federation. 
Government science shapes environmental understandings that underpin and permeate 
policy and town and industry planning on local, state, and national levels. Science 'speaks 
for nature' while also being the primary frame through which 'natural resources' are 
understood and managed. Robin explores the political and cultural contexts of science, 
particularly government science, in ways that highlight how it has informed, and 
continues to inform, 'a national vision'. She discusses, for example, a series of 
government backed settlements on the Daly River in the Northern Territory established 
from the early twentieth century. She does this within the context of government 
scientists' (and scientists outside governments) debates over settlement of tropical 
northern Australia. Many of the Daly River settlements (including government 
experimental farms) were short-lived, as government planning did not take account of 
place-specific environmental conditions, including the extreme potential for many of the 
sites to flood.3 Drawing on such examples, Robin argues that room needs to be made in 
political and cultural spaces for 'alternative voices that might also speak for nature'. 4 
Further, Robin suggests that government planning and management processes might be 
improved through the incorporation of other environmental knowledges, such as those of 
Indigenous peoples, farmers, and town dwellers. 
This is something for which James C. Scott has also argued. Scott argued that 
government (and institutions and enterprises) can add to, and improve, their knowledge 
base by incorporating local knowledge: 'An institution, social form, or enterprise that 
takes much of its shape from the evolving metis [local or practical knowledge] of the 
2 For discussions on the benefits of greater inclusion of 'local knowledge' in government decision-making, 
especially in terms of riparian communities, see, Helen Cheney, et al., 'Weirs and Flows in the Hawkesbury-
Nepean', in Emily Potter et al. (eds.), Fresh Water: New Perspectives on Water in Australia (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 2007), pp.185-20 1; and, Jennifer McKay, 'Water, Rivers and Ecologically 
Sustainable Development', in Emily Potter et al. (eds.), Fresh Water: New Perspectives on Water in Australia 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2007), pp.90-104. 
3 Libby Robin, How a Continent Created a Nation (Sydney: Univers ity of New South Wales Press, 2007), 
pp. 123-149. 
4 Libby Robin, How a Continent Created a Nation, p.10. 
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people engaged in it will thereby enhance their range of experience and skills' . 5 Scott 
suggested that a question we should ask of 'any planned, built, or legislated form of social 
life' is: 'to what degree does it promise to enhance the skills, knowledge, and 
responsibility of those who are part of it?'. This, Scott argued, should be its test.6 
Through her study of the relationship between science and government in 
Australia, Robin draws attention to a pervasive issue within Australian government 
bureaucracy: a need for the inclusion of place-informed (including experiential - which 
does not mean uninformed) understandings in decision-making processes. However, in 
such a global happening as climate change, what are the limits of local knowledge? This 
chapter seeks to explore the value of local knowledge in the face of environmental 
uncertainty, induced by climate change and other alterations to the environment from 
past and current settler land use practices. Scientists are uncertain about the effects of 
climate change. I will argue that in this environment of uncertainty and potentially 
radical change, there is an additional, and even greater need for alternative voices in 
debates about, as well as decisions towards, how Australians and their governments will 
approach altering ecosystems. 
* * * 
Climate Change 
Recent sn1dies, such as bureaucrat Greg McKeon's 2006 submission to Australia's 'State 
of the Environment Committee' ('Living in a Variable C limate'), the 2008 'Garnaut 
C limate C hange Review', and recent assessments by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate C hange, conclude that the effects of climate change on floods in the Murray-
Darling Basin and other semiarid countries around the world cannot currently be 
predicted. 7 One reason that the effects of climate change on flooding in the Basin is 
uncertain is that the intensity of the effects of global warming (and changes to rainfall, 
temperature, and water evaporation rates) depends on the degree to which governments 
5 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New 
Haven: Yale Univers ity Press, 1998), p.356. 
6 Scott, Seeing Like a State, p.355. 
7 G reg McKeon, 'Living in a Variable C limate', prepared for the 2006 Australian State of the Environment 
Committee, http://www.environment.gov.au/soe/2006/publications/integrative/climate/ index.html, 
accessed 2 February 2008; Ross Garnaut, 'Garnaut Climate Change Review Interim Report', 
http://www.garnautreview.org.au/CA25734EOO l6Al3 l/pages/reports-and-papers, accessed 2 July 2008; 
and, Assessment Reports, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
htto://www.ipcc.ch/ ipccreports/ assessments-reports.htm, accessed 6 March 2009. 
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and national administrative regimes around the world (especially in developed and 
developing nation-states) reduce the production of greenhouse gasses. Another is that 
instrumental records of rainfall and river heights in the Murray-Darling Basin do not 
extend far enough back, or are too suspect (i.e. cannot be accurately standardised into 
current measuring systems) to provide reliable bases for future projections. However, 
strong evidence is emerging that climate change will affect the Darling and Murray river 
systems differently. 
The Darling River system is affected by northern monsoonal rains, whereas the flow 
in the Murray is largely dependent on winter rainfall and Spring snowmelt. In a 2008 
study, Barrie Pittock et al draw attention to how these different hydrologies may be 
affected by climate change: summer monsoons will probably intensify, with higher 
rainfalls, and more frequent severe floods are likely in northern parts of the Basin. Floods 
could also be faster and more erosive if there is widespread vegetation deterioration. 
Along the Murray, a decrease in rainfall and snowmelt could mean possibly fewer floods 
and generally less river flow.8 Pittock et al warn, however, that 'any accurate quantitative 
estimate of changes in flood frequency in the MOB [Murray-Darling Basin] due to 
enhanced greenhouse effect is at this stage premature'.9 While the exact effects of climate 
change are unknown, the rivers and floodplains are likely to change dramatically and 
quickly, while floods are likely to become more unpredictable. Tannock's call for the 
establishment of warning systems and response mechanisms able to cope with increased 
floods in the Darling river system remains valid. 
* * * 
Past Settler Land Use 
Along with the uncertainties of climate change, the rivers and floodplains are 
experiencing more localised changes to ecological processes from past settler land use. In 
2005-06, the Basin contained 65 percent of Australia's irrigated agriculture and (with 
extractions totalling 65 percent of all diversions) it is largely water extraction for this 
industry (but also for rural and urban water supply and pastoral irrigation) that has 
8 Barrie Pittock, et al. , 'Climatic Background to Past and Future Floods in Australia', in Aldo Poiani (ed.), 
Floods in an Arid Continent, Advances in Eco logical Research No. 39 (Elsevier: California, 2006), pp.13-39. 
9 Pittock, et al. , 'Climatic Background to Past and Future Floods in Australia' , p.35. 
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caused an overall dramatic decrease in flow. '0 In 2000, a Murray-Darling Basin report 
revealed that water flow out of the Murray mouth had reduced to 28 percent of its 
previous flow. 11 It is largely irrigation agriculturalists, graziers, and towns dependent upon 
the industries, as well as floodplain ecologies, that are feeling the effects of reduced water 
flow. lrrigators' extraction licences were suspended in 2007 throughout the Basin after a 
decade of drought. While Victoria and South Australia have since eased these 
restrictions, the future of the irrigation industry remains uncertain. Extraction has been 
continual and unlimited, stemmed only by drought. 
In 1994 the Murray-Darling Basin Commission (MDBC) implemented a cap on 
irrigation extractions for each state. States agreed to be 'capped' at their 1993 rates of 
extraction. However 'the Cap', is not enforceable under rights of state sovereignty held in 
the Constitution, and states (particularly New South Wales) frequently extract more than 
their assigned amount. 12 One significant result of extractions has been that smaller, as 
well as larger floods, have not flowed across floodplains and wetlands. Extractions have 
caused serious deterioration in riverine environments, changing vegetation, and affecting 
the survival of fauna such as frogs that rely on periodic river 'flushings' for breeding. 13 
Further, flood and drought mitigation by large dams, that aim to contain rivers within 
their banks and make their flows consistent, has seen the death of many stretches of red 
gum forests on the Murray River. Settler land use practices have also contributed to 
increased soil salinisation in the Murray and Darling river systems. Salt concentrations 
have reached levels of toxicity in areas of the Basin, that have rendered the land unfit for 
farming and poisoned vegetation. 14 
In his recent book, Water Politics in the Murray-Darling Basin, Daniel Connell draws 
attention to the fact the Australians have not yet seen the full environmental effects of 
extraction: 'There are long lag times in these ecological systems that mean it will be many 
years before the full extent of degradation caused by contemporary levels of extraction are 
10 
'Water and the Murray-Darling Basin -A Statistical Profile, 2000-01 to 2005-06' (4610.0.55.007), 
Australian Bureau of Statistics , 
http://www.abs.gov .au/a usstats/abs@. nsf / Latestprod ucts/DCO DC8AAE4 ECD 7 2 7 CA25 7 4A5 00 1 F803A? 
opendocument, accessed 3 July 2009. 
11 Daniel Connell, Water Management in the Murray-Darling Basin (Sydney: Federation Press, 2007), p.17. 
12 Richard Kingsford, 'Review: Ecological impacts of dams, water diversions and river management on 
floodplain wetland', Austral Ecology, 2000, 25, pp.109-127, p.119. 
13 Kingsford, 'Review: Ecological impacts of dams, water diversions and river management on floodplain 
wetland', p.110 and p. 111. 
14 Connell, Water Politics in the Murray-Darling Basin, pp.17-18, pp.105-8, and pp.134-144. 
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evident'. 15 The ecology of the Basin will continue to change for many hundreds of years 
in response to extractions, the introduction of new fauna and flora, dramatically different 
land use practices by humans since European settlement, and current extraction. Flood 
flow and size will alter as these changes manifest in future landscapes. 
There has been growing recognition by governments since the 1970s, 
internationally and within Australia, that the pattern of past water use will be the source 
of future social, political, and environmental instability. United Nations conferences in 
the 1970s and 1980s, along with the Brundtland Report published in 1987, argued for 
national governments to manage fresh water for environmental, social, political, and 
economic sustainability (see chapter six). A 1992 United Nations (UN) conference in on 
Environment and Development outlined management systems based on catchment areas 
as the best way to develop policy, solve environmental justice issues, and address the aims 
of sustainability. The catchment management model relied on community involvement, 
in essence arguing that rather than 'top down' management, 'bottom and top' negotiation 
was essential to approaching water conflicts. The 1992 UN conference made clear that it 
is essential to include stakeholders in decision-making processes and to ensure that both 
government and those 'on the ground' were vested with responsibility for the outcomes. 
* * * 
Water Bureaucracies 
In response to the 1992 UN conference, and growing public and industry concern over 
environmental degradation, Connell argues that Australia 'embarked on a program of 
institutional reform'. 16 There were two significant changes to national and state 
institutional structures. First, the River Murray Commission was replaced by a tripartite 
structure: the Murray-Darling Ministerial Council, the Community Advisory Committee, 
and the MBDC. Queensland joined New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and the 
Federal government as part of the restructure. Secondly, integrated catchment 
management was adopted by each state in the early to mid 1990s, and by the MDBC in 
2001. The catchment approach 'integrates water quality and quantity issues, land, water 
15 Connell, Water Politics in the Murray-Darling Basin, p. 17. 
16 Connell, Water Politics in the Murray-Darling Basin, p. 16. 
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and air interactions and upstream and down stream affects, is systems oriented, requires 
research-based policy and emphasises stakeholder involvement and partnerships'. It was a 
more 'holistic' approach to water management. 17 
Integrated Catchment Management (ICM), Catchment Management Authorities, 
and community consultation were established by the states in the late 1980s to mid 1990s 
to engage communities and to gain feedback on water quality, distribution, and ecosystem 
health decisions and issues, and to involve community members in locally run projects 
jointly established with government. An example of the effectiveness of Catchment 
Management Authorities is the achievement of the Basin Salinity Management Strategy 
(implemented in 2001) in reducing salinity through changed methods of community 
d 1: . . 18 governance an rarmmg practices. 
A key part of ICM has been restoring floodplains and wetlands. Floodplain 
restoration has further been spurred on by the National Water Initiative (NWI), which 
was approved in 2004 by the Commonwealth and state governments. The NWI is an 
added attempt at institutional restructuring that aims to stimulate economic growth while 
protecting ecologies. 19 The primary function of the two management bodies is to 
negotiate and balance the need for water between the irrigators and the environment. 
Another area of government management that was addressed in the 1990s was the 
inclusion of processes for community consultation in flood response and preparation. 
Following the 1990 floods the Queensland government, with federal assistance, took 
steps to construct levee banks to protect Charleville from further large floods and to carry 
out land and flood surveys. Importantly, decision-making about the location and height 
of the levees included extensive consultation with members of the community. 20 In the 
debriefing sessions held in Brisbane and Roma after the 1990 flood, the need for longer-
term preparation for floods, beyond the event, was identified, such as levee building in 
some areas and a greater understanding of flood risks. Further, greater community 
consultation in longer-term preparation was identified. Due to a lack of community 
consensus about the height and location of levees in Charleville, the levees were not built 
17 Connell, Water Politics in the Murray-Darling Basin, p.17. 
18 Connell, Water Management in the Murray-Darling Basin, pp .141-144. See also, Sharon Pepperdine, 
'Integrating Social Considerations in Catchment Management', in Emily Potter et al. (eds.), Fresh Water: 
New Perspectives on Water in Australia (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2007), pp.202-216, pp. 205-
206. 
19 Connell, Water Management in the Murray-Darling Basin, pp.26-34. See, Connell, Water Management in the 
Murray-Darling Basin for more on the structure of ICM and NWI, 
zo 'Charleville Levee', Emergency Management Australia, c.2008. 
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in the following years. After further floods through the Warrego river system in 1997, 
when residents of Charleville were again evacuated and damages of $1000 million were 
incurred, new levee plans were developed by the local, state, and Federal governments in 
consultation with the community. In September 2000, the local government agreed to 
construct levees that could protect the town from a flood such as occurred in 1997 (which 
was not as high as the 1990 flood). The 1997 flood, along with another that occurred in 
1998, prompted (along with other events and administrative issues) a review of the 
governing legislation, that included an expansion of the role of the SES and greater 
. 1 . 2 1 community consu tatton. 
The State Counter-Disaster Organisation 1975 legislation was reviewed in 2002-03. 
The review resulted in a new Act which replaced the 197 5 legislation - the Disaster 
Management Act 2003. This Act remains the current legislation in Queensland. The new 
Act retained many of the previous Act's measures and in addition expanded the role of 
the State Emergency Service (SES) and included implicit mechanisms for community 
consultation. In particular it expanded the role of the SES to include longer-term 
preparation for floods, for example flood mitigation and prevention. Under the previous 
Act the different levels of government involved were required to establish action plans 
that could be implemented during a flood event, and at different stages the plans of 
corresponding levels of government could be implemented and supersede other, more 
local, plans. The new Act established a legal mechanism for community involvement and 
consultation in the process of longer-term local planning through the SES, which is 
mostly formed from local volunteers, local government, and district disaster centres. 
Through the SES there are now avenues for local knowledge to play an important role 
within government flood preparation and response at a local and regional level. 22 Indeed, 
at many levels of government the importance of community involvement in flood 
preparation is recognised. Emergency Management Australia, a federal body, today 
encourages school children to 'know your local flood history', to empower them to make 
informed individual decisions during future flood events. Such encouragement and flood 
knowledge could also allow them to become significantly involved in future community 
21 
'Charleville Levee', Emergency Management Australia, c.2008. See also, Stephen Yeo, 'Flooding in 
Australia: A Review of Events in 1998', Natural Hazards, 25, 2002, pp.177-191. 
22 See, 'Prevention and Preparedness', Queensland Government State Disaster Management Group, 
http://www.disaster.gld.gov.au/ managementlprevention.asp, accessed 19 June 2009. 
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and wider flood preparations. 23 Whether these consultative and educational processes are 
effective will take time to ascertain as they are tested in years to come. The Disaster 
Management Act 2003, like the Act that preceded it, still allows state government officials 
to take charge in flood events, including enforcing evacuations.24 
While a number of government agencies have been adjusted, or created, to 
facilitate community consultation and participation in decision-making processes related 
to rivers, floodplains, and flood events, these agencies remain disparate and represent 
different government and settler interests that often conflict. Recently, ecologist Richard 
Kingsford argued that there was a bureaucratic gulf in river and floodplain management 
that limited holistic management of riverine areas. He argued, ' [i)n practice, river 
managers focus on the hydrology of the river channel, while conservation managers 
concentrate on the ecology of floodplain wetlands'.25 River managers, Kingsford 
continued, concentrate on 'delivering water for human purposes'. Ecologists on the other 
hand attempt to study and manage floodplains for ecological conservation. Kingsford 
argued that the management of rivers and that of floodplains are too independent of each 
other and require greater synergy as they are related to one another, especially through 
flood flows. Kingsford's observations and arguments remain relevant to current 
management practices, as river and floodplain management continue to remain largely 
independent of each other. To these disparate management areas we can add another: 
flood mitigation, preparedness, and response. Management of rivers for irrigation and 
other 'human purposes', floodplain ecologies, and flood events are largely independent of 
one another, although each is relevant to the others as their 'on the ground' effects 
interact. Further, they are often in conflict, for example, when water supply for irrigators 
interrupts flood flows to floodplains and wetlands. 
In addition, some residents of flood country and government managers have 
conflicting interests. A good example is on the Macquarie River, where competition for 
floodwater between irrigators and the 'environmental flows' allocated by the MDBC (as 
of late 2008, the Murray-Darling Basin Authority) for the Macquarie Marshes still 
remains unresolved. In February 2008, the results of a year long study of Macquarie River 
floodplains by researchers at the University of New South Wales (UNSW), including 
23 
'Floods - In My Backyard?', Emergency Management for Schools, Emergency Management Australia, 
http:// www.ema.gov.au/ www/ ema/ schools.nsf/ Page/ Learn AboutFloods InMyBackyard lnMyBackyard , 
accessed 19 June 2009. 
24 Disaster Management Act 2003, s77(1)(c). 
25 Kingsford, 'Review: Ecological impacts of dams, water diversions and river management on floodplain 
wetland' , p.121. 
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Kingsford, were released. Satellite images and aerial photographs showed that farmers had 
built earth works to funnel floodwater on to their drought ridden, and irrigation-licence-
suspended, properties for (mainly cotton) irrigation and farming, diverting water from the 
ecologically important wetlands. Parts of the Macquarie River floodplains are protected 
Nature Reserves, covering high density water bird breeding sites, while 88 percent of the 
marshes are under private ownership, and subject to strict regulation, as they also include 
breeding sites for birds and other species.26 The UNSW report claimed that 2,000 
kilometres of levees have been built across the floodplains. Some levee banks may have 
been authorised. However, the report claimed that 400 kilometres of levees (which were 
up to 20 kilometres long and five metres high) and storage dam embankments were 
illegal.27 These embankments subverted government agreements over wetland restoration 
and irrigation licence suspension by going 'under the radar', at the same time 
circumventing MDBC Cap monitoring and audits. In addition, these embankments have 
been shown to interact with flood flows, increasing their depth and velocity (see chapter 
six). The media labelled the irrigators' diversions 'water theft' and 'floodplain 
harvesting'. 28 The use of such terminology in public forums reflects substantial 
institutional problems as well as the acceleration of ecological, social, economic, and 
political crises. Further, after substantial debate by scientists and in the media as to 
whether the prolonged drought beginning in 2000 (that had seen the government 
suspend many irrigation licences) was part of the El Nino/La Nina cycle or intensified by 
climate change, in late 2007 the Bureau of Meteorology declared the severity of the 
drought to be influenced by climate change. 
Connell argues that there is '[g]rowing acceptance of the imperative to adapt 
continually to changing circumstances' as 'part of a worldwide reassessment of the extent 
to which humans can control and direct complex socio-ecological systems', and the UN 
conferences, ICM, and the NWI reflect this view.29 Management frameworks may reflect 
such trends, but 'on the ground' there is clearly disjuncture between bureaucratic aims, 
26 Macquarie Marshes Management Committee, 
http://www.macquariemarshes.com/ bwWebsite/ fotlowon.asp?PagelD= 1223, accessed 19 June 2008. 
27 
'Report Reveals Illegal Murray-Darling Irrigation', ABC News, 
http:/ /www.abc.net.au/news/ stories/ 2008/ 02/25/ 21715 l 7.htm, accessed 3 March 2008. 
28 
'Murray-Darling Woes', Sky News Online, www.skynews.com.au/ eco/article.aspx?id=219253, accessed 3 
March 2008 (No longer available online. Excerpts archived at: Water Conserve: Water Conservation Portal and 
Search Engine, 
http://www.waterconserve.org/shared/reader/ welcome.aspx?linkid=93416&keybold=water%20AND%20 
%20theft, accessed 8 August 2009). 
29 Connell, Water Management in the Murray-Darling Basin, p.3. 
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disparate administrative processes, and the needs and expectations of those who live with 
the rivers, over important issues. Perhaps one reason for the gap, noted by social 
geographer Sharon Pepperdine in relation to community values in Woady Yaloak 
catchment in Victoria, is that riverine and floodplain management structures focus largely 
on biophysical issues and do not account for complex social and industrial relationships 
and issues.30 In the face of climate change and effects of past and current settler land use 
practices, these issues have become pressing. 
* * * 
Local Knowledge and Environmental C hange 
W orldwide networks of researchers and investigators of global phenomena are attempting 
to fathom the interconnectedness of atmospheric, geological, vegetative, animal, and 
hydrological processes and the repercussions of temperature changes across the earth. In 
Australia, there is the additional factor of future effects of past and current settler land 
use practices. Australians are living in a time of increasing environmental uncertainty. 
The potential effects of these changes (and those that are already being experienced) on 
human and non-human species, and their habitats, seem to suggest an even stronger need 
for effective avenues to be established through which people, living in places like 
Cunnamulla and the Macquarie Marshes, can communicate and work with governments 
to adapt and become more involved in planning for those changes. Recent government 
initiatives, such as 'WISE: W ater Information Systems for the Environment' establ ished 
by New South W ales National Parks and Wildlife Service, have attempted to bring 
together government, scientists, and custodians of local knowledge with the aim of 
'pooling' these d ifferent types of knowledge to improve river management. Such 
organisations may go some way forwards to better river and flood management by 
providing an avenue through which local knowledge can be valued within more standard 
sources of knowledge (science) and incorporated into decision-making processes.31 
However, Tannock's knowledge was accumulated over a lifetime, during which he 
experienced and observed substantial, but slow, changes in the river and landscape. 
30 Sharon Pepperdine, 'Integrating Social Considerations in Catchment Management', p.202. 
31 Leah Gibbs, 'Just Add Water: Colonisation, Water G overnance and the Australian Inland', Environment 
and Planning A, forthcoming. 
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Climate change could cause relatively rapid and dramatic instability, potentially thwarting 
such an accumulation of knowledge in a human lifetime on an experiential scale. Rapidly 
changing habitats could prevent or limit both the accumulation of useful knowledge and 
the relative stability needed to formulate a benchmark through which change and 
particular biophysical conditions can be comprehended. The biophysical conditions of 
each flood could alter so quickly and drastically that experiential knowledge of one does 
not translate to the next, nor the ones before. Each flood, while already unique, could 
become more so as ecosystems respond to global changes. 
Yet there is also the potential for local knowledge, particularly where it is 
knowledge of uncertain and unpredictable events, to play a pivotal role in flood planning 
and human adaptation to climate change induced alterations in riverine habitats where 
variability is increasing. Close knowledge of rivers can give important perspectives on how 
flows alter, and may alter in the future, as well as how communities might accommodate 
those changes. Despite possible future limitations to accumulating experiential knowledge 
of the rivers and understandings of changes in flow, and the current atmosphere of 
distrust between government and irrigators, uncertainties about the effects of climate 
change mean that holders (or custodians) of local knowledge could work in synergy with 
government. As uncertainties are great, it is critical now, more than ever, that different 
forms of knowledge be given voice in decision-making and adaptive processes. It is a 
question of the best ways in which local knowledge, such as Tannock's, can be included 
within government planning frameworks so that it is valued and given credence in the 
face of uncertainty. This has perhaps become a more pressing issue recently, as floods in 
coastal Queensland, New South Wales, and the inland signal the beginning of a series of 
La N ifia years. 
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When I went to Mildura in 2006 for research, it was the 50'" anniversary of the 1956 
floods. The town was alive with commemorative exhibitions, seminars, and activities. I 
had missed, but was told about, the rally of hundreds of Ferguson tractors (or 'Fergies') in 
Wentworth earlier that year. These tractors had been assigned to soldier settlers 
throughout the Sunraysia farming district and in 1956 their sturdiness and useful design 
attributes - including a detachable front end loader - made them a feature of volunteer 
efforts to construct levee banks.' In 1959 a monument of a Fergie was erected in 
Wentworth as part of the town's centenary celebrations. At the unveiling, the Town 
Clerk proclaimed, 'by God and by Fergie we beat the flood'. 2 Fergie tractors quickly 
became symbols of settler efforts to combat the 1956 floods. The memorialisation of the 
1956 floods through these tractors, today remind us of the importance of the heroes and 
heroics that emerge during floods (and other environmental 'battles') and in the stories 
that are told about them. Stories of 'combat' and 'control', rather than of flow and 
adaptation, dominate Australia's publicly-told flood and river histories. The tractors, 
however, also reflect the specific context in which the 1956 floods occurred; namely, post-
war irrigation expansion and dam building along the Murray and its tributaries. Like the 
settlers along the Murray and Darling rivers in 1956, our relationships with floods today 
are mediated and transformed by technologies and diverse ways of knowing and 
interacting with rivers. 
1 Carmel Chapman, By God and By Fergie ... We Beat the Flood, second edition (Wentworth: Wentworth Shire 
Council, 2006), p. l ; and, Krista Eleftheriou, 'Flood, Sweat and Tears', Landline: ABC Broadcasting, 16 July 
2006, http:Uwww.abc.net.au/ landline/content/2006/s 1685568.htm, accessed 1 May 2007. 
z Quoted in, Chapman, By God and By Fergie ... We Beat the Flood, p. l. 
Figure 9.2 (right) 
Riverside flood marker at Lock 11, 
Mildura. 
The 1956 flood mark is second from 
the top. The top mark is the height 
reached by the 1870 flood. 
[Ted Lawton, 9 January 2001, used with 
permission.) 
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Figure 9.1 (left) 
This book, by Carmel 
Chapman, takes its title from 
the statement by the 
Wentworth Town Clerk and is 
a history of the 1956 floods as 
experienced by residents of 
Wentworth. First published in 
2001, a new edition of the 
book was released for the 50'h 
anniversary of the 1956 floods 
in 2006. On its cover is a Fergie 
tractor. These tractors were 
standard issue to soldier settlers 
and were used to build levees 
during the 1956 floods. 
[Carmel Chapman, By God and 
By Fergie ... We Beat the Flood, 
second edition (Wentworth: 
Wentworth Shire Council, 
2006).] 
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In 2006 exhibitions in Mildura and elsewhere included photographs by Ted 
Lawton, Frank Zaetta, and others, videos of residents recounting their memories of events 
and historic footage of the floods, and maps. One of these maps was a poster of the 
Murray-Darling Basin produced by the Murray-Darling Basin Commission. Along with a 
current map of the Basin, the poster had information about, and photographs of, the 
floods that had flowed through the river system fifty years earlier. While on this research 
trip I also drove to Renmark, in South Australia, to see a travelling exhibition of flood 
photographs that was making its way through towns in the Sunraysia region. The 
exhibition was located on the banks of the Murray, and visitors could gaze out over the 
river in contemplation of past and possible future floods. A nearby pub, like so many 
others throughout the Murray and Darling river systems, had photographs of floods 
hanging on the walls. 
The commemorations of the 1956 floods in Mildura and Sunraysia, along with 
pub photographs and riverside markers, demonstrate the importance of floods in local, as 
well as national, histories. They also point to the way floods have shaped and been shaped 
by settler lives, technology, and livelihoods as well as government policy. Floods 
punctuate individual and collective histories and are entangled not only in environments 
but in their cultural, social, economic, and political contexts. 
This thesis has explored changing ways of knowing and understanding floods in 
the Murray and Darling river systems over one hundred and fifty years; from the early 
settlers in Gundagai, who criticised government surveyors for establishing the town on a 
floodplain and who evaluated Aboriginal knowledge and their own experiences of floods 
against the commercial value of trading on the flat; to the people in Cunnamulla, who 
relied on the local knowledge of a resident and resisted an evacuation in 1990. This 
history comes right up to the present, into an engagement with issues of contemporary 
importance, such as climate change and environmental degradation from past and 
continuing settler land use practices. 
Through the case studies and linking chapters this thesis has analysed the tensions 
and cooperations between residents of flood country and centralised governments. This 
issue has been unmistakable as one of the major distinguishing features of each of the 
floods discussed. In particular, I have highlighted the ways in which these tensions have 
been shaped by the dominance of centralised governments in both short-term decision-
making processes during flood events, and in the long-term planning of settlements, flood 
mitigation, and environmental management. In the context of relief arrangements, for 
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example, we have seen an increasing centralisation to state (and Federal) governments. 
Centralised responses to 'natural disasters' were especially evident during the 1956 and 
1990 floods and were discussed in the last four chapters. We can, however, see the 
beginnings of direct government involvement in flood mitigation in the discussions for a 
permanent levee to protect Bourke in 1890 (chapter three). This flood highlights an 
important point of transition to greater government responsibility in managing natural 
disasters. Government finances were necessary for long-term flood planning, particularly 
for built works, but also for emergency aid. This kind of government involvement, 
however, also created the opportunity for centralised governments to have greater power 
over local responses to flood events. 
Centralised water management and responses to floods have provided important 
and necessary bureaucratic frameworks. Two of the most obvious, and important, aspects 
of these are coordination (of disparate claims on river flow and floodwater) and the 
mobilisation of resources (for example, during flood events). The way these frameworks 
have functioned during particular floods, and their ability to address local issues and 
circumstances, however, have been the source of many tensions. 
Many of these tensions have centred on different ways of knowing and 
understanding rivers and floods. I have discussed some of these ways within the context 
of broad categories like local knowledge, scientific knowledge, and government and 
managerial knowledge. These knowledges have been valued very differently within 
centralised bureaucracies and in local areas; we have seen, for example, that local 
knowledges and considerations of communities-in-place have often been sidelined. 
Alongside points of tension, there have also been points of cooperation between 
custodians of different kinds of understandings, both within regional areas and between 
residents of flood country and centralised governments. Competing understanding of 
floods connect with different values and livelihoods; for example, floods are important to 
graziers as rejuvenating to pastures, but they are viewed as destructive by cotton irrigators 
and township residents. 
Different values and understandings of floods have been influenced by broad 
changes in approaches to environments. In the late nineteenth century, supporters of 
river engineering challenged the dominance of meteorology and flood forecasts as an 
acceptable way of preparing for floods. Settlers and governments increasingly looked to 
engineering as a way to mitigate the effects of floods and droughts (chapter three). 
Following Federation, state and federal bureaucratic frameworks fostered river 
361 
engineering, and ultimately led to the construction of large dams throughout the Murray 
and Darling river systems, particularly in the inter- and post-war periods (chapter four). 
The construction of dams in these periods constituted a major turning point in 
the way that water was managed and natural disasters were mitigated. Together dams and 
irrigation radically altered flood flows and represented an understanding of environments 
and rivers as controllable resources for the production of agricultural commodities. 
Projects built in these periods, such as the Snowy Mountains Scheme and the Hume, 
Burrendong, and Keepit dams, were made possible through highly centralised state 
government water management and federal bureaucracies, especially the River Murray 
Commission (RMC) (chapters five and six). 
During and after the 1956 floods, engineering was perceived by settlers to have 
failed to adequately mitigate and manage these events. By the 1960s river engineering, 
especially the building of dams, was seen by various groups to have failed in other ways. 
The privileged position of irrigation and national development through dams was 
challenged by economists, non-irrigators, and environmentalists. The ecological sciences, 
a relatively new disciplinary area, became aligned with environmental opposition to 
projects of land and river development (chapter six). The study of ecologies has become a 
way to assess the environmental impacts of dams and irrigation, and a tool in the 
conservation of biological diversity. The RMC was replaced by the Murray-Darling Basin 
Initiative in 1992. The Initiative established a tripartite administrative structure, one 
branch of which was the Murray-Darling Basin Commission (MDBC). With its 
establishment, the Initiative defined the Murray-Darling Basin as a managerial unit, in 
part to engage with the environmental degradation of floodplains throughout the region. 
Dams, the expansion of irrigation, and the resultant changes to flood flows have been 
major causes of this environmental degradation, including soil salinity and the decline of 
wetlands like the Macquarie Marshes. 
In 2007 the Federal government announced a $10 billion fund to aid in the 
management of ecosystems and competing demands on water in the Murray-Darling 
Basin. This money has invigorated federal involvement in the region and has been 
accompanied by bureaucratic changes. In December 2008 the MDBC was superseded by 
the Murray-Darling Basin Authority, in accordance with the Water Act 2008. This most 
recent restructure is part of a history of government attempts to address changing 
national concerns and aims in river management. A major aim of the new management 
and funding is a government 'buy-back' scheme for purchasing farms and their associated 
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water licences. It is planned that the water entitlements of these licences will contribute to 
environmental flow allocations, for example to wetlands; that is, when there is water in 
the rivers to meet these entitlements. Whether this new management and injection of 
money will be able to address the many issues and conflicts within the Basin remains to 
be seen. 
Remnants of all of these past practices and management approaches are still 
present in the landscape. Grazing, dams and irrigation, as well as social and legal 
arrangements like water allocations, have shaped current environments, rivers, and 
floods. These and other current management plans and practices enter into environments 
shaped by past settler relationships with rivers and floods. The histories of industries, 
technologies, and relationships with environments need to be considered in current 
approaches to managing and living in the region. The Fergie tractor rally and other 
commemorations of the 1956 floods remind us that the flood country of today has been 
shaped by those past relationships with rivers; and by the fraught, duplicitous role of 
flood as natural disasters and as part of wider environments and water management. 
Physical traces and cultural legacies of past understandings and practices are another 
reason why histories are so important in addressing contemporary issues. Floods in the 
Murray and Darling river systems continue to shape lives and livelihoods, ideas of the 
nation and national politics. It is out of this complex history that we will ultimately need 
to create liveable water futures. 
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Permission to Reproduce Maps 
Permission for the reproduction of maps was sought from the relevant copyright holders 
where necessary. Permission was obtained from the State Records Authority of New 
South Wales and is included below: 
From STATE RECORDS NSW 
Our reference:09/0351 
To: Ms Emily O'Gorman 
emilyo@coombs.anu.edu.au 
Dear Ms O'Gorman 
PERMISSION TO USE STATE ARCHIVES 
I am replying to your request for permission to use material held as State archives 
by State Records. 
State Records, on behalf of the State of New South Wales grants Emily O'Gorman a 
non-exclusive licence to use the following materials sourced from the State archives 
on the following terms: 
MATERIALS: Maps of Gundagai from State Records NSW: Surveyor Generals Maps and 
Plans; NRS 13859,items; Map 2811 Map 2813 Map 2824 Map 2827 Map 2830 Map 
2831. Kindly note that the AO prefix denotes Archives Office, State Records former 
name which is no longer used. They can be cited as SRNSW:NRS 13859,[Map 2831] 
PERMITTED USE: 
To be used in your PhD thesis is titled: 'Flood Country: Floods in the Murray and 
Darling River Systems, 1850 to the Present' for submission to The Australian National 
University. 
STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS: 
This permission is given on the condition that you comply at all times with the attached 
Standard Terms and Conditions of Use of State archives. 
CORRECT NOTICE 
You must acknowledge State Records NSW as the source of the Materials. 
SCOPE OF PERMISSION GENERALLY: 
The State of New South Wales is the copyright holder for the all records comprised 
in the Materials. 
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For a brief summary of copyright please refer to Archives in Brief 74: Research and 
copyright at http:/www.records.nsw.gov.au/archives/ archives_in_brief_74_856.asp 
By using the Materials, you and any other persons covered by this Permission are deemed 
to accept the terms of this Permission and the attached Standard Terms and 
Conditions. 
You must apply in writing to State Records if you wish to make any use of the 
Materials not allowed under this permission. 
Yours sincerely 
Gail Davis 
Senior Archivist 
Research and Publications 
State Records 
State Records Authority of New South Wales Department of Commerce 
Tel: 61296731788 Fax: 61298334518 
Street address: 143 O'Connell Street Kingswood 
Postal: PO Box 516 KINGSWOOD NSW 2747 AUSTRALIA World Wide Web: 
http://www.records.nsw.gov.au 
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